Nagle et al v. Gusman et al, No. 2:2012cv01910 - Document 298 (E.D. La. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS denying Dr. Higgins's MOTION 236 248 for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 2/26/15. (jjs) Modified on 2/26/2016 (jjs).
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Nagle et al v. Gusman et al Doc. 298 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA MARGARET GOETZEE NAGLE and J OHN ERIC GOETZEE CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 12-1910 SHERIFF MARLIN GUSMAN, ET AL. SECTION "R" (2) ORD ER AN D REASON S This action arises out of the August 7, 20 11 suicide of William Goetzee, an inm ate of Orleans Parish Prison (“OPP”). Following Goetzee’s death, his siblings, Margaret Goetzee Nagle and J ohn Eric Goetzee, filed this section 1983 civil rights and state-law suit against numerous em ployees of the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office, including defendant Dr. Charles “Mike” Higgins. 1 Goetzee was a comm ander in the United States Coast Guard Reserve and a civilian employee of the Coast Guard. Goetzee com m itted suicide while being held as a pretrial detainee on the mental health tier of the House of Detention at OPP on charges related to a suicide attem pt five days earlier. On the day of Goetzee’s death, OPP Deputy William Thom pson was assigned to m aintain “suicide watch” of Goetzee. Thom pson repeatedly left his suicide 1 R. Doc. 1. Dockets.Justia.com watch post, and it was during one of these absences that Goetzee comm itted suicide. Dr. Higgins was the Chief of Psychiatry at OPP when Goetzee died. Plaintiffs contend that not only did Dr. Higgins help to develop OPP’s approach to m ental health care and suicide prevention, but also that Dr. Higgins was directly involved in Goetzee’s psychiatric treatment at OPP. According to plaintiffs, OPP’s suicide prevention practices were grossly inadequate, and Dr. Higgins condoned a de facto policy of allowing deputies and nurses to leave suicidal inm ates unwatched. For this reason, plaintiffs argue, Thom pson was derelict in his duties as the deputy assigned to conduct direct observation of Goetzee, leading to Goetzee’s death. Dr. Higgins now moves the Court for sum m ary judgm ent on plaintiffs’ section 1983 and state-law claim s. 2 For the following reasons, the Court denies the m otion. 2 Dr. Higgins filed two separate m otions for sum m ary judgment – one addressing plaintiffs’ substantive claims, and one addressing plaintiffs’ claim for punitive dam ages. See R. Doc. 236; R. Doc. 248. Dr. Higgins relies on the sam e argum ents in both motions, so the Court resolves both m otions in this order. I. BACKGROU N D A. Go e tze e ’s Arre s t, In carce ratio n , an d Su icid e On the m orning of August 2, 20 11, Goetzee approached a m arked Federal Protective Services vehicle occupied by a uniform ed law enforcem ent officer. Goetzee opened the front passenger door, entered the vehicle, and seated himself in the front passenger seat. Goetzee lunged for the officer’s weapon, exclaim ing, “I want to kill m yself, give m e your gun.”3 Federal agents arrested Goetzee and transported him to OPP later that day. 4 The next day, on August 3, prison officials brought Goetzee to federal court for his initial appearance on charges related to his conflict with the federal officer during his suicide attem pt the day before. While at court, Goetzee behaved strangely in the presence of attorneys, federal officers, and the judge. A representative for Goetzee informed the court that he was “obviously having m ental issues.”5 Back at OPP, a nurse alerted Dr. Higgins to Goetzee’s behavior, and Dr. Higgins ordered that Goetzee be transported to University Hospital to “rule out delirium .”6 Two days later, on August 5, 3 R. Doc. 266, Exhibit AA. 4 R. Doc. 248-1 ¶ 6; R. Doc. 265-1 ¶ 68. 5 See R. Doc. 266, Exhibit ZZ. 6 R. Doc. 266, Exhibit I. University Hospital discharged Goetzee back to OPP with a diagnosis of psychosis. 7 On August 6, Dr. Higgins conducted an “Initial Psychiatric Evaluation” of Goetzee. From this evaluation, Dr. Higgins ordered that Goetzee be housed on OPP’s m ental health tier and placed on direct observation. 8 Dr. Higgins’s “direct observation” order required a Sheriff’s Office em ployee to “m aintain direct and constant observation” of Goetzee at all tim es, i.e., “suicide watch.”9 Goetzee was under suicide watch on August 6 and 7, 20 11. On the m orning of August 7, Deputy William Thom pson was assigned to m aintain supervision of Goetzee. During his suicide watch shift, Thom pson left his post at least three tim es, leaving Goetzee unobserved each tim e. During these absences, Goetzee went unobserved for an hour and a half, fifteen m inutes, and two hours, respectively. During Thom pson’s final absence, an inm ate notified another on-duty officer that Goetzee was lying on the floor of his cell, unresponsive. Apparently, Goetzee had repeatedly swallowed 7 R. Doc. 248-1 ¶ 11; R. Doc. 265-1 ¶ 73. 8 R. Doc. 266, Exhibit J . 9 See, e.g., R. Doc. 266, Exhibits D-E. wads of toilet paper and asphyxiated him self while Thom pson was not m onitoring him . 10 As a result of these events, Thompson pleaded guilty to the crime of m alfeasance in office. While under oath, and as part of his plea, Thompson accepted the state’s factual basis for the charge. The factual basis specified that Thom pson was assigned to continuously m onitor Goetzee; that he left his post three tim es for one and one-half hours, fifteen m inutes, and two hours, respectively; that another inm ate discovered Goetzee unconscious while Thom pson was not monitoring him; and that Thom pson had fraudulently subm itted an observation checklist for August 7, 20 11, because the checklist indicated that he had continuously m onitored Goetzee all day when in fact Thom pson had not done so. 11 The Court has already granted sum m ary judgment in favor of plaintiffs on their section 1983 and state-law claim s against Thompson. The Court has also granted sum mary judgm ent against Sheriff Gusm an on plaintiffs’ statelaw vicarious liability claim s and partial sum m ary judgm ent on plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim s. 12 10 See R. Doc. 266, Exhibit AA at OPSO 12531. 11 See generally R. Doc. 248, Exhibit E. 12 R. Doc. 113. B. D r. H iggin s ’s Alle ge d In vo lve m e n t an d Re s p o n s ibility fo r Go e tze e ’s Su icid e As Director of Psychiatry at OPP, Dr. Higgins was responsible for “overseeing psychiatric services” within the prison and “integrating psychiatric services with m edical and security functions.”13 His responsibilities also included supervising daily operations on OPP’s m ental health tier where Goetzee was housed. 14 While Goetzee was incarcerated, OPP undoubtedly m aintained a written suicide prevention policy founded upon direct observation of suicidal inm ates. Specifically, the written policy required that “all inm ates with active suicidal ideation . . . be directly observed by the Security staff at all tim es.”15 The written policy further provided that “periodic m onitoring [was] a suboptim al solution [because] the few m om ents required to successfully com m it suicide necessitates continuous, direct observation.”16 According to plaintiffs, despite OPP’s written policy, the observation that suicidal inm ates actually received was interm ittent or periodic at best, 13 R. Doc. 248-2 at 20 -21. 14 See id. at 21. 15 R. Doc. 266, Exhibit D. 16 Id. and Dr. Higgins knew about it. For exam ple, the general layout of OPP’s m ental health tier, where Goetzee was housed, was not conducive to direct, continuous observation. According to plaintiffs, regardless of where a direct observation deputy sat or stood on the m ental health tier to conduct suicide watch, the deputy was physically unable to view the entirety of the three cells that held suicidal inm ates. 17 Additionally, nurses and deputies who worked on the tier testified at their depositions that Dr. Higgins was aware that suicidal inm ates often frequently went unobserved for long periods of tim e. 18 According to Deputy William Thom pson, there was “no question that Dr. Higgins knew” that suicidal inm ates were left unobserved. 19 According to Nurse David Schaible, he regularly complained about the direct observation deputies, but eventually gave up because “nothing changed.”20 Schaible also stated that “Dr. Higgins was well aware that it was a problem .”21 17 R. Doc. 266, Exhibit A at 163-64; R. Doc. 266, Exhibit DD at 62-63. 18 See, e.g., R. Doc. 266, Exhibit A at 155-56; R. Doc. 266, Exhibit DD at 50 -52, 10 2-110 ; R. Doc. 266, Exhibit GGG at 144, 153. 19 R. Doc. 266, Exhibit A at 160 . 20 R. Doc. 266, Exhibit DD at 20 6-0 7. 21 Id. at 211-12. According to plaintiffs, Dr. Higgins’s role as Chief of Psychiatry em powered him to enforce OPP’s written direct observation policy, but Dr. Higgins failed to do so. Dr. Higgins adm itted that, as Chief of Psychiatry, he regarded suicide prevention as his “highest priority” and that he had an ethical obligation to “address [OPP’s] suicide prevention practices.”22 Further, Sheriff Gusm an expected OPP’s security and m edical staff to work together to ensure com pliance with any direct observation orders. 23 According to OPP Sergeant Nicole Harris, the security and m edical staff “worked seam lessly together” on the m ental health tier, including with regard to direct observation inm ates. 24 Although Dr. Higgins suggests that he had no authority to “control security” after issuing a direct observation order, 25 OPP Deputy Tyrone William s regarded Dr. Higgins as “in charge” on the m ental health tier. 26 William s explained that if Dr. Higgins gave a deputy an order, “it got 22 R. Doc. 266, Exhibit Z at 79, 20 0 . 23 R. Doc. 266, Exhibit MM at 84-86, 341-42. 24 R. Doc. 266, Exhibit LL at 194-95. 25 R. Doc. 248-2 at 19. 26 R. Doc. 266, Exhibit GGG at 31. followed.”27 According to William s, Dr. Higgins never expressed any concern about the way deputies carried out direct observation, but if he had, William s “would have done whatever Dr. Higgins told [William s] to do.”28 Based on the foregoing evidence, plaintiffs argue that Dr. Higgins was deliberately indifferent to Goetzee’s mental health needs and known risk of suicide. For this, plaintiffs seek to hold Dr. Higgins liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Louisiana tort law. C. D r. H iggin s ’s Mo tio n fo r Su m m ary Ju d gm e n t Dr. Higgins now moves for sum m ary judgm ent on plaintiffs’ claims. Dr. Higgins argues that plaintiffs undisputedly cannot prevail on their section 1983 claim s because, according to Dr. Higgins, plaintiffs cannot show that Dr. Higgins violated Goetzee’s constitutional rights. Dr. Higgins also argues that plaintiffs cannot satisfy the burden required to sustain a claim for punitive dam ages under section 1983. 29 Finally, Dr. Higgins argues that plaintiffs cannot prevail on their state-law negligence claim s. 27 See id. at 32. 28 Id. at 98. 29 Dr. Higgins also argues that plaintiffs cannot prevail on their claim for punitive dam ages under Louisiana law, but plaintiffs do not appear to seek punitive dam ages on their Louisiana negligence claim s. See generally Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 89 So. 3d 30 7, 317 (La. 20 15) (noting II. LEGAL STAN D ARD Sum m ary judgment is warranted when “the m ovant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any m aterial fact and the m ovant is entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 10 69, 10 75 (5th Cir. 1994). When assessing whether a dispute as to any m aterial fact exists, the Court considers “all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s] from m aking credibility determ inations or weighing the evidence.” Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationw ide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 20 0 8). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonm oving party, but “unsupported allegations or affidavits setting forth ‘ultim ate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law’ are insufficient to either support or defeat a m otion for sum m ary judgment.” Galindo v. Precision Am . Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Little, 37 F.3d at 10 75. “No genuine dispute of fact exists if the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-m oving party.” EEOC v. Sim baki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 20 14). the Louisiana Legislature generally disallowed punitive dam ages, except in specific situations). Accordingly, the Court will not address this argum ent. III. D ISCU SSION As noted, plaintiffs seek to hold Dr. Higgins liable for com pensatory and punitive dam ages under section 1983 and for com pensatory dam ages under Louisiana tort law. The Court addresses each theory in turn. A. Plain tiffs ’ Se ctio n 19 8 3 Claim s The elements of a section 1983 cause of action are: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by federal law (2) that occurred under color of state law, and (3) was caused by a state actor. See Victoria W . v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 482 (5th Cir. 20 0 4). As the Court explained in an earlier sum m ary judgment order, 30 “[t]he State's exercise of its power to hold detainees . . . brings with it a responsibility under the U.S. Constitution to tend to essentials of their wellbeing.” Hare v. City of Corinth (Hare III), 74 F.3d 633, 638– 39 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Accordingly, pretrial detainees, like Goetzee, have a right to “constitutional essentials” such as safety and medical care, including protection against the risk of self-harm . Jacobs v. W est Feliciana Sheriff's Dep't, 228 F.3d 388, 393 (5th Cir. 20 0 0 ). “Unlike convicted prisoners, whose rights to constitutional essentials like m edical care and safety are 30 See R. Doc. 113. guaranteed by the Eighth Am endm ent, pretrial detainees look to the procedural and substantive due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Am endm ent to ensure provision of these sam e basic needs.” Id. (citing Bell v. W olfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)). “The failure to provide pre-trial detainees with adequate protection from their known suicidal im pulses is actionable under § 1983.” Evans v. City of Marlin, 986 F.2d 10 4, 10 7 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Rhy ne v. Henderson Cty ., 973 F.2d 386, 391 (5th Cir.1992)). Here, plaintiffs sued Dr. Higgins under section 1983 in both his individual capacity and official capacity. Plaintiffs also proceed on two alternative theories: first, that Dr. Higgins is liable for an “episodic act or om ission” that deprived Goetzee of his constitutional rights and second, that Dr. Higgins is responsible for a general “condition of confinement” that deprived Goetzee of his constitutional rights. 31 In his m otion for sum m ary judgment, Dr. Higgins argues that plaintiffs cannot prevail on their section 1983 claim s under the Seventh Circuit’s application of the Eighth Am endm ent, which does not apply here. In addition, Dr. Higgins addresses only plaintiffs’ episodic-act-or-om ission claim . 31 Because the standard applicable to a Fourteenth Am endm ent See R. Doc. 265 at 20 . episodic-act-or-om ission claim by a pretrial detainee is sim ilar to the standard applicable to an Eighth Am endm ent claim by a convicted prisoner, the Court will nonetheless address Dr. Higgins’s arguments on this point. See Ard v. Rushing, 597 F. App’x 213, 218 -19 (5th Cir. 20 14) (citing Hare v. City of Corinth (Hare III), 74 F.3d 633, 638 -39 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc)). With an episodic-act-or-om ission claim , “the com plained-of harm is a particular act or om ission of one or m ore officials.” Scott v. Moore, 114 F.3d 51, 53 (1997) (en banc). A plaintiff in an episodic-act-or-om ission case “com plains first of a particular act of, or om ission by, the actor and then points derivatively to a policy, custom , or rule (or lack thereof) of the m unicipality that perm itted or caused the act or om ission.” Id. To im pose liability on a defendant in his individual capacity in an episodic-act-or-om ission case, a pretrial detainee m ust establish that the defendant acted with subjective deliberate indifference. Id. A person acts with subjective indifference if (1) “he knows that an inm ate faces a substantial risk of serious bodily harm ,” and (2) “he disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Anderson v. Dallas Cty ., Tex., 286 F. App’x 850 , 860 (5th Cir. 20 0 8) (citing Gobert v. Caldw ell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 20 0 6)). In inmate suicide cases, the defendant m ust be aware of a substantial and significant risk that the inm ate will com m it suicide and “effectively disregard[] it.” Jacobs v. W . Feliciana Sheriff’s Dep’t, 228 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 20 0 0 ). Although “the law is clearly established that jailers m ust take m easures to prevent inm ate suicides once they know of the suicide risk,” it is not clearly established “as to what those m easures m ust be.” Id. To im pose liability on a defendant in his official capacity, and thus hold a m unicipality accountable for the constitutional violation, the detainee “m ust show that the m unicipal em ployee’s act resulted from a m unicipal policy or custom adopted or m aintained with objective deliberate indifference to the detainee’s constitutional rights.” Scott, 114 F.3d at 54; see also Sibley v. Lem aire, 184 F.3d 481, 488 (5th Cir. 1999) (requiring plaintiff to show objective deliberate indifference “[t]o hold superiors liable”). Objective indifference “considers not only what the policy m aker actually knew, but what he should have known, given the facts and circum stances surrounding the official policy and its im pact on the plaintiff’s rights.” Corley v. Prator, 290 F. App’x 749, 750 (5th Cir. 20 0 8) (citing Law son v. Dallas Cty ., 286 F.3d 257, 264 (5th Cir. 20 0 2)). As to plaintiffs’ individual capacity claim , Dr. Higgins adm its that he “was aware of Goetzee’s suicidal tendencies [and] knew he was at risk [of com m itting suicide.]”32 Therefore, the only issue for the Court is whether plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence of Dr. Higgins “disregard[ing] that risk by failing to take reasonable m easures to abate it.” See Anderson, 286 F. App’x at 860 . Dr. Higgins argues that once he determ ined Goetzee required direct observation, “security step[ped] in . . . and [Dr. Higgins] did not have authority to control security.”33 Sim ilarly, Dr. Higgins argues that aside from ordering direct observation, there was nothing he could do to prevent Goetzee’s suicide. 34 Plaintiffs present sufficient evidence to withstand summ ary judgm ent here. Dr. Higgins testified at his deposition that, as Chief of Psychiatry, suicide prevention at OPP was his “highest priority” and that he had an ethical obligation as a psychiatrist to “address [OPP’s] suicide prevention practices.”35 Certain evidence also shows that Dr. Higgins knew that the direct observation deputies often eschewed their responsibilities. First, the layout of OPP’s m ental health tier physically precluded a direct observation deputy from constantly m onitoring every suicidal inm ate, as required by 32 R. Doc. 248-2 at 15. 33 Id. at 16. 34 Id. at 22. 35 R. Doc. 266, Exhibit Z at 79, 10 0 . OPP’s written suicide prevention policy. No m atter where a deputy sat or stood on the m ental health tier, he or she could not sim ultaneously observe all three cells where the suicidal inm ates were housed. 36 See Jacobs, 228 F.3d at 396 (explaining that detaining a suicidal inm ate in a cell with a “blind spot” and other hazards was “obviously inadequate”). Additionally, nurses and deputies alike testified that the medical supervisors, including Dr. Higgins, were aware that suicidal inm ates were often ignored for long periods of time. 37 Deputy William Thom pson testified that there was “no question that Dr. Higgins knew” that suicidal inm ates were left unobserved. 38 Nurse David Schaible sim ilarly testified that he com plained about deputies not properly conducting direct observation, but stopped voicing his concerns after a few m onths because “nothing changed.”39 According to Schaible, “[Dr. Higgins] was well aware that it was a problem .”40 See Dom ino v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim inal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 36 R. Doc. 266, Exhibit A at 163-64; R. Doc. 266, Exhibit DD at 62-63. 37 See, e.g., R. Doc. 266, Exhibit A at 155-56; R. Doc. 266, Exhibit DD at 50 -52, 10 2-110 ; R. Doc. 266, Exhibit GGG at 144, 153. 38 R. Doc. 266, Exhibit A at 160 . 39 R. Doc. 266, Exhibit DD at 20 6-0 7. 40 Id. at 211-12. 756 (5th Cir. 20 0 1) (noting that “ignor[ing] com plaints” m ay amount to deliberate indifference). Plaintiffs argue that the evidence also shows that despite Dr. Higgins’s knowledge of the frequent lapses in direct observation, he did nothing to remedy the problem . Sheriff Gusman testified at his deposition that he expected both security staff and m edical staff, which included Dr. Higgins, to ensure com pliance with direct observation orders. 41 Sergeant Nicole Harris sim ilarly explained that security and m edical staff “worked seam lessly together” on the m ental health tier, including with regard to direct observation inm ates. 42 At least one deputy testified at his deposition that “Dr. Higgins was . . . in charge” on OPP’s mental health tier. 43 According to Deputy Tyrone William s, if Dr. Higgins gave a deputy an order, “it got followed.”44 William s also explained that Dr. Higgins never told him that he was concerned about deputies failing to follow direct observation orders; had Dr. Higgins expressed any concern, William s “would have done whatever Dr. Higgins 41 See R. Doc. 266, Exhibit MM at 84-86, 341-42. 42 R. Doc. 266, Exhibit LL at 194-95. 43 R. Doc. 266, Exhibit GGG at 31. 44 Id. at 32. told [William s] to do.”45 Thus, according to plaintiffs, because Dr. Higgins knew about the significant lapses in direct observation, but did nothing to ensure his direct observation orders were properly carried out, Dr. Higgins effectively disregarded Goetzee’s known suicide risk by subjecting Goetzee to m ental health care that Dr. Higgins knew to be “obviously inadequate.” See Jacobs v. W . Feliciana Sheriff’s Dep’t, 228 F.3d 388, 397 (5th Cir. 20 0 0 ) (denying sheriff qualified im m unity because he may have acted with deliberate indifference by “plac[ing] [a suicidal inm ate] in conditions he knew to be obviously inadequate”); Lew is v. Parish of Terrebonne, 894 F.2d 142, 146 (5th Cir. 1990 ) (“[A] detainee with suicidal tendencies . . . requires [] protective action in that the detainee presents a risk of dam age to him self and other inm ates.”). Accordingly, sum m ary judgm ent is not warranted on plaintiffs’ episodic-act-or om ission claim against Dr. Higgins in his individual capacity. Although Dr. Higgins’s m otion for sum m ary judgm ent appears to address plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim against him in his official capacity, he m erely repeats his argum ent that there is no evidence that Dr. Higgins 45 Id. at 98. disregarded Goetzee’s risk of suicide. 46 Dr. Higgins fails to address the elements of an official capacity claim. Therefore, for the same reasons the Court denies summary judgment on plaintiffs’ individual capacity claim , the Court also denies sum m ary judgm ent on plaintiffs’ official capacity claim . B. Plain tiffs ’ Claim fo r Pu n itive D am age s U n d e r Se ctio n 19 8 3 Under section 1983, plaintiffs also seek punitive dam ages for Dr. Higgins’s alleged constitutional violation. Punitive dam ages m ay be awarded in a section 1983 action “only when the defendant’s conduct is m otivated by evil intent or demonstrates reckless or callous indifference to a person’s constitutional rights.” W illiam s v. Kaufm an Cty ., 352 F.3d 994, 10 15 (5th Cir. 20 0 3) (citing Sm ith v. W ade, 461 U.S. 30 , 56 (1983)). The “reckless or callous indifference” standard requires “recklessness in its subjective form ”—that is, “a subjective consciousness of a risk of injury or illegality and a criminal indifference to civil obligations.” Id. In the Fifth Circuit, it is “fair to say that acting or failing to act with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding that risk.” Cam pbell v. Miles, 228 46 Indeed, Dr. Higgins appears to have sim ply copied-and-pasted substantial portions of his arguments into the separate subsections of his brief. See R. Doc. 248-2. F.3d 40 9, 20 0 0 WL 10 56131, at *3 (5th Cir. 20 0 0 ) (quoting Sibley v. Lem aire, 184 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir. 1999)). Because plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to withstand sum m ary judgm ent on their deliberate indifference claim , plaintiffs also survive sum m ary judgm ent on their claim for punitive dam ages. Even if plaintiffs bore a higher burden of proof to recover punitive dam ages, there is enough evidence in the record for a jury to find that Dr. Higgins acted with reckless or callous indifference as well. C. Plain tiffs ’ State -Law Claim fo r N e glige n ce Finally, Dr. Higgins argues that plaintiffs cannot prevail on their claim of negligence or medical m alpractice under Louisiana law. As Dr. Higgins correctly points out, deliberate indifference is a m uch higher standard than negligence or m edical m alpractice. 47 See Hood v. Montgom ery Cty ., Tex., 584 F. App’x 238, 238-39 (5th Cir. 20 14) (noting deliberate indifference requires a showing of intent that is unnecessary to sustain a claim for negligence or medical m alpractice). Accordingly, because sum m ary judgm ent is not warranted on plaintiffs’ deliberate indifference claim, 47 Id. at 22-23. neither is summ ary judgment warranted on their state-law claim for negligence or m alpractice. IV. CON CLU SION After reviewing the evidence in a light m ost favorable to plaintiffs, the Court finds that there are sufficient facts for plaintiffs to proceed to trial against Dr. Higgins. For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Dr. Higgins’s m otions for sum m ary judgment. 48 26th New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ _ _ day of February, 20 16. ____________________________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 48 R. Doc. 236; R. Doc. 248.
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