Becnel v. St. Charles Parish Sheriff's Office et al, No. 2:2015cv01011 - Document 14 (E.D. La. 2015)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS granting 4 defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and dismisses Nicole Becnel's complaint without prejudice. The Court GRANTS Becnel leave to amend her complaint within twenty-one (21) days of the entry of this order. Failure to timely amend will result in dismissal of Becnels claims with prejudice.. Signed by Chief Judge Sarah S. Vance on 9/24/15. (jjs)
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Becnel v. St. Charles Parish Sheriff&#039;s Office et al Doc. 14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA NICOLE BECNEL CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO: 15-10 11 ST. CHARLES PARISH SHERIFF’S OFFICE and SHERIFF GREG CHAMPAGNE SECTION: R(2) ORD ER AN D REASON S Defendants St. Charles Parish Sheriff’s Office and Sheriff Greg Cham pagne m ove to dism iss plaintiff’s com plaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).1 For the following reasons, the Court grants the m otion and grants plaintiff leave to am end her com plaint. I. BACKGROU N D On April 1, 20 15, plaintiff Nicole Becnel filed suit, alleging a num ber of constitutional and state-law violations against defendants St. Charles Parish Sheriff’s Office and Sheriff Greg Cham pagne, in his official capacity.2 The facts surrounding the incident, as alleged in Becnel’s com plaint, are as follows.3 1 R. Doc. 4. 2 See R. Doc. 1. 3 Becnel attem pts to present a num ber of new factual allegations in her opposition to defendants’ m otion to dism iss. “[I]t is axiom atic that a Dockets.Justia.com On May 6, 20 14, Becnel was booked as an inm ate at the Nelson Colem an Correctional Center in St. Charles Parish.4 Upon Becnel’s arrival at the Correctional Center, she underwent a m edical exam ination. The m edical exam iners noted that Becnel had a long history of bi-polar disorder and depression, for which she had been taking m edication. The prison physician then prescribed Klonopin and Effexor as treatm ent for Becnel’s conditions.5 Over the next three days, Becnel was not given the prescribed m edications. Without medication, Becnel becam e increasingly depressed. On May 9, 20 14, Becnel attem pted suicide by jum ping off a second-floor balcony.6 After the suicide attem pt, Becnel underwent toxicology screening at LSU Interim Hospital that revealed that the m edications Becnel had been com plaint cannot be am ended by briefs in opposition to a m otion to dism iss.” In re Enron Corp Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 761 F. Supp. 2d 50 4, 566 (S.D. Tex. 20 11) (citing cases). Therefore, the Court will not consider the new allegations Becnel raises in her briefing. 4 R. Doc. 1 at 3 ¶ 4. 5 See id. at ¶ 5. 6 Id. at ¶ 8. 2 prescribed were not in her system .7 As a result of her suicide attem pt, Becnel injured her spine, spleen, wrists, and head.8 Becnel alleges that by failing to provide her the proper m edication, the Sheriff’s Office and Sheriff Greg Cham pagne violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Section 50 4 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794; and Louisiana tort law. Specifically, Becnel alleges that Sheriff Cham pagne failed to “insur[e] that defendants provided [m edical] care in accordance with acceptable standards” and failed to “properly supervis[e] the m edical staff and m onitor[] the quality of their work.”9 Becnel also alleges that both the Sheriff’s Office and Sheriff Cham pagne “knew, or should have known, that [Becnel] was not being m edicated as required,” and that “[d]espite their knowledge of these serious deficiencies in policies, practices and procedures, and all of the training and supervision of staff, Defendants acted with deliberate indifference by failing to take appropriate action to address and am eliorate these deficiencies.”10 Defendants m ove to dism iss Becnel’s com plaint for failure to state a claim . In response, Becnel adm its that her Rehabilitation Act and Louisiana 7 Id. at 4 ¶ 10 . 8 Id. at 3-4 ¶ 9. 9 Id. at 5 ¶¶ 15-16. 10 Id. at 5-6 ¶¶ 17, 22 3 tort law claim s should be dism issed. Accordingly, the Court dism isses these claim s without further discussion. On her rem aining section 1983 civil rights claim , Becnel opposes the m otion. II. LEGAL STAN D ARD To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) m otion to dism iss, the plaintiff m ust plead enough facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (20 0 9) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (20 0 7)). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the m isconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. A court m ust accept all well-pleaded facts as true and m ust draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Lorm and v. U.S. Unw ired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 239 (5th Cir. 20 0 9); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190 , 196 (5th Cir. 1996). A legally sufficient com plaint m ust establish m ore than a “sheer possibility” that the plaintiff's claim is true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. It need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it m ust go beyond labels, legal conclusions, or form ulaic recitations of the elem ents of a cause of action. Id. In other words, the face of the com plaint m ust contain enough factual m atter to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of each 4 elem ent of the plaintiff's claim . Lorm and, 565 F.3d at 257. If there are insufficient factual allegations to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, or if it is apparent from the face of the com plaint that there is an insuperable bar to relief, the claim m ust be dism issed. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. at 555. III. D ISCU SSION Having adm itted that her Rehabilitation Act and Louisiana tort law claim s should be dism issed, Becnel’s only remaining claim against the Sheriff’s Office and Sheriff Greg Cham pagne, in his official capacity,11 arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A suit against a governm ent officer “in his official capacity” is the sam e as a suit against the governm ent entity of which he is an agent. See Burge v. Parish of St. Tam m any , 187 F.3d 452, 468 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing McMillian v. Monroe Cty ., Ala., 520 U.S. 781, 784-85 (1997). Therefore, the case law applicable to whether the Sheriff’s Office, as a governm ent entity, is liable also applies to Sheriff Cham pagne. See id. To plausibly state a section 1983 claim against a governm ent entity, the plaintiff m ust allege that the governm ent entity directly “caused a 11 See R. Doc. 1 at 2. 5 constitutional tort through a policy statem ent, ordinance, regulation or decision officially adopted and prom ulgated by the body’s officers.” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121 (1988) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of City of N .Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)). Thus, section 1983 m unicipal liability requires proof of three elem ents: (1) a policym aker, (2) an official policy or custom , and (3) a violation of constitutional rights whose “m oving force” is the policy or custom . See Davis v. Tarrant Cty ., Tex., 565 F.3d 214, 227 (5th Cir. 20 0 9); Piotrow ski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 20 0 1) (citation om itted). Proof of these three elem ents is necessary “to distinguish individual violations perpetrated by local government em ployees from those that can be fairly identified as actions of the governm ent itself.” See Piotrow ski, 237 F.3d at 578. A m unicipality cannot be held liable under section 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior m erely because it em ploys a tortfeasor. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Esteves v. Brock, 10 6 F.3d 674, 677 (5th Cir. 1997). A. Po licym ake r To sustain liability under section 1983, “the policym aker m ust have final policym aking authority.” See Davis, 565 F.3d at 227 (citations om itted). 6 Whether a governm ent officer has “final policym aking authority” is a question of state law. Id. (citing Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 70 1, 737 (1989)). Under Louisiana law, a sheriff is “virtually an autonom ous local governm ent official.” See Burge, 187 F.3d at 469 (citing La. Const. art. 5 § 27). The sheriff is the “chief law enforcem ent officer in the parish,” La. Const. art. 5 § 27, and also “the keeper of the public jail of his parish.” La. Rev. Stat. § 15:70 4. As keeper of the jail, the Sheriff is charged with its adm inistration, see O'Quinn v. Manuel, 773 F.2d 60 5, 60 9 (5th Cir. 1985), and has the power to “by all lawful m eans preserve the peace and apprehend all disturbers thereof.” § 15:70 4. Courts recognize that sheriffs are the final policym akers of the m anagem ent of parish jails. See, e.g., O'Quinn, 773 F.2d at 60 9 (explaining that “the adm inistration of the jails is the province of the sheriff”); Jones v. St. Tam m any Parish Jail, 4 F. Supp. 2d 60 6, 613 (E.D. La. 1998) (“Under Louisiana law, it is the Sheriff's office that has the obligation to provide m edical care for the prisoners.”). Accordingly, the Sheriff’s Office and Sheriff Champagne may be properly considered the relevant policymakers with regard to Becnel’s claim s of inadequate m edical care while incarcerated at the St. Charles Parish Correctional Center. B. Official Po licy 7 A m unicipality m ay be held liable under section 1983 only if the constitutional violation was inflicted through an official policy or custom . See Piotrow ski, 237 F.3d at 579. As the Fifth Circuit explains, the official policy requirem ent can be m et in at least three ways. See Burge, 187 F.3d at 471. First, there m ay be an “official policy or custom that deprives individuals of their constitutional rights” or “a persistent, widespread practice which, although not officially prom ulgated, is so com m on and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents m unicipal policy.” Esteves, 10 6 F.3d at 677 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694); Bennett v. City of Slidell, 735 F.2d 861, 862 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 10 16 (1985)). Second, the conduct of the policym aker itself m ay have violated a person’s constitutional right. See Burge, 187 F.3d at 471. Third, a policym aker's failure to take som e affirm ative action m ay evidence a “deliberate indifference” to constitutional rights. See id. (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). Here, Becnel’s allegation that defendants “acted with deliberate indifference by failing to take appropriate action” m ust fall under the third category of proof of an official policy or custom . See id. (holding that allegations of failure to establish policies and procedures constitute a claim of deliberate indifference); see also Butler v. Fletcher, 465 F.3d 340 , 345 (8th Cir. 20 0 6) (“[D]eliberate indifference is the appropriate standard of culpability 8 for all claim s that prison officials failed to provide pretrial detainees with adequate food, clothing, shelter, m edical care, and reasonable safety.” (em phasis added)). As the Fifth Circuit holds, deliberate indifference is a “stringent test.” Piotrow ski, 237 F.3d at 579 (quoting Bry an Cty ., 520 U.S. at 40 7). “[A] showing of sim ple or even heightened negligence will not suffice[.]” Id. To support an allegation of deliberate indifference, a civil rights plaintiff m ust allege that the governm ent officer “knows of and disregards and excessive risk to inm ate health or safety; the offic[er] m ust both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he m ust also draw the inference.” See Farm er v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); see also Stew art v. Murphy , 174 F.3d 530 , 533-34. The Court finds that Becnel has failed to sufficiently allege that defendants acted with the deliberate indifference necessary to satisfy the official policy or custom requirem ent of a section 1983 claim . The entirety of the allegations against defendants are as follows: defendants “should have known that policies and procedures were not in place . . . to prevent m isadm inistration of m edication”; Sheriff Cham pagne “is responsible for the hiring, training, supervision, and control of all of the em ployees under his com m and, including m edical personnel”; “the Sheriff could have prevented injury to [Becnel] by insuring that defendants provided care in accordance 9 with acceptance standards” and “by properly supervising the m edical staff and m onitoring the quality of their work”; defendants “knew, or should have known, that [Becnel] was not being m edicated as required”; and “[d]espite [] knowledge of these serious deficiencies in policies, practices and procedures, and all of the training and supervision of staff, Defendants acted with deliberate indifference by failing to take appropriate action to address and am eliorate these deficiencies.”12 Becnel’s com plaint is light on factual allegations and heavy on conclusory statem ents. Beyond the bare assertions that defendants knew or should have known that the Correctional Center had no policy regarding “m isadm inistration of m edication” and that Becnel did not receive her prescribed m edication, Becnel fails to plausibly allege any facts supporting her conclusion that defendants specifically knew of and disregarded a risk to her safety. See Brennan, 511 U.S. at 8 37; Stew art, 174 F.3d at 533-34. Becnel alleges that a “prison physician” prescribed her psychiatric m edication and that unnam ed m em bers of the Correctional Center’s “m edical staff” failed to adm inister to Becnel her prescribed m edication.13 Neither of these allegations 12 See id. at 4-6. 13 Id. at 3, 5. 10 im plicate defendants. Notably, Becnel reiterates that Sheriff Cham pagne is “responsible for” and “supervis[es]” the Correctional Center em ployees and that the Sheriff’s Office em ploys Sheriff Cham pagne and the Correctional Center staff.14 But as the Court has discussed, a m unicipality or m unicipal officer cannot be held liable under section 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Esteves, 10 6 F.3d at 677. Without factual allegations that “go beyond . . . legal conclusions or form ulaic recitations of the elem ents of a cause action,” Becnel has failed to plausibly state a claim upon which relief can be granted. C. Vio latio n o f Co n s titu tio n al Righ ts W h o s e “Mo vin g Fo rce ” is th e Official Po licy o r Cu s to m Because Becnel fails to plausibly allege the existence of an official policy or custom , the Court need not address the causal connection between the m unicipal policy and the alleged violation of Becnel’s constitutional rights. See Davis, 565 F.3d at 227 (requiring proof of all three elem ents to state a section 1983 civil rights claim ); Piotrow ski, 237 F.3d at 578 (sam e). Without 14 See id. at 2, 6. 11 factually sufficient allegations of each elem ent of her cause of action, Becnel’s com plaint m ust be dism issed. IV. LEAVE TO AMEN D In her opposition to defendants’ m otion to dism iss, Becnel requests leave to am end her com plaint.15 The Court should “freely give” leave to am end “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); Leal v. McHugh, 731 F.3d 40 5, 417 (5th Cir. 20 13). As the Suprem e Court holds, “[i]f the underlying facts or circum stances relied upon by a plaintiff m ay be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the m erits.” Fom an v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Therefore, the Court grants Becnel leave to am end her com plaint within twenty-one (21) days of the entry of this order. V. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants’ m otion to dism iss under Rule 12(b)(6) and dism isses Nicole Becnel’s com plaint without prejudice. The Court GRANTS Becnel leave to am end her com plaint within 15 R. Doc. 6 at 9. 12 twenty-one (21) days of the entry of this order. Failure to tim ely am end will result in dism issal of Becnel’s claim s with prejudice. New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ _ _ _ _ _ _ day of Septem ber, 20 15. 24th ___________________________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 13
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