In Re: The Matter of Marquette Transportation Company Gulf-Inland, LLC, No. 2:2013cv05114 - Document 127 (E.D. La. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS - the Court finds that because John Tran was a nonseafarer killed in Texas's territorial waters, he is a "nonseafarer" for purposes of the Supreme Court's holding in Yamaha. Thus, Yamaha does not preclude the Tra n claimants from seeking pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages under Texas's wrongful death and survival statutes. The Court ORDERS the Tran claimants to file a memorandum clarifying what Texas state-law damages they are seeking from Marquette (be aring in mind that the Court has already dismissed all punitive damages claims with prejudice), and identifying the individuals whom they believe to be the appropriate claimants, by April 27, 2016 at 5:00 p.m. Marquette shall file any response by April 28 at 5:00 p.m.. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 4/26/16.(jjs)
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In Re: The Matter of Marquette Transportation Company Gulf-Inland, LLC Doc. 127 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA CIVIL ACTION IN THE MATTER OF MARQUETTE TRANSPORTATION COMPANY GULF-INLAND, LLC, AS OWNER AND OPERATOR OF THE TOWING VESSEL FATHER SEELOS, ETC. NO. 13-5114 SECTION: R ORD ER AN D REASON S Before the Court is the Tran claim ants' "Mem orandum of Law Supporting their Recovery of State Law Wrongful Death Dam ages,"1 as well as an opposition "Mem orandum of Law" filed by lim itation plaintiff Marquette Transportation Com pany Gulf-Inland, LLC ("Marquette").2 For the following reasons, the Court finds that decedent J ohn Tran is a "nonseafarer" for purposes of the Suprem e Court's holding in Yam aha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996). Thus, Yam aha does not preclude the Tran claim ants from seeking pecuniary and non-pecuniary dam ages under Texas's wrongful death and survival statutes. 1 R. Doc. 96. 2 R. Doc. 10 1. Dockets.Justia.com I. BACKGROU N D The facts of this case, as alleged by the Tran claim ants, are set forth in detail in a previous order.3 Briefly, this case arises out of a J uly 7, 20 13 collision between the FATHER SEELOS, a towing vessel owned and operated by Marquette, and a vessel owned by J ohn Tran, a self-em ployed com m ercial fisherm an. The collision occurred in the territorial waters of the State of Texas. As a result, the fishing vessel was destroyed and J ohn Tran was killed. Marquette filed a com plaint seeking exoneration from or lim itation of liability under 46 U.S.C. § 30 50 1, et seq., and claim ants Susan Tran (individually and as a personal representative of the decedent, J ohn Tran, on behalf of herself and her m inor child, Marsha Tran), Quoc Tran, J eanie Tran, and Nancy Pham filed a claim against Marquette under general m aritim e law and the survival and wrongful death laws of Texas and/ or Louisiana. On April 20 , 20 16, the Court granted Marquette's m otion for judgm ent on the pleadings on the Tran claim ants' claim s for unseaworthiness, negligent hiring and negligent retention, gross negligence, and punitive dam ages. The Court dismissed the Tran claimants' unseaworthiness, gross negligence, and punitive dam ages claim s with prejudice but perm itted the Tran claim ants to am end 3 R. Doc. 98. 2 their pleadings to better allege their negligent hiring and negligent retention claim s. On April 19, 20 16, the Tran claim ants filed a m em orandum of law on the issue of whether they m ay supplem ent rem edies available under general m aritim e law with state-law rem edies provided by Texas's wrongful death and survival statute.1 The Tran claim ants argue that because J ohn Tran was neither a J ones Act seam an nor a m aritim e em ployee covered by the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Com pensation Act (LHWCA), he was a "nonseafarer" and, as such, that his survivors m ay pursue state law rem edies under Yam aha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996). Marquette filed an opposition "Mem orandum of Law" on April 21.2 Marquette contends that because J ohn Tran earned his living as a fisherm an, he was a "person engaged in m aritim e trade." According to Marquette, J ohn Tran was therefore a "seafarer" under Yam aha, thus precluding his survivors from recovering non-pecuniary dam ages under state law. The parties have fully briefed, and now ask the Court to decide, whether J ohn Tran is a "nonseafarer" for purposes of the Suprem e Court's Yam aha decision. 1 R. Doc. 96. 2 R. Doc. 10 1. 3 II. D ISCU SSION It is undisputed that J ohn Tran is neither a J ones Act seam an nor a longshore worker covered by the LHWCA.3 Rather, both sides agree that J ohn Tran was a self-em ployed com m ercial fisherm an, who was killed in Texas's territorial waters. Both sides also agree that the Tran claim ants' negligence claim s against Marquette arise under general m aritim e law. At issue is whether, given these facts, the Tran claim ants m ay supplem ent rem edies available under general m aritim e law with state law rem edies, including the rem edies provided by Texas's wrongful death and survival statute. Citing the Suprem e Court's opinion in Yam aha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996), the Tran claim ants argue that J ohn Tran was a "nonseafarer" and, as such, that his survivors m ay pursue state law rem edies. Citing several district courts opinions interpreting and applying Yam aha, Marquette contends that because J ohn Tran earned his living as a licensed crabber he was a person "engaged in m aritim e trade." According to Marquette, J ohn Tran was therefore a "seafarer," and Yam aha precludes his survivors from recovering non-pecuniary dam ages under state law. At bottom , this dispute turns on 3 Although Marquette contends in a footnote to its m em orandum that "Tran could arguably be construed to be a seam an," it provides no argum ent and does not apply any law to the facts of this case in support of this position. See R. Doc. 10 1 at 5 n. 2. 4 com peting interpretations of the key phrase in the Yam aha opinion. A brief review of this area of law puts the parties' argum ents into perspective. The developm ent of the law of wrongful death at sea proceeds from the case of The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 214 (1886), where the Suprem e Court held that in the absence of a state of federal statute, general m aritim e law did not afford a wrongful death cause of action to the survivors of individuals killed on the high seas or in navigable waters. As the Third Circuit has noted, "[t]he harshness of this rule prom pted reaction from the federal judiciary and from Congress." Calhoun v. Yam aha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 40 F.3d 622, 631 (3d Cir. 1994), aff'd, 516 U.S. 199, 116 S. Ct. 619, 133 L. Ed. 2d 578 (1996). In the judiciary, som e federal courts began to apply state wrongful death statutes in state territorial waters because there was no applicable federal statute. See Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 20 7, 212 (1986); Calhoun, 40 F.3d at 631. Eventually, Congress passed the J ones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, providing a wrongful death cause of action for the survivors of seam an killed in the course of their em ploym ent, and the Death on the High Seas Act ("DOSHA"), 46 U.S.C. § 761, which provides a federal wrongful death rem edy for survivors of all persons, seam an and non-seam an, killed m ore than three nautical m iles from the shore of any state or territory. Collectively, these 5 developm ents ensured that a wrongful death rem edy was available for m ost people killed on the high seas or in navigable waters. Nonetheless, The Harrison rem ained problem atic, creating several "incongruities," in the law of wrongful death in adm iralty. "First, in territorial waters, general m aritim e law allowed a rem edy for unseaworthiness resulting in injury, but not for death." Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 26 (1990 ). In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970 ), for exam ple, the district court dism issed the suit of a longshore worker's widow because Florida's wrongful death statute did not encom pass unseaworthiness as a basis for liability. If, however, the unseaworthy condition had only injured her husband, his recovery under the LHWCA would be prem ised on strict liability for unseaworthiness. Second, DOSHA allowed survivors of seam an killed on the high seas to pursue a wrongful death action based on unseaworthiness, while survivors of those killed inside territorial waters could not, unless a state wrongful death statute allowed recovery based on unseaworthiness. Miles, 498 U.S. at 26. Third, survivors of a so-called Sieracki seam an--that is, a longshore worker em ployed by an independent contractor but doing the work of a seam an aboard ship--could recover for death within territorial waters under applicable state statutes, while survivors of a J ones Act seam an could not. Id. 6 In an effort to rem edy these incongruities, the Suprem e Court overruled The Harrisburg in Moragne, 398 U.S. 375, and recognized a general m aritim e wrongful death cause of action under federal com m on law. 398 U.S. 375, 378 (1970 ).4 The Court declined to define the nature and scope of the new cause of action, reasoning that "final resolution should await further sifting through the lower courts in future litigations." Id. at 40 8. The Court explained that "[i]f . . . subsidiary issues should require resolution, such as particular questions of the m easure of dam ages, the courts" should look to DOSHA and state wrongful death statues for guidance. Id. After a period of "sifting" by lower courts, the Suprem e Court addressed the issue of dam ages available under the nonstatutory wrongful death cause of action in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990 ), holding that the m other of a seam an killed in state territorial waters has no claim for nonpecuniary dam ages under general m aritim e law. Id. at 29-30 . The Court reasoned that under Moragne there are essentially two causes of action for the wrongful death of the seam an--a statutory action under the J ones Act based 4 Although the specific holding of Moragne created a general m aritim e wrongful death rem edy based on the unseaworthiness, the decision has since been interpreted as creating a wrongful death rem edy for cases involving negligence. See Miles v. Melrose, 882 F.2d 976, 985 (5th Cir. 1989), aff'd sub nom ., 498 U.S. 19 (1990 ) ("In Moragne, the Suprem e Court recognized a wrongful death action for negligence and unseaworthiness under general m aritim e law."). 7 on negligence, and an action under general m aritim e law based on unseaworthiness, in which liability is without fault. Id. at 29-30 . For the sake of uniform ity, the Court held that because the J ones Act lim its the m easure of dam ages for the death of a seam an to pecuniary loss, recovery under the nonstatutory m aritim e death cause of action should be lim ited to pecuniary loss as well. Id. at 32-33. The Court explained that "[i]t would be inconsistent with our place in the constitutional schem e were we to sanction m ore expansive rem edies in a judicially created cause of action in which liability is without fault than Congress has allowed in cases of death resulting from negligence." Id. Following Miles, courts consistently held that the survivors of J ones Act seam an m ay not recover nonpecuniary dam ages under general m aritim e law. See, e.g., Savoie v. Chevron Texaco, No. CIV.A. 0 4-130 2, 20 0 5 WL 20 36740 , at *2 (E.D. La. J uly 22, 20 0 5) (collecting cases). The issue rem ained, however, whether non-pecuniary damages were available in cases involving non-seaman killed or injured in state territorial waters. Id. The Suprem e Court took up this issue in Yam aha, 516 U.S. 199 (1996), the case at the heart of the parties' dispute in this lawsuit. In Yam aha, the parents of a child killed in a jet ski accident in territorial waters sought state law rem edies. Id. at 20 3. The m anufacturer argued that, in the interests of 8 uniformity, the general m aritim e rem edy provided by Moragne should occupy the field, ousting any rem edies not available in adm iralty. Id. at 20 9. The Court rejected this argum ent, noting that the uniform ity analysis in Moragne "centered on the extension of relief, not the contraction of rem edies." Id. at 213-14 (noting that "Moragne . . . showed not hostility to concurrent application of state wrongful death statutes" and that it is "difficult to see" how that opinion "can be taken as intent to preclude the operation of state laws that do supply a rem edy"). Drawing a distinction between "seafarers" and "nonseafarers," the Court held that the general m aritim e wrongful death action does not preem pt state rem edies in cases involving the death of a nonseafarer in state territorial waters. The Court explained that, under Miles, "[w]hen Congress has prescribed a com prehensive tort recovery regim e to be uniform ly applied, there is, we have generally recognized, no cause for enlargem ent of the dam ages statutorily provided." Id. at 215. Reasoning that "Congress has not prescribed remedies for the wrongful deaths of nonseafarers in territorial waters," the Court found that there is no basis for displacing state rem edies in cases of this nature. Id. In the years since Yam aha, courts have divided on the m eaning of the critical "nonseafarer" term in the Suprem e Court's opinion--and therefore on which groups are entitled to supplem ent their rem edies under general 9 m aritim e law with recovery under state wrongful death and survival statutes. The difficulty stem s from an am biguity within Yam aha itself. In a paragraph explaining the issue to be decided, the Court noted that it granted certiorari on the following issue: "Does the federal m aritim e claim for wrongful death recognized in Moragne supply the exclusive rem edy in cases involving the deaths of nonseafarers in territorial waters?" Id. at 20 6. In a footnote to that sentence, the Court explained that "by 'nonseafarers,' we m ean persons who are neither seam an covered by the J ones Act . . . nor longshore workers covered by the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Com pensation Act. . . ." Id. at 20 6 n. 2. Elsewhere in the Yam aha opinion, however, the Suprem e Court described the scope of its holding by noting that state rem edies are not displaced by the federal wrongful death action recognized in Moragne and rem ain applicable in cases where the claim ant "was not a seam an, longshore worker, or person otherw ise engaged in m aritim e trade." Id. at 20 2. Based on this language, several district courts have concluded that a "person otherwise engaged in m aritime trade," though not a J ones Act Seam an or a longshorem an covered by the LHWCA, is a seafarer precluded from pursuing non-pecuniary dam ages under state law. See Savoie, 20 0 5 WL 20 36740 , at *3; In re Com plaint of Stone Energy Corp., No. CIV.A. 0 2-2969, 20 0 3 WL 21730 621, at *2-*3 (E.D. La. J uly 24, 20 0 3); Matter of Com plaint 10 of Goose Creek Traw lers, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 946, 949-50 (E.D.N.C. 1997). Mirroring Marquette's argum ents in this lawsuit, these courts have further held that the "otherwise engaged in m aritim e trade" language encom passes individuals who, like J ohn Tran, are self-em ployed com m ercial fisherm en. See, e.g., Goose Creek, 972 F. Supp. 946, 950 (reasoning that "[b]y the very nature of his livelihood, [the com m ercial shrim per] was a 'person otherwise engaged in a m aritim e trade" and therefore a seafarer). Under this reasoning, J ohn Tran would be deem ed a seafarer under Yam aha, and the Tran claim ants would be barred from supplem enting federal maritime law remedies with nonpecuniary dam ages provided by Texas statutory law. Other courts have rejected this approach (either expressly or im plicitly), and adopted the Yam aha footnote's definition of "nonseafarer" as a person who is neither a J ones Act seam an nor a longshore worker or m aritim e em ployee covered by the LHWCA. Under this interpretation, "Yam aha stands for the proposition that nonseam en, those not covered by Congressional statute, pursuing a claim resulting from an accident in state territorial waters, m ay supplem ent that claim under general m aritim e law with applicable state law." Liner v. Dravo Basic Materials Co., No. CIV.A.0 0 -190 8, 20 0 0 WL 1693678, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 7, 20 0 0 ) (em phasis added); see also Doy le v. Graske, 579 F.3d 898, 90 5 (8th Cir. 20 0 9) ("A 'nonseafarer' is som eone . . . 11 who is neither a seam an covered by the J ones Act . . . nor a longshore or harbor worker covered by the [LHWCA]."); Am . Dredging Co. v. Lam bert, 81 F.3d 127, 130 (11th Cir. 1996) (characterizing a "nonseafarers" as people who "are not seam en or longshore workers"); Zagklara v. Sprague Energy Corp., 919 F. Supp. 2d 163, 166 n. 2 (D. Me. 20 13) (adopting definition of "nonseafarer" in the Yam aha footnote); Trinh ex rel. Tran v. Dufrene Boats, Inc., 6 So. 3d 830 , 840 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1/ 22/ 0 9) (adopting Yam aha footnote and holding that self-em ployed fisherm an was a "nonseafarer" entitled to pursue state-law wrongful death rem edies). An influential adm iralty and m aritim e law treatise has taken the sam e position. See Thom as J . Schoenbaum , Adm iralty and Maritim e Law § 8-3 (5th ed.) (describing a nonseafarer as "a person who is neither a seam an or a longshorem an"). The Court finds the second line of cases m ore persuasive and m ore consistent with the Yam aha opinion as a whole. Two prim ary considerations drive this conclusion. First, it is significant that in defining the term "nonseafarer" as used in the question presented for certiorari, the Suprem e Court expressly tied seafarer status to coverage under federal m aritim e statutes. Under the definition in the Yam aha footnote, it is clear that J ones Act seaman and longshore workers covered by the LHWCA are seafarers, while individuals who are not covered by these m aritim e statutes are nonseafarers. 12 This definition is consistent with the reasoning and general thrust of the Yam aha opinion. As noted, Yam aha's holding that state statutes apply to nonseafarers killed in territorial waters, despite the uniform ity principle em bodied in Moragne and Miles, turned on the fact that "Congress has not prescribed rem edies" for wrongful deaths of this nature. Yam aha, 516 U.S. at 215. The J ones Act applies only to seam en; the LHWCA applies only to covered m aritim e workers; and DOSHA, while applying to nonseafarers, applies only to deaths on the high seas. Indeed, the Court noted that Section 7 of DOSHA shows special deference to state law by specifically stopping DOSHA from displacing state law in territorial waters. Id. at 215-16. For this reason, the Court found that supplem enting general m aritim e rem edies with state wrongful death and survival statutes in cases involving the death of nonseafarers in territorial waters is both logical and consistent with Congressional intent. See id. at 216 ("Taking into account what Congress sought to achieve, we preserve the application of state statutes to deaths within territorial waters."). That the Court grounded its holding on the absence of federal statutory rem edies supports the conclusion that the key term that structures the Yam aha analysis, "nonseafarers," m eans individuals who are not covered by Congressional statute, as the footnote provides. 13 Second, assum ing that the Suprem e Court intended Yam aha to be internally consistent, rather than contradictory, it is easy to reconcile the "otherwise engaged in m aritim e trade" language in the body of the opinion with the definition set forth in the footnote. As noted, the footnote m akes clear that "seafarer" includes J ones Act seam an and longshore workers covered by the LHWCA. Im portantly, the LHWCA covers a range of nonseam an m aritim e em ployees. Section 90 2(3) of the LHWCA defines "em ployee" as "any person engaged in m aritim e em ploy m ent, including any longshorem an or other person engaged in longshoring operations, and any harbor-worker including a ship repairm an, shipbuilder, and ship-breaker. . . ." 33 U.S.C. § 90 2(3) (em phasis added). Given the close parallel to the language in Section 90 2(3), it is reasonable to conclude that Yam aha's reference to "person[s] engaged in m aritim e trade" m erely refers to those m aritim e em ployees who are not longshore workers but are, nonetheless, covered by the LHWCA. See Trinh, 6 So. 3d at 841 (finding that the sim ilarity of language supports a conclusion that the Suprem e Court did not intend its holding in Yam aha to extend to general m aritim e wrongful death actions involving self-em ployed com m ercial fisherm an). By contrast, if one takes the position that the Suprem e Court intended to preclude state law rem edies for all "person[s] otherwise engaged in m aritim e trade," including those who are 14 not a J ones Act Seam an or a m aritim e workers covered by the LHWCA, then the footnote is entirely contradictory and superfluous. Neither Marquette nor the federal district courts that it cites give a satisfactory explanation for interpreting the Yam aha opinion in this way. For these reasons, the Court joins those courts that have held that, for purposes of Yam aha, a "nonseafarer" is som eone who is "neither a seam an covered by the J ones Act . . . nor a longshore or harbor worker covered by the [LHWCA]." Doy le, 579 F.3d at 90 5 (quoting Yam aha, 516 U.S. 199, 20 2 n. 2). Turning to the facts of this case, it is clear that J ohn Tran is a nonseafarer. Like the decedent in Yam aha, J ohn Tran is not covered by the "com prehensive tort recovery regim e" provided by Congressional m aritim e statutes. Yam aha, 516 U.S. at 215. As a self-em ployed com m ercial fisherm an killed in Texas's territorial waters, he was neither a J ones Act seam an, an LHWCA m aritim e em ployee, nor a potential claim ant under DOSHA. Accordingly, J ohn Tran is a nonseafarer, and Yam aha does not preclude application of Texas statutes perm itting recovery of non-pecuniary dam ages. The Court notes, however, that although the Tran claim ants argue that they are entitled to "all pecuniary and non-pecuniary dam ages" perm itted 15 under applicable Texas laws,5 they have not explained what those dam ages are or by whom they m ay be recovered. Nor have the Tran claim ants directly addressed Marquette's argum ent that Susan Tran is the only proper party to assert a claim against Marquette in this litigation. Accordingly, the Tran claim ants shall file a m em orandum of law addressing these issues by April 27, 20 16 at 5:0 0 p.m . Marquette shall file any response by April 28 at 5:0 0 p.m . III. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that because J ohn Tran was a nonseafarer killed in Texas's territorial waters, he is a "nonseafarer" for purposes of the Suprem e Court's holding in Yam aha. Thus, Yam aha does not preclude the Tran claim ants from seeking pecuniary and non-pecuniary dam ages under Texas's wrongful death and survival statutes. The Court ORDERS the Tran claim ants to file a m em orandum clarifying what Texas state-law dam ages they are seeking from Marquette (bearing in m ind that the Court has already dism issed all punitive dam ages claim s with prejudice), and identifying the individuals whom they believe to be the 5 R. Doc. 96 at 12. 16 appropriate claim ants, by Ap ril 2 7, 2 0 16 at 5:0 0 p .m . Marquette shall file any response by Ap ril 2 8 at 5:0 0 p .m . 26th New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ _ _ _ day of April, 20 16. ________________________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 17
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