Starks v. Advantage Staffing, LLC, et al, No. 2:2014cv01592 - Document 171 (E.D. La. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS granting in part and denying in part 157 Motion for New Trial. IT IS ORDERED that the Plaintiffs motion for additur is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiffs motion for a new trial on general and special damages is GRANTED. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan on 11/14/2016. (cg)
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Starks v. Advantage Staffing, LLC, et al Doc. 171 U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT COU RT EASTERN D ISTRICT OF LOU ISIAN A CH ED RICK STARKS CIVIL ACTION VERSU S N O. 14 -15 9 2 AD VAN TAGE STAFFIN G, LLC, e t al SECTION “E” ( 5) ORD ER AN D REAS ON S Before the Court is Plaintiff’s m otion to for additur or, in the alternative, m otion for a new trial. 1 The m otion is opposed. 2 The Plaintiff argues an additur or a new trial is warranted because the jury awarded the Plaintiff future m edical expenses, but did not award him dam ages for future pain and suffering. 3 I. Motion for Additur The Plaintiff argues the Court should grant him additional dam ages—an additur— for future pain and suffering dam ages. 4 The Seventh Am en dm ent, however, prohibits courts from using additur to increase the dam ages awarded by the jury. 5 There is a lim ited exception to this prohibition where “the jury has properly determ in ed liability an d there is no valid dispute as to the am ount of dam ages.”6 “[This] exception applies only where the am ount of dam ages has been conclusively established as a m atter of law.”7 This exception does not apply to this case, and the Plaintiff’s m otion for additur is denied. 1 R. Doc. 157. R. Doc. 165. 3 R. Doc. 157-1. 4 Id. 5 Jones v. Bratton, 39 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam ); Gasperini v. Ctr. for Hum anities, 518 U.S. 415, 433 (1996). 6 Rom an v. W estern Mfg., Inc., 691 F.3d 68 6, 70 2 (5th Cir. 20 12). 7 Matheny v. Chavez, 593 Fed. App’x 30 6, 30 9 (5th Cir. 20 14). 2 1 Dockets.Justia.com II. Motion for New Trial Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(1)(A), a court m ay grant a m otion for a new trial if the court finds the verdict is against the weight of the eviden ce, the dam ages awarded are excessive or inadequate, the trial was unfair, or prejudicial error was com m itted. 8 The grounds for granting a new trial m ust be that the verdict is against the w eight of the evidence, not m erely the preponderance of the evidence. 9 “Courts do not grant new trials unless it is reasonably clear that prejudicial error has crept into the record or that substantial justice has not been done, and the burden of showing harm ful error rests on the party seeking a new trial.”10 A district court should not grant a new trial if the jury’s verdict is “clearly within the universe of possible awards which are supported by the evidence.”11 The Plaintiff brought this lawsuit against Defendants on the theory of negligence under general m aritim e law for personal injuries sustained as a result of a piece of equipm ent breaking free and striking the Plaintiff. As a result of the incident, the Plaintiff underwent m ultiple surgeries on his arm . The jury returned a verdict stating the Defendants were 50 % liable and the Plaintiff was 50 % liable for those injuries. 12 The parties stipulated to $ 10 9, 213.96 for past m edical expenses. 13 The jury then awarded the Plaintiff $ 16,0 0 0 for unpaid past m edical expenses, $ 50 ,0 0 0 for past pain and suffering, 8 See Lucas v. Am . Mfg. Co., 630 F.2d 291, 293 (5th Cir. 1980 ); Sm ith v . Transw orld Drilling Co., 773 F.2d 610 , 613 (5th Cir. 1985). 9 Pagan v. Shoney ’s, Inc., 931 F.2d 334, 337 (5th Cir. 1991). 10 Peralta v. Epic Diving and Marine Servs., LLC, No. 10 -4322, 20 12 WL 3815634, at *1 (E.D. La. Sept. 4, 20 12) (quoting Del Rio Dist., Inc. v. Adolph Coors, Co., 589 F.2d 176, 179 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979)). 11 Brun-Jacobo v. Pan Am . W orld Airw ay s, Inc., 847 F.2d 242, 246 (5th Cir. 1988 ). 12 R. Doc. 148 at 2. 13 R. Doc. 10 4. 2 and $ 150 ,0 0 0 for future m edical expenses. 14 The jury entered zero as the award for future physical pain an d suffering and m ental anguish. 15 The Defendants argue the jury’s verdict is proper because there was eviden ce presented to the jury that provide a basis for not awarding dam ages for future pain and suffering. 16 The Defendants argue this case is sim ilar to Dietz v. Garske, where the Fifth Circuit affirm ed the trial court’s denial of a new trial on dam ages because there was eviden ce on which jurors could rely that the plaintiff would not have future pain. 17 The plaintiff in Dietz suffered whiplash after an autom obile accident, and the jury heard testim ony that she could “live with pain without surgery.”18 The independent m edical exam iner concluded that surgery was not necessary because future pain “could be controlled with very m inim al follow-up care, including m edications, exercise, or physical therapy.”19 Courts have held that it is “inconceivable” that a jury could find for past and future m edical expenses and past pain and suffering, but not for future pain and suffering. 20 The failure to award dam ages for future pain and suffering, however, does not autom atically require a new trial. W iltz v. W elch, a recent Fifth Circuit opinion, explains the following: [T]he dem arcation line for these cases is whether the plaintiff has proven objective in juries that require m edical care. If a plaintiff establishes objective injuries, then a jury’s failure to award dam ages for pain and suffering is an abuse of discretion. But if a plaintiff fails to prove objective injuries and instead incurs m edical expenses for evaluative or precautionary 14 Id. The jury also awarded the Plaintiff $ 39,50 0 for lost incom e and $ 10 ,0 0 0 for loss of future earn ing capacity. Id. 15 Id. 16 R. Doc. 165. 17 40 6 Fed. App’x 863, 866 (5th Cir. 20 10 ). 18 Id. at 865. 19 Id. 20 See Yarbrough v. Sturm , Ruger & Co., 964 F.2d 376, 379 (5th Cir. 1992). 3 purposes, then a jury’s award of special dam ages but no general dam ages is not an abuse of discretion. 21 In W iltz, the Fifth Circuit found that the jury did not abuse its discretion by failing to award Wiltz general dam ages because “there was insufficient evidence to conclude that his collision with Welch resulted in com pensable pain and suffering and that his m edical care was som ething m ore than evaluative or precautionary in nature.”22 Unlike the plaintiff in Dietz and W iltz, the Plaintiff in this case underwent m ultiple surgeries for injuries to his wrist an d elbow, which necessarily cause pain and suffering. The Plaintiff provided testim ony that he continues to have m uscle spasm s and is unable to com plete household chores because of pain in his wrist. Dr. Fenn, the Plaintiff’s treating physician, provided testim ony that the Plaintiff will require pain m edication in the future. Dr. Cowen, the Plaintiff’s life care planner, testified the Plaintiff will experien ce chronic pain in his left wrist, and this chronic pain could have behavioral side effects, such as depression an d anxiety. Dr. Gidm an, an indepen dent m edical exam in er, opined the Plaintiff will need to see a hand surgeon one or two tim es per year for approxim ately two m ore years, and the Plaintiff will likely need to continue taking pain m edication for another year. The Court therefore finds there is no evidentiary basis for the jury’s award of “$ 0 ” for future pain and suffering because the Plaintiff has proven objective injuries that require m edical care. 23 21 W iltz v. W elch, 651 Fed. App’x 270 , 273 (5th Cir. 20 16). Id. 23 The Plaintiff does not argue that the jury’s verdict was a “com prom ise verdict.” “A com prom ise verdict occurs when a jury which is unable agree on liability com prom ises that disagreem ent and awards inadequate dam ages.” Rogers v. McDorm an , 521 F.3d 381, 396– 97 (5th Cir. 20 0 8). The Court exam in es the totality of the circum stances to determ ine whether the jury reached a com prom ise verdict, considering “any indicia of com prom ise apparent from the record . . . and other factors which m ay have caused the jury to return a verdict for inadequate dam ages.” Pagan, 931 F.2d at 339. But an inadequate finding of dam ages alone “does not autom atically m andate the conclusion that a com prom ise verdict produced the award.” Id. The Plaintiff does not point to any other action besides the jury’s inconsistent verdict to suggest a 22 4 Accordingly, a new trial is warranted on the issue of dam ages for the Plaintiff’s injuries. “On retrial, questions of both general and special dam ages should be subm itted to the jury, and the jury should be instructed that if it awards no general dam ages, it m ay not award any special dam ages.”24 Accordingly; IT IS ORD ERED that the Plaintiff’s m otion for additur is D EN IED . IT IS FU RTH ER ORD ERED that the Plaintiff’s m otion for a new trial on gen eral and special dam ages 25 is GRAN TED . N e w Orle a n s , Lo u is ian a, th is 14 th d ay o f N o ve m be r, 2 0 16 . _____________________ _______ SU SIE MORGAN U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT J U D GE com prom ise verdict. Accordingly, the Court does not find that the jury’s award of “$ 0 ” was a result of a com prom ise verdict. 24 Pagan, 931 F. at 337– 38. In this case the parties’ stipulated to the dam ages for past m edical expenses that had already been paid in the am ount of $ 10 9,213.96. 25 R. Doc. 157. 5
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