-REW Hellman et al v. Chesley et al, No. 2:2011cv00057 - Document 34 (E.D. Ky. 2011)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider Pltfs' claims. IT IS ORDERED as follows: 1) This case is REMANDED to the Kenton Circuit Court; 2) The Defts' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 28 and Motion to Stay 31 are DENIED, as moot; and 3) This action is STRICKEN from the Court's docket. Signed by Judge Danny C. Reeves on 8/2/2011.(ECO)cc: COR
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY NORTHERN DIVISION (at Covington) BARBARA HELLMAN, et al., Plaintiffs, V. STANLEY M. CHESLEY, et al., Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Civil Action No. 2: 11-57-DCR MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER *** *** *** *** Plaintiffs Julane Simpson, Heather Moser, and Tom Cardosi1 are suing Defendants Stanley Chesley, Robert Steinberg, and Waite, Schneider, Bayless, & Chesley Co., LPA for breach of fiduciary duty, professional negligence, and fraud. [Record No. 1-1] The action was originally filed in Kenton Circuit Court and was timely removed by the defendants to this Court. [Record No. 1] However, because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted, the case will be remanded back to the Kenton Circuit Court. I. Background This case arises out of a class action filed in state court against the Catholic Diocese of Covington, Kentucky. The plaintiffs Complaint is based on the precise same facts and legal claims as the complaints recently dismissed in two related cases: Anderson v. Chesley, 1 12] Plaintiff Barbara Hellman voluntarily dismissed her claims on April 6, 2011. [See Record No. 11, -1- No. 2: 10-116-DCR (E.D. Ky., May 27, 2010) and Wenger v. Chesley, No. 2: 10-117-DCR (E.D. Ky., May 27, 2010). In fact, an analysis of the complaints in this case and in Anderson and Wenger reveals that the complaints are, for the most part, precise copies of one another. Compare Record No. 1-1, with Wenger, Record No. 2, and Anderson, Record No. 2. For that reason, the Court will incorporate its factual summaries from the Memorandum Opinion and Order entered in those cases. See Anderson, Record No. 81, pp. 3 16; Wenger, Record No. 70, pp. 3 16. In short, the plaintiffs in this action complain that the actions of Chesley and Steinberg caused them to receive less money in settlement of the state court action than they believe they were otherwise entitled to receive. The Boone Circuit Court approved the settlement and entered a Final Order of Dismissal on May 28, 2009. On June 3, 2009, the Boone Circuit Court also denied a request by Simpson and three other class members for: (i) a hearing to inquire about their placement in the settlement matrix; (ii) copies of their files; and (iii) a detailed accounting of the funds disbursed in the case. [Record No. 21-4] Simpson and the others appealed that ruling to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, but their appeal was dismissed for failure to join necessary or indispensable parties. [Record No. 23-4] They took no further action in state court to challenge the outcome of the Diocese litigation. II. Analysis Before examining the factual or legal merits of a case, a district court has an obligation to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims presented. Probus v. Charter Comm., LLC, 234 F. App x 404, 406 07 (6th Cir. 2007). In fact, even if -2- neither party raises the issue, the court must do so on its own initiative. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). Thus, although the plaintiffs have not sought to remand, the Court considers sua sponte whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the instant claims. See Probus, 234 F. App x at 406. In the present case, the Court concludes it lacks subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes lower federal courts . . . from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments. Marks v. Tennessee, 554 F.3d 619, 622 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006)). It applies where a plaintiff in federal court alleges injury arising out of a state-court decision. McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir. 2006). The determining factor for Rooker-Feldman purposes is the source of the injury the plaintiff alleges in the federal complaint. If the source of the injury is the state court decision, then the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would prevent the court from asserting jurisdiction. Id. This Court has already concluded that the claims asserted in both Anderson and Wenger were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Anderson, No. 2: 10-116-DCR (E.D Ky. Aug. 1, 2011); Wenger, No. 2: 10-117-DCR (E.D. Ky. Aug. 1, 2011). The same analysis applies here. The plaintiffs injury is a less-than-desired payout in the state court proceeding. See Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506, 510 (7th Cir. 1996) (dismissing, on Rooker-Feldman grounds, a federal complaint by members of a state court class action against class counsel alleging, inter alia, fraud, legal malpractice, and breach of fiduciary duty). However, the Boone Circuit Court has already determined following a -3- fairness hearing and extensive analysis that the settlement in the Diocese litigation was fair, reasonable, and adequate. [See Record No. 28-20] The Boone Circuit Court s determination also included a finding that counsel s performance was sufficient. [Id.] For this Court to find the contrary would run directly into the state court finding. Kamilewicz, 92 F.3d at 511. Thus, because their injuries are a result of the state court judgment, the plaintiffs claims are barred by Rooker-Feldman. Id. When the Court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over removed claims, remand is mandatory. See 28 U.S.C. ยง 1447(c) ( If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. (emphasis added)). And because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is jurisdictional in nature, this rule applies with equal force when the plaintiffs claims fall under its bar. See Battah v. ResMAE Mortg. Corp., 746 F. Supp. 2d 869, 874 (E.D. Mich. 2010) ( [T]he existence of any subject matter jurisdiction defect mandates remand. ). Thus, the Court must remand this case to the Kenton Circuit Court for further consideration. III. Conclusion This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs claims. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED as follows: 1. This case is REMANDED to the Kenton Circuit Court; 2. The Defendants Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [Record No. 28] and Motion to Stay [Record No. 31] are DENIED, as moot; and -4- 3. This action is STRICKEN from the Court s docket. This 2nd day of August, 2011. -5-
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
