Trammell v. SSA, No. 2:2012cv00038 - Document 23 (E.D. Ky. 2015)
Court Description: MEMMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER:; 1)The 21 Motion for Attorney Fees is GRANTED/b>; 2)Judgment to be entered by separate order. Signed by Judge Joseph M. Hood on 7/27/2015. (LST)cc: COR
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Trammell v. SSA Doc. 23 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DIVISION OF KENTUCKY NORTHERN DIVISION at COVINGTON JULIA CAROL TRAMMELL, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner of Social Security Defendant Case No. 2:12-cv-38-JMH MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER *** This matter is before the Court Upon Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees Under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). [DE 21]. The Commissioner has filed a Response, [DE 22], in which it states that it has requested. no objection to the Motion or to the amount The Court has reviewed the motion and the materials offered in support of the request for relief and concludes that an award of fees is warranted. The Court may award "a reasonable fee [for work before the Court] . . . not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits." 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1); Horenstein v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 35 F.3d 261, 262 (6th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff's attorneys, Anthony E. Hoyle and David S. Jones, request $7,300.00 in attorney fees for 29.20 total hours spent before the district court. [Exhibit C, DE 21-3]. The amount is 1 Dockets.Justia.com consistent with the contingent fee agreement between Plaintiff and his attorneys [Exhibit A, DE 21-3] and would result in payment of a fee not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits, which have been calculated to be $48,699.00. The Court has considered the matter and, noting the absence of any objection, concludes that this request is reasonable and in keeping with the relevant law.1 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Attorney Fees [DE 21] is GRANTED. Judgment shall be entered by separate order. This the 27th day of July, 2015. 1 In light of the rule articulated in Jankovich v. Bowen, 868 F.2d 867, 871 n.1 (6th Cir. 1989) ([“[A]ttorneys are prohibited from collecting both EAJA fees and § 406(b) fees in the same case . . . .”), the Court notes that Plaintiff’s attorneys have not received EAJA fees, as the entirety of the EAJA award was offset by Plaintiff’s pre-existing federal debt. [DE 20; Exhibit B, DE 21-3]. 2
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
