Goings v. Sumner County District Attorney's Office et al, No. 6:2013cv01107 - Document 25 (D. Kan. 2013)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 20 Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs' amended complaint is hereby dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The court shall also dismiss this case based upon the application of Younger abstention. Signed by District Judge Richard D. Rogers on 12/9/2013.Mailed to pro se party Joseph Goings by regular mail (meh)
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Goings v. Sumner County District Attorney&#039;s Office et al Doc. 25 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS JOSEPH GOINGS, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) _ Plaintiff, v. SUMNER COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE; KERWIN SPENCER, Defendants. Case No.13-1107-RDR MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This initiated case arises against the from criminal plaintiff in proceedings state court. that were Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brings this action against the Sumner County District Attorney=s Office and Kerwin Attorney for Sumner County, Kansas. Spencer, the County This matter is presently before the court upon defendants= motion to dismiss. Defendants contend that plaintiff=s amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. motion, defendants raise three arguments. In their First, they contend that the ASumner County District Attorney=s Office@ is not an entity capable of being sued. claims against immunity. defendant Finally, they Second, they contend that any Spencer are assert that barred the by prosecutorial Younger abstention doctrine compels dismissal of this action. Dockets.Justia.com I. ATo survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to >state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.=@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A[T]he mere metaphysical possibility that some plaintiff could prove some set of facts in support of the pleaded claims is insufficient; the complaint must give the court reason to believe that this plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these claims.@ Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007). AThe court’s function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to assess whether the plaintiff=s complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted.@ Cir. Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1201 (10th 2003). In determining whether a claim is facially plausible, the court must draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. All well-pleaded facts in the complaint are assumed to be true and are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 118 (1990); Swanson v. Bixler, 750 F.2d 810, 813 (10th Cir. 1984). Allegations 2 that merely state legal conclusions, however, need not be accepted as true. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). A court liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies Aless stringent lawyers.@ standards Erickson v. than Pardus, formal 551 pleadings U.S. 89, drafted 94 by (2007). Nonetheless, a pro se litigant=s Aconclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.@ Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. The court Awill not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff=s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff=s behalf.@ 1173B74 (10th Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, Cir. 1997). II. The following complaint. facts are drawn from plaintiff=s amended In January 2013, a criminal complaint was filed against plaintiff in Sumner County District Court. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, subsequently sought discovery in the case. The state court judge initially granted plaintiff=s motion, but later set the order aside when he became aware that the order had been entered without a hearing. without mutual consent of the parties A hearing was then set in March 2013. and Prior to the hearing, plaintiff caused a subpoena duces tecum to be served on a Wellington, Kansas police officer asking him to 3 Aany bring case.@ and all evidence relevant to Plaintiff=s The officer did not appear at the hearing. criminal Plaintiff contends that defendant Spencer instructed the officer not to appear. Plaintiff=s motion for discovery was not granted at the hearing. Plaintiff hearing. filed the instant action four days after the He asserts two claims in his amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. ' 1983. In his first claim, he contends that defendant Spencer violated his 14th Amendment right to due process by (1) enacting and consistent following with K.S.A. discovery 23-3212; procedures and (2) which telling are not Wellington police officers that they did not have to comply with subpoenas issued by plaintiff. that the train, Sumner supervise In the second claim, plaintiff alleges County and District discipline Attorney=s its Office employees failed regarding to (1) their discretionary administrative actions; (2) protections of the United States Constitution; (3) violations of discovery under Kansas law; and (4) violations of Kansas law regarding defendant Spencer=s actions. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief along with compensatory and punitive damages. III. A. The arguments asserted by the defendants are well-founded. 4 There is no serious argument that the instant action should not be dismissed. The court will briefly discuss the arguments raised by the parties. The defendants first contend that the ASumner County District Attorney=s Office@ is not an entity capable of being sued. The court agrees. Generally, governmental sub-units are not separate suable entities that may be sued under ' 1983. See Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 444 (10th Cir. 1985)(AThe >City of Denver Police Department= is not a separate suable entity@). Under Kansas law, absent a specific statute, subordinate governmental agencies do not have the capacity to sue or be sued. Mason v. Twenty-Sixth Judicial District, 670 F.Supp. 1528, 1555 (D.Kan. 1987); Hopkins v. State, 237 Kan. 601, 702 P.2d 311, 316 (1985). Actions against Kansas district attorney=s offices attorney=s and county offices have routinely ben dismissed because they are not entities capable of being sued. See Fugate v. Unified Government of Wyandotte County/Kansas City, 161 F.Supp.2d 1261, 1266-67 (D.Kan. 2001)(AWyandotte County District Attorney=s Office@ not an entity capable of being sued); Whayne v. State of Kansas, 980 F.Supp. 387, 392 (D.Kan. 1997)(AShawnee County Prosecuting Attorneys@ was not a recognized entity capable of being sued). Plaintiff has pointed to no Kansas statute that would allow 5 an action against the Sumner County Attorney=s Office. Rather, plaintiff has chosen to raise arguments based upon the Eleventh Amendment. Amendment The defendants, however, have not asserted Eleventh immunity as a basis for dismissal here. The defendants have argued simply that the Sumner County District Attorney=s Office is not an entity capable of being sued. Because the Kansas legislature has not authorized suits against district or county attorneys= offices, plaintiff=s attempted claim against the Sumner County District Attorney=s Office must be dismissed. B. The court next turns is to the entitled defendants= to argument absolute that defendant Spencer prosecutorial immunity. The defendants contend that prosecutorial immunity applies to Spencer=s decisions regarding discovery provided to plaintiff in plaintiff=s criminal case. The defendants further argue that plaintiff cannot avoid the prosecutorial immunity bar by challenging Spencer=s discovery policy. contend that Spencer is immune for any Finally, defendants counsel he gave to subpoenaed witnesses. AProsecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for their decisions to prosecute, their investigatory or evidence-gathering actions, their evaluation of evidence, their 6 determination of whether probable cause exists, and determination of what information to show the court.@ v. Board of County Com=rs., 582 F.3d 1155, their Nielander (10th 1164 Cir. 2009)(citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 425-28 (1976)). The test is a functional one which focuses on activities Aintimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. . . .@ Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430. The focus, therefore, is Anot on the harm that the conduct may have caused or the question whether it was lawful.@ Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 271 (1993). The Supreme Court in Imbler put it as follows: [A] prosecutor inevitably makes many decisions that could engender colorable claims of constitutional deprivation. Defending these decisions, often years after they were made, could impose unique and intolerable burdens upon a prosecutor responsible annually for hundreds of indictments and trials. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 425-26. There is little question that prosecutorial immunity applies to Spencer=s decisions regarding the decisions to provide discovery to the plaintiff. The actions taken by Spencer during the course of plaintiff=s criminal action were undertaken by him during the course of his prosecution of the plaintiff. Such actions fall within the scope of prosecutorial immunity. See U.S. ex rel. Price v. McFarland, 2004 WL 3171649 at * 7 (D.Kan. 2004)(absolute immunity 7 applies to allegations that prosecutor hindered plaintiffs= access to discovery in state court proceedings). Plaintiff seeks to avoid the application of prosecutorial immunity by indicating that he is challenging Adiscovery the policy@ formulated by Spencer prior to the time that plaintiff was charged. The court finds no merit to this argument. Plaintiff cannot avoid the operation of absolute immunity by attempting to limit his focus to the policy rather than the decisions made pursuant to that policy. divorce his claims from his ongoing Plaintiff=s efforts to state court prosecution leaves him without an injury in fact and, therefore, without standing. If he were not being prosecuted in Sumner County, he would have no right to complain about the discovery policies of the County Attorney’s office. Moreover, plaintiff=s efforts to shift the focus from Spencer=s specific decisions in his criminal case to the formulation of the policy that decisions does not provide any help to plaintiff. immunity is no less available if the guided those Prosecutorial prosecutor=s discovery decisions are made pursuant to a standing policy, rather than on an individual basis. AIn analyzing the rational underpinnings of absolute prosecutorial immunity in this context, there is >no meaningful distinction between a decision on prosecution in a single instance and decisions formulated as a policy for general 8 application.=@ Roe v. City & County of San Francisco, 109 F.3d 578, 583 (9th Cir. 1997)(citation omitted); see also Eisenberg v. District Attorney of County of Kings, 847 F.Supp. 1029, 1037-38 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)(development associated with the of actual policy conduct that of the is intimately prosecution is protected by prosecutorial immunity). Plaintiff=s officers attempted not to claim to that appear compel at Spencer the their prosecutorial immunity. advised hearings attendance subpoenaed at is which also police plaintiff barred by Plaintiff has not offered any specific argument to counter the defendants= contention that this claim is barred by prosecutorial immunity. Rather, plaintiff argues that this claim is part of his discovery claim. there is additional evidence within the He asserts that Wellington Police Department that is relevant to his criminal case and Spencer is violating his constitutional right to be heard in court. All Aacts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceeding or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity.@ U.S. at 273. Buckley, 509 Prosecutorial immunity applies to a determination by a prosecutor that a witness need not appear to testify, even if that advice is wrong. See Lerwill v. Joslin, 712 F.2d 435, 9 438 (10th Cir. 1983)(A[S]ince a prosecutor=s immunity is absolute, it applies no matter how obvious it is to the prosecutor that he is acting unconstitutionally and thus beyond his authority.@). C. Lastly, the court considers the defendants= contention that Younger abstention compels dismissal of this action. Although the court has already dismissed the claims made by plaintiff, the court believes that some comment must also be made concerning Younger abstention. The abstention doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) prevents a federal court in most circumstances from directly interceding in ongoing state criminal proceedings. Further, the Younger abstention doctrine applies while a case works its way through defendant is convicted. of City of New the state appellate process, if a New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 369 (1989). Only in extraordinary circumstances will the Younger doctrine not bar federal interference with ongoing state criminal proceedings. Younger, 401 U.S. at 45. The Younger doctrine is based Aon notions of comity and federalism, which require federal courts to respect state functions and the independent operation of state legal systems.@ Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 885, 889 (10th Cir. 1997)(citing Younger, 401 10 U.S. at 44B45)). Under the doctrine established in Younger, abstention is appropriate whenever there exists (1) ongoing state proceedings, (2) which implicate courts important afford an state interests, adequate forum to (3) wherein present the the state applicant=s federal constitutional challenges. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass=n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982); Taylor v. Jaquez, 126 F.3d 1294, 1297 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1005 (1998). All here. three First, of the the aforementioned pleadings criminal case is ongoing. conditions indicate that are the present plaintiff=s Second, the state court in which the criminal prosecution is proceeding is an adequate forum to hear plaintiff=s complaints subpoenas. Finally, about the discovery State of and Kansas= the issuance of prosecution of plaintiff for violation of its criminal laws involves important state interests. Plaintiff has suggested that he is not asking the court to interfere with state court proceedings. plaintiff=s pleadings, this court cannot agree. Based upon the He is asking for this court to determine that he should have received or should be receiving discovery materials in the state court proceedings. He is also asking the court to determine that the subpoenas issued in those proceedings were valid and should have been 11 honored. criminal He is also asking the court to determine that the case should never have been filed. There is no question that he is asking this court to enter rulings which will impact the underlying criminal case. extraordinary frustrations circumstances do not present amount to The court finds no here. Plaintiff=s Aextraordinary circumstances@ warranting federal intervention and oversight over an ordinary state court prosecution. Given the important state interest in enforcement of its criminal laws, and recognizing that the state courts matters, are we prepared believe to that fully the address proper the merits exercise of of these discretion weighs in favor of abstention and dismissal of this federal case. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants= motion to dismiss (Doc. # 20) be hereby granted. Plaintiffs= amended complaint is hereby dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The court shall also dismiss this case based upon the application of Younger abstention. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this 9th day of December, 2013, at Topeka, Kansas. s/ Richard D. Rogers Richard D. Rogers United States District Judge 12 13
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