David et al v. Signal International LLC et al, No. 2:2008cv01220 - Document 2603 (E.D. La. 2015)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS re 2396 Motion for Summary Judgment - IT IS ORDERED that the Dewan Defendants Motions for Summary Judgment are hereby GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Signals non-indemnity crossclaims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Signals crossclaims for indemnity against the Burnett and Dewan Defendants are, for the reasons stated above, not barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan on 12/1/2015. (bwn)
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David et al v. Signal International LLC et al Doc. 2603 U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT COU RT EASTERN D ISTRICT OF LOU ISIAN A KU RIAN D AVID , e t al., Pla in tiffs CIVIL ACTION VERSU S N o . 0 8 -12 2 0 SIGN AL IN TERN ATION AL, LLC, e t al., D e fe n d an ts SECTION "E" R e la t e d Ca s e s : EQU AL EMPLOYMEN T OPPORTU N ITY COMMISSION , Pla in tiff CIVIL ACTION VERSU S N o . 12 -557 SIGN AL IN TERN ATION AL, LLC, e t al., D e fe n d a n ts SECTION "E" LAKSH MAN AN PON N AYAN ACH ARI, e t al., Pla in tiffs CIVIL ACTION VERSU S N o . 13 -6 2 18 ( c/ w 13 -6 2 19 , 13 -6 2 2 0 , 13 -6 2 2 1, 14 -73 2 , 14 -18 18 ) SIGN AL IN TERN ATION AL, LLC, e t al., D e fe n d an ts SECTION "E" 1 Dockets.Justia.com REJ I SAMU EL, e t al., Pla in tiffs CIVIL ACTION VERSU S N o . 14 -2 8 11 c/ w 14 -2 8 2 6 , 15 -2 2 9 5, 15 -2 2 9 6 15 -2 2 9 7 SIGN AL IN TERN ATION AL, LLC, e t al., D e fe n d an ts SECTION "E" Ap p lie s t o : D a v id v . Sig n a l ( 0 8 -12 2 0 ) ; Ach a r i v . Sig n a l ( 13 -6 2 18 ) ; Sa m u e l v . Sig n a l ( 14 -2 8 11) ; Jo s e p h v . Sig n a l ( 14 -2 8 2 6 ) ORD ER AN D REAS ON S Before the Court are the Dewan Defendants’ Motions for Sum m ary J udgm ent on the crossclaim s of Co-Defendant Signal International, LLC (“Signal”). 1 Signal opposes the Motions. 2 The Dewan Defendants have also filed reply m em oranda in further support of the Motions for Sum m ary J udgm ent. The Court has considered these briefs, the record, and the applicable law, and now issues its ruling. For the reasons that follow, the Motions for Sum m ary J udgm ent are GRAN TED IN PART and D EN IED IN PART. FACTU AL AN D PROCED U RAL BACKGROU N D This m atter arises out of an allegedly unlawful recruitm ent schem e used by Signal to recruit and em ploy citizen s of India in the afterm ath of Hurricane Katrina. 3 Plaintiffs, 1 This Order and Reasons applies to the identical Motions for Sum m ary J udgm ent currently pending in David v. Signal (0 8-1220 ), R. Docs. 2396, 2397; Achari v. Signal (13-6218), R. Docs. 50 4, 50 7; Sam uel v. Signal (14-2811), R. Docs. 219, 220 ; and Joseph v. Signal (14-28 26), R. Docs. 216, 217. The m otions were originally filed by Defendant Malvern C. Burnett, the Gulf Coast Im m igration Law Center, LLC, and the Law Offices of Malvern C. Burnett, APC (“the Burnett Defendants”). Defendants Sachin Dewan and Dewan Consultants, Pvt. Ltd. (“the Dewan Defendants”), thereafter join ed in the m otions. The Burn ett Defendants are no longer defendants to this action. Accordingly, for purposes of this Order and Reasons, the Court treats the Motions for Sum m ary J udgm ent solely as that of the Dewan Defendants. 2 R. Doc. 513 (in the Achari cases) (13-6218 ). For sim plicity, the Court, where n ecessary, refers to the Motions for Sum m ary J udgm ent and related briefs by citing the docum ent num bers assigned those filings in Achari v. Signal (13-6218). The docum ent num bers related to the Motions in the other relevant cases are reflected, supra, in footnote 1. 3 See generally R. Doc. 20 0 (in the Achari cases) (13-6218). 2 a num ber of the recruited Indian workers, allege that Signal, am ong others, recruited Plaintiffs to work at Signal’s facilities in Pascagoula, Mississippi, post-Hurricane Katrina. 4 Signal allegedly prom ised Plaintiffs that, in connection with the recruitm ent schem e, it would assist Plaintiffs in acquiring perm anent residen ce in the United States. 5 Plaintiffs contend, however, that Signal never followed through with these prom ises or took steps to assist Plaintiffs in obtaining green cards. 6 Moreover, Plaintiffs argue, inter alia, that they experienced discrim inatory treatm ent at the hands of Signal and were forced to live in deplorable conditions. 7 The present Motions for Sum m ary J udgm en t concern the crossclaim s levied by Signal against the Burnett Defendants and the Dewan Defendants in (1) David v. Signal (0 8-1220 ); (2) the consolidated cases in Achari v. Signal (13-6218); 8 (3) Sam uel v. Signal (14-28 11); and (4) Joseph v. Signal (14-2826). J udgm ent was entered on the crossclaim s in the first David trial 9 against Signal and in favor of the Burnett and Dewan Defendants. 10 The Dewan Defendants conten d in the present Motions that, because “identical” crossclaim s were alleged and adjudicated in the first David trial, 11 Signal’s 4 R. Doc. 20 0 at 4– 5 (in the Achari cases) (13-6218). R. Doc. 20 0 at 6 (in the Achari cases) (13-6218). 6 R. Doc. 20 0 at 6– 7 (in the Achari cases) (13-6218). 7 R. Doc. 20 0 at 7 (in the Achari cases) (13-6218). 8 Signal filed crossclaim s against the Burnett and Dewan Defendants in each of the cases consolidated in Achari v. Signal. These consolidated cases, along with the docum ent num ber of Signal’s crossclaim s in those cases, include: Thom as v. Signal (14-1818), R. Doc. 370 (E.D. La.); Achari v. Signal (13-6218), R. Doc. 642 (E.D. La.); Chakkiy attil v. Signal (13-6219), R. Doc. 643 (E.D. La.); Krishnakutty v. Signal (136220 ), R. Doc. 644 (E.D. La.); Devassy v. Signal (13-6221), R. Doc. 645 (E.D. La.); Singh v. Signal (14732), R. Doc. 646 (E.D. La.). 9 The first David trial involved only 5 of the Plaintiffs in David. The claim s of the rem ainin g 7 Plaintiffs against the Dewan Defendants, as well as Signal’s related crossclaim s against the Dewan Defendants, rem ain pendin g in David. 10 R. Doc. 50 4 at 2 (in the Achari cases) (13-6218); R. Doc. 50 4-1 at 2– 3 (in the Achari cases) (13-6218). 11 Counts 1 through 8 were resolved prior to trial when the Court granted judgm en t as a m atter of law in favor of the Burnett and Dewan Defendants. See David v. Signal (0 8 -1220 ), R. Doc. 2265. The jury foun d in favor of the Burnett and Dewan Defendants on the indem nity crossclaim s. See David v. Signal (0 8-1220 ), R. Doc. 2268-2 at 78 – 83. 5 3 crossclaim s in David—with respect to the rem aining David Plaintiffs—and in the consolidated Achari cases, as well as the Sam uel and Joseph cases, are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. LEGAL STAN D ARD S A. Sum m ary Judgm ent Standard Sum m ary judgm ent is appropriate only “if the m ovant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any m aterial fact and the m ovant is entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law.”12 “An issue is m aterial if its resolution could affect the outcom e of the action.”13 When assessing whether a m aterial factual dispute exists, the Court considers “all of the eviden ce in the record but refrains from m aking credibility determ inations or weighing the evidence.”14 All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-m oving party. 15 There is no genuine issue of m aterial fact if, even viewing the evidence in the light m ost favorable to the non-m oving party, no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonm oving party, thus entitling the m oving party to judgm ent as a m atter of law. 16 B. Res Judicata Standard “Under the doctrine of res judicata, parties and their privies are precluded from relitigating claim s that were or should have been raised in a prior action and have reached a final judgm ent on the m erits.”17 For the doctrine of res judicata to apply, four requirem ents m ust be satisfied: (1) the parties m ust be identical in both suits, or the 12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322– 23 (1986). DIRECTV Inc. v. Robson, 420 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 20 0 5). 14 Delta & Pin e Land Co. v . N ationw ide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 20 0 8 ). See also Reeves v . Sanderson Plum bing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 – 51 (20 0 0 ). 15 Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 10 69, 10 75 (5th Cir. 1994). 16 Sm ith v. Am edisy s, Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 440 (5th Cir. 20 0 2). 17 Metro Charities, Inc. v. M oore, 748 F. Supp. 1156, 1159 (S.D. Miss 1990 ) (citing Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981)). See also Allen v. McCurry , 449 U.S. 90 , 94 (1980 ) (“The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, forecloses relitigation of claim s that were or could have been raised in a prior action.”). 13 4 parties m ust be in privity with parties who were identical in both suits; (2) the prior judgm ent m ust have been rendered by a court of com petent jurisdiction; (3) the prior judgm ent m ust have been a final judgm ent on the m erits; and (4) the sam e claim or cause of action m ust be involved in both suits. 18 D ISCU SSION It is undisputed that the first two requirem ents of the res judicata analysis are satisfied in this case. 19 The Dewan Defen dants and Signal agree that (1) the parties in the crossclaim s are identical or in privity; and (2) the crossclaim s in the first David trial were decided by a court of com petent jurisdiction. The prin cipal disputes with respect to the present Motions for Sum m ary J udgm ent concern the third and fourth requirem ents of the res judicata analysis. The Court will address each requirem ent, in turn, below. A. Final Judgm ent on the Merits The third requirem ent of the res judicata inquiry, as recited above, requires that the prior judgm ent be a final judgm ent on the m erits. 20 The Dewan Defendants contend it is “self evident” that the prior judgm ent on Signal’s crossclaim s in the first David trial is final and on the m erits, noting that a “verdict was issued as a result of a trial o[n] the m erits and J udgm ent was issued pursuant to Rule 54(b).”21 Signal, on the other hand, disputes the assertion that the first David trial resulted in a final judgm ent on its crossclaim s. 22 Signal argues that, because it has appealed the Court’s judgm ent on its crossclaim s, the judgm ent is not final for purposes of res judicata. 23 More specifically, 18 See, e.g., Sw ate v. Hartw ell (In re Sw ate), 99 F.3d 128 2, 1286 (5th Cir. 1996); R. Doc. 50 4-2 at 4– 5 (in the Achari cases); R. Doc. 513 at 4 (in the Achari cases) (13-6218 ). 20 See supra note 18 and accom panying text. 21 R. Doc. 50 4-2 at 5 (in the Achari cases) (13-6218). 22 R. Doc. 513 at 5 (in the Achari cases) (13-6218). 23 R. Doc. 513 at 5 (in the Achari cases). Signal states that the pendency of its appeal should “defeat” the finality argum ent. R. Doc. 513 at 5 (in the Achari cases) (13-6218). 19 5 Signal contends the pendency of an appeal renders the appealed-from judgm ent “insufficiently final” for res judicata purposes. Under Fifth Circuit case law, it is im m aterial for res judicata purposes that a prior judgm ent has been appealed. The Fifth Circuit has specifically held that “[a] case pen ding appeal is res judicata and entitled to full faith and credit unless and until reversed on appeal.”24 Signal’s argum ent to the contrary, that its taking of an appeal ren ders the Court’s judgm ent “insufficiently final,” is incorrect. 25 Signal’s appeal has, for res judicata purposes, no bearing on the finality of the Court’s judgm ent on Signal’s crossclaim s in the first David trial. As a result, the Court finds the third requirem en t of the res judicata inquiry satisfied. The judgm ent on Signal’s crossclaim s in the first David trial is, for purposes of res judicata, final and on the m erits. The Court now turns to the fourth requirem ent. B. Sam e Claim s or Causes of Action The fourth requirem ent of the res judicata inquiry, as recited above, requires that the sam e claim s or causes of action be involved in both suits. 26 To determ ine whether two suits involve the sam e claim s or causes of action, the Fifth Circuit instructs courts to use the “transactional test” of the Restatem ent (Second) of J udgm ents, § 24. 27 Under the 24 Com er v . Murphy Oil USA, 718 F.3d 460 , 467 (5th Cir. 20 13) (quoting Fid. Standard Life Ins. Co. v. First N at’l Bank & Trust Co., 510 F.2d 272, 273 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam )) (internal quotation m arks om itted). See also United States v. M unsingw ear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950 ); 18A CHARLES A. W RIGHT & ARTHUR D. M ILLER, F EDERAL P RACTICE AND P ROCEDURE § 4427 (2d ed. 20 12). 25 Signal cites Griggs v. United States, 253 F. App’x 40 5 (5th Cir. 20 0 7), for the proposition that a judgm ent, when appealed, is insufficiently final for res judicata purposes. R. Doc. 513 at 5– 6. Signal’s reliance on Griggs for this conclusion is inapposite. Griggs does not hold that a judgm ent, if appealed, is not final for res judicata purposes. Instead, the Fifth Circuit in Griggs noted, in dicta, that a judgm ent, which is not appealed, is final, though that judgm ent m ay be erron eous or based on law that is n o longer controllin g. See Griggs, 253 F. App’x at 411. 26 See supra note 18 and accom panying text. 27 See, e.g., In re Southm ark Corp., 163 F.3d 925, 934 (5th Cir. 1999) (citin g Southm ark Prop. v. Charles House Corp., 742 F.2d 862, 870 – 71 (5th Cir. 198 4)); see also Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. v. U.S., 365 F.3d 385, 395– 96 (5th Cir. 20 0 4). 6 transactional test, a prior judgm ent’s preclusive effect exten ds “to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the [original] action arose.”28 Which grouping of facts constitutes a “transaction” or a “series of transactions” m ust “be determ ined pragm atically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in tim e, space, origin, or m otivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatm ent as a unit conform s to the parties’ expectations or business understandin g or usage.”29 The critical issue under the transactional test is whether the two actions or suits are based on the “sam e nucleus of operative facts.”30 In the first David trial, Signal’s crossclaim s were enum erated in 10 separate counts. 31 Counts 1 through 8 were Signal’s crossclaim s for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, m alpractice, two counts of breach of contract, unfair trade practices, detrim ental reliance, and tortious interference with a contractual relationship. 32 Counts 9 and 10 were Signal’s crossclaim s for indem nity against the Burnett and Dewan Defendants. 33 Signal does not dispute that Counts 1 through 8 arise out of the “sam e nucleus of operative facts” as its corresponding, non-in dem nity crossclaim s in the rem aining portion of the David case, the consolidated Achari cases, and the Sam uel and Joseph cases. 34 Indeed, Signal concedes that its non-indem nity crossclaim s in these cases satisfy the fourth requirem ent of the res judicata inquiry and involve the sam e claim s or causes of action as Signal’s non- 28 Petro-Hunt, 365 F.3d at 395– 96 (quoting R ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF J UDGMENTS § 24(1) (198 2)) (internal quotation m arks om itted). 29 Id. (quotin g R ESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF J UDGMENTS § 24(2) (198 2)) (internal quotation m arks om itted). 30 N ew York Life Ins. Co. v . Gillispie, 20 3 F.3d 384, 38 7 (5th Cir. 20 0 0 ). See also Davis v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 383 F.3d 30 9, 313 (5th Cir. 20 0 4). 31 David v. Signal (0 8-1220 ), R. Doc. 1748 at 95– 10 4. 32 David v. Signal (0 8-1220 ), R. Doc. 1748 at 95– 10 2. Prior to the trial in David, the Court dism issed Counts 1 through 8 of Signal’s crossclaim s, granting the Burn ett and Dewan Defendants judgm ent as a m atter of law. David v. Signal (0 8-1220 ), R. Doc. 2265. 33 David v. Signal (0 8-1220 ), R. Doc. 1748 at 10 2– 10 4. 34 See R. Doc. 513 at 8– 9 (in the Achari cases) (13-6218). 7 indem n ity crossclaim s adjudicated in the first David trial. Because the parties agree that the first and second requirem ents of the res judicata analysis are m et, and because the Court has found that the third and fourth requirem ents are m et, Signal’s non-in dem nity crossclaim s are barred by the doctrine of res judicata as a result of the judgm ent in the first David trial. The indem nity counts of Signal’s crossclaim s—Counts 9 and 10 in the first David trial—require a m ore lengthy and involved analysis. 35 Signal argues, in sum , that its indem n ity crossclaim s against the Burnett and Dewan Defendants in the first David trial were not based on the sam e nucleus of operative facts as Signal’s indem nity crossclaim s in the rem aining portion of the David case, the consolidated Achari cases, and the Sam uel and Joseph cases. 36 Signal contends its crossclaim s for indem nity necessarily involve facts specific to each individual Plaintiff and that the “facts surrounding a given Plaintiff’s recruitm ent” are dispositive of Signal’s crossclaim s for indem nity in each particular case. 37 As such, Signal avers that, because facts specific to the rem aining Plaintiffs in David, the Plaintiffs in Achari, and the Plaintiffs in Sam uel and Joseph were not presented and adjudicated at the first David trial, Signal’s indem nity crossclaim s should not be barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 38 The Dewan Defendants, on the other hand, argue that, with respect to Signal’s indem n ity crossclaim s, “the category of dam ages, the alleged basis of recovery, and the operative facts on which [Signal] bases its claim for recovery are the sam e as presented in David.”39 The Dewan Defendants m aintain the “only difference” is the “am ount of 35 See R. Doc. 513 at 9 (in the Achari cases) (13-6218). See R. Doc. 513 at 9– 10 (in the Achari cases) (13-6218 ). 37 R. Doc. 513 at 9– 12 (in the Achari cases) (13-6218). 38 R. Doc. 513 at 13– 14 (in the Achari cases) (13-6218). 39 R. Doc. 50 4-2 at 11 (in the Achari cases) (13-6218). 36 8 dam ages, if any, for which Signal m ay be held responsible.”40 The Dewan Defendants do not agree that Signal’s indem nity crossclaim s against the Burnett and Dewan Defendants are “plaintiff specific” and turn on the particular facts surrounding the recruitm ent of each Plaintiff. The Court agrees with Signal. Signal’s crossclaim s for indem nity against the Burnett and Dewan Defendants do require a “plaintiff-specific” analysis. In reaching this conclusion, the Court notes that, in the first David trial, the portion of the J ury Verdict Form which addressed Signal’s crossclaim s for indem nity against the Burnett and Dewan Defendants required an analysis of the facts and circum stances unique to the Plaintiffs in that case. 41 Specifically, with respect to Signal’s indem nity crossclaim s, the J ury Verdict Form referenced the “legal obligation” owed by Signal to the “Plaintiffs in the m ain action” and whether, “in all fairness,” the Burnett or Dewan Defendants should indem nify Signal for that legal obligation owed by Signal to those specific Plaintiffs. 42 Accordingly, in reaching a verdict on Signal’s indem nity crossclaim s in the first David trial, the jury was required to consider the specific circum stances and testim ony of the Plaintiffs and determ ine whether the Burnett and Dewan Defendants were required to indem nify Signal for Signal’s conduct with respect to those five David Plaintiffs whose claim s were presented in the first trial. At the first David trial and, specifically, during cross exam in ation, Signal elicited testim ony from each Plaintiff as to the conduct of the Burnett and Dewan Defendants and how each Plaintiff’s experience with Burnett and Dewan was unique and distinct. For exam ple, each Plaintiff was asked about unauthorized actions of Burnett and Dewan that 40 R. Doc. 50 4-2 at 11– 12 (in the Achari cases) (13-6218). David v. Signal (0 8-1220 ), R. Doc. 2268-2 at 78– 83. 42 See David v. Signal (0 8-1220 ), R. Doc. 2268-2 at 78– 83 (em phasis added). 41 See 9 were relevant to whether the Burnett and Dewan Defendants would be required to indem n ify Signal for Signal’s conduct vis-à-vis those David Plaintiffs. The Court is not persuaded by the argum ent, set forth by the Dewan Defendants, that Signal’s indem nity crossclaim s involve only an assessm ent of Signal’s and the Burnett and Dewan Defendants’ conduct vis-à-vis each other. 43 As stated above, whether the Burnett and Dewan Defendants were required by law to indem nify Signal in the first David trial turned on the particular facts and circum stances surrounding the individual Plaintiffs in that trial. Signal’s indem nity crossclaim s in the first David trial are necessarily distinct and do not involve the sam e claim s or causes of action as Sign al’s indem n ity crossclaim s in the rem aining portion of David, the consolidated Achari cases, or the Sam uel or Joseph cases. Sign al’s crossclaim s for indem nity against the Burnett and Dewan Defendants are not barred by the doctrine of res judicata. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Signal’s crossclaim s for indem nity against the Dewan Defendants in the rem aining portion of the David case, the consolidated Achari cases, and the Sam uel and Joseph cases are not barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Signal’s non-indem nity crossclaim s are barred under the doctrin e of res judicata. Accordingly; IT IS ORD ERED that the Dewan Defendants’ Motions for Sum m ary J udgm ent 44 are hereby GRAN TED IN PART and D EN IED IN PART. Signal’s non-in dem n ity crossclaim s are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Signal’s crossclaim s for in dem n ity 43 44 See R. Doc. 524 at 5– 6 (in the Achari cases) (13-6218). R. Doc. 50 4 (in the Achari cases) (13-6218). 10 against the Burnett and Dewan Defendants are, for the reasons stated above, not barred by the doctrin e of res judicata. N e w Orle a n s , Lo u is ian a, th is 1s t d ay o f D e ce m be r, 2 0 15 . _______ _____________ _______ SU SIE MORGAN U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT J U D GE 11
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