David et al v. Signal International LLC et al, No. 2:2008cv01220 - Document 2136 (E.D. La. 2015)
Court Description: ORDER granting in part and denying in part 1827 Motion in Limine to Exclude Legal Opinion Testimony of Plaintiffs' and Signal's Immigration Law Experts and 1830 Motion to Exclude Portions of the Report and Testimony of Signal's Proposed Expert Enrique Gonzalez, III, as stated herein. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan on 1/11/2015. (tsf)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
David et al v. Signal International LLC et al Doc. 2136 U N ITED STATES D ISTRICT COU RT EASTERN D ISTRICT OF LOU ISIAN A KU RIAN D AVID , e t al. Plain tiffs CIVIL ACTION VERSU S N o . 0 8 -12 2 0 SIGN AL IN TERN ATION AL, LLC, e t al., D e fe n d an ts SECTION “E” EQU AL EMPLOYMEN T OPPORTU N ITY COMMISSION , Plain tiff CIVIL ACTION VERSU S N o . 12 -557 SIGN AL IN TERN ATION AL, LLC, e t al., D e fe n d an ts SECTION "E" LAKSH MAN AN PON N AYAN ACH ARI, e t al., Plain tiffs CIVIL ACTION VERSU S N o . 13 -6 2 18 ( c/ w 13 -6 2 19 , 13 -6 2 2 0 , 13 -6 2 2 1, 14 -73 2 , 14 18 18 ) SIGN AL IN TERN ATION AL, LLC, e t al., D e fe n d an ts SECTION "E" Ap p lie s To : D a v id v . Sig n a l ( N o . 0 8 -12 2 0 ) 1 Dockets.Justia.com ORD ER Before the Court are (1) Defendant Burnett’s Motion to Exclude Legal Opinion Testim ony of Plaintiffs’ Im m igration Law Expert, Cyrus D. Mehta, and Signals’ Im m igration Law Expert, Enrique Gonzalez,1 and (2) Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude Portions of the Report and Testim ony of Signal’s Proposed Expert, Enrique Gonzalez, III.2 Both witnesses are im m igration law experts who have been offered to testify about the H-2B program , green card process, best practices of attorneys practicing im m igration law, and Burnett’s representation of Plaintiffs and Signal in im m igration m atters. Burnett seeks to prohibit both Mehta and Gonzalez from offering any testim ony as to their opinions of the law, inferences, and legal conclusions or interpretation of what the evidence establishes. With respect to Gonzalez, Plaintiffs seek to prohibit him from testifying only with respect to Opinion II in his report and certain statem ents in the report that appear to be directed at Plaintiffs. The Federal Rules of Evidence perm it an expert witness with “scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge” to testify if such testim ony “will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determ ine a fact in issue,” so long as “the testim ony is based upon sufficient facts or data,” “the testim ony is the product of reliable principles and m ethods,” and “the expert has reliably applied the principles and m ethods to the facts of the case.”3 Courts, as “gatekeepers,” are tasked with m aking a prelim inary 1 R. Doc. 1827. R. Docs. 1830 . 3 Fed. R. Evid. 70 2. 2 2 assessm ent whether expert testim ony is both reliable and relevant.4 The trial judge is afforded broad latitude in m aking such expert testim ony determ inations. 5 “The expert testim ony m ust be relevant, “not sim ply in the sense that all testim ony m ust be relevant [pursuant to Rule 40 2], but also in the sense that the expert’s proposed opinion would assist the trier of fact to understand or determ ine a fact in issue.”6 To determ ine what expert testim ony m ay be used, “‘[t]here is no m ore certain test . . . than the com m on sense inquiry whether the untrained laym an would be qualified to determ ine intelligently and to the best degree the particular issue without enlightenm ent from those having a specialized understanding of the subject involved in the dispute.’”7 Testim ony about Im m igration Law Generally and Specifically There are no objections to the training, experience, knowledge, or skill of either expert. The parties also have no objection to either expert testifying as to the factual issues dealing with im m igration law and the general process for obtaining H-2B visas and green cards, such as the identification and wording of particular statutes and regulations at issue, applicable procedures, the proper filing of form s, and the like. Because im m igration law is a large and com plex body of law with which an ordinary juror is not fam iliar,8 the Court finds expert testim ony on these areas will be helpful to 4 See Pipitone v. Biom atrix, Inc., 288 F.3d 239, 243– 44 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm ., Inc., 50 9 U.S. 579, 592– 93 (1993)). 5 See Kum ho Tire Co. v. Carm ichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999). 6 Bocanegra v. Vicm ar Servs., Inc., 320 F.3d 581, 584 (5th Cir. 20 0 3). 7 Vogler v. Blackm ore, 352 F.3d 150 , 156 n.5 (5th Cir. 20 0 3) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 70 2 advisory com m ittee’s note)). 8 See Ism ail v. Gonzales, 245 F. App’x 366, 368 (5th Cir. 20 0 7) (internal quotation m arks and citation om itted) (“[F]ederal imm igration laws are exceedingly com plex.”); Singh v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 969, 980 (9th Cir. 20 0 7) (internal quotation m arks and citation om itted) (“The m aze of im m igration statutes and am endm ents is notoriously com plicated and has been described as second only to the Internal Revenue Code in complexity.”); Muhur v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 653, 656 (7th Cir. 20 0 4) (“The im m igration laws are com plex and their application often requires knowledge of foreign cultures unfamiliar to m ost 3 the jury.9 Both experts m ay testify generally to factual issues dealing with im m igration law and the general process for obtaining H-2B visas and green cards. Mehta and Gonzalez also offer opinions in their reports as to whether certain conduct would be consistent or inconsistent with im m igration law. Under Rule 70 4, an expert witness’s testim ony m ay “em brace an ultim ate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.” However, “Rule 70 4 . . . does not open the door to all opinions” or allow experts to offer legal conclusions.10 This is because any such conclusions invade the province of the jury, which is capable of com ing to its own conclusion after considering all of the evidence presented at trial.11 However, the Court finds testim ony regarding the language and applicability of im m igration statutes and regulations and whether conduct generally would be consistent or inconsistent with these laws does not am ount to a legal Am ericans.”). See also N ieves-Villanueva v. Soto-Rivera, 133 F.3d 92, 10 1 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating “[w]e can . . . hypothesize instances in rare, highly com plex and technical m atters where a trial judge, utilizing lim ited and controlled mechanism s, and as a m atter of trial m anagem ent, perm its som e testim ony seem ingly at variance with the general rule” that an expert m ay not opine on questions of law. “Such an instance m ay be patent litigation, in which technical experts are generally allowed to comm ent on the scope of a patent’s coverage and give their conclusions on the issue of infringem ent”); Centricut, LLC v. Esab Grp., Inc., 390 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 20 0 4) (stating “[i]n other areas of the law courts have held that relevant expert testimony regarding m atters beyond the comprehension of laypersons is som etim es essential” and citing cases). 9 Expert testim ony should be excluded if it does not assist the jury “to understand the evidence or to determ ine a fact in issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 70 2. See also Andrew s v. Metro N . Com m uter R. Co., 882 F.2d 70 5, 70 8 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing other circuits and stating “[f]or an expert’s testim ony to be adm issible under this Rule, however, it m ust be directed to m atters within the witness’ scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge and not to lay m atters which a jury is capable of understanding and deciding without the expert’s help”). 10 Fed. R. Evid. 70 4; Ow en v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 698 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 1983). See also Goodm an v. Harris Cnty ., 571 F.3d 388, 399 (5th Cir. 20 0 9) (“[A]n expert may never render conclusions of law . . . nor, m ay an expert go beyond the scope of his expertise in giving his opinion.”); United States v. Lueben, 812 F.2d 179, 183– 84 (5th Cir. 1987) (“[T]he m ajor surviving exception” to Rule 70 4(a) is that “an expert m ay not express an opinion on a conclusion of law.”). 11 Cf. Bly the v. Bum bo Int'l Trust, No. 6:12-CV-36, 20 13 WL 6190 284, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 26, 20 13) ("[C]ourts do not allow experts to invade the province of the jury . . . .") (collecting cases). See Lackey v. SDT W aste & Debris Servs., LLC, No. 11-10 87, 20 14 WL 3866465, at *7 (E.D. La. Aug. 6, 20 14) ("It is the job of the Court—not the expert—to instruct the jury on the applicable law."); Askanase v. Fatjo, 130 F.3d 657, 673 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[O]ur legal system reserves to the trial judge the role of deciding the law for the benefit of the jury.”). 4 conclusion in this case and will be helpful to the jury.12 Accordingly, both experts m ay give their opinions on these topics. In light of this ruling, the Court considers Plaintiffs’ specific request to exclude testim ony regarding Opinion II in Gonzalez’s report, which states: “Foreign nationals seeking an H-2B visa are considered to have com m itted im m igration fraud if they deliberately conceal their intent to rem ain perm anently in the United States from a U.S. consular or im m igration officer.” The Court finds Gonzalez m ay testify about Opinion II because it discusses actions generally inconsistent with im m igration law, which will be helpful to the jury in evaluating Plaintiffs’ claim s and Signal’s cross-claim . Plaintiffs will have the opportunity to cross-exam ine Gonzalez and m ay also request a lim iting instruction if they believe one is needed. Plaintiffs also seek to exclude testim ony that references Plaintiffs’ actions since Gonzalez adm itted under oath that he did not look into Plaintiffs’ conduct. The Court finds Gonzalez is prohibited from testifying as to whether Plaintiffs did certain acts and whether their conduct constituted im m igration fraud. Likewise, he m ay not testify about whether it was Plaintiffs’ or any Defendant’s intent for the workers to rem ain in the U.S. perm anently. The Court also considers Burnett’s request that Mehta’s opinions regarding Burnett’s actions be excluded. Mehta’s opinions in his report go far beyond the H-2B program , green card process, and what actions are consistent or consistent with 12 See Mobil Exploration & Producing v. A-Z/ Grant Int'l Co., 91-3124, 1996 WL 194931, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 22, 1996) (“In the Court's opinion, Hill's proposed testim ony regarding the existence and applicability of certain regulations—Coast Guard's regulations, CFRs—to the Rowan Paris and whether the alleged m islabeling was consistent or inconsistent with these regulations does not am ount to a legal conclusion. However, whether such action violated the term s of the contract or whether such action caused the alleged dam age is a conclusion best left for the jury. Accordingly, defendants' m otion is DENIED.”). 5 im m igration laws. Mehta provides opinions that Burnett’s actions were “deceptive” and that Burnett m ay have caused the plaintiffs to m isrepresent to consular officers their true intentions. These conclusions are within the province of the jury because they go to the ultim ate issues in this case, and the jury can “adeptly assess [the evidence] using only their com m on experience and knowledge.”13 Because his expert testim ony takes the extra step of opining on what Burnett’s actions m ean in this case legally speaking—i.e., m akes legal conclusions as to whether they were fraudulent or m isrepresentations—this testim ony is prohibited. Testim ony about the Standard of Care for Im m igration Attorneys In this action, Signal brings a cross-claim against Burnett for breach of fiduciary duty and legal m alpractice. Both experts’ reports include opinions about Burnett’s conduct as an attorney, including his duty as an im m igration lawyer, the standard of care, and whether Burnett breached the standard of care. Regardless of which state’s law this Court applies to Signal’s m alpractice cross-claim s, expert testim ony is necessary to establish the duty owed by Burnett as an im m igration attorney and the standard of care required of him .14 Signal’s expert Gonzalez m ay testify on the duty owed as an im m igration attorney, the standard of care, and his opinion as to whether Burnett breached this standard of care. Notably, Plaintiffs do not bring a claim for legal m alpractice against Burnett. Thus, Plaintiffs’ expert Mehta m ay not testify as to the duty 13 Peters v. Five Star Marine Serv., 898 F.2d 448, 450 (5th Cir. 1990 ). See Bradford v. Gauthier, Houghtaling & W illiam s, LLP, 13-240 7, 20 14 WL 4425743, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 8, 20 14) (“Typically, Louisiana courts require a plaintiff to retain an expert witness to establish both the duty and breach elem ents of a legal m alpractice claim .”); Stevens v. Lake, 615 So. 2d 1177, 1185 (Miss. 1993) (quotation m arks om itted) (“In cases involving [Mississippi] legal m alpractice [claim s], this Court has held that the generally accepted rule is that expert testim ony is ordinarily necessary to support an action for m alpractice of a professional m an in those situations where special skills, knowledge, experience, learning or the like are required.”). 14 6 owed as an im m igration lawyer, the standard of care, or his opinion as to whether Burnett breached this duty. Conclusion While both experts may testify about the factual issues dealing with im m igration law and the general process for obtaining H-2B visas and green cards, and whether conduct in general was consistent or inconsistent with im m igration law, neither can go so far as to determine whether any particular party’s actions were deceptive or fraudulent or opine on how certain conduct im pacted the Plaintiffs’ actions or caused them dam ages. These are questions for the jury to decide. Only Gonzalez m ay testify as to the duty, standard of care, and best practices of attorneys practicing im m igration law and whether Burnett’s actions breached that duty. Accordingly; IT IS ORD ERED that the Motions are GRAN TED IN PART and D EN IED IN PART as detailed above. N e w Orle an s , Lo u is ian a, th is _11th d ay o f Jan u ary, 2 0 15. ___ ______________ _________________ SU SIE MORGAN U N ITED STATES D ISTRICT JU D GE 7
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
