Rose et al v. Computer Sciences Corporation, No. 2:2015cv00813 - Document 143 (E.D. La. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS - IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs' 96 motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's 95 motion for summary judgment is DENIED. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan. (bwn)
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Rose et al v. Computer Sciences Corporation Doc. 143 U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT COU RT EASTERN D ISTRICT OF LOU ISIAN A STEVE ROSE, ET AL., Plain tiffs CIVIL ACTION VERSU S N O. 15 -8 13 COMPU TER SCIEN CES CORPORATION , D e fe n d an t SECTION "E" ( 4 ) ORD ER AN D REAS ON S Before the Court are the parties’ cross-m otions for sum m ary judgm ent. 1 Both Plaintiffs’ m otion and Defendant’s m otion are opposed. 2 For the reasons explained below, the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sum m ary J udgm ent 3 is GRAN TED . The Defendant’s Motion for Sum m ary J udgm ent 4 is D EN IED . BACKGROU N D Plaintiffs brought suit against Com puter Sciences Corporation (“CSC”) seeking unpaid wages pursuant to an em ploym ent contract they executed in connection with their voluntary deploym ent to Southwest Asia. 5 Each Plaintiff executed two docum ents related to his or her em ploym ent with CSC, an offer letter and a Foreign Travel Letter (“FTL”), both provided by CSC. 6 Each em ployee’s offer letter quoted an hourly rate for his or her em ploym ent, specifically stating, “your com pensation will con sist of an hourly rate of [between $ 29 and $ 33], which will be paid biweekly.”7 The offer letter also m entions other benefits available to the candidate upon acceptance, including health insurance, 1 R. Docs. 95 and 96. R. Docs. 10 4 and 10 2. 3 R. Doc. 96. 4 R. Doc. 95. 5 R. Doc. 41. 6 R. Doc. 110 -2 at ¶ 2. 7 R. Doc. 96-13 (Offer letter of Plaintiff Helen Haynes). 2 1 Dockets.Justia.com enrollm ent in a 40 1(k) plan, and tuition reim bursem ent, but does not otherwise describe the em ployee’s com pensation. 8 The FTL details the conditions of the em ployee’s deploym ent overseas. 9 It describes a standard of conduct to which the em ployee should com ply while in the country of his or her deploym ent, and identifies potential legal consequen ces of not com plying. 10 The FTL also explains m edical requirem ents for overseas deploym ent and the logistical details of the em ployee’s travel to the relevant country. 11 The “Com pensation” section states that the em ployee’s base pay will not change as a result of the overseas assignm ent, explain s the different “uplifts” available to the em ployee for working in a potentially dangerous environm en t, and clarifies that the pay is taxable incom e. 12 The Plaintiffs contend they received less com pensation than they should have under the term s of the offer letter. 13 Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that CSC paid them a fixed am ount each pay period regardless of how m any hours they worked, rather than at the hourly rate stated in their offer letter. 14 Plaintiffs seek unpaid wages at the hourly rate of their respective offer letters for all hours worked. 15 Plaintiffs seek dam ages for the period between March 13, 20 12 and J une 1, 20 12. 16 8 Id. See, e.g., R. Doc. 96-15 (FTL of Plaintiff H elen Haynes). 10 Id. at 1-2. 11 Id. at 2-3. 12 Id. at 3-4. See also R. Doc. 96-46 at 2. 13 R. Doc. 15 at 7-8 . 14 R. Doc. 96-46 15 Id. at ¶¶ 39– 41. The Plain tiffs also sought statutory penalties and legal fees pursuant to LA. R EV. STAT. 23:631. On October 26, 20 17, the Court ruled that Plaintiffs are unable to recover these dam ages pursuant to Louisiana law. See R. Doc. 137. 16 This Court held that claim s for wages owed prior to March 13, 20 12 are prescribed by Louisiana’s threeyear prescription period. See R. Doc. 78 . On J un e 1, 20 12, CSC required all em ployees to sign a new letter agreeing to be paid according to an annualized salary. 9 2 On August 10 , 20 17, the parties filed cross-m otions for sum m ary judgm ent. 17 Plaintiffs argue the offer letter and the FTL together com prise an unam biguous em ploym ent contract that CSC breached by “arbitrarily capping their pay and failing to pay the agreed hourly rate for all hours worked.”18 Defendant puts forth several argum ents in favor of its m otion for sum m ary judgm ent. 19 First, Defendant argues that the two docum ents have conflicting term s, but they can be reconciled to provide for pay on a salary basis. Alternatively, Defendant argues that, if the term s of the offer letter and the FTL cannot be reconciled, then either there was no m eeting of the m inds, or the Court should rely on parol eviden ce to discern the parties’ intent. 20 On October 26, 20 17, the Court ruled that the law of Virginia applies in this action. 21 SU MMARY JU D GMEN T STAN D ARD Sum m ary judgm ent is appropriate only “if the m ovant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any m aterial fact and the m ovant is entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law.”22 “An issue is m aterial if its resolution could affect the outcom e of the action.”23 When assessing whether a m aterial factual dispute exists, the Court considers “all of the eviden ce in the record but refrains from m aking credibility determ inations or weighing the evidence.”24 All reasonable inferen ces are drawn in favor of the nonm oving party. 25 There is no genuine issue of m aterial fact if, even viewing the evidence in the light m ost 17 R. Docs. 95 and 96. R. Doc. 96-46 at 7. 19 R. Doc. 95. 20 R. Doc. 95-1 at 6. 21 R. Doc. 137. 22 F ED . R. CIV. P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322– 23 (1986). 23 DIRECTV Inc. v. Robson, 420 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 20 0 5). 24 Delta & Pine Land Co. v. N ationw ide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 20 0 8 ); see also Reeves v . Sanderson Plum bing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 – 51 (20 0 0 ). 25 Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 10 69, 10 75 (5th Cir. 1994). 18 3 favorable to the nonm oving party, no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonm oving party, thus entitling the m oving party to judgm ent as a m atter of law. 26 If the dispositive issue is on e on which the m oving party will bear the burden of persuasion at trial, the m oving party “m ust com e forward with evidence which would ‘entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.’”27 If the m oving party fails to carry this burden, the m otion m ust be denied. If the m oving party successfully carries this burden, the burden of production then shifts to the nonm oving party to direct the Court’s attention to som ething in the pleadings or other evidence in the record setting forth specific facts sufficient to establish that a genuine issue of m aterial fact does indeed exist. 28 If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonm oving party will bear the burden of persuasion at trial, the m oving party m ay satisfy its burden of production by either (1) subm itting affirm ative eviden ce that negates an essential elem ent of the nonm ovant’s claim , or (2) dem onstrating there is no evidence in the record to establish an essential elem ent of the nonm ovant’s claim . 29 When proceeding under the first option, if the nonm oving party cann ot m uster sufficient eviden ce to dispute the m ovant’s contention that there are no disputed facts, a trial would be useless, and the m oving party is entitled 26 Sm ith v. Am edisy s, Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 440 (5th Cir. 20 0 2). Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v . Rally ’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263– 64 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Golden Rule Ins. Co. v. Lease, 755 F. Supp. 948, 951 (D. Colo. 1991)). 28 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322– 24. 29 Id. at 331– 32 (Brennan, J ., dissenting); see also St. Am ant v. Benoit, 80 6 F.2d 1294, 1297 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing J ustice Brennan’s statem ent of the sum m ary judgm ent standard in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322– 24 (1986), and requirin g the m ovants to subm it affirm ative evidence to negate an essential elem ent of the nonm ovant’s claim or, alternatively, dem onstrate the nonm ovant’s evidence is insufficient to establish an essential elem ent); Fano v. O’N eill, 80 6 F.2d 1262, 1266 (citing J ustice Bren nan’s dissent in Celotex, and requiring the m ovant to m ake an affirm ative presentation to n egate the non m ovant’s claim s on sum m ary judgm ent); 10 A CHARLES ALAN W RIGHT, ARTHUR R. M ILLER & M ARY KAY KANE , F EDERAL P RACTICE AND P ROCEDURE §2727.1 (20 16) (“Although the Court issued a five-to-four decision , the m ajority and dissent both agreed as to how the sum m ary-judgm ent burden of proof operates; they disagreed as to how the standard was applied to the facts of the case.” (internal citations om itted)). 27 4 to sum m ary judgm ent as a m atter of law. 30 When, however, the m ovant is proceeding under the second option and is seeking sum m ary judgm ent on the ground that the nonm ovant has no evidence to establish an essential elem ent of the claim , the nonm oving party m ay defeat a m otion for sum m ary judgm ent by “calling the Court’s attention to supporting eviden ce already in the record that was overlooked or ignored by the m oving party.”31 Under either scenario, the burden then shifts back to the m ovant to dem onstrate the inadequacy of the evidence relied upon by the nonm ovant. 32 If the m ovant m eets this burden, “the burden of production shifts [back again] to the nonm oving party, who m ust either (1) rehabilitate the evidence attacked in the m oving party’s papers, (2) produce additional eviden ce showing the existence of a genuin e issue for trial as provided in Rule 56(e), or (3) subm it an affidavit explaining why further discovery is necessary as provided in Rule 56(f).”33 “Sum m ary judgm ent should be granted if the nonm oving party fails to respond in one or m ore of these ways, or if, after the nonm oving party responds, the court determ ines that the m oving party has m et its ultim ate burden of persuading the court that there is no genuine issue of m aterial fact for trial.”34 AN ALYSIS Sum m ary judgm ent is appropriate in this case as the parties do n ot dispute the relevant facts. 35 All dom estic and overseas em ployees received the sam e form of offer 30 First N ational Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 28 8 – 89 (198 0 ); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby , Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249– 50 (1986). 31 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 332– 33. 32 Id. 33 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 332– 33, 333 n.3. 34 Id.; see also First N ational Bank of Arizona, 391 U.S. at 289. 35 R. Doc. 110 -2 (Plaintiffs adm itting Defendant’s statem ents of undisputed m aterial fact). Defendant denies several of Plaintiffs’ statem ents of undisputed m aterial fact. R. Doc. 10 2-1. The Court finds that these disputes are not m aterial to the disposition of the case, however, as they either involve legal issues that m ust be resolved by the Court, R. Doc. 10 2-1 at ¶¶ 4-5, or con cern irrelevant parol eviden ce, id. at ¶ 7. 5 letter. 36 The em ployees, who were specifically hired to serve as defense contractors in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Kuwait sim ultaneously received and executed both an offer letter and a FTL. 37 The texts of the docum ents are not contested. 38 The parties dispute only the m eaning of the docum ents’ texts, specifically, whether the docum ents provide for an hourly wage or a fixed salary during the Plain tiffs’ em ploym ent overseas. This issue m ust be decided by the Court as a m atter of law. 39 The Court’s objective in interpreting a contract is to give effect to the parties’ intent. 40 In discerning the parties’ intentions, the Court must look first to the contract itself. 41 If the contract is unam biguous, the Court should look no further than the four corners of the docum ent. 42 A contract is am biguous if it can reasonably be interpreted in m ore than one way. 43 A contract is not am biguous, however, sim ply because the parties disagree about the m eaning of the contract’s term s. 44 Under Virginia law, if parties have entered into m ultiple docum ents relating to a business transaction, a court m ust construe the docum ents “together to determ in e the parties’ intent.”45 Plaintiffs’ offer letters and FTLs were executed contem poraneously. 46 Accordingly, the two docum ents “will be construed together as form ing one contract.”47 36 R. Doc. 110 -2 at 1. Id. at ¶¶ 11, 22, 35, 50 , 62, 73. 38 Com pare R. Docs. 95-38 and 95-39 w ith R. Docs. 96-13 and 96-14 (Offer letter an d FTL of Plaintiff Helen Haynes). 39 See Hom eland Training Center, LLC v. Sum m it Point Auto. Research Center, 594 F.3d 285, 290 (4th Cir. 20 10 ). 40 Pocahontas Mining Ltd. Liab. Co. v . CN X Gas Co., 276 Va. 346 (20 0 8 ). 41 Id. at 353. 42 Id. 43 Robinson-Huntley v . George W ashington Carver Mut. Hom es Ass’n , Inc., 287 Va. 425 (20 14). 44 Id. 45 First Am . Bank of Va. v. J.S.C. Concrete Const., Inc., 259 Va. 60 , 523 S.E.2d 496, 50 0 (20 0 0 ). 46 R. Doc. 110 -2 (Plaintiffs adm it to Defendant’s statem ents of uncontested fact). 47 Landsdow ne on the Potom ac Hom eow ners Ass’n v. OpenBand at Lansdow ne, LLC, 718 F.3d 187, 20 5 (4th Cir. 20 13). See also Virginia Hous. Dev. Auth. V. Fox Run Ltd. P’ship, 255 Va. 356, 364 (1998). 37 6 The offer letter unequivocally states in its opening paragraph, “com pensation will consist of an hourly rate of [dollar am ount], which will be paid bi-weekly.”48 The parties agree that the offer letter provides for com pensation on an hourly rate. 49 The dispute is whether the phrase “base weekly salary” in the FTL alters the otherwise clear term s of the offer letter. The FTL uses the word “salary” five tim es. Under the sub-heading “Base Pay,” the FTL states, “[y]our base weekly salary will not change as a result of this assignm ent,” and that the em ployee “will be eligible for salary reviews in accordance with standard CSC policies.”50 Hardship pay is “paid as a percentage of your base weekly salary.”51 Danger pay is sim ilarly defined as a percentage of “weekly base salary.”52 Lastly, the FTL states that an em ployee’s “base salary an d all other com pensation . . . are taxable incom e.”53 The Court finds that the offer letter and the FTL, read together, unam biguously provide for an hourly rate of pay for the Plaintiffs’ work overseas. 54 A Court should seek to “harm onize” the various provisions of a contract, “giving effect to each when reasonably possible.”55 Accordingly, the m ere m ention of a “base weekly salary” in the FTL does not rewrite the term s of the offer letter. 56 In the specific context of the FTL, the phrase “base weekly salary” is refers to the em ployee’s baseline com pen sation to establish rates of danger pay and hardship pay. Nothing in the FTL lim its an em ployee to forty hours of 48 R. Doc. 96-13 (Offer Letter of Plaintiff Helen Haynes). R. Doc. 110 -2 at ¶ 11. 50 Id. at 3. 51 Id. 52 Id. at 4. 53 Id. 54 Even if the Court were to find that the contract were am biguous, the result would not change. Under Virgin ia law, courts construe am biguous term s against the drafter. See Martin & Martin, Inc. v. Bradley Enterprises, Inc., 50 4 S.E.2d 849, 851 (Va. 1998) (“In the event of an am biguity in the written contract, such am biguity m ust be construed against the drafter of the agreem ent.”). 55 Schuilin g v. Harris, 286 Va. 187, 20 2 (20 13). 56 To find otherwise would be contrary to basic rules of contractual interpretation. Robinson-Huntley , 756 S.E.2d at 418 (“Contracts are construed as written , without adding term s that were not included by the parties.”) 49 7 com pensation per week. “Base weekly salary” is thus best read as the am ount an em ployee would be paid under a standard 40 -hour work week, notwithstanding any addition al com pensation owed, including danger pay, hardship pay, or pay for hours worked in excess of the base num ber. This defin ition harm onizes the other provisions of the contract, as “base weekly salary” does not alter the plain m eaning of the phrase “com pensation will consist of an hourly rate.” Defendant contends that because the FTL governs other aspects of the overseas deploym ent, it trum ps the “general” provisions of the offer letter. 57 The Court disagrees. The FTL contain s no provision stating that its term s override those of the offer letter. Indeed, the FTL provides that the em ployee’s pay “will not change as a result of this assignm ent.”58 Defendant repeatedly asserts that the FTL contained a “com prehensive com pensation section,”59 but the FTL neither states the em ployee’s com pensation nor redefines the hourly rate as a fixed annual salary. The em ployee’s hourly rate of pay is stated only in the offer letter. Accordingly, because the FTL is silent as to the m eaning of “base weekly salary,” the Court m ust look to the offer letter for its definition. Rather than superseding the offer letter, the FTL m ust be read with the offer letter to form one contract. Interpreting the contracts as written, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs are entitled to sum m ary judgm ent on their breach of contract claim . The two docum ents, interpreted as a single contract, provide for an hourly rate of pay for all hours worked overseas. CON CLU SION IT IS ORD ERED that Plaintiffs’ m otion for sum m ary judgm ent is GRAN TED . 57 R. Doc. 95-1 at 22. Id. at 2-3. 59 See R. Doc. 10 2 at 14. 58 8 IT IS FU RTH ER ORD ERED that Defendant’s m otion for sum m ary judgm ent is D EN IED . N e w Orle a n s , Lo u is ian a, th is 6 th d ay o f N o ve m be r, 2 0 17. _____________________ __________ SU SIE MORGAN U N ITED STATES D ISTRICT JU D GE 9
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