Thibodeaux v. Wellmate, No. 2:2012cv01375 - Document 220 (E.D. La. 2016)

Court Description: ORDER denying 216 217 Motion for New Trial. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan on 8/3/16. (cg)

Download PDF
Thibodeaux v. Wellmate Doc. 220 U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT COU RT EASTERN D ISTRICT OF LOU ISIAN A J OEL C. TH IBOD EAU X, Pla in tiff CIVIL ACTION VERSU S N O. 12 -13 75 W ELLMATE, e t al., D e fe n d an t SECTION : “E” ORD ER AN D REAS ON S This m atter com es before the Court on a m otion for new trial filed by Plaintiff, J oel C. Thibodeaux, on his failure-to-warn claim , pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a). 1 Intervenor, Chevron USA, Inc., also filed a m otion for new trial on the Plaintiff’s failure to warn claim , adopting the argum ents m ade by Plaintiff. 2 Defendant, Pentair Water Treatm ent (OH) (“Pentair”), opposes the m otions. 3 For the reasons that follow, the m otions are D EN IED . FACTU AL & PROCED U RAL BACKGROU N D The Plaintiff filed suit under the Louisiana Product Liability Act 4 seeking dam ages for injuries he suffered while servicing a water pressure tank m anufactured by Pentair. Plaintiff’s asserted product liability claim s included defective design and m anufacture and failure to warn. The jury returned a verdict on J une 7, 20 16, finding that the Pentair water pressure tank was not unreasonably dangerous. 5 The Court rendered judgm ent in Pentair’s favor that sam e day. 6 1 R. Doc. 216. R. Doc. 217. 3 R. Doc. 219. 4 La. R.S. 9:280 0 .51, et seq. 5 R. Doc. 210 . 6 R. Docs. 211, 215. 2 1 Dockets.Justia.com LAW AN D AN ALYSIS A m otion for new trial under Rule 59(a) is an extraordinary rem edy that should be used sparingly. 7 Rule 59(a) provides, specifically, that the district court m ay grant a new jury trial on all or som e of the issues “for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.”8 Although Rule 59(a) does not delineate the precise grounds for granting a new trial, the Fifth Circuit has held that Rule 59(a) allows the district court to grant a new trial if it “finds the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the dam ages awarded are excessive, the trial was unfair, or prejudicial error was com m itted in its course.”9 Still, the decision whether to grant a new trial under Rule 59(a) is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and the court’s authority is broad. 10 The undisputed eviden ce showed there was no warning label on the water pressure tank at the tim e of Plaintiff’s accident. 11 Plaintiff argues that Pentair could escape liability for its failure to warn only by proving that the warning label was on the tank at the tim e of m anufacture and at the tim e the tank left Pentair’s control. 12 Plaintiff contends a new trial is warranted because Pentair was allowed to introduce the expert testim ony of Thom as Proft 13 that warning labels were applied to the water tank at the tim e it was m anufactured and that the warning labels were present when the water tank left Pentair’s control, while the Plaintiff was prohibited from cross-exam ining Mr. Proft as to “the length of tim e a warning label should last and the sufficiency of the adhesive that should 7 Karim v. Finch Shipping Co., 111 F. Supp. 2d 783, 784 (E.D. La. 20 0 0 ) (citing Avondale Indus., Inc. v. Bd. of Com m ’rs of the Port of N ew Orleans, No. 94-2786, 1996 WL 413645, at *2 (E.D. La. J uly 24, 1996)). 8 F ED . R. CIV. P. 59(a). See Sm ith v. Transw orld Co., 773 F.2d 610 , 613 (5th Cir. 1985). 9 See Sm ith, 773 F.2d at 613 (citing Reed Bros., Inc. v . M onsato Co., 525 F.2d 486, 499– 50 (8th Cir. 1975)). 10 In re Om ega Protein, Inc., No. 0 4-0 20 71, 20 0 7 WL 197430 9, at *2 (W.D. La. J uly 2, 20 0 7). See also Thom as v. Concerned Care Hom e Health, Inc., No. 13-5912, 20 16 WL 930 943, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 11, 20 16). 11 R. Doc. 114 at 8 ¶ 31. 12 R. Doc. 216-1 at 3. 13 Mr. Proft was allowed to testify as an expert in m aterial science and engineerin g. See R. Doc. 213 at 8:16– 20 (Trial Tr. J une 6, 20 16). 2 be used when applyin g a warning label to a product.”14 Plaintiff argues his in ability to cross-exam ine Mr. Proft deprived him of a fair trial with respect to Pentair’s duty to warn because Plaintiff should have been allowed to show the jury through cross-exam ination that, even if a warning label was applied to the water tank at the tim e it was m anufactured, Mr. Proft’s testim ony that the label rem ained on the tank until the tim e it left Pentair’s control was not credible. 15 Plaintiff argues “the presen ce (or absence) of warning labels on the water tank—both at the tim e of m anufacture and at the tim e it left Pentair’s control—necessarily im plicates the adequacy of the warning,”16 and, as a result, entitles him to a n ew trial on this issue. Plaintiff argues that this error is com pounded by the fact that the Court precluded his expert, Cynthia Sm ith, from testifying about “whether warning labels were present on the Wellm ate tank at the tim e the tank left Pentair’s control.”17 Defendants adm it Mr. Proft testified he found eviden ce that a warning label existed at one tim e on the drain assem bly of the water pressure tank but argue that the adequacy of the language in the warning label is outside the expertise of Mr. Proft and beyond the scope of his direct exam ination. Defendants argue further that Plaintiff has not explain ed why testim ony concerning whether the warnin g was on the tank at the tim e it left Pentair’s control affected the jury finding that the tank was not unreasonably dangerous based on the warning. 18 14 R. Doc. 216-1 at 5. R. doc. 216-1 at 6. 16 R. doc. 216-1 at 5. 17 R. Doc. 172 at 7. The Court excluded Ms. Sm ith’s testim ony on the existence and perm an ency of the warnin gs because it was not based on sufficient facts or data and was not the product of reliable principles and m ethods. Id. at 8 . 18 R. Doc. 219 at 2. 15 3 Plaintiff argues that the Court com m itted prejudicial error when it sustained objections to his counsel’s cross-exam ination of Mr. Proft. A m otion for new trial m ay be granted only if substantial errors occurred in the adm ission or rejection of eviden ce at trial. 19 Plaintiff argues that the Court com m itted substantial error in the rejection of certain testim ony by refusing to allow his counsel to cross-exam ine Mr. Proft on (1) whether the label was on the tank at the tim e of m anufacture an d at the tim e the tank left the control of Pentair, (2) the sufficiency of the adhesive used to attach the warning to the tank, and (3) the length of tim e the warning could have been expected to stay on the tank. 20 Plaintiff, without a clear explanation, argues this line of questioning is relevant to the sufficiency of the wording of the warning. 21 The questions asked of Mr. Proft on direct were: Q. In your opinion, is there physical evidence here to suggest that the warning label that was to be applied at m anufacture was, in fact, applied at the tim e of m anufacture? A. The warning label was specified to be applied in this area. We can see a very sharp line at this point and a less distinct line across the bottom that seem to indicate that m aterial was protected for a longer amount of tim e than, let’s say, this m aterial here, in other words, protected from the environm ent, which would im ply that there was som ething on top of it such as the label. 22 *** Q. [I]n your opinion, was the warning label applied to the drain assem bly at the tim e of m anufacture by Pentair? A. Yes. 23 19 Goodm an v. Pennsy lvania Tpk. Com m ’n, 293 F.3d 655, 676 (3d Cir. 20 0 2). R. Doc. 216-1 at 5. 21 R. Doc. 216-1 at 5. 22 R. Doc. 213 at 25:21– 26:5 (Trial Tr. J une 6, 20 16). 23 Id. at 27:12– 15. 20 4 Plaintiff’s counsel did not object to either of these questions. 24 To the extent that Plaintiff’s m otion rests on the im propriety of the adm ission of this testim ony, that argum ent is waived because the Plaintiff failed to object. When “no good reason is shown for the failure of appellant’s trial counsel to object to the adm ission of eviden ce, the objection is deem ed to have been waived.”25 Plaintiff’s counsel showed no good reason for his failure to object. Even if Plaintiff’s counsel had objected, the testim ony elicited from Mr. Proft was relevant and adm issible and did not run afoul of any of the Court’s pretrial rulings on m otions in lim ine. Its adm ission did not am ount to substantial error. According to the Plaintiff, the questions asked of Mr. Proft on direct opened the door to the questions Plaintiff was not allowed to ask on cross-exam ination. With respect to the first line of questioning, whether the label was on the tank at the tim e of m anufacture and at the tim e the tank left the control of Pentair, the record reflects that Plaintiff’s counsel was allowed to cross-exam ine the witness on this issue. 26 As a result, there was no rejection of this testim ony and there can be no substantial error in this regard. With respect to the second and third lines of questioning, the sufficiency of the adhesive and the tim e the warning m ight be expected to rem ain on the tank, the Court finds that the questions asked of Mr. Proft on direct did not open the door to these areas of inquiry on cross. Rule 611(b) of the Federal Rules of Eviden ce provides that “[c]rossexam ination should not go beyond the subject m atter of the direct exam ination an d 24 Id. at 25:21– 26:5, 27:12– 15. Rojas v. Richardson, 70 3 F.2d 186, 189 (5th Cir.), on reh’g, 713 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting Pury ear v. United States, 378 F.2d 29, 30 (5th Cir.1967)). See also Jenkins v. General Motors Corp., 446 F.2d 377 (5th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 40 5 U.S. 922 (1972) (noting that a tim ely objection generally is required to preserve appealability); Un ited States v. Ray born, 310 F.2d 339 (6th Cir.1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 952 (1963). 26 R. Doc. 213 at 68:5– 7 and 25 and 69:14– 70 :5 (Trial Tr. J une 6, 20 16). 25 5 m atters affecting the witness’s credibility.” Mr. Proft’s testim ony that there was a warning label at the tim e of m anufacture and at the tim e the tank left the control of Pentair clearly did not open the door to cross-exam ination as to the adequacy of the warning or how long the warning could have been expected to stay on the tank. Mr. Proft did not testify about the content of the warning or its adequacy or the adhesive used to affix the warning to the tank. Instead, he testified that he is not a warnings expert. 27 The Court did not com m it substantial error in sustaining objections to Plaintiff’s cross-exam ination of Mr. Proft. “A trial court, based upon its sound discretion, m ay lim it the scope and extent of crossexam ination, and its decision will not be disturbed on review unless an abuse of discretion is present.”28 The Court did not abuse its discretion in this regard. The Court did not com m it substantial error with respect to the adm ission or rejection of testim ony. A new trial on Plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim is not warranted. 29 CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons; IT IS ORD ERED that Plaintiff’s and Intervenor’s m otions for new trial are D EN IED . N e w Orle an s , Lo u is ian a, th is 3 rd d ay o f Au gu s t, 2 0 16 . ________________________________ SU SIE MORGAN U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT J U D GE 27 R. Doc. 213 at 68:12 (Trial Tr. J une 6, 20 16). United States v. Ram irez, 622 F.2d 898, 899 (5th Cir. 1980 ). 29 See Facille v. Madere & Sons Tow ing, LLC, No. 13-6470 , 20 15 WL 50 170 12, at *10 (E.D. La. Aug. 21, 20 15) (citing United States v. Jefferson , 258 F.3d 40 5, 412 (5th Cir. 20 0 1)). 28 6

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.