Willis v. Daviess County Detention et al, No. 4:2016cv00028 - Document 6 (W.D. Ky. 2016)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Chief Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr.; Upon initial screening, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Daviess County Detention Center and Advanced Health-Care Systems are DISMISSED for failure to s tate a claim upon which relief may be granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 30 days from the entry date of this Memorandum Opinion and Order, Plaintiff may file an amended complaint with respect to his claims concerning his medical treatment. cc: Plaintiff, pro se; Defendants (ERH)
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Willis v. Daviess County Detention et al Doc. 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY AT OWENSBORO CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:16CV-P28-JHM JEFFREY RAY WILLIS PLAINTIFF v. DAVIESS COUNTY DETENTION et al. DEFENDANTS MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff Jeffrey Ray Willis filed the instant pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action proceeding in forma pauperis. This matter is before the Court on initial review of the complaint and amendments pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons stated below, the Court will dismiss the claims against the named Defendants and allow Plaintiff to amend his complaint. I. Plaintiff is an inmate at the Daviess County Detention Center. Plaintiff names “Daviess County Detention” and “Advanced Health-Care Systems” as Defendants. The Court construes “Daviess County Detention” to be the Daviess County Detention Center (DCDC). As his statement of the claim, Plaintiff states as follows: I was put on Meds i didn’t Ask for; or see a Doctor or nurse About. They put me on prosac meds without even asking or see a psych doctor. Putting someone on meds without seeing the Doctor is wrong. And these meds have made me feel different since then. There curtain procedjugers that are suppose to be taken, before you put someone on psych meds. These were not taken. And i never been on any prosac meds before, And I’ve never been on any psych meds here at Daviess County Detention Center. As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages. II. When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any Dockets.Justia.com portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.’” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). Although this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less stringent’ with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted). And this Court is not required to create a 2 claim for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To command otherwise would require the Court “to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). III. “Section 1983 creates no substantive rights, but merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere.” Flint ex rel. Flint v. Ky. Dep’t of Corr., 270 F.3d 340, 351 (6th Cir. 2001). Two elements are required to state a claim under § 1983. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980). “[A] plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988). “Absent either element, a section 1983 claim will not lie.” Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff sues DCDC and Advanced Health-Care Systems. However, DCDC is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983 because municipal departments, such as jails, are not suable under § 1983. Marbry v. Corr. Med. Servs., No. 99-6706, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 28072, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2000) (holding that a jail is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983); see also Rhodes v. McDannel, 945 F.2d 117, 120 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that a police department may not be sued under § 1983). In this situation, Daviess County is the proper defendant. Smallwood v. Jefferson Cty. Gov’t, 743 F. Supp. 502, 503 (W.D. Ky. 1990). Further, Daviess County is a “person” for purposes of § 1983. See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 3 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The Court therefore will construe the claims against DCDC as claims against Daviess County. When a § 1983 claim is made against a municipality, this Court must analyze two distinct issues: (1) whether Plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional violation; and (2) if so, whether the municipality is responsible for that violation. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). The Court will first address the second issue, i.e., whether the municipality is responsible for the alleged constitutional violations. A municipality cannot be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Deaton v. Montgomery Cty., Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th Cir. 1993). To demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular injury was incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)). The policy or custom “must be ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation’ in order to establish the liability of a government body under § 1983.” Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (citation omitted)). This same municipal-liability analysis applies to § 1983 claims against a private corporation like Advanced Health-Care Systems.1 See Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 818 (6th Cir. 1996) (“Monell involved a municipal corporation, but every circuit to consider the issue has extended The Sixth Circuit has held that “[i]t is clear that a private entity which contracts with the state to perform a traditional state function such as providing medical services to prison inmates may be sued under § 1983 as one acting ‘under color of state law.’” Hicks v. Frey, 992 F.2d 1450, 1458 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54 (1988)). Advanced Health-Care Systems has apparently contracted with the DCDC to provide medical services to the inmates. Thus, on initial review of the complaint, the Court presumes that Advanced Health-Care Systems is a state actor. 1 4 the holding to private corporations as well.”). Liability must be based on a policy or custom of the contracted private entity or “the inadequacy of [an employee’s] training.” Id. at 817; Starcher v. Corr. Med. Sys., Inc., 7 F. App’x 459, 465 (6th Cir. 2001) (“CMS’s [Correctional Medical Systems, Inc.,] liability must also be premised on some policy that caused a deprivation of [plaintiff’s] Eighth Amendment rights.”). In the instant case, Plaintiff alleges that he has been given psychiatric medication that was not prescribed by a doctor. However, Plaintiff does not allege that the action or inaction of any personnel occurred as a result of a policy or custom implemented or endorsed by either Daviess County or Advanced Health-Care Systems. Plaintiff’s complaint appears to allege an isolated occurrence affecting only him. As such, the complaint fails to establish a basis of liability against either the municipality or Advanced Health-Care Systems and therefore fails to state a cognizable § 1983 claim against these entities. See Fox v. Van Oosterum, 176 F.3d 342, 348 (6th Cir. 1999) (“No evidence indicates that this was anything more than a one-time, isolated event for which the county is not responsible.”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against DCDC/Daviess County and Advanced Health-Care Systems must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. “[U]nder Rule 15(a) a district court can allow a plaintiff to amend his complaint even when the complaint is subject to dismissal under the PLRA [Prison Litigation Reform Act].” LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013). The Court will allow Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint to name as Defendant(s) the person or persons who he claims engaged in the alleged wrongdoing and to describe the facts surrounding how each Defendant allegedly violated his rights. 5 IV. For the reasons set forth herein, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Daviess County Detention Center and Advanced Health-Care Systems are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 30 days from the entry date of this Memorandum Opinion and Order, Plaintiff may file an amended complaint with respect to his claims concerning his medical treatment. Plaintiff shall name as Defendant(s) the person or persons who he claims engaged in the alleged wrongdoing and to describe the facts surrounding how each Defendant allegedly violated his rights. Plaintiff shall sue these Defendant(s) in their individual capacities. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to place the case number and word “Amended” on a § 1983 complaint form and send it, along with three summons forms, to Plaintiff for his use should he wish to amend the complaint. Plaintiff is WARNED that should he fail to file an amended complaint within 30 days, the Court will enter an Order dismissing the action for the reason stated herein. Date: July 21, 2016 cc: Plaintiff, pro se Defendants 4414.010 6
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