Robertson, et al. v. Chevron USA, Inc., et al, No. 2:2015cv00874 - Document 53 (E.D. La. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS re 30 MOTION to Remand - IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion to Remand is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs have until August 22, 2016, to file a supplemental memorandum identifying individual plaintiffs whose cl aims must be remanded because they do not exceed the $75,000 individual amount-in-controversy requirement. Defendants have until September 5, 2016, to file a response to Plaintiffs supplemental memorandum. The parties may conduct jurisdictional discovery through August 10, 2016, related to this issue. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs request for costs and attorney fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) is DENIED. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan on 7/8/2016.(bwn)
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Robertson, et al. v. Chevron USA, Inc., et al Doc. 53 U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT COU RT EASTERN D ISTRICT OF LOU ISIAN A J OSEPH ROBERTSON , ET AL., Plain tiffs CIVIL ACTION VERSU S N O. 15-8 74 CH EVRON U SA, IN C., ET AL., D e fe n d an t SECTION : “E” ( 3 ) ORD ER AN D REAS ON S This case involves personal injury an d property dam age claim s arising from alleged exposure to contam ination from oil field pipe. The case was originally filed in state court and subsequently rem oved to federal court under the m ass action provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”). 1 Plaintiffs, J oseph Robertson, et al., m ove to rem and for lack of subject-m atter jurisdiction. 2 Defendants Exxon Mobil Corporation (“Exxon”) and Mobil Exploration and Producing U.S., Inc. (“MEPUS”) oppose Plaintiffs’ m otion, 3 as do Defendants J oseph F. Grefer and Cam ille Grefer (“the Grefers”). 4 The Court initially granted the m otion to rem and, but after reviewing the Court’s decision on appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and rem anded the case for consideration of Plaintiffs’ rem aining jurisdictional argum ents. 5 For the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Rem and is D EN IED , and Plaintiffs’ request for costs and attorney’s fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) is D EN IED . 1 R. Doc. 1. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, 1446, 1453. R. Doc. 30 . 3 R. Doc. 35. 4 R. Doc. 36. 5 See R. Doc. 52. 2 1 Dockets.Justia.com BACKGROU N D J oseph Robertson and 157 other plaintiffs filed suit in Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans on February 5, 20 15; 33 additional plaintiffs were n am ed in a supplem ental petition. 6 In their m otion to rem and, Plaintiffs argue that (1) Defendants failed to show that the Court has jurisdiction over this m atter under CAFA, (2) the local single event exclusion applies, and (3) Plaintiffs’ action falls under CAFA’s m andatory abstention provisions, nam ely the local controversy exception and the hom e state exception. 7 Plaintiffs also argue they are entitled to all costs and attorney’s fees incurred as a result of the rem oval pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 8 On April 20 , 20 15, this Court ordered Defendants to conduct any discovery related to jurisdiction by May 22, 20 15. 9 On J une 1, 20 15, Defendants Exxon and MEPUS filed an opposition to the m otion to rem and, 10 as did the Grefers. 11 Plaintiffs filed a reply in support of their m otion to rem and on J une 12, 20 15. 12 This Court issued an order on Septem ber 2, 20 15, granting Plaintiff’s m otion to rem and the case to state court, as the Court found Defendants failed to establish the individual am ount in controversy as required under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) and (d)(11)(B)(i). On J anuary 22, 20 16, the Fifth Circuit reversed this Court’s finding that no plaintiff has satisfied the individual am ount-in-controversy requirem ent, and the Fifth Circuit 6 See R. Doc. 1-1. R. Doc. 30 . 8 Id. 9 R. Doc. 34. 10 R. Doc. 35. 11 R. Doc. 36. 12 R. Doc. 40 . 7 2 rem anded the case to this Court to address Plaintiffs’ rem aining jurisdictional argum ents. 13 STAN D ARD OF LAW Generally, a defendant m ay rem ove a civil action from state court to federal court if the federal court would have had original jurisdiction over the action. 14 “The rem oving party bears the burden of showing that federal jurisdiction exists and that rem oval was proper.”15 To determ in e whether the Court has jurisdiction, the Court considers the claim s in the state court petition as they existed at the tim e of rem oval. 16 Rem and is proper if at any time before final judgm ent it appears the Court lacks subjectm atter jurisdiction. 17 CAFA vests federal district courts with origin al jurisdiction over “m ass actions.”18 A “m ass action” under CAFA is a civil action “in which m onetary relief claim s of 10 0 or m ore persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claim s involve com m on questions of law or fact.”19 A m ass action is deem ed a class action rem ovable under CAFA. 20 This Court has jurisdiction over m ass actions where (1) there are m ore than 10 0 plaintiffs; (2) m inim al diversity exists between the parties; (3) the am ount in controversy exceeds $ 5 m illion; 21 and (4) the prim ary defendants are not 13 See R. Doc. 52. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 15 See Manguno v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720 , 723 (5th Cir. 20 0 2). 16 Id. 17 See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“A m otion to rem and the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject m atter jurisdiction m ust be m ade within 30 days after the filing of the notice of rem oval . . . . If at any tim e before final judgm ent it appears that the district court lacks subject m atter jurisdiction, the case shall be rem anded.”). 18 See 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(11). See also Rainbow Gun Club, Inc. v . Denbury Onshore, L.L.C., 760 F.3d 40 5, 40 8 (5th Cir. 20 14). 19 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(11)(B)(i). 20 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(11)(A). 21 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (6). See also Hood ex rel. Miss. v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 737 F.3d 78 , 85 (5th Cir. 20 13). 14 3 states, state officials, or other governm ental entities. 22 In addition, CAFA provides that a court has jurisdiction “only over those plaintiffs whose claim s in a m ass action satisfy the jurisdictional am ount requirem ents under subsection (a)”23 for diversity jurisdiction, which requires the m atter in controversy to exceed $ 75,0 0 0 , exclusive of interest and costs. 24 The rem oving party bears the burden of proving that the provisions of CAFA are satisfied, 25 while “the party objecting to CAFA jurisdiction m ust prove that the CAFA exceptions to federal jurisdiction divest[] the district court of subject m atter jurisdiction.”26 AN ALYSIS I. Does This Case Satisfy CAFA’s J urisdictional Requirem ents? A. Minim al Diversity To rem ove a m ass action under CAFA, the case m ust have m inim al diversity, which is satisfied when at least one plaintiff and one defen dant are citizen s of different states. 27 Citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction m ust exist at the tim e the action com m ences. 28 “In cases rem oved from state court, diversity of citizen ship m ust exist both at the tim e of filing in state court and at the tim e of rem oval to federal court.”29 Plaintiffs argue Defendants fail to establish m in im al diversity. 30 22 See Hollinger v. Hom e State Mut. Ins. Co., 654 F.3d 564, 569 (5th Cir. 20 11); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (5), (11)(A). 23 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i). 24 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 25 See Rainbow Gun Club, 760 F.3d at 40 9 n .3; Preston v. Tenet H ealthsy stem Mem orial Medical Center, Inc. (“Preston II”), 485 F.3d 80 4, 810 (5th Cir. 20 0 7) (“CAFA contains a basic jurisdictional test for rem oval, which requires the rem ovin g defendant to prove m inim al diversity and an aggregated am ount in controversy of $ 5,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 or m ore.”). 26 Hollinger, 654 F.3d at 571. See also Rainbow Gun Club, 760 F.3d at 40 9 n.3. 27 See Hollinger, 654 F.3d at 569. 28 See Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 571 (20 0 4) (“It has long been the case that the jurisdiction of the court depends upon the state of things at the tim e of the action brought.”) (internal quotations om itted); Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 248 (5th Cir. 1996). 29 Coury , 85 F.3d at 249. 30 R. Doc. 30 -1 at 8– 9. 4 In the notice of rem oval, the Grefers list each defendant’s state of incorporation and prin cipal place of business both at tim e of filing and tim e of removal. 31 It is clear that at least one defen dant is not a citizen of Louisiana. 32 The Grefers also state in the notice of rem oval that “[u]pon inform ation and belief at least one [p]laintiff is a citizen of Louisiana.”33 To support their contention, the Grefers cite Plaintiffs’ petition for dam ages, in which Plaintiffs aver that “Petitioners all live in or form erly lived in, and/ or work or form erly worked in, and/ or own or form ally [sic] owned real property in Harvey, Parish of J efferson, State of Louisiana. . . .”34 Section 1332, however, provides for jurisdiction over civil actions between “citizens of different states.”35 An allegation that a party is a “resident” of a particular state is insufficient because Section 1332 “dem ands diverse citizenship, not diverse residency.”36 The petition fails to provide the state(s) of dom icile or citizen ship of any plaintiff. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs do not dispute that they are Louisiana citizens; in deed, in their m em oran dum in support of their m otion to rem and, Plaintiffs state, “Greater than two-thirds of the Plaintiffs are citizens of Louisiana.”37 31 R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 6– 23. See id. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., for exam ple, “was [at the tim e Plaintiffs filed their original petition] and is now a Pennsylvan ia corporation with its principal place of business in the State of California.” Id. at ¶ 6. Thus, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. was a citizen of Pennsylvan ia and Californ ia, both at the tim e Plaintiffs filed their original petition and at the tim e of rem oval. 33 R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 25. 34 R. Doc. 1-1 at 2 ¶ 5.A. Exxon and MEPUS also rely on this paragraph in their opposition to the m otion to rem and to support their contention that at least som e of the plaintiffs are citizens of Louisiana. See R. Doc. 35 at 5. 35 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (em phasis added). 36 N adler v. Am . Motor Sales Corp., 764 F.2d 40 9, 413 (5th Cir. 1985). See also Preston v. Tenet Healthsy stem M em orial Medical Center, Inc. (“Preston I”), 485 F.3d 793, 797 (5th Cir. 20 0 7) (“In determ in in g diversity jurisdiction, the state where som eone establishes his dom icile serves a dual function as his state of citizenship.”); Stine v. Moore, 213 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1954) (“With respect to the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, citizenship has the sam e m eanin g as dom icile. . . . Residence alone is not the equivalent of citizenship.”). 37 R. Doc. 30 -1 at 20 . 32 5 Accordingly, the Court finds Defendants have established m inim al diversity for purposes of rem oval under CAFA, as at least one plaintiff and one defendant are citizens of different states. 38 B. Am ount in Controversy CAFA im poses two am ount-in-controversy requirem ents. First, CAFA requires that the aggregated am ount in controversy exceed $ 5 m illion. 39 Second, under CAFA, a court has jurisdiction “only over those plaintiffs whose claim s in a m ass action satisfy the jurisdictional am ount requirem ents under subsection (a),” which states that the m atter in controversy m ust exceed $ 75,0 0 0 , exclusive of interest and costs. 40 Defendants seeking rem oval of a m ass action have the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence 41 that the individual and aggregate am ount-in-controversy requirem ents are satisfied. 42 A defendant m eets this burden if (1) it is apparent from the 38 Although Plaintiffs devote a section of their m otion to rem and to m inim al diversity with a headin g that reads, “The Defendants fail to establish m in im al diversity,” Plaintiffs actually raise the local controversy exception to CAFA (discussed infra) rather than challenge whether Defendants established m inim al diversity, erroneously conflating the local-controversy exception with the m inim al-diversity requirem ent. See R. Doc. 30 -1 at 9 (“Defendants posit that plaintiffs ‘have not alleged that over 2/ 3 of plaintiffs are citizens of Louisiana.’ . . . Ultim ately, if the defendant’s [sic] are contendin g that the original petition does not allege or otherwise cannot show that plaintiffs m eet the 2/ 3 citizenship requirem ent, then the defendants would likewise not be able to establish in itial diversity jurisdiction for CAFA and the m atter would have to be rem anded.”). 39 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (6); see also JP Morgan, 737 F.3d at 85. 40 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). See Miss. ex. rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S.Ct. 736, 740 (20 14) (“[W]hereas § 1332(a) ordinarily requires each plaintiff’s claim to exceed the sum or value of $ 75,0 0 0 . . . , CAFA grants federal jurisdiction over class and m ass actions in which the aggregate am ount in controversy exceeds $ 5 m illion . . . . Class an d m ass actions filed in state court that satisfy CAFA’s requirem ents m ay be rem oved to federal court, . . . but federal jurisdiction in a m ass action, unlike a class action, ‘shall exist only over those plaintiffs’ whose claim s individually satisfy the $ 75,0 0 0 am ount in controversy requirem ent.” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i)). 41 Although a rem oving defen dant generally needs to provide only a plausible allegation that the am ount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold, See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), when the plaintiff contests the defendant’s allegations in a m otion to rem and, as in this case, the defendant m ust establish the am ount by a preponderance of the evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(B). See also Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., L.L.C. v. Ow ens, 135 S.Ct. 547, 553– 54 (20 14). 42 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i); JP Morgan, 737 F.3d at 85 (“As the party seeking rem oval [of a m ass action under CAFA], Defendants bear the burden of provin g both am ounts in controversy.”). See also Manguno, 276 F.3d at 723 (“The rem oving party bears the burden of showing that federal jurisdiction exists and that rem oval was proper.”). As this Court explained in Shanley , et al. v. Chalm ette Refining, L.L.C., et al., No. 6 face of the petition that the claim s satisfy the am ount-in-controversy requirem ents, or (2) the defendant sets forth sum m ary judgm ent-type evidence that supports a finding of the requisite am ounts. 43 In addressing a rem oving defendant’s burden to establish the am ount in controversy, the Suprem e Court has said, “[N]o antirem oval presum ption attends cases invoking CAFA, which Congress enacted to facilitate adjudication of certain class actions in federal court.”44 1. Aggregate Am ount in Controversy The aggregate am ount-in-controversy requirem ent is m et if (1) it is apparent from the face of the petition that the claim s are likely to exceed $ 5 m illion, or (2) the defendant sets forth “sum m ary judgm ent type evidence” of facts in controversy that support a finding of the requisite am ount. 45 The dem onstration Defendants m ust m ake “concern s what the plaintiff is claim ing (and thus the am ount in controversy between the parties), not whether the plaintiff is likely to win or be awarded everything he seeks.”46 Defendants argue it is apparent from the face of the petition that the aggregate am ount in controversy exceeds $ 5 m illion. 47 In Plaintiffs’ petition for dam ages, Plaintiffs aver that the Grefers obtained com pensatory dam ages of $ 56 m illion and punitive dam ages of $ 1 billion “against the sam e Defendants nam ed in this suit, for a part of the sam e radioactive contam ination com plained of in this m atter” and argue that Plaintiffs in this case “are entitled to share in those dam ages.”48 The Grefers cite this paragraph to 12-30 45 R. Doc. 124, at *3, 4 (E.D. La. Oct. 3, 20 14), CAFA has not altered the traditional rule regarding rem oving defendants’ burden in establishing jurisdiction. 43 See Manguno, 276 F.3d at 723. 44 Dart Cherokee Basin, 135 S.Ct. at 554. 45 See Manguno, 276 F.3d at 723. 46 Berniard v. Dow Chem . Co., 481 F. App’x 859, 862 (5th Cir. 20 10 ) (quoting Spivey v. Vertrue, Inc., 528 F.3d 98 2, 986 (7th Cir. 20 0 8)). 47 R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 29. 48 R. Doc. 1-1 ¶ 47. 7 support their assertion that the am ount in controversy satisfies CAFA’s requirem ents. 49 Exxon and MEPUS also cite this paragraph in their opposition as support and explain , “Even if one ignores the punitive dam ages award from the Grefer verdict, $ 56 m illion split am ongst 191 plaintiffs averages over $ 293,0 0 0 per claim ant, satisfying both the aggregate an d individual am ount-in-controversy requirem ents under CAFA.”50 Plaintiffs allege that the nearby cleaning of pipes used in the oil industry over a period of several decades produced harm ful radioactive dust, debris, and other residue that injured their health and dam aged their property. 51 Plaintiffs seek dam ages for physical injuries; past, present, and future m edical expenses; lost wages; anxiety an d em otional distress; increased risk of contracting disease, including cancer and leukem ia; aggravation of preexisting conditions or illnesses; fear of contracting cancer; property dam age; and dim inution in property value. 52 Plaintiffs also seek punitive dam ages. 53 Plaintiffs, however, do not specify the m onetary am ount they seek, as Louisiana law prohibits plaintiffs from alleging in their petition the am ount of dam ages they seek. 54 Other courts have found sim ilar allegations sufficient to establish that the am ount in controversy exceeds $ 5 m illion. For exam ple, in DeHart v. BP Am erica, the plaintiff filed suit in state court on behalf of him self and a class of sim ilarly situated in dividuals claim ing personal injury as a result of exposure to airborne radiation, dust/ t-norm s. 55 Individually, the plaintiff sought dam ages resulting from his alleged exposure to 49 R. Doc. 36 at 3– 4 (citing Grefer v. Alpha Technical, 965 So.2d 511 (La. App. 4 Cir. 20 0 7)). R. Doc. 35 at 7. 51 R. Doc. 1-1. 52 R. Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 44– 63. 53 R. Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 49– 63. 54 LA. CODE CIV. P RO . art. 893. See also Perritt v. W estlake Vin y ls Co., L.P., 562 F. App’x 228 , 231 (5th Cir. 20 14). 55 DeHart v. BP Am ., Inc., No. 0 9-0 626, 20 10 WL 231744, at *1 (W.D. La. J an . 14, 20 10 ). 50 8 radiation, causing an alleged perm anent neurological, psychological, and pathological condition. In addition, the plaintiff and other class m em bers sought dam ages for severe “and possibly disabling” physical, m ental, and em otional injuries associated with alleged exposure to airborne radiation exposure, including dam ages for diagnostic studies an d future m edical m onitoring. 56 The court found it was facially apparent that the am ount in controversy exceeded $ 5 m illion based on the nature of the dam ages sought and the size of the purported class, which consisted of about 118 people. 57 The court concluded that “even a m inim al award to each of the 118 potential plaintiffs . . . m ore likely than not satisfies this court’s jurisdictional m inim um in the aggregate.”58 Sim ilarly, this Court finds it is facially apparent that, based on the petition in this case, the am ount in controversy m ore likely than not exceeds $ 5 m illion in light of the nature of the injuries alleged and the dam ages sought. Even if it were not facially apparent the aggregate am ount-in-controversy requirem ent is satisfied, Defendants have established with com petent sum m ary judgm ent-type evidence that the jurisdictional am ount is satisfied. Defendants attached to their opposition to the m otion to rem and Plaintiffs’ interrogatory answers, which constitute sum m ary judgm ent-type eviden ce. 59 Plaintiffs provided a list of each plaintiff’s claim ed dam ages, including can cer, wrongful death of a loved one, stroke, hair loss, breathing problem s, fear, and anxiety. 60 In LeBlanc v. Texas Brine, L.L.C., a rem oved class action before another section of this Court, the class contained at least 150 m em bers 56 Id. at *9. Id. 58 Id. 59 See F ED . R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A). 60 R. Doc. 36-1. 57 9 who alleged injuries as a result of exposure to radioactive m aterials. 61 Plaintiffs sought dam ages that “[ran] the gam ut from m edical m onitoring, business interruption, lost wages, property dam age, evacuation expen ses, property rem ediation, em otional injury, and econom ic dam ages associated with m ortgage obligations.”62 The court concluded that the am ount-in-controversy requirem ent had been m et under CAFA. The court explained that, although the class size involved was “not particularly large when com pared to other classes, these cases do not involve a quickly controlled and tem porary exposure to harm less substances.”63 The court also found persuasive that the dam ages to the class continued to accrue at the tim e the court determ ined whether the am ount in controversy exceeded $ 5 m illion: “These dam ages began to accrue at the latest in August of 20 12 an d continue to accrue at the tim e of this writing. The Court is persuaded that in light of the ongoing and continuous nature of the dam ages, as well as the extrem ely broad scope of dam ages sought by the class, the am ount in controversy . . . exceeds $ 5,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 .”64 Plaintiffs in this case allege that dam ages have accrued since the 1950 s and continue to accrue. 65 Plaintiffs’ com plaint alleges that Plaintiffs have been exposed to contam ination for decades and details the dam ages Plaintiffs seek, while Plaintiffs’ answers to interrogatories provides a list of injuries for which each plaintiff seeks dam ages. The Court finds the aggregate am ount in controversy am ong the 189 plaintiffs 61 LeBlanc v. Texas Brin e, L.L.C., No. 12-20 59, 20 13 WL 68 230 2, at *1 (E.D. La. Feb. 22, 20 13). Id. at *7. 63 Id. 64 Id. 65 R. Doc. 1-1 ¶ 8 , 28 , 38 . 62 10 m ore likely than not exceeds $ 5 m illion in light of the nature of the injuries Plaintiffs allege and of the dam ages Plaintiffs seek to recover. 66 2. Individual Am ount in Controversy On appeal, the Fifth Circuit concluded that “[w]hether or not the am ount in controversy is facially apparent from Plaintiffs’ com plaint, Defendants subm itted eviden ce that satisfies their burden of showing that at least one plaintiff’s claim exceeds $ 75,0 0 0 .”67 The Fifth Circuit has not yet addressed whether only one or at least 10 0 of the plaintiffs m ust satisfy the individual am ount-in-controversy requirem ent in order to confer CAFA jurisdiction. 68 Several district courts in this circuit, however, have determ ined that only one plaintiff m ust satisfy the $ 75,0 0 0 am ount-in-controversy requirem ent under CAFA. 69 Moreover, courts in this circuit have found the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Low ery v. Alabam a Pow er Co. 70 persuasive. 71 In Low ery , the Eleventh Circuit concluded that CAFA requires only one plaintiff’s claim s to exceed $ 75,0 0 0 . Otherwise, as the court noted in dicta, the aggregate am ount in controversy 66 See Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1336 (5th Cir. 1995) (m akin g com m on-sense inferences regarding the am ount in controversy in light of the num ber of plaintiffs and defendants and the nature of the dam ages sought). 67 R. Doc. 52 at 9. 68 See, e.g., JP Morgan, 737 F.3d at 86 n.4 (“As non e of the plaintiffs here satisfies this requirem ent, we need not resolve the issue of whether m ore than on e plaintiff m ust satisfy the individual am ount in controversy requirem ent today.”). 69 See, e.g., Greco v. Jones, 992 F.Supp.2d 693, 696 (N.D. Tex. 20 14) (“Un bridled by any precedent from this Circuit to the contrary, the Court rejects Plaintiffs’ assertion that the $ 75,0 0 0 provision forecloses jurisdiction over the entire case if the rem oving party does not prove that each Plaintiff asserts claim s greater than that am ount.”); Ham ilton v. Burlington N orthern Santa Fe Ry . Co., No. 0 8-132, 20 0 8 WL 8148619, at *6– 8 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 8 , 20 0 8) (concludin g that rem ovin g defendants need not establish that each plaintiff satisfies the $ 75,0 0 0 threshold); Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. Entergy Mississippi, Inc., 20 12 WL 370 4935, at *9– 12 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 25, 20 12) (concluding that only after rem oval should the court consider the individual am ount-in-controversy requirem ent and rem and any plaintiffs’ individual claim s that do not exceed $ 75,0 0 0 ). 70 483 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 20 0 7). 71 See, e.g., Greco, 992 F.Supp.2d at 697; Entergy Mississippi, 20 12 WL 370 4935, at *9– 11. 11 requirem ent ($ 5 m illion) would be surplusage, as 10 0 individual claim s of m ore than $ 75,0 0 0 each would total m ore than $ 7.5 m illion. 72 Thus, “[e]very civil action satisfying the num erosity requirem ent [of 10 0 plaintiffs] and the $ 75,0 0 0 provision would exceed $ 5,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 in the aggregate,”73 and the aggregate am ount-in-controversy requirem ent would be m eaningless. In the Fifth Circuit’s decision rem anding this case, it endorsed the Eleventh Circuit’s approach without deciding the issue: We have previously left open the question of whether—because federal jurisdiction exists only over those plaintiffs whose claim s in a m ass action satisfy the individual jurisdictional am ount requirem ents—the party asserting federal jurisdiction m ust show at rem oval that at least 10 0 plaintiffs seek m ore than $ 75,0 0 0 . The Eleventh Circuit has rejected the view, not yet em braced by any circuit, that CAFA im poses a threshold rem ovability requirem ent that at least 10 0 plaintiffs satisfy the individual jurisdictional am ount. That court chiefly reasoned that such a construction would negate the $ 5 m illion aggregate am ount-in-controversy requirem ent by m akin g the aggregate requirem ent variable, but always greater than $ 7.5 m illion. We have no reason to question the Eleventh Circuit’s sound reasoning here because the district court decided only that Defendants had not shown that any plaintiff’s claim exceeds $ 75,0 0 0 and Plaintiffs have not briefed any argum ent for a greater threshold requirem ent. 74 This Court finds the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning persuasive and, consistent with several other district courts in this circuit, holds that a defendant need only establish at least one plaintiff’s am ount in controversy exceeds $ 75,0 0 0 . Because Defendants have shown that at least one plaintiff’s am ount in controversy satisfies the jurisdictional am ount, Defendants have m et their burden of showing the individual am ount-in controversy requirem ent is m et. 72 See Low ery v. Alabam a Pow er Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 120 4 (11th Cir. 20 0 7) (“If there are 10 0 individual plaintiffs, as there m ust be under the num erosity requirem ent of § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i), and if their individual claim s cannot be rem oved unless the claim s of each plaintiff exceed $ 75,0 0 0 , then one need not even resort to a calculator to deduce that the aggregate value of the claim s of each of the 10 0 plaintiffs would be, at a m inim um , $ 7,50 0 ,0 0 0 . This approach negates the need for the $ 5,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 aggregate am ount in controversy requirem ent of § 1332(d)(2), which is applied to m ass actions through § 1332(d)(11)(A).”). 73 Id. 74 R. Doc. 52 at 8 n .2 (em phasis in original) (citations om itted) (internal quotation m arks om itted). 12 The Court, however, has jurisdiction only over those plaintiffs whose claim s exceed the individual $ 75,0 0 0 am ount-in-controversy requirem ent. The Sen ate Report on CAFA states, “[I]t is the Com m ittee’s intent that any claim s that are included in the m ass action that standing alone do not satisfy the jurisdictional am ount requirem ents of Section 1332(a) (currently $ 75,0 0 0 ), would be rem an ded to state court.”75 In Miss. ex. rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., the Suprem e Court explained as follows: [W]hereas § 1332(a) ordinarily requires each plaintiff’s claim to exceed the sum or value of $ 75,0 0 0 . . . , CAFA grants federal jurisdiction over class and m ass actions in which the aggregate am ount in controversy exceeds $ 5 m illion. . . . Class an d m ass actions filed in state court that satisfy CAFA’s requirem ents m ay be rem oved to federal court, . . . but federal jurisdiction in a m ass action, unlike a class action, “shall exist only over those plaintiffs” whose claim s individually satisfy the $ 75,0 0 0 am ount in controversy requirem ent. 76 In Hood ex rel. Miss. v . JP Morgan Chase & Co., the Fifth Circuit found that none of the plaintiffs satisfied the individual am ount in controversy requirem ent. 77 Nevertheless, the court reiterated that, if one plaintiff’s am ount in controversy exceeded $ 75,0 0 0 and as a result the court had jurisdiction, the court still would not have supplem ental jurisdiction over the other individual plaintiffs who did not m eet the individual am ount-incontroversy requirem ent: “Even assum ing arguendo that one of the plaintiffs did satisfy the individual am ount in controversy requirem ent, the exercise of supplem ental jurisdiction here would be an end-run around CAFA, which contain s the explicit statutory requirem ent that ‘jurisdiction shall exist only over those plaintiffs whose claim s in a m ass action satisfy’ the $ 75,0 0 0 requirem ent.”78 Thus, this Court has jurisdiction under CAFA over a m ass action in which there is m inim al diversity, m ore than 10 0 plaintiffs, an d an 75 S. Rep. No. 10 9-14, at 46– 47 (20 0 5). AU Optronics Corp., 134 S.Ct. at 740 (quotin g 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i)) (em phasis added). 77 JP Morgan, 737 F.3d at 87– 8 8. 78 JP Morgan, 737 F.3d at 88 n.9. 76 13 aggregate am ount in controversy of $ 5 m illion, but this Court has jurisdiction only over those plaintiffs in the m ass action whose am ount in controversy exceeds $ 75,0 0 0 . The Court m ust determ ine whether Plaintiffs or Defendants have the burden to establish which of the individual plaintiffs, if any, do not m eet the $ 75,0 0 0 am ount-incontroversy requirem ent. The District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi described the determ ination of CAFA jurisdiction over m ass actions as a “two-step process.”79 First, the Court determ ines whether the threshold jurisdictional requirem ents under CAFA are m et, including whether there is m inim al diversity, whether the aggregate am ount in controversy is m et, and whether there are 10 0 or m ore plaintiffs whose claim s rest on com m on issues of law and fact. 80 Second, the Court rem ands the claim s of individual plaintiffs that do not satisfy the $ 75,0 0 0 individual am ount-in-controversy requirem ent. 81 The district court in Mississippi concluded, in light of the plain language of the statute, that the $ 75,0 0 0 individual am ount-in-controversy requirem ent is an exception to CAFA jurisdiction, rather than a threshold requirem ent. 82 Under this interpretation, after the rem oving defendants establish the threshold jurisdictional requirem ents under CAFA, the plaintiffs would have the burden of showing which claim s should be rem anded because they fail to m eet the individual am ount-incontroversy requirem ent. 83 79 Entergy Mississippi, 20 12 WL 370 4935, at *9. Id. (citing Low ery , 483 F.3d at 120 2– 0 3). 81 Id. 82 See id. at *10 . 83 Hollinger, 654 F.3d at 571 (“This court has held that the party objectin g to CAFA jurisdiction m ust prove that the CAFA exceptions to federal jurisdiction divest[] the district court of subject m atter jurisdiction .”); Rainbow Gun Club, 760 F.3d at 40 9 n.3 (“Gen erally, the party seeking rem oval has the burden of proving that the provisions of CAFA are satisfied. The party seeking rem and, however, has the burden of proving the applicability of any exceptions to CAFA jurisdiction .”). 80 14 Sim ilarly, in Ham ilton v. Burlington N orthern Santa Fe Railw ay Co., the District Court for the Western District of Texas found the defendants m ade a “prim a facie case for rem oval pursuant to CAFA’s m ass action provisions because the aggregated claim s are worth m ore than $ 5,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 .”84 The court then placed the burden on the plaintiffs to identify the individual claim s that m ust be rem anded because they fall below the $ 75,0 0 0 threshold. 85 The Court agrees with this interpretation of the statutory provisions. Plaintiffs m ust identify which claim s of individual plaintiffs, if any, should be rem anded because the plaintiff fails to meet the individual am ount-in-controversy requirem ent. The Court will allow Defendants to conduct jurisdictional discovery through August 10 , 20 16, and will give the parties an opportunity to provide supplem ental briefing on this issue. II. Does an Exception or Exclusion to CAFA Apply? A. The Local Single Event Exclusion Plaintiffs argue this case is not a “m ass action” under CAFA because of the local single event exclusion. 86 This exclusion provides: “the term ‘m ass action’ shall not include any civil action in which . . . all of the claim s in the action arise from an event or occurrence in the State in which the action was filed, and that allegedly resulted in injuries in that State or in States contiguous to that State.”87 The parties dispute who has the burden to establish the applicability or inapplicability of the exclusion. 88 In Rainbow Gun Club, Inc. v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C., 84 See Ham ilton, 20 0 8 WL 8 148619, at *8 . Id. (“Plaintiffs have the burden of identifyin g individual claim s that m ust be rem anded because they fall below the $ 75,0 0 0 threshold specified in § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i). As Plaintiffs have identified no specific claim that falls below this am ount, no rem and is warranted on these grounds at the present tim e.”). 86 R. Doc. 30 -1 at 13– 16. See generally Rainbow Gun Club, 760 F.3d at 40 8 . 87 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I). 88 See R. Doc. 30 -1 at 13; R. Doc. 35 at 9; R. Doc. 36 at 9. 85 15 the Fifth Circuit suggested, without deciding, that the party seeking rem and m ust establish the applicability of the exclusion: The parties briefly dispute who has the burden of dem onstrating the applicability or inapplicability of the [local single event] exclusion. Generally, the party seeking rem oval has the burden of proving that the provisions of CAFA are satisfied. The party seeking rem and, however, has the burden of proving the applicability of an y exceptions to CAFA jurisdiction. Because it does not affect the outcom e, and because the parties have presented no argum ent on this issue other than sum m ary assertions, we decline to address this dispute. 89 Other courts in this district have determ ined that a plaintiff seekin g rem and bears the burden of establishing the applicability of the local single event exclusion. 90 In accordance with the courts that have addressed this issue, the Court finds Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing the applicability of this exclusion. The local single event exclusion applies to a single event or occurrence but one that “need not be confined to a m om ent in tim e.”91 In Rainbow Gun Club, the plaintiffs— several individuals, groups, and trusts—entered into leases with the defen dant allowing the defendant to explore for oil, gas, and m in erals. The plaintiffs argued the defendant’s pattern of negligence led to the failure of a well. The court concluded the district court lacked jurisdiction because the defendant’s pattern of negligent acts was an “event or occurrence” under the CAFA exclusion. The Fifth Circuit explained that an event or occurrence under the exclusion can include a pattern of conduct “in which the pattern is 89 Rainbow Gun Club, 760 F.3d at 40 9 n.3 (citations om itted). See, e.g., Ham ilton, 20 0 8 WL 8148619, at *8 (“Because the ‘local occurrence rule’ is an exception to CAFA’s m ass action jurisdictional provisions, Plaintiffs have the burden of proof on the issue.”) (citing Frazier v. Pioneer Am ericas, L.L.C., 455 F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 20 0 6) (“Here, longstandin g § 1441(a) doctrine placing the burden on plaintiffs to show exceptions to jurisdiction buttresses the clear congressional intent to do the sam e with CAFA. This result is supported by the reality that plaintiffs are better positioned than defendants to carry this burden. . . . We hold that plaintiffs have the burden to show the applicability of the §§ 1332(d)(3)– (5) exceptions when jurisdiction turns on their application .”)); Greco, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 70 1 (“Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving the applicability of this [event or occurrence] jurisdictional exception.”). 91 Rainbow Gun Club, 760 F.3d at 40 9. 90 16 consistent in leading to a single focused event that culm inates in the basis of the asserted liability.”92 The court further explained that “there was an ongoing pattern of conduct that was contextually connected, which when com pleted created one event consistent with the ordinary understanding and the legislative history of the exclusion.”93 Thus, the failure of the well, a single even t or occurren ce, “resulted from a num ber of individual negligent acts related to each other, all of which cam e together to culm inate in the single event.”94 In addition to Rainbow Gun Club, Plaintiffs rely on Arm stead v. Multi-Chem Group, L.L.C., in which the Western District of Louisiana found that the underlying single event precluded the action from constituting a “m ass action” under CAFA. 95 The plaintiffs in Arm stead alleged an explosion and fire led to the release of hazardous fum es that penetrated nearby neighborhoods. 96 In concluding the exclusion applied, the court noted, “[A]ll injuries alleged . . . were incurred in, and resulted from , personal and property exposure to the hazardous fum es released . . . as a result of that one explosion and fire.”97 In this case, Plaintiffs argue the alleged injuries resulted from pipe-cleaning operations conducted over 34 years by several different defen dants. 98 Unlike in Rainbow Gun Club and Arm stead, Plaintiffs do not allege the operations culm inated in one single event that led to Plain tiffs’ injuries. Instead, they allege, for exam ple, the landowners m aintain ed an attractive nuisance, failed to tim ely warn Plaintiffs that there were radioactive m aterials on the property, and failed to prevent Plaintiffs from using the 92 Id. at 412. Id. at 413. 94 Id. See also Allen v. Boeing Co., 784 F.3d 625, 633 (9th Cir. 20 15) (analyzing and applyin g the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Rainbow Gun Club); Arm stead v . Multi-Chem Group, L.L.C., 20 12 WL 1866862, at *7– 8 (W.D. La. May 21, 20 12) (concluding that injuries allegedly suffered from exposure to hazardous fum es resulted from a “singular injury-producin g incident,” an explosion and fire). 95 R. Doc. 30 -1 at 15– 16; Arm stead, 20 12 WL 1866862, at *9. 96 Arm stead, 20 12 WL 18668 62, at *9. 97 Id. (em phasis added). 98 R. Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 5, 8 , 10 . 93 17 property for recreation and farm ing. 99 Plaintiffs allege the oil com panies failed to properly supervise the operations of the pipe contractors, failed to test their pipe for hazardous m aterials, failed to rem ediate the property, and acted carelessly and negligently. 10 0 Plaintiffs also allege that, am ong other claim s, the pipe contractors failed to clean up contam inated soil and water, failed to properly test pipes for radiation, and failed to warn Plaintiffs of radioactive m aterials. 10 1 Yet nothing in the petition, m otion to rem and, or reply m em orandum suggests that a single event led to the in juries alleged, and Defendants m aintain that no such single event occurred. Indeed, the Grefers note that the alleged conduct is not a single even or occurrence because the allegations involve the operations of five different pipe-cleaning defendants cleaning pipe for nineteen different oil com panies at various locations on separate properties owned by three different landowners over the course of 34 years. 10 2 The Court finds the local single event exclusion does not apply to this case. B. The Local Controversy Exception Plaintiffs argue the local controversy exception applies and as a result the Court lacks jurisdiction over this m atter. 10 3 The local controversy exception, found in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A), applies when an action m eets four requirem ents: (1) m ore than two-thirds of the class m em bers are citizen s of the state in which the action was originally filed; (2) at least one defendant from whom “significant relief” is sought and whose conduct is a “significant basis” for the claim s is a citizen of the state in which the action was origin ally filed; (3) the principal 99 See R. Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 26. See id. at ¶ 30 . 10 1 See id. at ¶ 34. 10 2 R. Doc. 36 at 4– 5. 10 3 R. Doc. 30 -1 at 8 – 9. 10 0 18 injuries resulting from the alleged con duct or any related conduct of each defendant were incurred in the state in which the action was originally filed; and (4) in the three-year period preceding the filing of the class or m ass action, no other class action has been filed “asserting the sam e or sim ilar factual allegations against any of the defendants” on behalf of any person. 10 4 To establish the local controversy exception applies, Plaintiffs have the burden of showing the four prongs are satisfied. 10 5 “[T]he exception is intended to be narrow, with all doubts resolved in favor of exercising jurisdiction over the case.”10 6 1. Whether m ore than two-thirds of the class m em bers are citizens of Louisiana. Plaintiffs m aintain that “[g]reater than two-thirds of the Plaintiffs are citizens of Louisiana.”10 7 Plaintiffs, however, fail to allege or provide the state of citizenship or dom icile of each plaintiff. Plaintiffs attach to their m otion to rem and an affidavit from the class action m anager at Ates Law Firm that says of the 190 claim ants, 10 8 “147 currently live in Louisiana; 27 are deceased; however I have confirm ed that their residen ce at the tim e of their deaths was in Louisiana” and the rem aining 16 Plaintiffs live in states other than Louisiana. 10 9 Plaintiffs also provide the current addresses of each plaintiff in their answers to Defendants’ interrogatories. 110 Nevertheless, Section 1332 provides for jurisdiction over actions between “citizens of different states.”111 An allegation that a party is a “resident” of a particular state is insufficient because Section 1332 “dem ands diverse 10 4 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A). Opelousas Gen. Hosp. Auth. v. FairPay Sols., Inc., 655 F.3d 358 , 360 (5th Cir. 20 11) (“The plaintiffs bear the burden of establishin g that they fall within CAFA’s local controversy exception.”). 10 6 Id. (internal quotation m arks om itted). 10 7 R. Doc. 30 -1 at 20 – 22. 10 8 Note that while Plaintiffs consistently m ention that there are 190 claim ants, Defendants consistently m ention that there are 191. CM/ ECF reflects that there are 191 Plaintiffs. Regardless, the difference does not affect the analysis. 10 9 R. Doc. 30 -5 at 2. 110 See R. Doc. 36-1 at 4– 18. 111 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (em phasis added). 10 5 19 citizen ship, not diverse residency.”112 Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to m eet their burden under the first prong of the local controversy exception. 2. Whether at least one defendant from whom “significant relief” is sought and whose conduct is a “significant basis” for the claim s is a citizen of Louisiana. To satisfy the second prong of the local controversy exception, Plain tiffs need not provide a “defin itive analysis of the m easure of dam ages caused by each defendant,” but they m ust provide “detailed allegations or extrinsic evidence detailing the local defendant’s conduct in relation to the out-of-state defendants.”113 Nevertheless, Plaintiffs fail to even identify which defendant they argue satisfies this prong. Plaintiffs instead state, “Each of the nam ed defen dants have been involved in previous litigation over this incident and independently acted so as to form a significant basis for the claim s asserted by the plaintiffs.”114 Plaintiffs provide no support for this statem ent in their m otion to rem and or reply, and Plaintiffs also fail to provide evidence that these “significant defendants” are citizen s of Louisian a, where the action was originally filed. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the second prong of the exception. 3. Whether the principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct or any related conduct of each defendant were incurred in Louisiana. Plaintiffs have satisfied the third prong of the exception, as the principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct of each defendant were incurred in Louisiana. 115 Plaintiffs allege the injuries for which they seek redress resulted from contam ination of property in Harvey, Louisiana, 116 and Plaintiffs’ answers to Defendants’ interrogatories 112 N adler, 764 F.2d at 413. Opelousas General Hosp., 665 F.3d at 363. 114 R. Doc. 30 -1 at 26. 115 See R. Doc. 36-1 at 4– 18. 116 R. Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 5.A, ¶ 7. 113 20 support their allegation that the injuries were suffered in Louisiana. 117 Accordingly, the third prong is satisfied. 4. Whether any other class action has been filed in the three years preceding the filing of this m ass action asserting the sam e or sim ilar factual allegations against any of the defendants on behalf of any person. Plaintiffs fail to satisfy the fourth prong, as a class action was filed asserting sim ilar factual allegations against som e of the sam e defendants during the three-year period preceding the filing of this action. In 20 14, a class of about 465 plaintiffs filed a suit, Bernard, et al., v. Gefer, et al., against at least ten of the sam e defendants in this case. 118 The plaintiffs in Bernard alleged personal injuries and property dam ages resulting from alleged exposure to naturally occurring radioactive m aterial. 119 The case, which was rem oved to this district pursuant to CAFA, involved the sam e tract of land at issue in this case. 120 As a result, Plaintiffs have not satisfied the fourth prong of the local controversy exception. 121 Because Plaintiffs have not satisfied three of the four prongs, Plaintiffs have failed to m eet their burden of establishing the applicability of the local controversy exception. C. The Hom e State Exception Plaintiffs argue CAFA’s hom e-state exception precludes the Court from exercising jurisdiction over this m atter. 122 117 R. Doc. 36-1. Bernard, et al. v. Grefer, et al., No. 14-887 R. Doc. 1-1 (E.D. La. April 16, 20 14). 119 Id. See also Bernard v . Gefer, 20 15 WL 3485761 (E.D. La. J une 2, 20 15). 120 See Bernard, No. 14-8 87 R.Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 10 . 121 See gen erally Caruso v. Allstate Ins. Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 364, 370 – 71 (E.D. La. 20 0 7) (“Since [sim ilar class actions] were filed during the three-year period before the instant action , their existence is fatal to plaintiffs’ argum ent that this lawsuit falls under CAFA’s ‘local-controversy’ exception.”). 122 R. Doc. 30 -1 at 28 – 29. 118 21 The hom e state exception requires district courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction over an action in which “two-thirds or m ore of the m em bers of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate, and the prim ary defen dants, are citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed.”123 Plaintiffs bear the burden of showin g the hom e state exception applies. 124 As previously discussed, Plaintiffs fail to establish the citizenship of each plaintiff. Even if Plaintiffs were to establish that at least two-thirds of the plaintiffs are citizens of Louisiana, they n evertheless have not dem onstrated the applicability of this exception. Plaintiffs argue the Grefers, both of whom are citizens of Louisiana, are “in cluded in the group of ‘prim ary defendants.’”125 While that m ay be true, Plaintiffs fail to show that the oil com panies, which are foreign citizen s, are not prim ary defendants. 126 Plaintiffs argue they have “no obligation to rank each individual defendant’s liability against the other defendants an d exclude som e as ‘prim ary’ an d others as ‘non-prim ary.’”127 Several courts have con cluded, however, that under this exception all prim ary defendants m ust be citizen s of the state in which the action was originally filed. 128 Plaintiffs have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the hom e state exception to CAFA jurisdiction applies 129 ; accordingly, Plaintiffs m ust establish that all prim ary defendants 123 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B). Hollinger, 654 F.3d at 571. 125 R. Doc. 30 -1 at 28 . 126 In the Petition for Dam ages, Plaintiffs allege the following, indicating that the oil com panies m ay be prim ary defendants: “These acts and/ or om issions of the Oil Com panies are a substantial, contributing cause of the Petitioners’ in juries and dam ages. These acts and/ or om issions, therefore, are a direct cause of the in juries, dam ages, and losses suffered by the Petitioners.” R. Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 32. 127 R. Doc. 30 -1 at 29. 128 See Rasberry v . Capitol Cnty . Mut. Fire. Ins. Co., 60 9 F. Supp. 2d 594, 60 6 (E.D. Tex. 20 0 9)) (notin g that “all prim ary defendants m ust be citizens of the state in which the action was originally filed”) (em phasis in original); DeHart, 20 10 WL 231744, at *13 (sam e); Vodenichar v. Halcon Energy Properties, Inc., 733 F.3d 497, 50 6 (3d Cir. 20 13) (“[B]y using the word ‘the’ before the words ‘prim ary defendants’ rather than the word ‘a,’ the statute requires rem and under the hom e state exception only if all prim ary defendants are citizens of [the state in which the action was originally filed].”). 129 Hollinger, 654 F.3d at 570 – 71. 124 22 are citizens of Louisiana. Because Plaintiffs have failed to do so, the hom e state exception does not divest this Court of jurisdiction. III. Are Plaintiffs Entitled to Costs and Attorney Fees? Plaintiffs seek costs and attorney’s fees incurred as a result of the rem oval pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 130 The Suprem e Court held in Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., that “absent unusual circum stances, attorney’s fees should not be awarded [under § 1447(c)] when the rem oving party has an objectively reasonable basis for rem oval.”131 In applying this holding, the Fifth Circuit noted that § 1447 does not have a strong preference for or against fee awards. 132 The Fifth Circuit in Adm iral Insurance Co. v. Abshire found the defendants’ rem oval m ay have been objectively unreasonable. 133 The court noted there was som e eviden ce in the record that the defendants rem oved with the purpose of prolonging the litigation and im posin g costs on the plaintiffs. 134 Nevertheless, the court determ ined that “it is equally true that, given the com plexity of the instant com m en cem ent question, an award of fees m ight underm in[e] Congress’ basic decision to afford defendants a right to rem ove as a general m atter, when the statutory criteria are satisfied.”135 Consequently, the court affirm ed the district court’s decision to decline to award attorney’s fees under § 1447(c). 136 130 See R. Doc. 30 -1 at 29– 31. v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 136 (20 0 5). 132 Adm iral Ins. Co. v. Abshire, 574 F.3d 267, 280 (5th Cir. 20 0 9). 133 See id. 134 Id. 135 Id. (internal citations and quotations om itted). 136 Id. at 281. 131 Martin 23 The rem oval in this case was objectively reasonable, and the Court denies the m otion to rem and. Awarding Plaintiffs costs and attorney’s fees under § 1447(c) would be im proper. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ request for costs and attorney’s fees is denied. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons; IT IS ORD ERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Rem and 137 is D EN IED . IT IS FU RTH ER ORD ERED that Plaintiffs have until Au gu s t 2 2 , 2 0 16 , to file a supplem ental m em orandum identifying individual plaintiffs whose claim s m ust be rem anded because they do not exceed the $ 75,0 0 0 individual am ount-in-controversy requirem ent. Defendants have until Se p te m be r 5, 2 0 16 , to file a response to Plaintiffs’ supplem ental m em orandum . The parties m ay conduct jurisdictional discovery through Au gu s t 10 , 2 0 16 , related to this issue. IT IS FU RTH ER ORD ERED that Plaintiffs’ request for costs and attorney fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) is D EN IED . N e w Orle a n s , Lo u is ian a, th is 8 th d ay o f Ju ly, 2 0 16 . ________________________________ SU SIE MORGAN U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT J U D GE 137 R. Doc. 30 . 24
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