In Re: The Matter of Marquette Transportation Company Gulf-Inland, LLC, No. 2:2013cv05114 - Document 98 (E.D. La. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS granting 58 Motion by Marquette for Judgment on the Pleadings. The Tran claimants shall have five (5) days from the entry of this order to amend their claim that Marquette was negligent in hiring and retaining Kass as captain of the FATHER SEELOS. All other claims addressed in Marquette's motion are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 4/20/16. (jjs)
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In Re: The Matter of Marquette Transportation Company Gulf-Inland, LLC Doc. 98 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA CIVIL ACTION IN THE MATTER OF MARQUETTE TRANSPORTATION COMPANY GULF-INLAND, LLC, AS OWNER AND OPERATOR OF THE TOWING VESSEL FATHER SEELOS, ETC. NO: 13-5114 SECTION: R ORD ER AN D REASON S Lim itation plaintiff Marquette Transportation Com pany Gulf-Inland, LLC m oves the Court for judgm ent on the pleadings with respect to the Tran claim ants’ claim s for unseaworthiness, negligent hiring and negligent retention, gross negligence, and punitive dam ages. 1 For the following reasons, the Court grants the m otion. I. BACKGROU N D This case arises out of a J uly 7, 20 13 collision between the FATHER SEELOS, a towing vessel owned and operated by Marquette Transportation Com pany Gulf-Inland, LLC (“Marquette”), and a fishing vessel owned by 1 R. Doc. 58. Dockets.Justia.com J ohn Tran. 2 The collision occurred while the FATHER SEELOS was pushing barges in the territorial waters of the State of Texas. 3 As a result of the collision, the fishing vessel was destroyed and J ohn Tran was killed. 4 On J uly 18, 20 13, Marquette filed a com plaint seeking exoneration from or lim itation of liability under 46 U.S.C. § 30 50 1, et seq. 5 Marquette also posted a bond for the lim itation fund in the am ount of $ 3,30 0 ,0 0 0 (the alleged value of the FATHER SEELOS and her pending freight). The Court then stayed all actions arising out of the collision and ordered that any claim ant seeking recovery for any loss, dam age, or injury caused by the collision m ust file his or her claim with this Court by October 25, 20 13. 6 On October 23, 20 13, claim ants Susan Tran (individually and as a personal representative of the decedent, J ohn Tran, on behalf of herself and her m inor child, Marsha Tran), Quoc Tran, J eanie Tran, and Nancy Pham filed a claim against Marquette under general m aritim e law and the 2 3 Id. 4 Id. at 3. 5 R. Doc. 1. 6 2 R. Doc. 1 at 2. R. Doc. 5. survival and wrongful death laws of Texas and/ or Louisiana. 7 In their Am ended Claim, the Tran claim ants allege that the negligence and/ or gross negligence of Marquette and the unseaworthiness of the FATHER SEELOS caused J ohn Tran’s death. 8 Specifically, the Tran claimants allege that Marquette drove the FATHER SEELOS on the wrong side of the navigable channel and failed to, am ong other things, keep a proper lookout and m aintain a safe distance between the FATHER SEELOS and J ohn Tran’s fishing vessel. 9 The Tran claim ants further allege that Marquette was negligent in hiring and retaining Timothy David Kass, the captain of the FATHER SEELOS at the tim e of the collision. 10 The Tran claim ants seek com pensatory dam ages, as well as punitive dam ages under general m aritim e law. 11 Marquette now m oves for judgment on the pleadings concerning the Tran claim ants’ unseaworthiness, negligent hiring and negligent retention, 7 R. Doc. 7. 8 R. Doc. 54 at 2-3. 9 Id. 10 Id. at 3. 11 Id. 3 at 3-4. gross negligence, and punitive dam ages claim s. 12 Marquette argues that the Tran claim ants cannot m aintain an unseaworthiness claim against Marquette as the owner of the FATHER SEELOS because J ohn Tran was not a crew m ember of that vessel. As to the rem aining claim s, Marquette argues that the Tran claim ants’ allegations are conclusory and insufficient to satisfy the pleading standards of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. II. LEGAL STAN D ARD A m otion for judgm ent on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is appropriate if the m atter can be adjudicated by deciding questions of law rather than factual disputes. Brittan Com m c’ns Int’l Corp. v. Sw . Bell Tel. Co., 313 F.3d 899, 90 4 (5th Cir. 20 0 2). It is subject to the same standard as a m otion to dism iss under Rule 12(b)(6). My Space, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 20 0 8). Doe v. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) m otion to dism iss, the plaintiff m ust plead enough facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (20 0 7). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads 12 4 R. Doc. facts that allow the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the m isconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (20 0 9). A court m ust accept all well-pleaded facts as true and m ust draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Lorm and v. U.S. Unw ired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 239 (5th Cir. 20 0 9). But the Court is not bound to accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A legally sufficient com plaint m ust establish m ore than a “sheer possibility” that plaintiff’s claim is true. Id. It need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it m ust go beyond labels, legal conclusions, or form ulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action. Id. In other words, the face of the complaint m ust contain enough factual m atter to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of each element of the plaintiff’s claim. Lorm and, 565 F.3d at 257. If there are insufficient factual allegations to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, or if it is apparent from the face of the com plaint that there is an insuperable bar to relief, the claim m ust be dism issed. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. at 555. 5 III. D ISCU SSION Marquette m oves for judgm ent on the pleadings on the Tran claim ants’ claim s for unseaworthiness, negligent hiring and negligent retention, gross negligence, and punitive dam ages. The Court addresses each claim in turn. A. U n s e aw o rth in e s s Marquette argues that the Tran claim ants cannot m aintain an unseaworthiness claim against Marquette as the owner of the FATHER SEELOS because J ohn Tran was not a crew m ember of that vessel. 13 The Tran claim ants do not argue against this conclusion. A shipowner’s duty to provide a seaworthy vessel is an absolute and nondelegable duty which “the owner of a vessel owes to the m em bers of the crew w ho m an her.” United N ew York & N ew Jersey Sandy Hook Pilots Ass’n v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613, 616 (1959) (em phasis added). The duty of seaworthiness requires the shipowner to furnish the crew with a vessel, and its appurtenances, that are reasonably fit for their intended uses. Mitchell v. Traw ler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960 ). With a narrow exception, 13 6 R. Doc. 58-1 at 3. not applicable here, 14 a plaintiff cannot assert an unseaworthiness cause of action against a vessel on which he is not a crew mem ber. See, e.g., Coakley v. SeaRiver Mar., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 712, 714 (E.D. La. 20 0 4), aff’d, 143 F. App’x 565 (5th Cir. 20 0 5) (holding that seam an working on a barge while employed as a crewman of a tow vessel could not m aintain an unseaworthiness action against the barge owner); Speer v. Taira Ly nn Marine, Ltd., Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 826, 829 (S.D. Tex. 20 0 0 ) (“In order to bring an unseaworthiness cause of action, plaintiff m ust be a m em ber of the crew of the vessel on which he suffered his injury.”). Here, the Tran claim ants do not allege that J ohn Tran was a crew m ember aboard the FATHER SEELOS. Their claim is that J ohn Tran was 14 In Sea Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, the United States Supreme Court extended the unseaworthiness cause of action to longshorem en em ployed by an independent contractor but doing the work of a seam an aboard ship. 328 U.S. 85, 99 (1946). But in 1972, Congress amended the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Com pensation Act (LHWCA) to add 33 U.S.C. § 90 5(b), which effectively abolished the Sieracki unseaworthiness cause of action. Edm onds v. Com pagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443, U.S. 256, 262 (1979). The Sieracki cause of action is still available to certain workers who are not subject to the LHWCA. See Aparicio v. Sw an Lake, 643 F.2d 110 9, 114 (5th Cir. Unit At 1981) (holding that federally-employed worker not covered by the LHWCA had a Sieracki claim ). But the Tran claim ants do not claim that J ohn Tran was a Sieracki seam an, and such an claim would be m eritless under Fifth Circuit law. See Sm ith v. Harbor Tow ing & Fleeting, Inc., 910 F.2d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 1990 ) (declining to extend Sieracki seam an status to seam an injured on vessels on which they are not crew m embers). 7 operating a different vessel when it was struck by the FATHER SEELOS. Thus, the Tran claim ants fail to state an unseaworthiness claim against Marquette as a m atter of law, and the Court grants Marquette’s m otion to judgm ent on the pleadings with respect to this claim . B. N e glige n t H irin g/ Re te n tio n Marquette argues that the Tran claim ants fail to allege facts to support claims of negligent hiring and negligent retention of Kass, the captain of the FATHER SEELOS. Specifically, Marquette contends that the Tran claim ants’ claim offers labels and conclusions, and does not allege facts suggesting that Marquette failed to inquire into Kass’s qualifications or that a lack of inquiry was a legal cause of the collision. 15 To state a claim for negligence under general m aritim e law, a plaintiff m ust allege “that there was a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, breach of that duty, injury sustained by the plaintiff, and a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury.” In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. LLC, 624 F.3d 20 1, 211 (5th Cir. 20 10 ) (quoting Canal Barge Co. v. Torco Oil Co., 220 F.3d 370 , 376 (5th Cir. 20 0 0 )). As to causation a party’s negligence is actionable only if it is the 15 8 R. Doc. 58-1 at 5. “legal cause” of the plaintiff’s injuries. Id. The Fifth Circuit defines legal cause as “something m ore than but for causation,” meaning that “the negligence m ust be a substantial factor” in causing the injuries. Id. Here, the Tran claim ants fail to plausible allege that Marquette was negligent in hiring and retaining Kass as a captain. While a shipowner owes a duty to exercise reasonable care in selecting a master and crew, see Kersey v. Am . River Transp. Co., 353 F. Supp. 2d 683, 696 (E.D. La. 20 0 4) (quoting Thom as J . Schoenbaum , Adm iralty and Maritim e Law § 6– 22, at 348 (4th ed. 20 0 4)), a claim that a shipowner breached that duty requires m ore than a formulaic recitation of the elem ents of the cause of action. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. at 555. The relevant portions of the Am ended Claim m erely allege, without factual support, that Marquette is liable to claim ants for “negligent hiring of” and “negligent entrustment to a reckless, incom petent and/ or unsafe captain.”16 The Tran claim ants provide no facts dem onstrating how Marquette’s hiring process failed to conform to the applicable standard of care. Nor do they plead facts to support the conclusion that Kass was “reckless” and “incom petent” at the tim e 16 9 R. Doc. 54 at 3. Marquette hired him . Cf. Patterson v. Om ega Protein, Inc., No. CIV.A. 136293, 20 14 WL 4354461, at *7 (E.D. La. Sept. 2, 20 14) (finding that plaintiff could not recover for against vessel owner for negligent hiring when there was no indication that the negligence of a crew member who harm ed plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable when the crew mem ber was hired). Finally, as to the claim of negligent retention, the Am ended Claim is devoi of facts tending to show that a reasonable employer would have term inated Kass prior to the collision that killed J ohn Tran. Thus, the Tran claim ants fail to state a plausible negligence claim against Marquette based on its hiring and retention of Kass. To resist this conclusion, the Tran claim ants ask the Court to consider public records dem onstrating that Kass has m ultiple felony convictions. While it is true that district courts m ay consider m atters of public record without converting a m otion for judgm ent on the pleadings into a m otion for sum mary judgm ent, Stringer v. Davis Mountain Prop. Ow ners Ass’n, Inc., 81 F. App’x 50 2 (5th Cir. 20 0 3), the Tran claim ants give no argument explaining why Kass’s crim inal history rendered him unfit to operate the FATHER SEELOS. 17 Because the Tran claim ants fail to explain how Kass’s 17 While the Tran claim ants do argue that the felony convictions suggest that Marquette should have conducted a background check on 10 convictions cure the deficiencies in their Am ended Claim, the Court will not consider them in ruling on Marquette’s motion for judgm ent on the pleadings. Accordingly, Marquette is entitled to judgm ent on the pleadings on the Tran claim ants’ negligent hiring and negligent retention claim s. C. Gro s s N e glige n ce Marquette also challenges the sufficiency of the Tran claim ants’ allegations of gross negligence. As with the negligent hiring and negligent retention claim s, Marquette contends that the Tran claim ants’ pleadings are conclusory and devoid of supporting factual m aterial. 18 Gross negligence is defined as reckless and wanton m isconduct. See Miles v. Melrose, 882 F.2d 976, 989 (5th Cir. 1989). Gross negligence is distinguished from ordinary negligence in that it “encompasses harm that is willfully inflicted or is caused by the wanton and reckless disregard for the safety of others.” See Com putalog U.S.A., Inc. v. Blake Drilling & W orkover Co., Inc., No. 95– 30 0 9, 1996 WL 720 761, at *2 (E.D. La. Dec. 9, 1996) (citing Todd Shipy ards Corp. v. Turbine Serv., Inc., 674 F.2d 40 1, Kass, R. Doc. 60 at 3-4, the Am ended Claim does not allege that Marquette perform or background check; nor does it allege any other deficiencies in Marquette’s pre-hire investigation of Kass’s personal history. 18 11 R. Doc. 58-1 at 4. 411 (5th Cir. 1982)). Here, the Tran claim ants have not alleged facts dem onstrating that Marquette acted willfully or with wanton and reckless disregard for safety. Although the Am ended Claim alleges that the collision was “the result of the negligence and gross negligence of [Marquette],”19 and that “Marquette’s actions were willful and wanton,”20 it provides no factual allegations to support these conclusions. Moreover, the facts that the Am ended Claim does allege—that the FATHER SEELOS “failed to keep a proper lookout,”21 “failed to properly and safely navigate the vessel,”22 and “negligently r[ode] on the wrong side of the channel”23—suggest ordinary negligence, not willful and wanton m isconduct. The Am ended Claims therefore fails to allege enough facts to m ove the Tran claim ants’ gross negligence claim “across the line from the conceivable to the plausible.” Turner v. Pleasant, 663 F.3d 770 , 775 (5th Cir. 20 11) (quoting Tw om bly , 19 R. Doc. 54 at 2. 20 Id. at 4. 21 Id. at 2. 22 Id. 23 12 Id. at 3 (em phasis added). 550 U.S. at 570 ). The Court grants Marquette’s m otion for judgm ent on the pleadings on the gross negligence claim . D. Pu n itive D am age s Finally, Marquette challenges the Tran claim ants’ claim for punitive dam ages. Marquette does not contend that punitive damages are unavailable as a m atter of law. Rather, it argues that to the extent punitive dam ages are available, a punitive damages claim requires proof of reckless, willful, and wanton conduct, which the Tran claim ants fail to allege. 24 The general m aritim e law provides for a rem edy of punitive dam ages in certain, lim ited situations. In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig Deepw ater Horizon in Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20 , 20 10 , 21 F.Supp.3d 657, 749 (E.D. La. 20 14). Im portantly, “punitive dam ages recovery always requires a finding of willful and wanton conduct” on the part of the alleged wrongdoer. Stow e v. Moran Tow ing Corp., 995 F. Supp. 2d 570 , 579 (E.D. La. 20 14) (quoting McBride v. Estis W ell Service, LLC, 731 F.3d 50 5, 517– 18 (5th Cir. 20 13)). In addition, Fifth Circuit precedent precludes a finding of punitive dam ages against an em ployer unless the plaintiff pleads and proves either: (1) “wanton m isconduct derived from a corporate policy,” or (2) that “a 24 13 R. Doc. 58-1 at 4. corporate official with policy-m aking authority participated in, approved of, or subsequently ratified the egregious conduct.” Collins v. A.B.C. Marine Tow ing, L.L.C., No. CIV.A. 14-190 0 , 20 15 WL 5970 392, at *4 (E.D. La. Oct. 14, 20 15) (citing In re Oil Spill, 21 F.Supp.3d at 749). As noted, the Tran claim ants fail to allege facts dem onstrating willful or wanton m isconduct by Marquette or any of its em ployees. Nor is there any allegation concerning policy-makers or corporate policies that would warrant im posing punitive dam ages on Marquette for the acts of its em ployees. Cf. In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig Deepw ater Horizon, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 749-50 (finding that em ployer was not liable for punitive dam ages under general m aritim e law when engineers whose recklessness caused well blowout were not policy-m aking officials and their conduct did not emanate from any corporate policy). The Court therefore grants Marquette’s motion for judgm ent on the pleadings on the claim for punitive dam ages. E. Le ave to Am e n d The Tran claim ants request leave to am end their claim to better allege their causes of action. Ordinarily, courts grant such requests unless it appears that amendm ent would be futile. See Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., LLC, 234 F.3d 863, 872– 73 (5th Cir. 20 0 0 ) (noting that leave to am end should be freely given when the complaint is subject to dism issal for failure 14 to state a claim unless such leave would be futile); Davis v. Teva Pharm . USA, Inc., No. CIV.A. 13-6365, 20 14 WL 4450 423, at *4 (E.D. La. Sept. 10 , 20 14) (noting that courts generally grant leave to amend in the context of judgm ent on the pleadings for failure to state claim ); Sekil v. ADT Sec. Servs. Inc., No. H– 0 8– 0 510 , 20 0 8 WL 484420 9, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 20 0 8) (stating that requests to am end pleadings are routinely granted when m ade in response to a m otion for judgm ent on the pleadings). Here, it appears that it would not be futile to grant the Tran claim ants leave to amend their negligent hiring and negligent retention claim s. In their opposition to Marquette’s m otion for judgment on the pleadings, the Tran claim ants suggest that, despite Kass’s crim inal record and alleged inexperience, Marquette hired him as a captain without conducting any inquiry into his personal history and qualifications. Because these allegations, if true, could plausibly give rise to a claim that Marquette breached its duty “to select a com petent m aster and crew,” Kersey , 353 F. Supp. 2d at 696, the Court grants the Tran claim ants five (5) days to am end its claim that Marquette was negligent in the hiring and retention of Kass as the captain of the FATHER SEELOS. The Court will not allow the Tran claim ants to am end their gross negligence or punitive dam ages claims, as amendment would be futile. To 15 support an earlier m otion for leave to am end, the Tran claim ants subm itted a “Proposed Second Am ended Claim .”25 That docum ent, which the Tran claim ants filed after Marquette m oved for judgm ent on the pleadings and with the benefit of Marquette’s briefing on the issue, purports to correct pleading defects in the Am ended Claim . In fact, it merely repeats the Tran claim ants’ failure to allege facts tending to show either gross negligence or willful or wanton m isconduct. The Proposed Second Am ended Claim alleges, for instance, that Marquette was grossly negligent in hiring Kass without conducting a pre-hire background check. 26 It also repeats the Am ended Claim’s allegation that Kass drove the FATHER SEELOS on the wrong side of the channel—adding only the conclusory assertion that this conduct was not merely negligent but grossly negligent. 27 Based on these allegations, the Proposed Second Amended Claim contends that Marquette is liable for punitive dam ages. 25 R. Doc. 69-3. 26 Id. at 5. 27 Com pare R. Doc. 54 at 3 (alleging that the FATHER SEELOS’s captain was “negligently riding on the wrong side of the channel”); w ith R. Doc. 69-3 at 5 (alleging that “Kass was grossly negligent in riding on the wrong side of the channel”). 16 Like the Tran claim ants’ current claim s, the proposed allegations sound in ordinary negligence. The Tran claim ants do not contend that Marquette knew that Kass was unfit to operate the FATHER SEELOS at the tim e they hired him ; nor is there any allegation that Marquette was aware of facts indicating an unacceptably high degree of risk that Kass was unqualified for the position. While Marquette’s alleged failure to inquire into Kass’s crim inal history m ay suggest a lack of due care, it does not rise to the level of gross negligence. See Maritrans Operating Partners v. Diana T, No. CIV. A. 97-1916, 1999 WL 144458, at *8 (E.D. La. Mar. 15, 1999) (finding that although a com pany’s failure to drug-test its em ployees was negligent, it did not rise to the level of gross negligently conduct). Because the Tran claim ants’ proposed am endm ent would be futile, the Court denies the Tran claim ants leave to am end their gross negligence and punitive dam ages claim s. IV. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Marquette’s m otion for judgm ent on the pleadings. The Tran claim ants shall have five (5) days from the entry of this order to amend their claim that Marquette was negligent in hiring and retaining Kass as captain of the FATHER SEELOS. 17 All other claim s addressed in Marquette’s m otion are DISMISSED WITH PREJ UDICE. 20th New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ _ _ day of April, 20 16. _______________________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 18
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