Thibodeaux v. Wellmate, No. 2:2012cv01375 - Document 200 (E.D. La. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS - IT IS ORDERED that Pentairs motion for judgment as a matter of law on all of Mr. Thibodeauxs claims is DENIED. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan.(bwn)
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Thibodeaux v. Wellmate Doc. 200 U N ITED STATES D ISTRICT COU RT EASTERN D ISTRICT OF LOU ISIAN A JOEL C. TH IBOD EAU X, Plain tiff CIVIL ACTION VERSU S N O. 12 -13 75 W ELLMATE, ET AL. D e fe n d an ts SECTION : “E” ( 5) ORD ER AN D REASON S Plaintiff J oel Thibodeaux claim s that Defendant Pentair Water Treatm ent OH Com pany is liable under the Louisiana Products Liability Act as a m anufacturer of the Wellm ate 12 water pressure tank. On Friday, J une 3, 20 16, Mr. Thibodeaux rested his case. Pentair then m oved for judgm ent as a m atter of law in open court pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court heard oral argum ent in open court, and both parties have subm itted written m em oranda to the Court. 1 “A party is entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law only if the evidence points but one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences which m ay support the opposing party’s position.” Logan v. Burgers Ozark Country Cured Ham s Inc., 263 F.3d 447, 455 (5th Cir. 20 0 1). When considering a m otion for judgm ent as a m atter of law, the court does not weigh evidence, judge witness credibility, or challenge the factual conclusions of the jury. Id. at 455– 56. Rather, judgm ent as a m atter of law is only appropriate if there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the non-m ovant. Paige v. Cochran, 212 F.3d 595 (5th Cir. 20 0 0 ). The m ovant m ust show a lack of 1 Plaintiff’s opposition to the m otion for judgm ent as a m atter of law is contained in Record Docum ent 197. Defendant subm itted its m em orandum in support of its m otion in court but has not filed it on the record electronically. 1 Dockets.Justia.com substantial evidence supporting the non-m ovant’s position and that all reasonable persons would draw the sam e conclusion. The evidence m ust be viewed in the light m ost favorable to the non-m ovant, and all reasonable inferences m ust be drawn in favor of the non-m ovant. Id.; Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529 F.3d 617, 622 (5th Cir. 20 0 8). There are three separate theories of liability under the LPLA that are applicable to Mr. Thibodeaux’s claim s against Pentair: (1) liability based on construction or com position; (2) liability based on design; and (3) liability based on inadequate warning. Pentair has m oved for judgm ent as a m atter of law on all of Mr. Thibodeaux’s claim s. First, with respect to Mr. Thibodeaux’s claim for liability under the LPLA based on construction or com position, Ms. Cynthia Sm ith testified that the bladder of the Wellm ate 12 tank contained m anufacturing defects. Pentair argues, however, that Ms. Sm ith never connected the defects she identified to the cause of Mr. Thibodeaux’s accident. Ms. Sm ith testified that the Wellm ate 12 tank at issue in this case contained m anufacturing defects. For exam ple, she testified that the bladder contained voids, or bubbles, in the polyethyl urethane m aterial and that the bladder failed to m eet Pentair’s or Bayer’s specifications. To prevail on his claim for liability under the LPLA based on construction or com position, Mr. Thibodeaux also m ust prove the m anufacturing defects proxim ately caused the accident at issue. Mr. Thibodeaux points to Ms. Sm ith’s testim ony that these m anufacturing defects were a contributing cause of this accident. A defect m ay be a proxim ate cause of dam age even though it operated in com bination with som e other cause. Where there are concurrent causes of an accident, the proper inquiry is whether the conduct in question was a substantial factor in bringing about the accident. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation, 20 11 WL 1792542, at *20 (E.D. La. 2 J an. 20 , 20 11); Hennegan v. Cooper/ T. Sm ith Stevedoring Co., 837 So. 2d 96, 10 2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/ 30 / 0 2). There can be m ore than one substantial factor that causes an accident. Hennegan, 837 So. 2d at 10 2; W estchester Fire Insurance Co. v. Haspel-Kansas Investm ent Partnership, 342 F.3d 416, 421 (5th Cir. 20 0 3). Sm ith testified that the m anufacturing defects she identified were contributing causes of this accident. For exam ple, she testified that, “in this case, with absolute certainty, [we know] those voids did contribute to this failure.”2 Ms. Sm ith testified that the voids in the bladder “would have m ade [the Wellm ate tank] fail m ore rapidly.”3 The Court finds there is legally sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude there was a m anufacturing defect in the Wellm ate tank that was a substantial cause of the accident. Thus, a reasonable jury could find in Mr. Thibodeaux’s favor on his LPLA claim based on construction or com position. Second, Pentair argues that Mr. Thibodeaux’s claim for liability under the LPLA based on design m ust fail because Mr. Thibodeaux has not established an alternative design that was capable of preventing this accident. The bladder in the tank at issue was attached to both the top and the bottom of the tank. Many witnesses, including Edward Lebreton, Matt Duhon, Fred Adams, and J oel Voytek, testified about an alternative design that currently exists and is in wide use; they testified that the design m ost typically seen attaches the bladder only to the top of the tank. In fact, these witnesses testified they had never seen a tank in which the bladder was attached to the top and the bottom of the tank before. 2 3 Trial Tr. Day 2 p.m . at 146. Id. at 147. 3 Pentair argued that, because no expert testified about this alternative design, Mr. Thibodeaux’s claim for liability based on defective design fails. Both the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and Louisiana courts have recognized that there m ay be cases in which expert testim ony is not needed—cases in which “the judge or the jury, by relying on background knowledge and com m on sense, can fill in the gaps in the plaintiff’s case, estim ating the extent of the risk avoided, the costs of im plem enting the proposed design change, or the adverse effects of the design m odification on the utility of the m achine. However, in order for this to be possible, the product itself, or at least the design feature in question, m ust be relatively uncom plicated, and the im plications of the change in design m ust be such that a laym an could readily grasp them .” McKey v. Gen. Motors Corp., 691 So. 2d 164, 170 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/ 14/ 97); Lavespere v. Niagara Machine & Tool W orks, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 184 (5th Cir. 1990 ); Krum m el v. Bom bardier Corp., 20 6 F.3d 548, 555 (5th Cir. 20 0 0 ). This is the kind of case in which the design feature in question, attachm ent of the bladder to the bottom of the tank, is relatively uncom plicated and the im plications of the change in design is such that a laym an could readily grasp them . Therefore, this is a case in which expert testim ony on the alternative design is not necessary. Pentair also argues there was no evidence that an alternative design would have been capable of preventing the accident. Ms. Sm ith testified, however, that “if the air cell had not been attached [to the drain assem bly] it would not have twisted at all. It twisted because of the design. It was attached to the bottom of the drain assem bly.”4 She testified 4 Trial Tr. Ms. Sm ith at 33– 34. 4 that, “without question,” the attachm ent of the bladder to the bottom of the tank “absolutely” contributed to this accident. 5 The Court finds there is legally sufficient evidence that there was an alternative design capable of preventing Mr. Thibodeaux’s dam age. A reasonable jury could find that the Wellm ate 12 tank was unreasonably dangerous in design and that the design defects proxim ately caused Mr. Thibodeaux’s injuries. Finally, Pentair m oves for judgm ent as a m atter of law on Mr. Thibodeaux’s LPLA claim for inadequate warning. Pentair argues that Mr. Thibodeaux has failed to establish proxim ate cause because Mr. Thibodeaux, Mr. Adam s, and Mr. Duhon all testified that the warning Pentair alleges it placed on the tank at the tim e of m anufacture was clear and that, if they had read the warning, they would have followed it. Mr. Thibodeaux, Mr. Adam s, and Mr. Duhon all testified there was no warning on the tank at the tim e of the accident. J oel Voytek, Pentair’s project m anager, testified that, based on the photographs he exam ined, there was no evidence of a label on the drain assem bly. 6 Mr. Voytek also testified that Wellm ate tanks are comm only used outdoors. The plaintiff points to testim ony regarding the visibility of the tank’s prim ary label, which is still visible on the tank today, and argues that the warning’s lack of presence on the tank at the time of the accident indicates that Pentair’s warnings were not adequate to withstand outdoor environm ental conditions, exposure to which Pentair should have known would degrade any warning labels. The Court finds there is legally sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude the tank was unreasonably dangerous because Pentair failed to provide an 5 6 Id. Trial Tr. Day 2 p.m . at 54. 5 adequate warning and that this unreasonably dangerous characteristic caused Mr. Thibodeaux’s injuries. Accordingly; IT IS ORD ERED that Pentair’s m otion for judgm ent as a m atter of law on all of Mr. Thibodeaux’s claim s is D EN IED . N e w Orle an s , Lo u is ian a, th is 6 th d ay o f Ju n e , 2 0 16 . ___________ __ _________________ SU SIE MORGAN U N ITED STATES D ISTRICT JU D GE 6
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