Thibodeaux v. Wellmate, No. 2:2012cv01375 - Document 166 (E.D. La. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS granting in part and denying in part 117 Motion in Limine Re Medical Expense Damages Sought by Plaintiff. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan on 5/22/2016. (bwn)
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Thibodeaux v. Wellmate Doc. 166 U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT COU RT EASTERN D ISTRICT OF LOU ISIAN A J OEL C. TH IBOD EAU X, Plain tiff CIVIL ACTION VERSU S N O. 12 -13 75 W ELLMATE, ET AL. D e fe n d an ts SECTION : “E” ( 5) ORD ER AN D REAS ON S Before the Court is Defendant’s m otion in lim ine regarding dam ages for past m edical expen ses sought by Plaintiff. 1 For the reason s set forth below, the m otion is GRAN TED . BACKGROU N D Plaintiff J oel C. Thibodeaux (“Thibodeaux”) brings claim s against Defendant Pentair Water Treatm ent OH Com pany (“Pentair”) under the Louisiana Products Liability Act (“LPLA”). 2 Thibodeaux was injured after the bladder in a water pressure tank, m anufactured by Pentair, ruptured on a platform operated by Chevron USA Inc. (“Chevron”), Thibodeaux’s em ployer and the plaintiff-in-intervention. 3 Thibodeaux filed this suit on May 30 , 20 12, 4 and brings claim s against Pentair under the Louisiana Products Liability Act. 5 Chevron filed a com plaint in intervention on March 1, 20 13, alleging it has paid indem nity and m edical benefits to or on behalf of Thibodeaux under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Com pensation Act as a result of his injuries. 6 1 R. Doc. 117. LA. R EV. STAT. §§ 9:280 0 .51– .60 . 3 R. Doc. 93-20 at 5; R. Doc. 10 1 at 10 ; R. Doc. 10 2-1 at 8 . 4 R. Doc. 1. 5 LA. R EV. STAT. §§ 9:280 0 .51– .60 . 6 R. Doc. 28 . 2 1 Dockets.Justia.com On March 15, 20 16, Pentair filed a m otion in lim ine regarding the am ount of dam ages Thibodeaux seeks for past m edical expen ses. 7 Thibodeaux filed an opposition on March 18, 20 16, 8 and Pentair filed a reply in support of its m otion in lim ine on March 23, 20 16. 9 LAW AN D AN ALYSIS At the tim e of Thibodeaux’s accident, Thibodeaux was working within the course and scope of his em ploym ent with Chevron on a Chevron-operated platform . 10 Pursuant to the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Com pensation Act, 11 Chevron has paid com pensation for m edical expenses to or on behalf of Thibodeaux in connection to his accident. 12 Although Thibodeaux contends his past m edical bills total $ 626,529.68 , 13 Chevron, Thibodeaux, and Pentair stipulated to the Court that, as of Decem ber 15, 20 15, Chevron has paid $ 244,70 2.87 in m edicals to or on behalf of Thibodeaux in connection to the accident. 14 The rem ainder of the m edical bills was not paid because the m edical providers accepted the lower am ounts as paym ent in full. 15 Nevertheless, Thibodeaux seeks past m edical dam ages of $ 626,529.68 , which allegedly constitutes the total am ount billed for Thibodeaux’s m edical treatm ent. 16 Pentair filed the in stant m otion in lim ine to lim it the am ount of past m edical dam ages Thibodeaux m ay recover to the am ount actually paid and to exclude any eviden ce of portions of m edical bills that were not paid and are not owed (the difference 7 R. Doc. 117. R. Doc. 119. 9 R. Doc. 123. 10 See R. Doc. 116. 11 33 U.S.C. § 90 1, et seq. 12 R. Doc. 116 at ¶ 2. 13 R. Doc. 114 at 19– 20 ; R. Doc. 119 at 3. 14 Id. at ¶ 3. 15 See R. Doc. 117-1 at 1– 2; R. Doc. 119 at 5 n.6. 16 R. Doc. 114 at 19– 20 ; R. Doc. 119 at 3. 8 2 between the total am ount billed and the am ount actually paid, referred to in cases as the “write-off” am ount). 17 Whether Thibodeaux m ay recover the am ount of m edical bills by which the bills were reduced, which is the differen ce between the $ 626,529.68 allegedly billed and the $ 244,70 2.87 actually paid on Thibodeaux’s behalf, is contingent upon whether the collateral source rule applies. If the collateral source rule applies, the plaintiff m ay recover the full value of his m edical expenses, including the “write-off” am ount. 18 If the collateral source rule does not apply, however, the plaintiff m ay not recover the “write-off” am ount; the total am ount the plaintiff m ay recover is lim ited to the am ount actually paid for m edical expenses. 19 Pentair argues the collateral source rule is inapplicable because Thibodeaux’s patrim ony has not been reduced in any way with regard to Chevron’s paym ent of the m edical bills and Thibodeaux did not give consideration for the com pensation ben efits. 20 Louisiana courts em brace and apply the collateral source rule, which is a rule of eviden ce and dam ages. 21 “Under the collateral source rule, a tortfeasor m ay not benefit, and an injured plaintiff’s tort recovery m ay not be reduced, because of m onies received by the plaintiff from sources independent of the tortfeasor’s procuration or contribution.”22 The paym ents a plaintiff receives from an independent source are not deducted from the award the aggrieved party would otherwise receive from the tortfeasor. 17 R. Doc. 117-1 at 2, 7. Bozem an v. State, 879 So. 2d 692, 70 3– 0 5 (La. 20 0 4). See also Griffin v . La. Sheriff’s Auto Risk Ass’n, 1999-2944 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/ 22/ 0 1), 80 2 So. 2d 691, 713– 15, w rit denied, 20 0 1-2117 (La. 11/ 9/ 0 1), 80 1 So. 2d 376. 19 See, e.g., Bozem an , 879 So. 2d at 70 0 – 0 6; Griffin, 80 2 So. 2d at 713– 15. 20 R. Doc. 117-1 at 7. 21 Bozem an, 879 So. 2d at 697. 22 Id. at 698. 18 3 As the Louisiana Suprem e Court explained in Bozem an v. State, “[a]s a result of the collateral source rule, the tortfeasor is not able to benefit from the victim ’s foresight in purchasing insurance and other benefits.”23 There are two prim ary considerations for determ ining whether the collateral source rule applies: “(1) whether application of the rule will further the m ajor policy goal of tort deterrence; and (2) whether the victim , by having a collateral source available as a source of recovery, either paid for such benefit or suffered som e dim inution in his or her patrim ony because of the availability of the benefit, such that no actual windfall or double recovery would result from application of the rule.”24 For exam ple, in Bozem an, the Louisiana Suprem e Court held that Medicaid recipients cannot collect Medicaid “write-off” am ounts as dam ages because no consideration is provided for the Medicaid benefit. 25 The court concluded that a plaintiff’s recovery is lim ited to what is actually paid by Medicaid. 26 The court explain ed, however, that “where [a] plaintiff’s patrim ony has been dim in ished in som e way in order to obtain the collateral source benefits, then plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of the bargain, an d m ay recover the full value of his m edical services, including the ‘write-off’ am ount.”27 In Bellard v. Am erican Cent Insurance Co., the Louisiana Suprem e Court recognized that a “troubling aspect” of the rule with which courts have struggled is “the double recovery or win dfall that m ight arise as a consequence of the victim ’s receipt of an outside paym ent”: “The purpose of tort dam ages is to m ake the victim whole. This goal is 23 Id. Lockett v. UV Ins. Risk Retention Grp., Inc., 15-166 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/ 19/ 15), 180 So. 3d 557, 570 , reh’g denied (Dec. 9, 20 15) (citing Bellard v. Am . Cent. In s. Co., 980 So. 2d 654, 669 (La. 20 0 8 )). See also Hoffm an v. 21st Century N . Am . Ins. Co., 20 15 WL 5776131, at *3 (La. 20 15). 25 Bozem an, 879 So. 2d at 70 5. 26 Id. at 70 5– 0 6. 27 Id. at 70 6. 24 4 thwarted, and the law is violated, when the victim is allowed to recover the sam e elem ent of dam ages twice.”28 In Bellard, the uninsured m otorist carrier for the victim ’s em ployer sought a credit for disability wage and m edical benefits paid by the em ployer or its workers’ com pensation carrier. 29 The court acknowledged that the tortfeasor would not receive any ben efit or reduction in liability as a result of the credit but also em phasized that the plaintiff had not given consideration for workers’ com pensation ben efits. The court noted that application of the collateral source rule in the case would allow the plaintiff to receive a windfall or double recovery. 30 The court explained that, “unlike sick leave, annual leave, or em ployer-provided health insurance, workers’ com pensation benefits cannot be considered a fringe ben efit in the nature of deferred com pensation that would otherwise be available to the plaintiff but for his injury. To the contrary, workers’ com pensation ben efits are required by law, and that sam e law prohibits an em ployer from assessing an em ployee, either directly or indirectly, with the cost of workers’ com pensation insurance.”31 In Hoffm an v. 21st Century N orth Am erica Insurance Co., the Louisiana Suprem e Court reiterated that, in both Bozem an and Bellard, the court “em phasized [that] a fundam ental consideration for application of the collateral source rule, in addition to tort deterrence, is ‘whether the victim , by having a collateral source available as a source of recovery, either paid for such benefit or suffered som e dim inution in his or her patrim ony because of the availability of the benefit, such that no actual windfall or double recovery would result from application of the rule.’”32 28 Bellard, 980 So. 2d at 668. Id. at 670 . 30 Id. at 679. 31 Id. at 670 . 32 Hoffm an, 20 15 WL 5776131, at *3 (quoting Bellard, 980 So. 2d at 669). 29 5 In Hoffm an, the plaintiff’s attorney negotiated a discount on plain tiff’s m edical expen ses with the m edical provider. 33 The plaintiff argued that his recovery should not be lim ited to m erely the m edical expenses actually paid because, under the collateral source rule, he was entitled to the total billed am ount, including the “written-off” portion of the bill. 34 The Louisiana Suprem e Court disagreed, holding that an attorney-negotiated m edical discount, or “write-off,” is not a paym ent or benefit that falls within the am bit of the collateral source rule. 35 The court explain ed that “allowing the plaintiff to recover an am ount for which he has not paid, and for which he has no obligation to pay, is at cross purposes with the basic principles of tort recovery in our Civil Code.”36 The court noted that “[t]he plaintiff has suffered no dim inution of his patrim ony to obtain the write-off, and, therefore, the defendant in this case cannot be held responsible for any m edical bills or services the plaintiff did not actually incur and which the plaintiff need not repay.”37 Louisiana’s jurisprudence on the collateral source rule is in accord with that of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. For exam ple, the Fifth Circuit has explain ed that, “for the [collateral source] rule to apply to ‘write-off’ am ounts of m edical expen ses that were billed but not paid because a third-party negotiated a lesser am ount, the plaintiff m ust give som e con sideration for the ben efit obtained or otherwise suffer a dim inution of patrim ony.”38 Thibodeaux gave no consideration for the com pensation Chevron provided pursuant to the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Com pensation Act. Indeed, 33 Id. at *1. Id. 35 Id. at *5– *6. 36 Id. at *4. 37 Id. 38 Miciotto v. United States, 270 F. App’x 30 1, 30 3 (5th Cir. 20 0 8) (per curiam ) (citing Bozem an, 879 So. 2d at 70 5– 0 6). 34 6 com pensation benefits, including for m edical services and supplies, are required by law. 39 There is no evidence that Thibodeaux suffered any dim inution of patrim ony. Rather, the crux of Thibodeaux’s argum ent is that, even though he did not suffer a reduction in his patrim ony, the policy goal of tort deterrence justifies his recovery of the full am ount billed. 40 Finding the collateral source rule inapplicable here, however, does not frustrate the purpose of the collateral source rule, as Thibodeaux argues. 41 Thibodeaux m ay still recover from Pentair all m edical expenses actually paid on his behalf, which will deter wrongful conduct by holding the tortfeasor responsible for the am ount paid. 42 “[W]here the plaintiff . . . provides no consideration for the collateral source benefits he receives, . . . the plaintiff is unable to recover the ‘write-off’ am ount.”43 Because Thibodeaux provided no consideration for the benefits paid pursuant to the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Com pensation Act, the collateral source rule is inapplicable, and Thibodeaux m ay not recover past m edical expenses billed but “written off” by the m edical provider and thus not paid by Chevron. 44 Thibodeaux m ay seek to recover only the am ount of past m edical expenses that have been paid on his behalf by Chevron ($ 244,70 2.87). The Court, however, will allow Thibodeaux to inform the jury of the total am ount billed, including the “write-off” am ounts, in addition to the am ount actually paid. The Court finds that evidence of the total am ount of past m edical expenses billed has som e 39 See 33 U.S.C. § 90 7. See also Bellard, 980 So. 2d at 670 . R. Doc. 117 at 3– 4. 41 Id. at 4. 42 See Hoffm an , 20 15 WL 5776131, at *4. 43 Bozem an, 879 So. 2d at 70 5. 44 See id. (“Any recovery above $ 950 .0 0 for the MRIs would am ount to a windfall and force the defendant to com pensate the plaintiff for m edical expenses the plaintiff has neither incurred nor is obligated to pay.”). 40 7 probative value that is not substantially outweighed by any risk of unfair prejudice. 45 The Court encourages the parties to enter into a stipulation, if possible, with respect to the total am ount billed and the total am ount paid on Thibodeaux’s behalf in the interest of stream lining the issues at trial. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons; IT IS ORD ERED that Pentair’s m otion in lim ine is GRAN TED IN PART and D EN IED IN PART. Thibodeaux m ay not seek to recover the “write-off” am ounts. Thibodeaux m ay not recover m ore dam ages for past m edical expen ses than the am ount actually paid on his behalf. He m ay, however, inform the jury of the total am ount of past m edical expenses billed. N e w Orle a n s , Lo u is ian a, th is 2 2 n d d ay o f May, 2 0 16 . _________ _ _______ __ _______ SU SIE MORGAN U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT J U D GE 45 See F ED. R. E VID. 40 3. 8
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