Atlantic Specialty Insurance Company et al v. Porter, Inc., No. 2:2015cv00570 - Document 77 (E.D. La. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS denying 59 Motion in Limine. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 10/28/16. (clc)
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Atlantic Specialty Insurance Company et al v. Porter, Inc. Doc. 77 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA ATLANTIC SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY AND NICHOLAS CHAD GONZALEZ VERSUS CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-570 PORTER, INC., D/ B/ A FORMULA BOATS SECTION “R” (4) ORD ER AN D REASON S Before the Court is Defendant Porter, Inc’s m otion in lim ine to exclude any and all evidence regarding prior fires on other boats m anufactured by defendant. 1 For the following reasons, defendant’s m otion is DENIED. I. BACKGROU N D This lawsuit arises out of a fire onboard the Budget Bender, a recreational boat owned by plaintiff Nicholas Chad Gonzalez, that occurred on or about December 21, 20 13 and rendered the boat a total loss. The boat was insured by Atlantic Specialty Insurance Com pany, which paid Gonzalez $ 280 ,0 0 0 on his insurance claim . Plaintiffs assert claim s against the boat’s 1 R. Doc. 59. Dockets.Justia.com m anufacturer, Porter, Inc., for redhibition, breach of contract, products liability, and negligence. 2 Plaintiffs allege that the fire was caused by an electrical m alfunction attributable to corroded wiring in the port side of the boat. 3 According to plaintiffs, a gap along the edge of a wet bar in the boat’s cockpit allowed water to flow downward and onto the wiring below, causing the corrosion. 4 Plaintiffs allege that this corrosion caused a short circuit that energized wires, causing them to overheat and eventually ignite a fire. 5 In the Pre-Trial Order, plaintiffs listed certain trial exhibits related to a February 13, 20 0 8 fire 6 on an identical m odel Form ula boat not subject to this litigation. 7 The exhibits are as follows: (1) “Summ ary of Margolis Matter as Subm itted by Mike Boyd”; (2) “Form ula Dealer Service Bulletin” dated March 28, 20 0 8; (3) “Ocean LED Letter to Form ula Boats” dated March 27, 20 0 8; and (4) “Form ula Dealer Service Bulletin” dated March 10 , 20 0 8. 8 Defendant now m oves to exclude this evidence and any other evidence related to prior fires on Form ula boats. 9 Defendant argues this evidence 2 R. Doc. 1-2 at 3-4. Id. at 2. 4 Id. 5 Id. 6 Pls.’ Ex. 39. 7 R. Doc. 55 at 14. 8 Pls.’ Ex. 39; Pls.’ Ex. 40 ; Pls.’ Ex. 41; Pls.’ Ex. 42. 9 R. Doc. 59 at 1. Defendant’s m otion is focused on two fires, the 20 0 8 fire and one that occurred in 20 0 6. R. Doc. 59-1 at 3-4. The Pre-Trial 2 3 should be excluded because the earlier fire did not occur under conditions substantially sim ilar to those that existed during the fire on the Budget Bender. 10 II. LEGAL STAN D ARD Evidence of sim ilar accidents can be adm issible in a products liability case to show “the defendant’s notice, m agnitude of the danger involved, the defendant’s ability to correct a known defect, the lack of safety for intended uses, strength of a product, the standard of care, and causation.” Ram os v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 615 F.2d 334, 338-39 (5th Cir. 1980 ); see also Bailey v. Oliver, 50 4 So. 2d 152, 155 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1987) (“The jurisprudence, both state and federal, holds that evidence of prior, sim ilar accidents m ay be extremely relevant in proving the defective and unreasonably dangerous nature of a product.”). Under Fifth Circuit law, evidence of previous accidents is adm issible at trial if it can be shown that (1) the earlier failure occurred under conditions substantially sim ilar to those existing during the failure in the accident central to the litigation, and (2) the earlier failure Order includes only exhibits related to the 20 0 8 fire, and plaintiffs have stated they have no intention of raising any issues related to the 20 0 6 fire. R. Doc. 69 at 3. Therefore, this m otion will address only the adm issibility of evidence related to the 20 0 8 fire. 10 R. Doc. 59-1 at 2. 3 occurred at a tim e not too rem ote from the tim e of the failure in the accident central to the litigation. Ram os, 615 F.2d at 339 (quoting Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Matherne, 348 F.2d 394, 40 0 (5th Cir. 1965)). Stated differently, the proponent of evidence of other accidents or occurrences m ust establish “that the facts and circum stances of other accidents or occurrences are ‘closely sim ilar’ to the facts and circum stances at issue.” Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 988 F.2d 573, 579 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing McGonigal v. Gearhart Indus., Inc., 851 F.2d 774, 778 (5th Cir. 1988); Jackson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 788 F.2d 10 70 , 10 82-83 (5th Cir. 1986)). The question of adm issibility of substantially sim ilar accidents is necessarily determ ined on a case-by-case basis, with consideration to be given to “any num ber of factors, including the product or component part in question, the plaintiff’s theory of recovery, the defenses raised by the defendant, and the degree of sim ilarity of the products and of the other accidents.” Brazos River Auth. v. GE Ionics, Inc., 469 F.3d 416, 426 (5th Cir. 20 0 6). Of course, “[s]ubstantial sim ilarity does not require an exact m atch.” Green v. Schutt Sports Mfg. Co., 369 F. App’x 630 , 638 (5th Cir. 20 10 ). The “substantial sim ilarity” requirement is relaxed to “reasonable sim ilarity” if the earlier accident is offered only to show defendants’ awareness of an arguably dangerous condition. Johnson, 988 F.2d at 580 ; W illis v. KIA 4 Motors Corp., No. 0 7-0 62, 20 0 9 WL 2351766, at *1 (N.D. Miss. J uly 29, 20 0 9) (“[O]nly ‘reasonably sim ilar’ incidents will be adm issible for the purpose[ ] of establishing notice.”); see also Young v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 618 F.2d 332, 339 (5th Cir. 1980 ) (noting that evidence of earlier accidents offered for the “sole purpose” of showing that defendant had notice of an “arguably dangerous” condition can be considered by the jury for the purpose of determ ining whether a reasonably prudent entity would have taken precautions against future accidents). III. D ISCU SSION It is clear from plaintiffs’ response to this m otion that plaintiffs do not seek to introduce this evidence for the sole purpose of showing that defendant had notice of the defective condition, and therefore do not challenge that the evidence m ust be substantially sim ilar in order to be adm issible. As the party seeking to introduce this evidence, the burden is on plaintiffs to establish substantial sim ilarity. See Johnson, 988 F.2d at 579. The “substantially sim ilar” predicate for the proof of sim ilar accidents is defined “by the defect or . . . product[] at issue.” Jackson, 788 F.2d at 10 83 (internal parenthetical om itted). 5 The 20 0 8 fire, which occurred on the sam e m odel boat as the Budget Bender, appears to have been caused by a defect in an underwater light driver attached to the boat. 11 The driver and underwater light itself were both m anufactured by third-party vendors, not by defendant. 12 In the 20 0 8 fire, for reasons unknown to defendant or to the driver m anufacturer, a short circuit occurred in the connections between the driver and the light fitting which caused the electrical system to overheat and eventually start a fire. 13 Ocean LED, the driver m anufacturer, noted that if either the driver or the boat’s electrical system had “in-line fuse” protection, then the fire would likely not have occurred. 14 As a result, defendant put out a service bulletin instructing all owners of boats with the driver in question to replace it with a new driver which included in-line fuse protection. 15 This driver was replaced on the Budget Bender before Gonzalez purchased the boat. 16 In arguing that the conditions of the Budget Bender fire are not substantially sim ilar to the 20 0 8 fire, defendant points out that, unlike here, the 20 0 8 fire had no allegations of water intrusion or long-term corrosion 11 12 13 14 15 16 Pls.’ Ex. 41. R. Doc. 59-1 at 4. Pls.’ Ex. 41. Id. Pls.’ Ex. 40 . R. Doc. 59-1 at 3. 6 causing the short circuit. Instead, as defendant argues, the fire was sim ply caused by the failure of a third-party com ponent. 17 In response, and in contrast to m any of its other responses to defendant in this litigation, plaintiffs assert that their theory of causation is that but for a lack of “shortcircuit” protection in the boat’s electrical system, the fire would not have occurred. 18 Therefore, plaintiffs allege that both the 20 0 8 fire and the Budget Bender fire share the following in comm on: (1) a m anufacturer’s defect; (2) an unprotected short circuit; and (3) an electrical fire the cause of which defendant never determ ined. 19 While the Court acknowledges that the 20 0 8 fire and this fire are not without their differences, the Court finds that the two fires are substantially sim ilar. Evidence of the 20 0 8 fire is therefore adm issible. Both fires involved identical m odel boats, were electrical in origin, and allegedly could have been prevented with additional short-circuit protection in the boats’ electrical system s. Consistent with other cases in this circuit, the Court places m ore weight on the sim ilarities between the two incidents, including 17 Id. R. Doc. 69 at 6. While plaintiffs do not m ention water intrusion at all in their response to this m otion, plaintiffs’ com plaint does allege that the fire occurred in part because of the boat’s “faulty electrical system.” R. Doc. 1-2 at 3. 19 Id. 7 18 the m odel of boat and alleged defect, than on their differences. See W ells v. Robinson Helicopter Co., No. 12-564, 20 15 WL 40 6630 3, at *2 (S.D. Miss. J uly 2, 20 15) (“In accordance with precedent [the court] has placed m ore weight on the sim ilarities of the product involved and the alleged defect, and less weight on other features of the accidents.”). Courts in this circuit have generally found that when accidents or occurrences involve the same defect and the sam e product m odel, there is substantial sim ilarity. See, e.g., Soden v. Freightliner Corp., 714 F.2d 498, 50 8 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding substantial sim ilarity between two fires with same m odel truck and same allegedly defective fuel system ); Scordill v. Louisville Ladder Group, LLC, No. 0 2-2565, 20 0 4 WL 30 7475, at *13 (E.D. La. Feb. 17, 20 0 4) (finding substantial sim ilarity between two occurrences of falls from a ladder, both m anufactured with the sam e allegedly defective fiberglass); see also N ester v. Textron, Inc., No. 13-920 , 20 15 WL 7272249, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 20 15) (collecting additional cases). Additionally, in cases where courts have found no substantial sim ilarity, the accidents in question had glaring differences that are not present in this case. See, e.g., Guy v. Crow n Equip. Corp., 394 F.3d 320 , 328-29 (5th Cir. 20 0 4) (affirm ing district court’s exclusion of evidence of prior accidents involving different m odel of forklift and different types of injuries); Johnson, 988 F.2d at 580 8 (affirm ing district court’s exclusion of evidence of prior accidents because there was no substantial sim ilarity given different m odels of vehicle and different alleged defects); Peters v. N issan Forklift Corp. N . Am ., No. 0 62880 , 20 0 8 WL 2625522, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 1, 20 0 8). Though there are differences between the conditions of the 20 0 8 fire and the fire at the heart of this litigation, these differences go to the weight that is to be given to this evidence, not the adm issibility. Jackson, 788 F.2d at 10 83 (citations om itted); Brazos River, 469 F.3d at 427. They do not, however, warrant the exclusion of all evidence related to the 20 0 8 fire. IV. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES defendant’s m otion. New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ 28th _ day of October, 20 16. ___ _____________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 9
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