Scott v. DPA Office Hopkinsville KY et al, No. 1:2024cv00008 - Document 6 (W.D. Ky. 2024)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION by Senior Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr on 4/15/24: For the foregoing reasons, the Court will, by separate Order, dismiss this action. cc: Plaintiff(pro se) (DJT)
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Scott v. DPA Office Hopkinsville KY et al Doc. 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY BOWLING GREEN DIVISION VERSACE ALAN SCOTT PLAINTIFF v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:24-CV-P8-JHM DPA OFFICE HOPKINSVILLE KY et al. DEFENDANTS MEMORANDUM OPINION This is a pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 prisoner civil-rights action. This matter is before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons set forth below, the action will be dismissed. I. STATEMENT OF CLAIMS Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee at the Logan County Detention Center, sues the DPA Office in Hopkinsville, Kentucky; Christian County; and two of the DPA Office’s public defenders, Victoria Citron and Darrin Higgs. He alleges that Citron and Higgs were his court-appointed attorneys. He states that he told them that the charges against him were “false and to contact the sherriff and FBI to verify I had a open FBI case on the officer who arrested him.” Plaintiff alleges that both Citron and Higgs “left me in jail.” He also alleges that they failed to file a motion to dismiss his charges despite his request. Plaintiff requests compensatory and punitive damages and to be released from wrongful imprisonment. II. ANALYSIS When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the action, if the Court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, Dockets.Justia.com or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2). When determining whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court must construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all of the factual allegations as true. Prater v. City of Burnside, Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). While a reviewing court must liberally construe pro se pleadings, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam), to avoid dismissal, a complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). In order to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both a violation of a right or rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States and that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988). It is firmly established that a defense attorney, regardless of whether he or she is a public defender or private attorney, is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983. Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (“[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”); Otworth v. Vanderploeg, 61 F. App’x 163, 165 (6th Cir. 2003) (“A lawyer representing a client is not, by virtue of being an officer of the court, a state actor under color of state law within the meaning of 2 § 1983.”); McBee v. Campbell Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 17-5481, 2018 WL 2046303, at *4 (6th Cir. Mar. 15, 2018) (“[A]public defender [] is [] not subject to liability under § 1983 as she ‘does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.’”) (citation omitted). Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under § 1983 against these Defendants regarding any performance of a traditional lawyer function, such as determining what motions to file. Further, Plaintiff makes no allegations involving Christian County. The only connection to the case evident from the complaint is that Christian County is the county in which the DPA Office is located. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court will, by separate Order, dismiss this action. Date: April 15, 2024 cc: Plaintiff, pro se 4414.009 3
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