Koviach, et al v. Crescent City Consulting, LLC, et al, No. 2:2014cv02874 - Document 62 (E.D. La. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS - IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs 25 motion to conditionally certify this matter as a collective action under the FLSA is GRANTED. The Court conditionally certifies this matter as a collective action with respect to all non-law enf orcement personnel, who, since December 2011, previously worked or currently work for Defendants in the State of Louisiana as a security officer (guard) and were not paid a rate of time and one-half for overtime worked in excess of 40 hours in any we ek, regardless of classification as an independent contractor. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs file a revised notice form and a revised opt-in consent form in accordance with this order by July 7, 2016. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants p roduce to Plaintiffs a computer-readable database with the names, last-known mailing addresses, email addresses, and telephone numbers of all potential class members by July 13, 2016. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that class members seeking to opt in to this case will have 120 days from the date on which the notice and consent forms are mailed to postmark their consent forms in order to opt in. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan. (bwn)
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Koviach, et al v. Crescent City Consulting, LLC, et al Doc. 62 U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT COU RT EASTERN D ISTRICT OF LOU ISIAN A CH ARLES KOVIACH , ET AL. Pla in tiffs CIVIL ACTION VERSU S N O. 14 -2 8 74 CRESCEN T CITY CON SU LTIN G, LLC, ET AL. D e fe n d an ts ORD ER AN D REAS ON S SECTION “E” Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ m otion to conditionally certify a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act an d to facilitate notice under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 1 BACKGROU N D This is a collective action filed by Plaintiffs Charles Koviach, Henry McCathen, J r., and Phillip Thom as (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”). 2 Plaintiffs filed this suit on Decem ber 18, 20 14, on behalf of them selves and all other sim ilarly situated individuals who were em ployed as security officers by Defendant Crescent City Consulting, LLC (“Crescent City”). 3 Defendant Marlon Defillo is the president of Crescent City. 4 Plaintiffs allege Defendants failed to pay overtim e wages for tim e Plaintiffs worked in excess of 40 hours per week in violation of the FLSA. 5 Plaintiffs allege Defendants failed to com ply with the law “by im plem enting a m anagem ent policy, plan, or decision that intentionally provided for the com pensation of Plaintiffs and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs as if they were exem pt from coverage under 29 1 R. Doc. 25. 29 U.S.C. § 20 1 et seq. 3 R. Doc. 7; R. Doc. 57. 4 R. Doc. 26-1 at ¶ 2. 5 R. Doc. 7. 2 1 Dockets.Justia.com U.S.C. §§ 20 1 through 219, disregarding the fact that they were not exem pt.”6 Plaintiffs further allege Defendants did not m aintain proper tim e records as m andated by the FLSA. 7 Plaintiffs seek to recover unpaid overtim e wages, liquidated dam ages, statutory penalties, and attorney’s fees and costs. 8 On Septem ber 18, 20 15, Plaintiffs filed a m otion to conditionally certify under the FLSA. 9 Defendants filed a response in opposition to the m otion on October 1, 20 15, arguing that “Plaintiffs failed to m eet their burden because Plaintiffs’ pleadings an d declarations are broad and vague and fail to define the scope of the class for which they request class certification.”10 Plaintiffs filed a reply in support of their m otion on October 6, 20 15. 11 After a status conference with the parties, the Court granted Plaintiffs an opportunity to file a supplem ental m em orandum to clarify the scope of their proposed collective class. 12 Plain tiffs filed a supplem ental m em orandum on April 1, 20 16. 13 Plaintiffs request that the Court conditionally certify the following collective class: All non-law enforcem ent personnel, who, sin ce Decem ber 20 11, previously worked or currently work for Defendants in the State of Louisiana as a security officer (guard) and were not paid a rate of tim e and one-half for overtim e worked in excess of 40 hours in any week, regardless of classification as an independent contractor. 14 Defendants filed a supplem ental m em orandum in opposition on April 7, 20 16. 15 6 Id. at ¶ 59. Id. at ¶ 60 . 8 Id. at ¶ 20 . 9 R. Doc. 25. 10 R. Doc. 26 at 8 . 11 R. Doc. 31. 12 See R. Doc. 48 . 13 R. Doc. 57. Plaintiffs filed a supplem ental m em orandum on April 1, 20 16, to clarify the scope of their proposed collective class. 14 Id. at 3. 15 R. Doc. 58. 7 2 STAN D ARD OF LAW Section 20 7(a) of the FLSA requires covered em ployers to com pensate non-exem pt em ployees at overtim e rates for tim e worked in excess of statutorily-defin ed m axim um hours. 16 Courts construe the FLSA “liberally in favor of em ployees, and exem ptions are to be narrowly construed against the em ployers seeking to assert them .”17 Under the FLSA, an em ployee m ay brin g an action on “behalf of him self . . . and other em ployees sim ilarly situated” to recover unpaid wages, liquidated dam ages, and attorney’s fees from an em ployer in violation of the Act. 18 While the FLSA applies to em ployees, it does not apply to indepen dent contractors. 19 Unlike Rule 23 class actions, in which potential class m em bers m ay choose to opt out of the action, FLSA collective actions require potential class m em bers to affirm atively opt in to the action. 20 “District courts are provided with discretionary power to im plem ent the collective action procedure through the sending of notice to potential plaintiffs.”21 Notice m ust be “tim ely, accurate and inform ative.”22 When deciding whether to certify a collective action, the Court m ust determ ine whether the m em bers of the putative collective class are sufficiently “sim ilarly situated” such that the Court should circulate notice to potential class m em bers and provide them 16 29 U.S.C. § 20 7(a). See also McGavock v. City of W ater Valley , Miss., 452 F.3d 423, 424– 25 (5th Cir. 20 0 6) (“The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1983 establishes the gen eral rule that em ployees m ust receive overtim e com pensation at one and one-half tim es the regular rate for hours worked in excess of 40 hours during a seven -day workweek.”). 17 Id. at 424. 18 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 19 Hopkins v. Corn erstone Am ., 545 F.3d 338, 342 (5th Cir. 20 0 8). 20 See Sandoz v. Cingular W ireless LLC, 553 F.3d 913, 916 (5th Cir. 20 0 8); Baricuatro v. Indus. Pers. & Mgm t. Servs., Inc., No. 11-2777, 20 12 WL 547230 2, at *1 (E.D. La. Nov. 9, 20 12); Lim a v. Int’l Catastrophe Sols., Inc., 493 F. Supp. 2d 793, 797 (E.D. La. 20 0 7). 21 Lopez v. Hal Collum s Constr., LLC, No. 15-4113, 20 15 WL 730 2243, at *4 (E.D. La. Nov. 18, 20 15) (quotin g Lim a, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 797). 22 Lim a, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 797 (quotin g Hoffm ann-La Roche Inc. v . Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 172 (1989)). 3 with an opportunity to opt in to the case. 23 The FLSA does not define “sim ilarly situated.”24 In Mooney v. Aram co Services Co., 25 the Fifth Circuit recognized that courts have followed two approaches—one set forth in Lusardi v. Xerox Corporation 26 and the other in Shushan v. University of Colorado at Boulder 27—when evaluating whether putative class m em bers are “sim ilarly situated” and whether notice should be given. 28 Although the Fifth Circuit has not endorsed a particular approach, 29 district courts com m only follow the two-stage Lusardi approach, as will this Court. 30 The first Lusardi step is the “notice stage,” in which the Court is charged with deciding whether to grant “conditional certification” and issue notice to potential m em bers of the putative collective class. 31 This determ in ation is typically m ade on the basis of only the pleadings and any affidavits. 32 At the notice stage, the burden is on the plaintiff to dem onstrate that “(1) there is a reasonable basis for crediting the assertion that aggrieved individuals exist; (2) those aggrieved individuals are sim ilarly situated to the plaintiff in relevant respects given the claim s and defenses asserted; and (3) those 23 See 29 U.S.C. § 20 7(a). See 29 U.S.C. § 20 7; Johnson v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 567, 573 (E.D. La. 20 0 8 ). 25 Mooney v. Aram co Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 120 7, 1212 (5th Cir. 1995), overruled on other grounds by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (20 0 3). 26 Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 118 F.R.D. 351 (D.N.J . 1987). 27 Shushan v. Univ. of Colorado at Boulder, 132 F.R.D. 263 (D. Colo. 1990 ). 28 Mooney , 54 F.3d at 1213– 14. 29 Acevedo v. Allsup’s Convenience Stores, Inc., 60 0 F.3d 516, 518– 19 (5th Cir. 20 10 ) (“We have not ruled on how district courts should determ in e whether plaintiffs are sufficiently ‘sim ilarly situated’ to advance their claim s together in a single § 216(b) action.”). 30 See, e.g., Lang v. DirecTV, Inc., No. 10 -10 85, 20 11 WL 693460 7, at *7 (E.D. La. Dec. 30 , 20 11) (noting that the Lusardi approach is “the m ore com m on approach and routinely used by courts in this District”); Lim a, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 797; W illiam s v. Bally ’s Louisiana, Inc., No. 0 5-50 20 , 20 0 6 WL 123590 4, at *2 (E.D. La. May 5, 20 0 6) (“[A] consensus of courts apply a two-step an alysis for conditional certification . . . .”); Badgett v. Texas Taco Cabana, L.P., No. 0 5-3624, 20 0 6 WL 2934265, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 12, 20 0 6) (“While the Fifth Circuit has not endorsed a particular m ethod for this process, the m ore com m only used m ethod, an d the one utilized by other courts in the Southern District of Texas, is the “twostage” Lusardi m ethod.”); England v. N ew Century Fin. Corp., 370 F. Supp. 2d 50 4, 50 9 (M.D. La. 20 0 5); Basco v. W al-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 0 0 -3184, 20 0 4 WL 149770 9, at *4 (E.D. La. J uly 2, 20 0 4). 31 Chapm an v. LH C Grp., Inc., No. 13-6384, 20 15 WL 50 89531, at *5 (E.D. La. Aug. 27, 20 15). 32 Sandoz v. Cingular W ireless LLC, 553 F.3d 913, 916 n .2 (5th Cir. 20 0 8 ); Chapm an, 20 15 WL 50 8 9531, at *5 (citin g Mooney , 54 F.3d at 1213– 14). 24 4 individuals want to opt in to the lawsuit.”33 “Because the court has m inim al evidence, this determ ination is m ade using a fairly lenient standard, an d typically results in conditional certification of a representative class.”34 Generally, courts “require nothing m ore than substantial allegations that the putative class m em bers were together the victim s of a single decision, policy, or plan . . . .”35 While the burden is lenient, however, certification is not autom atic. 36 “[G]eneral allegations that the em ployer violated the FLSA are insufficient.”37 If the Court grants conditional certification, the case proceeds through discovery as a collective class action to the “m erits stage,” during which the defendant m ay m ove for decertification of the class. 38 At the m erits stage, the court applies a three-factor test, “considering (1) the extent to which em ploym ent settings are sim ilar or disparate; (2) the extent to which any of the em ployer’s defenses are com m on or individuated; and (3) fairness and procedural concerns.”39 The court then “m akes a factual determ ination on the sim ilarly situated question.”40 “If the claim ants are sim ilarly situated, the district court allows the representative action to proceed to trial.”41 If the claim ants are not sim ilarly situated, the court dism isses the claim s of the opt-in plaintiffs without prejudice, and the class representatives proceed to trial on their individual claim s. 42 33 Chapm an, 20 15 WL 50 8 9531, at *5. See also Morales v. Thang Hung Corp., No. 0 8-2795, 20 0 9 WL 252460 1, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 20 0 9). 34 Mooney , 54 F.3d at 1214 (internal quotation m arks om itted). 35 Mooney , 54 F.3d at 1214 n .8 (quotin g Sperling v. Hoffm an-La Roche, Inc., 118 F.R.D. 392, 40 7 (D.N.J . 1988 )). See also Skelton v. Sukothai, LLC, 994 F. Supp. 2d 785, 787 (E.D. La. 20 14). 36 W hite v. Integrated Elec. Techs., Inc., No. 12-359, 20 13 WL 290 30 70 , at *3 (E.D. La. J une 13, 20 13). 37 Melson v. Directech Sw ., Inc., No. 0 7-10 87, 20 0 8 sWL 2598988 , at *4 (E.D. La. J une 25, 20 0 8 ). 38 Chapm an, 20 15 WL 50 8 9531, at *6 (citing Mooney , 54 F.3d at 1214). 39 Id. See also Johnson, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 573– 74. 40 Mooney , 54 F.3d at 1214. 41 Id. 42 Id. 5 D ISCU SSION I. Conditional Certification of the FLSA Collective Action The three nam ed plaintiffs and the opt-in plaintiff each provided a sworn declaration in which they state they were em ployed by Defendants and worked as security guards. 43 Each plaintiff was paid $ 11 per hour, and, although they “routinely worked for Defendants for m ore than 40 hours per week,” they were not paid overtim e wages for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 44 Plaintiffs state they were each classified as “independent contractors” rather than em ployees and, as a result of this “m isclassification,” Defendants were allowed to circum vent the requirem ents of the FLSA, 45 as the FLSA applies to em ployees but not to independent contractors. 46 Defendants argue Plaintiffs and the m em bers of the proposed collective class are independent contractors and thus are not covered under the FLSA. 47 In their supplem ental opposition, Defendants contend that “[c]om m issioned officers perform ing guard work duties are independent contractors, but certified security guards want to carve out an exception and are requesting to be certified as em ployees entitled to overtim e.”48 Defendants do not contest that Plaintiffs and the putative collective class m em bers were em ployed by Defendants as security officers or guards, worked m ore than 40 hours per week on at least som e occasions, and were not paid overtim e for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 49 43 See R. Doc. 25-2 at ¶ 2; R. Doc. 25-3 at ¶ 2; R. Doc. 25-4 at ¶ 2; R. Doc. 25-5 at ¶ 2. See R. Doc. 25-2 at ¶ 5, 20 , 21; R. Doc. 25-3 at ¶ 5, 20 , 21; R. Doc. 25-4 at ¶ 5, 20 , 21; R. Doc. 25-5 at ¶ 5, 20 , 21. See also R. Doc. 57-8. 45 See R. Doc. 25-2 at ¶ 21; R. Doc. 25-3 at ¶ 21; R. Doc. 25-4 at ¶ 21; R. Doc. 25-5 at ¶ 21. 46 Hopkins v. Corn erstone Am ., 545 F.3d 338, 342 (5th Cir. 20 0 8). 47 R. Doc. 58. 48 Id. at 5. 49 See id. 44 6 To determ in e whether an individual qualifies as an em ployee or an indepen dent worker, the Court m ust consider the econom ic dependence of the individual. 50 The Fifth Circuit has enum erated five non-exhaustive factors to aid this determ ination: (1) the degree of control exercised by the alleged em ployer; (2) the extent of the relative investm ents of the worker and the alleged em ployer; (3) the degree to which the worker's opportunity for profit or loss is determ in ed by the alleged em ployer; (4) the skill and initiative required in perform ing the job; and (5) the perm anency of the relationship. 51 “No single factor is determ inative.”52 Several courts in this district have condition ally certified collective actions that involved alleged m isclassification of em ployees as independent contractors without first determ ining whether the individuals were indeed em ployees of the defendant. 53 “Im portantly, lower courts have found that the FLSA’s defin ition of em ployer is so broad that the case m ay proceed even where there exist threshold questions regarding em ploym ent status.”54 The Court “need not decide at this juncture the exact nature of the em ploym ent relationship.”55 While Defendants have “raised possibly legitim ate questions about the em ploym ent status of [Plaintiffs] and the proposed class m em bers, such an inquiry is better addressed at the decertification stage after discovery has occurred, when 50 Hopkins, 545 F.3d at 343. 51 Id. 52 Id. See, e.g., Prejean v . O’Brien’s Response Mgm t., Inc., No. 12-10 45, 20 13 WL 5960 674, at *8 (E.D. La. Nov. 6, 20 13); W hite v. Integrated Elec. Techs., Inc., No. 12-359, 20 13 WL 290 30 70 , at *5– 8 (E.D. La. J une 13, 20 13); Lang v. DirecTV, Inc., No. 10 -10 85, 20 11 WL 693460 7, at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 30 , 20 11). See also W alker v. Honghua Am ., LLC, 870 F. Supp. 2d 462, 469– 71 (S.D. Tex. 20 12) (“The Court believes that the econom ic factors test is likely not appropriate for determ ination at the first stage of FLSA class certification .”). 54 Lang, 20 11 WL 693460 7, at *3 (citin g Fernandes da Silva v. Roy al Constr. of La., LLC, No. 0 8-40 21, 20 0 9 WL 3565949 (E.D. La. Oct. 29, 20 0 9); N obles v . State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., No. 10 -0 4175, 20 11 WL 37940 21 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 25, 20 11)). 55 Lang, 20 11 WL 693460 7, at *3. 53 7 the court will be in a position to scrutinize all of the evidence in greater detail.”56 While the Court recognizes that Defendants m ay succeed in having this case decertified, the Court finds that Plaintiffs, at this tim e, have satisfied their lenient burden and have dem onstrated “a reasonable basis for the allegation that a class of sim ilarly situated persons m ay exist.”57 The Court finds Plaintiffs have provided sufficient evidence at this stage to dem onstrate a reasonable basis for finding that there exist aggrieved individuals who are sim ilarly situated to the plaintiffs in relevant respects and that those individuals want to opt in to the lawsuit. 58 The plaintiffs each provided a sworn declaration asserting they were security guards em ployed by Defendant and “routinely” worked in excess of 40 hours per week without receiving overtim e com pensation as required under the FLSA. Each plaintiff declared that he is personally aware that other security guards who perform ed the sam e duties were classified as “independent contractors,” worked in excess of 40 hours per week, and were not paid overtim e. 59 Plaintiffs also provided payroll records to support their assertion that they were not paid overtim e wages for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 60 Plaintiffs essentially allege that Defendants’ policy was to m isclassify non-law enforcem ent security guards in order to circum vent the overtim e-wage requirem ent of the FLSA. At this stage, courts generally consider whether potential plaintiffs were identified, whether affidavits or sworn declarations of potential plaintiffs were subm itted, and whether eviden ce of a widespread discrim inatory plan was 56 Prejean , 20 13 WL 5960 674, at *8. Lim a, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 798. See W hite, 20 13 WL 290 30 70 , at *6. 58 See Chapm an , 20 15 WL 50 89531, at *5; Morales, 20 0 9 WL 252460 1, at *2. 59 R. Doc. 25-2 at ¶¶ 22– 24; R. Doc. 25-3 at ¶¶ 22– 24; R. Doc. 25-4 at ¶¶ 22– 24; R. Doc. 25-5 at ¶¶ 22– 24. 60 See, e.g., R. Doc. 57-8 . 57 8 subm itted 61 and “require nothing m ore than substantial allegations that the putative class m em bers were together the victim s of a single decision, policy, or plan . . . .”62 Plaintiffs’ allegations and evidence of Defendants’ generally applicable policy “are sufficient to satisfy the len ient standard for conditional certification at the notice stage.”63 Accordingly, conditional certification is appropriate. II. Form , Content, and Tim ing of Notice to be Given The judicial system benefits by efficient resolution in one proceeding of com m on issues of law and fact arising from the sam e alleged activity. 64 “These benefits, however, depen d on em ployees’ receiving accurate and tim ely notice concerning the penden cy of the collective action, so that they can m ake inform ed decisions about whether to participate.”65 Plaintiffs have subm itted a proposed notice form setting forth the scope of the litigation and inform in g putative class m em bers of their rights 66 and the opt-in consent form that putative class m em bers m ay sign and return in order to opt in to this case. 67 After Plaintiffs narrowed the scope of their class definition in their supplem ental m em orandum , Plaintiffs did not subm it revised notice and consent form s to reflect the collective class proposed therein. Accordingly, Plaintiffs shall revise their proposed notice and con sent form s to reflect the class definition approved by this order. Plaintiffs request that the Court authorize the distribution of the notice and 61 Lim a, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 798. Mooney , 54 F.3d at 1214 n .8 (quoting Sperling, 118 F.R.D. at 40 7). See also Skelton, 994 F. Supp. 2d at 787. 63 Prejean , 20 13 WL 5960 674, at *8. 64 See Hoffm ann -LaRoche, 493 U.S. at 170 . 65 Id. 66 R. Doc. 25-6. 67 R. Doc. 25-7. 62 9 consent form s to the last known address of potential m em bers of the collective class. 68 In order to facilitate notice, Plaintiffs request that the Court require Defendants to produce, within 14 days, a com puter-readable database that contains the nam es of all potential class m em bers and each potential m em ber’s last-known m ailing address, em ail address, telephone num ber, and Social Security num ber. 69 Plaintiffs propose that, in order to opt in to the lawsuit, the potential m em bers have 120 days after the date on which the notice and con sent form s are m ailed to postm ark their consent form s. Defendants do not oppose Plaintiffs’ requests or their proposed notice an d consent form s, 70 and several courts have approved sim ilar requests. 71 Courts are reluctant, however, to require em ployers to provide Plaintiffs with potential class m em bers’ Social Security num bers. 72 This Court recognizes the significant privacy and security concerns inherent in disclosing potential class m em bers’ Social Security num bers an d finds that “[a]ny need for the com pelled disclosure of such data is outweighed by the privacy interests of these current and form er workers.”73 Accordingly, the Court will not order 68 R. Doc. 25-1 at 16– 17. Id. at 17. 70 See R. Docs. 26, 58 . 71 See, e.g., Prejean, 20 13 WL 5960 674, at *1 (requirin g Defendants to give Plain tiffs within 30 days “a com puter-readable data file containin g all potential opt-in plaintiffs’ nam es and last known m ailin g and em ail addresses” (em phasis in original)); W illiam s, 20 0 6 WL 123590 4, at *3 (approving opt-in period of 180 days from entry of the order and requirin g defendant to provide plaintiffs with nam es, last-known addresses, and phone num bers of all potential opt-in plaintiffs within 26 days); Recinos-Recinos v. Express Forestry , Inc., 233 F.R.D. 472, 48 2 (E.D. La. 20 0 6) (approving opt-in period of 18 0 days from entry of the order and requirin g defendants to provide plaintiffs with nam es, last-known addresses, and phone num bers of all potential opt-in plaintiffs within 16 days); Cam p v. Progressive Corp., No. 0 1-2680 , 20 0 2 WL 31496661 (E.D. La. Nov. 8, 20 0 2) (approvin g opt-in period of 120 days from entry of the order). 72 See, e.g., Garcia v . TW C Adm in., LLC, No. 14-985, 20 15 WL 1737932, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 20 15) (declinin g to order the defendant to provide plaintiffs’ with the potential class m em bers’ Social Security num bers and explain ing that, “[w]ith respect to Social Security num bers in particular, privacy and security concerns outweigh the interest in ensuring that notice is received at this stage”); W hite, 20 13 WL 290 30 70 , at *10 (declin ing to order the defendants to provide the plaintiffs with the last four digits of potential class m em bers’ Social Security num bers); Hum phries v. Stream Int’l, Inc., 20 0 4 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20 465, at *12 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 20 0 4) (declinin g to order defendants to produce the last four digits of class m em bers’ Social Security num bers because “[t]his highly person al inform ation about persons who m ay in fact have no interest in this litigation should not be disclosed on the thin basis that [plaintiff’s] counsel desires it”). 73 Hum phries, 20 0 4 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20 465, at *12. 69 10 Defendants to provide the Social Security num bers of potential class m em bers. The Court otherwise grants Plaintiffs’ unopposed requests. CON CLU SION Accordingly; IT IS ORD ERED that Plaintiffs’ m otion to conditionally certify this m atter as a collective action under the FLSA is GRAN TED . The Court conditionally certifies this m atter as a collective action with respect to all non-law enforcem ent personnel, who, since Decem ber 20 11, previously worked or currently work for Defendants in the State of Louisiana as a security officer (guard) and were not paid a rate of tim e and one-half for overtim e worked in excess of 40 hours in any week, regardless of classification as an independent contractor. IT IS FU RTH ER ORD ERED that Plaintiffs file a revised notice form and a revised opt-in consent form in accordance with this order by Ju ly 7, 2 0 16 . IT IS FU RTH ER ORD ERED that Defendants produce to Plaintiffs a com puterreadable database with the nam es, last-known m ailing addresses, em ail addresses, and telephone num bers of all potential class m em bers by Ju ly 13 , 2 0 16 . IT IS FU RTH ER ORD ERED that class m em bers seeking to opt in to this case will have 120 days from the date on which the notice and consent form s are m ailed to postm ark their consent form s in order to opt in. N e w Orle a n s , Lo u is ian a, th is 2 9 th d ay o f Ju n e , 2 0 16 . ________________________________ SU SIE MORGAN U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT J U D GE 11
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