Hanover Insurance Company v. Superior Labor Services, Inc. et al, No. 2:2011cv02375 - Document 543 (E.D. La. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS denying 531 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan on 8/21/2017. (Reference: 16-2490)(clc)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Hanover Insurance Company v. Superior Labor Services, Inc. et al Doc. 543 U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT COU RT EASTERN D ISTRICT OF LOU ISIAN A H AN OVER IN SU RAN CE COMPAN Y, Pla in tiff CIVIL ACTION VERSU S N o . 11-2 3 75 c/ w 14 -19 3 0 14 -19 3 3 , 16 -2 4 9 0 SU PERIOR LABOR SERVICES, IN C., ET AL. D e fe n d an ts SECTION “E” Ap p lie s t o : 16 -2 4 9 0 ORD ER AN D REAS ON S Before the Court is Allied Shipyard, Inc.’s m otion for reconsideration. 1 On J uly 12, 20 17, the Court granted Lexington Insurance Com pany’s m otions for sum m ary judgm ent with respect to Allied’s status as an additional insured and with respect to Lexington’s duty to defend Allied in the Adam s and St. Pierre lawsuits as an additional insured under the 20 0 0 – 20 0 1 and 20 0 8 – 20 0 9 insurance policies issued by Lexington to Masse Contracting, Inc. 2 In Allied’s m otion, it asks the Court to reconsider its ruling under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Allied contends the Court com m itted m anifest errors of law in granting Lexington’s m otions for sum m ary judgm ent because (1) the Court ruled on the m otions for sum m ary judgm ent before Allied had an opportunity to answer or to conduct discovery on Lexington’s claim s, (2) the Court ruled that Allied was not a “certificate holder” under the 20 0 0 – 20 0 1 Lexington Policy, but Allied was not given the opportunity to conduct discovery with respect to whether it was a “certificate holder,” and (3) the Court failed to consider two Fifth Circuit cases when reaching its conclusion that 1 R. 2 Doc. 531. R. Doc. 50 9. 1 Dockets.Justia.com Lexington’s 20 0 8– 20 0 9 policy was “excess” to Allied’s prim ary insurance with the Gray Insurance Com pany. 3 A m otion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “m ust clearly establish either a m anifest error of law or fact or m ust present newly discovered evidence an d cannot be used to raise argum ents which could, and should, have been m ade before the judgm ent issued.”4 A m otion for reconsideration, however, “is ‘not the proper vehicle for rehashing eviden ce, legal theories, or argum ents that could have been offered or raised before the entry of [the order].’”5 “The Court is m indful that ‘[r]econsideration of a judgm ent after its entry is an extraordinary rem edy that should be used sparingly.’”6 “When there exists no independent reason for reconsideration other than m ere disagreem ent with a prior order, reconsideration is a waste of judicial tim e and resources an d should not be granted.”7 In deciding m otions under the Rule 59(e) standards, the courts in this district have considered the following factors: (1) whether the m ovant dem onstrates the m otion is n ecessary to correct m anifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgm ent is based; (2) whether the m ovant presents new eviden ce; (3) whether the m otion is necessary in order to prevent m anifest injustice; and (4) whether the m otion is justified by an intervening change in the controlling law. 8 3 R. Doc. 531-1 at 2– 4. Schiller v. Phy sicians Res. Grp. Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 20 0 3) (citations om itted) (internal quotation m arks om itted). 5 Lacoste v. Pilgrim Int’l, No. 0 7-290 4, 20 0 9 WL 1565940 , at *8 (E.D. La. J une 3, 20 0 9) (Vance, J .) (alteration in original) (quoting Tem plet v . Hy droChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 478 – 79 (5th Cir. 20 0 4)). 6 Castrillo v. Am . Hom e Mortg. Servicing, Inc., No. 0 9-4369, 20 10 WL 1424398, at *4 (E.D. La. April 5, 20 10 ) (alteration in original) (quotin g Tem plet, 367 F.3d at 479). 7 Lightfoot v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., No. 0 7-4833, 20 12 WL 711842, at *3 (E.D. La. Mar. 5, 20 12) (Brown, J .). 8 Castrillo, 20 10 WL 1424398, at *4. The Court notes that the tim e lim its of Rule 59 do not apply in this m atter because the order appealed is interlocutory. Rules 59 and 60 set forth deadlines for seeking 4 2 I. Th e Co u rt D id N o t Err in Gran tin g Le xin gto n ’s Mo tio n s fo r Su m m ary J u d gm e n t Be fo re Allie d w as Affo rd e d th e Op p o rtu n ity to An s w e r a n d to Co n d u ct D is co ve ry Allied first argues the Court com m itted m an ifest legal error in grantin g Lexington’s m otions for sum m ary judgm ent before Allied was afforded an opportunity to answer or to conduct discovery on Lexington’s claim s asserted against Allied. 9 Lexington filed its m otions for sum m ary judgm ent on J anuary 23, 20 17. 10 Allied filed responses to the m otions for sum m ary judgm ent on February 6, 20 17. 11 On February 14, 20 17, Lexington filed reply m em oranda in support of its m otions for sum m ary judgm ent. 12 Over Lexington’s objection, 13 the Court allowed Allied to file a supplem ental opposition to Lexington’s m otion for sum m ary judgm ent. 14 On J une 23, 20 17, Allied sought leave of Court to file yet another m em orandum in opposition to Lexington’s m otions for sum m ary judgm ent, which the Court granted. 15 Six m onths after Lexington’s m otions for sum m ary judgm ent were filed, and after Allied was allowed to file three m em oranda in opposition, Allied filed a m otion to strike Lexington’s m otions for sum m ary judgm ent, arguing Lexington and Allied were not adverse parties because there was no claim pending between them . 16 Realizing that this was, in fact, the case, on J uly 2, 20 17 the Court ordered Lexington to request leave of court reconsideration of final judgm ents. See Carter v. Farm ers Rice Milling Co., Inc., 33 F. App’x 70 4, at *2 (5th Cir. 20 0 2) (per curiam ); Lightfoot, 20 12 WL 711842, at *2. 9 R. Doc. 531-1 at 6. 10 R. Docs. 443, 444. 11 R. Docs. 450 , 451. 12 R. Docs. 462, 464. 13 Lexin gton filed a m otion to strike Allied’s m otion for leave to file a supplem ental m em orandum in opposition to its m otion for sum m ary judgm ent. R. Doc. 477. The Court denied Lexington’s m otion to strike. R. Doc. 478 . 14 R. Docs. 478, 479. Lexin gton filed a reply to Allied’s supplem ental opposition on May 23, 20 17. R. Doc. 488 . Because Allied’s responses to Lexington’s statem ents of uncontested facts were deficient, the Court ordered Allied to re-file its responses. R. Doc. 489. 15 R. Docs. 495, 496, 497. 16 R. Doc. 498. 3 to file an am ended com plaint in intervention nam ing Allied as a defendant-inintervention in case n um ber 14-1933 and/ or to file a cross-claim against Allied in case num ber 16-2490 . 17 In the interest of judicial econom y an d to avoid needless rebriefing of the sam e issue, the Court further stated that in either or both events it would “rely on the parties’ briefing that ha[d] already been subm itted” in ruling on Lexington’s m otions for sum m ary judgm ent. 18 Allied had notice that this would be the procedure followed by the Court on J uly 3, 20 17 and did not voice any objection. On J uly 10 , 20 17, Lexington filed an answer and crossclaim against Allied in case num ber 16-2490 and an am ended com plaint nam ing Allied as a defendant-in -intervention in case num ber 14-1933. 19 Neither Lexington’s crossclaim against Allied nor its am ended com plaint nam ing Allied as a defendant-in-intervention raised any new issues not already addressed in the briefs. Relying on the exten sive briefing already subm itted, the Court granted Lexington’s m otions for sum m ary judgm ent on J uly 12, 20 17. 20 Allied now argues the Court erred in ruling on Lexington’s m otions for sum m ary judgm ent before Allied was able to answer Lexington’s am ended com plaint in intervention and before Allied was able to conduct any discovery on Lexington’s claim s. 21 “[A] ‘court m ust not grant a sum m ary judgm ent . . . before the service of an answer, unless in the situation presented, it appears to a certainty that no answ er w hich the adverse party m ight properly serve could present a genuine issue of fact.’”22 Allied contends that its answer could have raised a genuine issue of m aterial fact with respect to whether it is 17 R. Doc. 499. Id. 19 R. Docs. 50 3, 50 7. 20 R. Doc. 50 9. 21 R. Doc. 531-1 at 6. 22 Kuperm an v. ICF Intern ., No. 0 8-565, 20 0 8 WL 647557 (E.D. La. Mar. 5, 20 0 8) (citing Stuart Inv. Co. v. W estinghouse Elec. Corp., 11 F.R.D. 277, 280 (D. Neb. 1951)) (em phasis added). 18 4 a “certificate holder” under Lexington’s 20 0 0 – 20 0 1 Policy. 23 According to Allied, Endorsem ent # 0 0 6 in the 20 0 0 – 20 0 1 Lexington Policy provides additional-insured coverage to “certificate holders.”24 Allied’s argum ent is that its answer could have raised a genuin e issue of m aterial fact because it is entitled to coverage under Endorsem ent # 0 0 6 if it is a certificate holder. The language of Endorsem ent # 0 0 6—an “other insurance” endorsem ent—provides: [T]he com pany agrees that such insurance as afforded by this policy for the benefit of certificate holders included as persons insured shall be prim ary and non-contributing insurance, but only as rests a claim , loss of liability arising out of insured operations or work on behalf of the nam ed insured perform ed under a written contract between the nam ed insured and the certificate holder that requires the n am ed insured to m aintain such prim ary and non-contributory insurance and to include the certificate holder as a person insured thereunder. 25 As stated in the Court’s order and reasons, Endorsem ent # 0 0 6 “provides insuran ce for the benefit of the certificate holder included as a person[s] insured.”26 “Endorsem ent # 0 0 6 m odifies neither the ‘Persons Insured’ section nor the definitions of ‘Insured’ or ‘Nam ed Insured’ of the 20 0 0 – 20 0 1 Lexington Policy.”27 The fact that an entity is a “certificate holder” does not autom atically entitle that entity to additional insured status under the 20 0 0 – 20 0 1 Lexington Policy; to enjoy additional in sured coverage, the “certificate holder” m ust be “included as persons insured.”28 As discussed at length in the Court’s ruling, Allied is not a “person insured” under the 20 0 0 – 20 0 1 Lexington Policy, and the policy does not contain an additional insured endorsem ent to provide Allied with 23 R. Doc. 531-1 at 6– 7. Id. at 7. 25 R. Doc. 443-17 at 38– 39 (em phasis added). 26 R. Doc. 50 9 at 23 (em phasis added). 27 Id. at 23– 24. 28 R. Doc. 443-17 at 38– 39. 24 5 additional insured status. 29 Even if Allied were a “certificate holder,” this fact alone would not entitle it to additional insured status under the 20 0 0 – 20 0 1 Lexington Policy. As a result, if Allied had conducted discovery and located certificates of insurance provided by Masse, or located such certificates in its own files, those certificates would not m ake Allied an additional insured. Louisiana law provides “Every insurance contract shall be construed according to the entirety of its term s and conditions as set forth in the policy, and as am plified, extended, or m odified by any rider, endorsem ent, or application attached to or m ade a part of the policy.”30 “Louisiana courts have found that certificates of insurance do not fall under this rubric and thus cannot create coverage.”31 “A certificate of insurance is not a rider, endorsem ent, or application” an d thus a court “cannot exam in e the certificate for purposes of determ ining if it m odifies the term s of coverage because . . . the certificate cannot am plify, exten d or m odify coverage.”32 A leading treatise on insurance provides: Certificates of insurance are often issued to the designated certificate holder as proof that the nam ed insured has insurance to cover work or operations being perform ed for the certificate holder and that the nam ed insured has had the certificate holder nam ed as an additional insured on the nam ed insured's insurance policy. However, the presentation of a certificate of insurance alone does not create coverage or legal obligations between the insurer an d the certificate holder. Generally, a certificate of insurance is not considered to be a part of the insurance contract; it is m erely evidence of the insurance. Accordingly, a certificate of insurance cannot contradict the term s of a policy but instead only provides inform ation as to the contents of the policy. In accordance with the above principles, a certificate of insurance cannot create a contractual relationship between an insurer and an alleged additional insured if the policy itself does not provide for such a relationship. In other words, no additional insured relationship exists where a certificate of insurance has been issued identifying an in dividual or 29 See R. Doc. 50 9. LA. R EV. STAT. § 22:8 81. 31 Arch Specialty Ins. Co. v. C&G Constr. of La., Inc., No. 12-20 47, 20 14 WL 3662837, at *5 (E.D. La. J uly 23, 20 14). 32 Citgo Petroleum Corp. v. Yeargin, Inc., 95-1574 (La. Ct. App. 3 Cir. 2/ 19/ 97); 690 So. 2d 154, 164. 30 6 entity as an additional insured without corresponding language in the policy or endorsem ent thereto that would include that individual or entity as an additional insured. 33 Even if Allied had been allowed tim e to conduct discovery to locate certificates of insurance and to file an answer, any certificates of insurance would be im m aterial. Any certificates of insurance provided by Masse to Allied would not alter the fact that the 20 0 0 – 20 0 1 Lexington Policy does not provide additional insured status to Allied, and the certificates them selves would not render Allied an additional insured. As a result, the Court’s granting of Lexington’s m otions for sum m ary judgm ent before Allied was able to serve an answer or conduct discovery was not in error because “no answer [that Allied] m ight properly serve could present a genuine issue of fact.”34 II. Th e Co u rt D id N o t Err in Co n clu d in g th a t th e 2 0 0 8 – 2 0 0 9 Le xin gto n Po licy w as Exce s s Lexington m oved for sum m ary judgm ent that: (1) Allied Shipyard, Inc. (“Allied”) does not qualify as an insured under the 20 0 8 -20 0 9 Lexington Policy, and therefore, no duty to defend is owed to Allied thereunder; (2) alternatively, even if Allied could qualify as an insured, which is denied, any coverage afforded to Allied under the 20 0 8-20 0 9 Lexington Policy is excess, excusing Lexington from any duty to defend unless and until all available prim ary insurance has been exhausted; and (3) in the further alternative, even if Allied could qualify as an insured and the coverage afforded to it under the 20 0 8 -20 0 9 Lexington Policy was not excess, both of which are denied, Lexington’s defense obligation is lim ited to 0 .833% for the Adam s Matter and 6.25% for the St. Pierre Matter of any post-tender defense costs. 35 Allied’s opposition to the m otion addressed only the first point—whether Allied is an additional insured under the policy. 36 Allied failed to address whether, even if it is an 33 3 COUCH ON I NS. § 40 :31 (J une 20 17). Kuperm an, 20 0 8 WL 647557, at *1. 35 R.Doc. 444-1 at 2. 36 R. Doc. 451. 34 7 insured, the coverage afforded is excess, excusing Lexington from any duty to defend unless and until all prim ary insurance has been exhausted. Now, in its m otion for reconsideration, Allied argues the Court com m itted legal error when it concluded that “Lexington, as Allied’s excess insurer, owes no duty to defen d Allied until Allied has exhausted its available prim ary insurance.”37 Allied could have and should have raised the issue of whether Lexington’s coverage is excess in its opposition to the m otion for sum m ary judgm ent. A m otion for reconsideration “is ‘not the proper vehicle for rehashing eviden ce, legal theories, or argum ents that could have been offered or raised before the entry of [the order].’”38 The Court notes also that the two Fifth Circuit cases cited by Allied, Ogea v. Loffland Brothers, Co. 39 and Tullier v. Halliburton Geophy sical Services, Inc., 40 are inapposite. First, those cases involved situations in which the indem nitee was required to purchase additional insured coverage for the indem nitor. 41 In this case, the indem nitor was required to purchase additional insured coverage for the in dem nitee. 42 Second, the insurance in those cases was prim ary, unlike the instant case in which the contract did not require that the insurance be prim ary and the policy clearly states that the coverage is excess. 43 The Lexington Addition al Insured Endorsem ent provides: Any coverage provided by this endorsem ent to an additional insured shall be excess over any other valid and collectible insurance available to the additional insured, whether prim ary, excess, contingent or on any other 37 R. Doc. 531-1 at 9. Lacoste, 20 0 9 WL 1565940 , at *8. 39 622 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 198 0 ). 40 81 F.3d 552 (5th Cir. 1996). 41 See Ogea, 622 F.2d at 187, 189; Tullier, 81 F.3d at 552, 555. 42 R. Doc. 234-7 at 3– 4. 43 See Marquette Trans. Co. v. La. Mach. Co., 367 F.3d 398, 40 7 (5th Cir. 20 0 4); Tullier, 81 F.3d at 554; A.M.C. Liftboats, Inc. v. Apache Corp., No. 0 6-10 543, 20 0 8 WL 217177, at *6 (E.D. La. J an . 25, 20 0 8 ). 38 8 basis unless a written contract or written agreem ent specifically requires that this insurance apply on a prim ary or non-contributory basis. 44 By the term s of the policy, Allied m ust exhaust any other insurance available to it before Lexington is required to pay. Only after all in surance has been exhausted do in dem n ity obligations com e into play. The Court did not err in finding that Lexington, as Allied’s excess insurer, owes no duty to defend Allied until Allied has exhausted its available prim ary insurance. Ogea and Tullier do not apply to the facts of this case. Accordingly; CON CLU SION IT IS ORD ERED that Allied’s m otion for reconsideration 45 is D EN IED . N e w Orle a n s , Lo u is ian a, th is 2 1s t d ay o f Au gu s t, 2 0 17. _________ _______ _________ S U SIE MORGAN U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT J U D GE 44 R. Doc. 444-17 at 37 (em phasis added). It is undisputed that neither the 1995 n or 20 0 7 Master Work Contracts between Allied and Masse require the coverage afforded to Allied to be prim ary and noncontributory. R. Doc. 444-2 at 7, ¶ 24; R. Doc. 492 at 3, ¶ 24; R. Doc. 444-18; R. Doc. 444-19. 45 R. Doc. 531. 9
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
