Turley v. Brown-Turley-Walker et al, No. 5:2014cv00180 - Document 4 (E.D. Ky. 2014)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: (1) Claims asserted under 42 USC 1983 against Dfts are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. (2) State law claims asserted against Dfts are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. (3) Judgment shall be entered w this Memo Opinion and Order in favor of the dfts. Signed by Judge Joseph M. Hood on 6/23/2014.(SCD)cc: Pro Se Pla(via US Mail)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY CENTRAL DIVISION AT LEXINGTON JAMES RICHARD TURLEY, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Plaintiff, v. LEANN MARIE BROWN-TURLEYWALKER, et al., Defendants. ***** Plaintiff James ***** Richard Civil Action No. 5:14-180-JMH MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ***** Turley ***** ( Turley ) is an inmate confined in the Northpoint Training Center located in Burgin, Kentucky. Proceeding without an attorney, Turley has filed a civil rights complaint asserting constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and pendent state law claims. paid the $400.00 filing fee. [R. 1]. Turley has [R. 3]. Pursuant to Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), district courts are permitted to conduct a limited screening procedure and to dismiss, sua sponte, a feepaid complaint when the allegations are totally implausible, attenuated, longer open unsubstantial, to frivolous, discussion. Apple, devoid 183 F.3d of at merit, 479 or no (citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974)). Dismissal on a sua sponte basis is also authorized where the asserted claims lack legal plausibility necessary to invoke federal subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 480; see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). any time, action, that the it Court Finally, if a court determines, at lacks must subject-matter dismiss the jurisdiction action. Fed. R. over an Civ. P. 12(h)(3). As explained below, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Turley s claims, and will therefore dismiss his complaint. BACKGROUND Turley was previously Brown-Turley-Walker married to Defendant ( Brown-Turley-Walker ), and Leann Marie together they had a daughter, J.R.T. In 2004, Turley and Brown-Turley-Walker began divorce proceedings in the Fayette Circuit Family Court, Case No. 2004-CI-04138 ( the Divorce Action ). that protracted litigation concerning both his Turley alleges child support obligations and his visitation rights with J.R.T. ensued in the Divorce Action for the next ten years. 1 [R. 1, pp. 7-12].1 The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that in December 2004, while the Divorce Action was proceeding, Turley was charged with, and convicted of, two counts of sodomy, one count of first-degree sexual abuse, one count of possession of marijuana, and two counts of possession of matter portraying sexual performance by a minor. The sodomy and sexual abuse charges were the result of an incident between Turley and J.R.T. 2 Brown-Turley-Walker is now married to Defendant Charles Thomas Walker, Sr. ( Walker ). Turley alleges that in 2013 he filed a series of motions in the Divorce Action seeking to enforce his visitation rights with J.R.T., on the grounds that Brown-Turley-Walker and Walker had continually violated a purportedly required them Kentucky Department confined so that he of prior to order that physically Corrections could in bring facility effectuate proceeding J.R.T. where visitation which to any Turley with is J.R.T. Turley alleges that on October 31, 2013, Fayette Family Court Judge Lucinda M. Masterton conducted a hearing on his motions; entered an order terminating his visitation privileges with J.R.T.; that he requested, but was denied, reconsideration of In November 2005, a jury found Turley guilty of two counts of sodomy in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, and possession of marijuana. The jury recommended a total twenty year sentence on the charges, and on January 12, 2006 the Fayette Circuit Court sentenced Turley according to the jury s recommendation. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed Turley s conviction. See Turley v. Commonwealth, No. 2006-SC-88-MR, 2008 WL 3875433 (Ky. Jan. 25, 2007). Turley unsuccessfully pursued numerous state-court collateral challenges to his conviction. In June 2011, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, challenging the constitutionality of his state court conviction on numerous grounds. See Turley v. Perry, Warden, No. 7:11-CV-84-ART-CJS (E.D. Ky. 2011). On March 2, 2012, this Court adopted the Magistrate Judge s 21-page Report recommending the denial of Turley s § 2255 motion, and entered judgment in favor of the respondent. [Id. at R. 12 and 20]. 3 that order; and that, in February 2014, he filed a Gabbard Appeal in the Fayette Circuit Court. ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT Turley alleges that on over three thousand occasions between October 5, 2004 and April 30, 2014, Brown-Turley-Walker prevented any form of contact between him and J.R.T.; failed and refused to have J.R.T. evaluated by a mental health specialist; and prevented him from exercising his visitation rights with J.R.T. [Id. at pp. 1-4, ¶¶ 1-8]. Turley-Walker s actions over various orders entered federal rights guaranteed Fourteenth Amendments in of this the by the Turley alleged that Brown10-year Divorce the Action; First, United period violated Fourth, States violated his Fifth, and Constitution, and violated his state rights guaranteed under numerous provisions of the Kentucky Constitution. Turley asserts practically identical claims against Walker, claiming that on over a thousand occasions between March 26, 2006 and April 30, 2014, Walker prevented him from communicating with J.R.T. and from carrying out his visitation rights with J.R.T., and that in so doing, Walker violated his federal and state constitutional rights. [Id. at pp. 4-6, ¶¶ 9-16]. Turley demands a jury trial and both money and punitive damages of up to $4 million from both defendants as compensation alleged violation of his federal and state rights. 4 for the DISCUSSION Turley s complaint warrant dismissal. suffers from several defects which First, Turley asserts his claims alleging violation of his federal constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but to proceed under that statute, a plaintiff must allege and establish that the defendant was a state actor. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978); Broomfield v. Garnes, 36 F. App x 545, 545 (6th Cir. 2002); Wolotsky v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1992). A private party generally is not subject to suit under § 1983, Brotherton v. Cleveland, 173 F.3d 552, 567 (6th Cir. 1999), and can be deemed a state actor only if he or she was acting under color of state law. Chapman v. Higbee Co., 319 F.3d 825, 833 (6th Cir. 2003). Turley alleges no facts indicating that either Brown- Turley-Walker or Walker were acting under color of state law rendering them state actors for purposes of § 1983. Turley alleges that Brown-Turley-Walker is his ex-wife and an employee of Central Kentucky Management Services, Inc., but neither of these allegations render her a state actor under § 1983. Further, Brown-Turley-Walker s status as an adverse party in the Divorce Action does not elevate her to the level of a state actor under § 1983. See Courtney v. Reed, No. 2:12-CV-10886, 2012 WL 1555207, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 30, 2012) (concluding that plaintiff s ex-wife was a private citizen and not a state 5 actor under § 1983); Milgrom v. Burstein, 374 F. Supp. 2d. 523, 527 (E.D. Ky. 2005) (same). Brown-Turley-Walker is merely a private party who is not subject to suit under § 1983. Next, Turley alleges that Walker is an employee of the LexingtonFayette Urban suggesting County that Government, Walker s alleged but he actions alleges were official capacity as a municipal employee. no taken facts in his Thus, Walker is likewise only a private party who has no liability to Turley under § 1983. A recent case from Michigan bears a striking similarity to this proceeding. In 2012, a Michigan prisoner unsuccessfully filed a federal civil rights action alleging essentially the same federal action. and state claims that Turley asserts in this In Kucera v. Black, No. 4:12-CV-15218, 2012 WL 6200332 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2012), Michigan prisoner John Kucera sued his ex-wife in federal court for her refusal to abide by the terms of divorce judgment which provide for visitations with his son. Kucera alleged that their Divorce Judgment provided that, if he were imprisoned in a facility within 100 miles of Detroit, his ex-wife would provide visitations with his son every-otherweekend at the facility, and that by failing to abide with that judgment, his relationship, ex-wife had intentionally violated his civil rights. interfered inflicted emotional Id. at *1. 6 with his family distress, and On initial screening, the court rejected all of Kucera s claims and dismissed his complaint, finding that among other things, his federal constitutional claims against his wife were based on private acts and conduct, and that she did not qualify as a state actor under § 1983. Id. at *3. Similarly, Turley s claims must be dismissed because they are based upon private acts and conduct. Second, established the legal domestic relations principle, precludes exception, Turley s a long claims. In Kucera, the district court discussed at length the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction, which the Supreme Court established in 1859 when it announced that federal courts have no jurisdiction over suits for divorce or the allowance of alimony. See Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 584 (1859). The exception was later expanded to include child custody cases. parte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 594 (1890). since reaffirmed that the domestic Ex The Supreme Court has relations exception to jurisdiction encompasses only cases involving the issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child custody Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 704 (1992). relations exception, federal decree. Ankenbrandt v. Pursuant to the domestic courts are precluded from exercising jurisdiction over cases whose substance is generally domestic relations issues. Chambers v. Michigan, 473 F. App x 477, 478 (6th Cir. 2012); see Firestone v. Cleveland Trust Co., 654 F.2d 1212, 1215 ( [F]ederal 7 courts traditionally have refrained from exercising jurisdiction over cases which in essence are domestic relations disputes. ). In Kucera, the court explained that the domestic relations exception involves federal recognizes local that problems courts. the field peculiarly Kucera, 2012 WL of domestic unsuited 6200332, to at relations control *1 by (quoting Firestone, 654 F.2d at 1215). The district court then applied the domestic relations exception to Kucera s claims, finding that although he had alleged that his ex-wife's refusal to abide by a visitation schedule was a tort, this case does not merely have domestic relations overtones it is in essence a run-of-themill domestic relations case that is properly addressed by the state courts. Kucera, 2012 WL 6200332, at *2. Similar to the facts in Kucera, the crux of Turley s claims in this case is that Brown-Turley-Walker and Walker allegedly violated an order or orders entered in the Divorce Action, thus interfering with or preventing his visitation rights with J.R.T. Turley frequently described his claims as deprivation of his property rights, or as violations of contract, see, e.g., R. 1, ¶¶ 5, 6, 8, but the substance of his claims concerns a child visitation issue, which is a core domestic relations matter. Because the substance of Turley s claims involves a quintessential domestic relations issue, the domestic relations exception bars consideration of his claims. Turley must pursue 8 his claims in the Divorce Action and/or in the state appellate courts, not in federal court. Further, while Turley does not expressly or directly challenge the October 31, 2013 order entered in the Divorce Action, which terminated his visitation rights with J.R.T., a broad reading of his claims suggests that he is trying to collaterally challenge that order through this § 1983 action. Specifically, Turley alleges that Brown-Turley-Walker violated his federal and state constitutional rights on thousands of occasions between October 5, 2004 and April 30, 2014, [R. 1, pp. 1-4]; that Walker engaged in the same unconstitutional action on numerous occasions between March 26, 2009, and April 30, 2014, see id., pp. 4-8; and that on October 31, 2013 Fayette Family Court Judge Lucinda M. Masterton entered an order in the Divorce Action which terminated his visitation rights with J.R.T. [Id. at pp. 11-12, ¶¶ 39-47]. Thus, to the extent that Turley alleges that the defendants violated his federal and state rights on or after the entry of the October 31, 2013 order, i.e., during the six-month period between October 31, 2013 and April 30, 2014, his § 1983 complaint qualifies as a collateral challenge to the October 31, 2013 order entered in the Divorce Action. If the Court permitted Turley s claim on this issue to proceed, it would 9 effectively invalidate, or at least call into question, the October 31, 2013 order entered in the Divorce Action. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Turley is not entitled to collaterally seek relief on such claims in the federal court by way of a § 1983 action. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review a case litigated and decided in state court, as only the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to correct state court judgments. Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482, 482 n.16 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415 16 (1923). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents consideration of Turley s construed claims as to any alleged violation of his rights that occurred between October 31, 2013 and April 14, 2014, because such impermissible claims amount back-door, or to nothing collateral, 374 dismissal F. of state court based on comity, App x 620, parents tort judgments which both and the 623 (6th claims that terminated Rooker-Feldman deference to state an to an See Stephens v. Cir. 2010) (affirming collaterally their doctrine s expertise than challenge adverse order entered in the Divorce Action. Hayes, more in attacked parental rights principles of the of field domestic relations); Partridge v. Ohio, 79 F. App x 844, 845-46 (6th Cir. 2003) ( Partridge's federal case is essentially an 10 impermissible appeal of the state court judgment as it raises specific grievances regarding relations courts. ). Again, decisions any of objection Ohio's or domestic challenge which Turley has to the October 31, 2013 order must be pursued in the Divorce Action, state court. and, if unsuccessful, Turley must appeal in For these reasons, Turley s § 1983 claims must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Finally, when claims, as has decline to exercise claims. been a district done in court this supplemental dismisses case, it all should jurisdiction over federal generally state law United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 ( [I]f the federal claims are dismissed before trial . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well. ); Weeks v. Portage Cnty. Exec. Offs., 235 F.3d 275, 279 80 (6th Cir. 2000); Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993). Therefore, the Court will dismiss Turley s pendent claims alleging violations of the Kentucky Constitution without prejudice to his asserting those claims in state court. CONCLUSION Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows: (1) James Richard Turley s claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Leann Marie Brown-Turley-Walker and Charles Thomas Walker, Sr. are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 11 (2) James Richard Turley s state law claims asserted against Defendants Leann Marie Brown-Turley-Walker and Charles Thomas Walker, Sr. are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Turley s right to assert those claims in state court. (3) Judgment shall be entered contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion and Order in favor of the defendants. This the 23rd day of June, 2014. 12
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