Thompson v. Yellow Fin Marine Services, LLC, No. 2:2015cv00311 - Document 84 (E.D. La. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS denying 78 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 5/11/2017. (cg)
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Thompson v. Yellow Fin Marine Services, LLC Doc. 84 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA RICHARD J . THOMPSON VERSUS CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-311 YELLOW FIN MARINE SERVICES, LLC. SECTION “R” (2) ORD ER AN D REASON S Plaintiff Richard J . Thom pson m oves for reconsideration 1 of the Court’s order 2 denying his m otion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a). In its order, the Court rejected Thom pson’s argum ent that the jury’s interrogatory responses were inconsistent. 3 Thom pson now m oves for reconsideration of that order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). For the following reasons, Thompson’s m otion is denied. A district court has considerable discretion to grant or to deny a m otion under Rule 59(e). See Edw ard H. Bohlin Co. v. Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350 , 355 (5th Cir. 1993). A court’s reconsideration of an earlier order is an extraordinary rem edy, which should be granted sparingly. See Fields v. Pool 1 2 3 R. Doc. 78. R. Doc. 77. Id. Dockets.Justia.com Offshore, Inc., 1998 WL 43217, *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 19, 1998); Bardw ell v. George G. Sharp, Inc., 1995 WL 517120 , *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 30 , 1995). The Court m ust “strike the proper balance between the need for finality and the need to render a just decision on the basis of all the facts.” Edw ard H. Bohlin Co., 6 F.3d at 355. A m oving party m ust satisfy at least one of the following criteria to prevail on a Rule 59(e) motion: (1) the m otion is necessary to correct a m anifest error of fact or law; (2) the m ovant presents newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence; (3) the m otion is necessary in order to prevent manifest injustice; and (4) the m otion is justified by an intervening change in the controlling law. See Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Om ni Bank, 1999 WL 970 526, *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 21, 1999); Fields, 1998 WL 43217 at *2. As explained m ore com pletely in the Court’s earlier order, Thom pson worked for defendant Yellow Fin Marine Services, LLC as a boat captain. In his com plaint, Thom pson sought recovery from Yellow Fin for alleged injuries sustained when the K-MARINE XI, one of Yellow Fin’s boats, collided with an energy platform . Thompson was serving as captain of the KMARINE XI at the tim e of the collision, and Yellow Fin counterclaim ed for dam age to the ship. 2 In its verdict form, the jury found that Yellow Fin was not responsible for any injuries to Thom pson. 4 As to Yellow Fin’s counterclaim s, the jury found Thom pson liable, but found that Thom pson was only 50 percent at fault for the collision. 5 The jury assigned the rem aining 50 percent of fault to Yellow Fin. 6 In his m otion for new trial, Thom pson argued that these findings are inconsistent, and that Thom pson is therefore entitled to a new trial. In denying Thompson’s m otion, the Court noted that Yellow Fin argued two theories in its defense: (1) that Thom pson, rather than Yellow Fin, was responsible for the collision; and (2) that Thompson was not injured in the collision, and that Thom pson’s alleged health issues in fact predate the accident. The Court found that the jury’s verdict is consistent with its crediting the latter defense. In other words, the jury could have found that both Yellow Fin and Thom pson were responsible for the collision, but that Thom pson was not injured in the collision and that he therefore cannot recover on his claim . In his m otion for reconsideration, Thom pson makes two arguments. First, Thompson sim ply rehashes his argument that the jury’s verdict is 4 5 6 R. Doc. 65. Id. Id. 3 inconsistent. This argum ent is rejected for the reasons offered in the Court’s previous order. Thom pson’s second argument is that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that Thom pson’s injuries predated the accident. In determ ining whether the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to support the verdict, the Court m ust “draw all reasonable inferences and resolve all credibility determ inations in the light m ost favorable to the nonm oving party.” Foradori v. Harris, 523 F.3d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 20 0 8) (citation om itted). The jury’s verdict m ust be upheld “[u]nless the evidence is of such quality and weight that reasonable and im partial jurors could not arrive at such a verdict.” Ferrara Fire Apparatus, Inc. v. JLG Indus., Inc., 581 F. App’x 440 , 443 (5th Cir. 20 14). Here, there was ample evidence to support a finding that Thom pson’s injuries predated the collision aboard the K MARINE XI. Although, Thom pson testified that he suffered pain only after the collision, “[t]he jury was under no obligation to believe the testim ony of [Thompson] as to his . . . pain, even if that testim ony were undisputed.” Sem per v. Santos, 845 F.2d 1233, 1237 (3d Cir. 1988); see also id. (“[T]he trier of fact, whether the issue be one of an excessive or inadequate verdict, is at liberty within the bounds of reason to reject entirely the uncontradicted testim ony of a witness which 4 does not convince the trier of its m erit.”). Furtherm ore, to the extent Dr. Gregory Brick, Thom pson’s treating physician, offered any opinion on causation, that opinion was explicitly based on Thom pson’s own account of his pain. 7 Dr. Brick also testified that Thom pson suffered from degenerative arthritis in both hips and that this condition developed before the collision. 8 Finally, Dr. Brick also agreed that he does not “relate” any pain in Thom pson’s left hip to the collision. 9 Based on this evidence, the jury was free to conclude that Thom pson’s injuries predated the collision. Accordingly, Thompson has shown no m anifest error of fact or law in the Court’s prior order. For these reasons, plaintiff Richard J . Thom pson’s m otion for reconsideration is DENIED. New Orleans, Louisiana, this _11th _ day of May, 20 17. ___ _____________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 7 See R. Doc. 80 at 19. (“Q: So, Doctor, assum ing Richard’s pain and sy m ptom s began follow ing the accident on August 1st, 20 14, isn’t it true that you would relate the need for the hip replacem ent to Richard being thrown into the bulkhead at the tim e of the boat accident? A: Yes.”) (emphasis added). 8 Id. at 23. 9 Id. at 21. 5
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