Webster v. Board of Supervisors of the University of Louisiana System et al, No. 2:2013cv06613 - Document 103 (E.D. La. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS denying plaintiff Dr. Michael G. Webster's MOTION 101 to review and reverse the Courts taxation of costs. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 8/24/16. (jjs)
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Webster v. Board of Supervisors of the University of Louisiana System et al Doc. 103 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA DR. MICHAEL G. WEBSTER VERSUS CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-6613 BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA SYSTEM, ET AL. SECTION “R” (3) ORD ER AN D REASON S Before the Court is plaintiff Dr. Michael G. Webster’s m otion to review and reverse the Court’s taxation of costs. In his m otion, Webster argues that Section 1220 5 of the Am ericans with Disabilities Act of 1990 displaces Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and, with it, the presum ption that prevailing parties are entitled to costs. Because the Court finds that Section 1220 5 is not “contrary” to Rule 54, Webster’s m otion is denied. I. BACKGROU N D Plaintiff Dr. Michael G. Webster filed this action alleging violations of the Am ericans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and the ADA Am endm ents Act of 20 0 8. Webster sued (1) the Board of Supervisors of the University of Louisiana System ; (2) Eric J ohnson, in his personal capacity Dockets.Justia.com and official capacity as Sims Library Director at Southeastern Louisiana University (SLU); (3) Lynette Ralph, in her personal capacity and official capacity as Assistant Sim s Library Director at SLU; and (4) Victor Pregeant, in his personal capacity and official capacity as Com pliance Officer for Equal Em ploym ent Opportunity / Am ericans with Disabilities Act at SLU. 1 In his com plaint, Webster alleged that he suffers from m anic and m ajor depression, and that he experienced discrim ination, harassment, and term ination following depression-induced actions. 2 On August 8, 20 14, the Court dism issed Webster’s claim s for m oney dam ages against SLU and against J ohnson, Ralph, and Pregeant in their official capacities, and Webster’s claim s against J ohnson, Ralph, and Pregeant in their personal capacities. 3 The Court permitted Webster to proceed with his claim s for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief against J ohnson, Ralph, and Pregeant in their official capacities. 4 On March 16, 20 15, Webster filed a m otion for leave to am end his com plaint to add a claim under Section 50 4 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 70 1, et seq., and to add or clarify a claim under Louisiana state 1 2 3 4 R. Doc. 1. Id. at 5-11. R. Doc. 26. Id. 2 obligations law. 5 The Magistrate J udge granted Webster’s m otion to add a Section 50 4 claim as to the Board of Supervisors, but denied the m otion in all other respects. 6 On review of the Magistrate J udge’s order, this Court reversed the Magistrate J udge’s decision in part and denied Webster’s m otion for leave to am end his com plaint to add a claim under Section 50 4. 7 On J uly 21, 20 15 the Court granted sum m ary judgment on all of Webster’s rem aining claim s and entered judgment in favor of defendants. 8 Following entry of judgm ent, defendants subm itted a Bill of Costs seeking reimbursement for $ 1,222.80 in court reporter and service of process fees. 9 Webster opposed the Bill of Costs, arguing that under the ADA’s attorney’s fees and costs provision, defendants are entitled to costs only if Webster’s suit was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. 10 The Clerk of Court rejected Webster’s argum ent and granted costs to defendants. 11 Webster now moves for review and reversal of the Bill of Costs, 12 and Defendants oppose the m otion. 13 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 R. Doc. 63. R. Doc. 73. R. Doc. 90 . R. Doc. 96; R. Doc. 97. R. Doc. 98. R. Doc. 99. R. Doc. 10 0 . R. Doc. 10 1. R. Doc. 10 2. 3 II. D ISCU SSION A district court reviews the Clerk of Court’s award of costs by exercising its own discretion to “decide the cost question [it]self.” Farm er v. Arabian Am . Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 233 (1964). Under Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, costs, “other than attorney’s fees,” should be allowed to a prevailing party “[u]nless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise . . . .” In Marx v. General Revenue Corp., the Suprem e Court offered com prehensive guidance for determ ining whether a statute “provides otherwise” and therefore displaces Rule 54: A statute “provides otherwise” than Rule 54(d)(1) if it is “contrary” to the Rule. See 10 J . Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 54.10 1[1][c], p. 54– 159 (3d ed. 20 12) (hereinafter 10 Moore’s). Because the Rule grants district courts discretion to award costs, a statute is contrary to the Rule if it lim its that discretion. A statute m ay lim it a court’s discretion in several ways, and it need not expressly state that it is displacing Rule 54(d)(1) to do so. ... Im portantly, not all statutes that provide for costs are contrary to Rule 54(d)(1). A statute providing that “the court m ay award costs to the prevailing party,” for exam ple, is not contrary to the Rule because it does not lim it a court’s discretion. See 10 Moore’s § 54.10 1[1][c], at 54– 159 (“A num ber of statutes state sim ply that the court may award costs in its discretion. Such a provision is not contrary to Rule 54(d)(1) and does not displace the court’s discretion under the Rule”). 133 S. Ct. 1166, 1173 (20 13). The Court then applied this standard and held that The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 4 1692k(a)(3)—which states that “the court m ay award to the defendant attorney’s fees reasonable in relation to the work expended and costs”—does not displace Rule 54. Id. at 1175. Section 1220 5 of the ADA, the costs provision at issue in this case, provides in pertinent part: “In any action or adm inistrative proceeding com m enced pursuant to this chapter, the court or agency, in its discretion, m ay allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and costs . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1220 5. Under the so-called Christiansburg test, attorney ’s fees should be awarded to a prevailing defendant under this section only if “the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” Christiansburg Garm ent Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978); see also Dutton v. Univ. Healthcare Sy s., L.L.C., 136 F. App’x 596, 60 4 (5th Cir. 20 0 5). Webster argues that the Christiansburg test extends to costs, and that a prevailing defendant in an ADA suit is therefore entitled to costs only when plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Webster cites several opinions that have held accordingly. See, e.g., Brow n v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 20 0 1) (“Because § 1220 5 makes fees and costs parallel, we hold that the Christiansburg test also applies to an award of costs to a prevailing defendant under the ADA”). 5 Webster’s cases, however, predate Marx. 14 The parties do not cite, and the Court has not found, any cases construing the interplay between Rule 54(d)(1) and Section 1220 5 in light of Marx. The Court finds that, applying Marx, the perm issive, “m ay” language of Section 1220 5 plainly does not lim it the Court’s discretion and is therefore not contrary to Rule 54(d)(1). This conclusion is supported by the sim ilarities between Section 1220 5 and the FDCPA provision considered by the Supreme Court. Both statutes provide that the court “m ay” grant attorney’s fees and costs to a party, but do not preclude the Court from taking any particular action with respect to costs. Because Section 1220 5 is not contrary, it does not “provide otherwise,” and Rule 54(d)(1) governs the allocation of costs in this case. Accordingly, the Clerk’s order is consistent with the “strong presum ption” contained in the Rule that the prevailing party will be awarded costs. Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 793 (5th Cir. 20 0 6). The m ere fact that Webster’s suit was not frivolous is insufficient to overcom e the presum ption. Id. at 795 (“The district court abused its discretion in denying costs to the prevailing party on 14 Even discounting Marx, the Court is skeptical that Christiansburg’s holding could be extended to costs. The “Am erican Rule” that the prevailing litigant m ay not collect attorney’s fees has long distinguished between attorney’s fees and other costs. See Aly eska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. W ilderness Soc’y , 421 U.S. 240 , 247-262 (1975). 6 the basis of plaintiff’s good faith alone.”). Defendants are therefore entitled to costs. III. CON CLU SION For the reasons above, plaintiff Dr. Michael G. Webster’s m otion to review and reverse the Court’s taxation of costs is DENIED. 24th New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ _ _ _ _ day of August, 20 16. _____________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 7
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