Walsworth v. Medtronic, Inc. et al, No. 2:2020cv02395 - Document 20 (D. Kan. 2020)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 10 Motion to Remand to State Court and denying 15 Motion for Sanctions. Signed by District Judge Sam A. Crow on 10/9/2020. (mls)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Walsworth v. Medtronic, Inc. et al Doc. 20 I N THE UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE DI STRI CT OF KANSAS JANE A. WALSWORTH, Plaint iff, Vs. No. 20- 2395- SAC- TJJ MEDTRONI C, I NC., MEDTRONI C USA, I NC., MEDTRONI C MI NI MED, I NC., MI NI MED DSTRI BUTI ON CORP., and MI CHELLE PRI CE, Defendant s. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER The case com es before t he court on t he plaint iff Jane Walswort h’s m ot ion t o rem and t his case t o t he Dist rict Court of Johnson Count y, Kansas, from which it was rem oved. ECF# 10. The defendant s Medt ronic, I nc., Medt ronic USA, I nc., Medt ronic MiniMed, I nc., and MiniMed Dist ribut ion Corp. ( collect ively, “ Medt ronic” ) rem oved t his product liabilit y act ion alleging federal diversit y j urisdict ion in t hat t here is com plet e diversit y of cit izenship bet ween t he plaint iff and t he Medt ronic defendant s, t hat t he defendant Michelle Price is fraudulent ly j oined m aking her cit izenship im m at erial, and t hat t he am ount in cont roversy exceeds t he j urisdict ional am ount . ECF# 1. The plaint iff m oves t o rem and disput ing t he linchpin t o rem oval, t hat is, whet her t he defendant Price is fraudulent ly j oined. Dockets.Justia.com Walswort h filed t his act ion in st at e court seeking t o recover dam ages sust ained from an overdose of insulin on July 31, 2018. She alleges t hat her physicians inst alled on her a Medt ronic MiniMed 670G insulin pum p in April of 2018 at St . Luke’s Sout h Hospit al in Overland Park, Johnson Count y, Kansas, which caused t his overdose of insulin. Specifically, t he com plaint alleges t his m odel of Medt ronic insulin pum p inst alled on t he plaint iff was recalled in Novem ber of 2019 “ for a ret ainer ring defect which allowed t he infusing and/ or dispersing of incorrect am ount s of insulin int o pat ient s.” ECF# 1- 1, ¶ 15. I t is also alleged t hat t he Medt ronic unit ’s safet y alarm syst em has a “ built - in safet y funct ion t hat is supposed t o occur and alert at t he early onset of a high or low blood sugar event ” and t hat it did not alert . I d. at ¶ 14. The com plaint assert s t hree count s against all defendant s. First , a st rict product liabilit y claim is brought on t he product being defect ive and unreasonably dangerous for it s ordinary and expect ed use in allow ing an overdose of insulin. Second, as est ablished by t he plaint iff’s overdose and by t he subsequent product recall, t here are breaches of t he express warrant y t hat t he pum p was safe and beneficial for cont rolling diabet es and of an im plied warrant y of m erchant abilit y and/ or fit ness for a part icular purpose. Third, for t he dut y “ t o use reasonable care in t he design, m anufact ure, prom ot ion, m arket ing and sale of t heir product s . . . t o ensure t hat t he 2 product s worked properly and for t heir int ended use,” t he plaint iff includes 13 breaches of t his dut y. I d. at ¶ 27. Specific t o t he individual defendant Price, t he plaint iff’s com plaint alleges t he following. Price is “ a Medt ronic Senior Territ ory Manager ( sales rep.) ” who resides in Overland Park, Kansas. She “ m arket ed and prom ot ed t he Medt ronic insulin pum p Plaint iff was using t o healt hcare providers including St . Luke’s Sout h.” ECF# 1- 1, ¶ 7. On t he sam e day t hat t he pum p was inst alled, Price m et wit h t he plaint iff advising her on using t he pum p. I d. at ¶¶ 7, 10. “ At all t im es relevant herein Defendant Price was act ing wit hin t he course and scope of her em ploym ent and/ or agency wit h Medt ronic.” I d. at ¶ 8. As part of count t hree, t he plaint iff alleges at ¶ 28 t hat Medt ronic and Price “ had t he dut y as a m edical device m anufact urer, m arket er and/ or dist ribut er t o warn St . Luke’s Sout h, Plaint iff’s physicians and Plaint iff t hat t here were t housands of adverse event s t hat caused deat h and serious inj uries t o pat ient s linked t o t he unreasonably dangerous” insulin pum p and also “ [ t ] housands of report s of insulin overdose and m alfunct ion were com ing in prior t o t he form al recall and prior t o Plaint iff’s use of t he product beginning in April of 2018.” I n arguing for fraudulent j oinder of Price in t heir not ice of rem oval, Medt ronic posit s t hat t he plaint iff cannot possibly est ablish an act ion against Price because t he com plaint fails t o allege t he exist ence of any dut y and it s violat ion by Price t hat is independent of t he allegat ions 3 against Medt ronic. As for t he negligence allegat ions in count t hree, Medt ronic cont ends t he plaint iff fails t o allege t hat Price had knowledge of prior adverse event s or report s or t hat she had an independent dut y t o warn of t hem . Medt ronic at t aches an affidavit from Price describing her lim it ed int eract ion wit h pat ient s, her provision of inform at ion exclusively from Medt ronic, and her not ificat ion and provision of any product safet y not ices at t he t im e of t heir issuance. ECF# 1- 3, ¶¶ 3- 5. A defendant m ay rem ove a st at e civil act ion if t he federal court would have had original j urisdict ion over it . 28 U.S.C. § 1441( a) . “ Defendant s m ay rem ove an act ion on t he basis of diversit y of cit izenship if t here is com plet e diversit y bet ween all nam ed plaint iffs and all nam ed defendant s, and no defendant is a cit izen of t he forum St at e.” Lincoln Propert y Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 84 ( 2005) . The part y invoking diversit y j urisdict ion m ust show com plet e diversit y of cit izenship bet ween adverse part ies. Dut cher v. Mat heson, 733 F.3d 980, 987 ( 10t h Cir. 2013) . Walswort h’s st at e court com plaint alleges t here is no diversit y j urisdict ion because t he plaint iff and t he defendant Price are bot h cit izens of Kansas. ECF# 1- 1, ¶ 9. “ When a plaint iff nam es a non- diverse defendant solely in order t o defeat federal diversit y j urisdict ion, t he dist rict court m ust ignore t he presence of t he non- diverse defendant and deny any m ot ion t o rem and t he m at t er back t o st at e court .” Henderson v. Washingt on Nat . I ns. Co., 454 4 F.3d 1278, 1281 ( 11t h Cir. 2006) . I n effect , t he non- diverse defendant is said t o have been fraudulent ly j oined, and so her cit izenship is “ ignored for t he purposes of assessing com plet e diversit y.” Dut cher, 733 F.3d at 988 ( cit at ion om it t ed) . Medt ronic bears a heavy burden in proving fraudulent j oinder: “ To est ablish [ fraudulent ] j oinder, t he rem oving part y m ust dem onst rat e eit her: ( 1) act ual fraud in t he pleading of j urisdict ional fact s, or ( 2) inabilit y of t he plaint iff t o est ablish a cause of act ion against t he non- diverse part y in st at e court .” Cuevas v. GAC Hom e Loans Servicing, LP, 648 F.3d 242, 249 ( 5t h Cir. 2011) . “ The defendant seeking rem oval bears a heavy burden of proving fraudulent j oinder, and all fact ual and legal issues m ust be resolved in favor of t he plaint iff.” Pam pillonia v. RJR Nabisco, I nc., 138 F.3d 459, 461 ( 2d Cir. 1998) . 733 F.3d at 988. This burden can be furt her broken down int o following proposit ions: I n general, t he rem oving part y m ust show t hat t he plaint iff has “ no cause of act ion” against t he fraudulent ly j oined defendant . See id. [ Dodd v. Fawcet t Pubs., I nc., 329 F.2d 82, 85 ( 10t h Cir. 1964) ] ; Roe v. Gen. Am . Life I ns. Co., 712 F.2d 450, 452 n. * ( 10t h Cir. 1983) . The obj ect ive, how ever, is not t o pre- t ry t he m erit s of t he plaint iff's claim s. As t he Third Circuit put it , “ [ a] claim which can be dism issed only aft er an int ricat e analysis of st at e law is not so wholly insubst ant ial and frivolous t hat it m ay be disregarded for purposes of diversit y j urisdict ion.” Bat off v. St at e Farm I ns. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 853 ( 3d Cir. 1992) . But neit her is t he court com pelled t o believe what ever t he plaint iff says in his com plaint . Rat her, “ upon allegat ions of fraudulent j oinder designed t o prevent rem oval, federal court s m ay look beyond t he pleadings t o det erm ine if t he j oinder, alt hough fair on it s face, is a sham or fraudulent device t o prevent rem oval.” Sm oot v. Chicago, Rock I sland and Pac. R.R. Co., 378 F.2d 879, 881–82 ( 10t h Cir.1967) . As t his court has furt her explained: “ t he ‘cit izens' upon whose diversit y a plaint iff grounds j urisdict ion m ust be real and subst ant ial 5 part ies t o t he cont roversy. Thus, a federal court m ust disregard nom inal or form al part ies and rest j urisdict ion only upon t he cit izenship of real part ies t o t he cont roversy.” Lenon v. St . Paul Mercury I ns. Co., 136 F.3d 1365, 1369 ( 10t h Cir.1998) ( int ernal quot at ion m arks om it t ed) . Upon considerat ion, we have det erm ined t hat none of Brazell's claim s st at ed a cause of act ion against Wait e as a real or subst ant ial part y t o t he cont roversy. Brazell v. Wait e, 525 Fed. Appx. 878, 881, 2013 WL 2398893, at * 3 ( 10t h Cir. 2013) ( unpub.) . Because fraudulent j oinder assert ions at t ack t he com plaint ’s allegat ions, t he Tent h Circuit has inst ruct ed court s t o “ pierce t he pleadings, consider t he ent ire record, and det erm ine t he basis of j oinder by any m eans available.” Dodd v. Fawcet t Pubs., I nc., 329 F.2d at 85. And in carrying out t his funct ion, court s “ m ust decide whet her t here is a reasonable basis t o believe t he plaint iff m ight succeed in at least one claim against t he nondiverse defendant .” Nerad v. Ast raZeneca Pharm aceut icals, I nc., 203 Fed. Appx. 911, 913, 2006 WL 2879057, at * 2 ( 10t h Cir. 2006) ( unpub.) . “ A ‘reasonable basis’ m eans j ust t hat : t he claim need not be a sure- t hing, but it m ust have a basis in t he alleged fact s and t he applicable law.” I d. “ I n evaluat ing fraudulent j oinder claim s, w e m ust init ially resolve all disput ed quest ions of fact and all am biguit ies in t he cont rolling law in favor of t he non- rem oving part y. We are t hen t o det erm ine whet her t hat part y has any possibilit y of recovery against t he part y whose j oinder is quest ioned.” Mont ano v. Allst at e I ndem nit y, 211 F.3d 1278, 2000 WL 525592 at * 1- * 2 6 ( 10t h Cir. Apr. 14, 2000) ( unpub.) ( quot ing Hart v. Bayer Corp., 199 F.3d 239, 246 ( 5t h Cir. 2000) ) . I n seeking rem and, t he plaint iff cont ends she has brought a good- fait h act ion against Price as a Medt ronic sales represent at ive on a dut y of care she owed t o t he plaint iff. The plaint iff assert s t his dut y arose from Price’s act ions in m arket ing and prom ot ing t his insulin pum p t o physicians and in failing t o give adequat e warning t o t he plaint iff about “ t he healt h risks caused by insulin pum ps, including overdosage of insulin by t he insulin pum p device it self.” ECF# 1- 1, ¶ 27( i) ; ECF# 10, p. 4. The plaint iff alleges Price was negligent in “ cont inuing t o m arket t he insulin pum p despit e a large num ber of adverse insulin overdosage report s com ing in t o Medt ronic,” and in failing t o respond reasonably t o report s of adverse event s “ obt ained by Medt ronic prior t o April 2018 and Medt ronic’s form al recall in Novem ber 2019.” ECF# 1- 1, ¶¶ 27( f) and 27( l) ; ECF# 10, p. 4. The plaint iff furt her alleges Price was negligent in not adequat ely warning her of t he healt h risks from insulin pum ps, including possible overdoses. ECF# 1- 1, ¶ 27( i) , ECF# 10, p. 4. The plaint iff argues t hese sam e allegat ions put forward a claim recognized under Kansas law . Dist inguishing her claim from t hose cases cit ed by Medt ronic, t he plaint iff point s t o her allegat ions here t hat Price advised and inst ruct ed her on t he safe use of t he insulin pum p and t hat Price also prom ot ed and m arket ed t he insulin pum p at issue t o t he physicians at 7 St . Luke’s. Price’s personal involvem ent here est ablishes, in t he plaint iff’s j udgm ent , a dut y of care and t he possibilit y of a cause of act ion. Medt ronic opposes rem and arguing t he plaint iff’s allegat ions against Price fail t o st at e a claim under Kansas law, including any claim for negligent ly failing t o warn. Medt ronic concedes it bears a heavy burden, “ ’t he issue is not necessarily whet her t he plaint iff has st at ed a valid claim against t he non- diverse defendant , but rat her whet her t he defendant has proven t he plaint iff’s inabilit y t o st at e a claim in st at e court despit e all legal and fact ual issues being decided in t he plaint iff’s favor.’” ECF# 13, p. 5 ( quot ing Schehrer v. Sm it h & Nephew, I nc., No. 19- 2003- JWL, 2019 WL 1002419, at * 2 ( D. Kan. 2019) ( quot ing in t urn Dut cher, 733 F.3d at 989) ) . The court concludes t hat Medt ronic has not carried t his heavy burden. “ The Kansas Product Liabilit y Act ( ‘KPLA’) governs ‘all product liabilit y claim s regardless of t he subst ant ive t heory of recovery.’” Davison v. C.R. Bard, I nc., No. 19- 2760- EFM, 2020 WL 2513069, at * 3 ( D. Kan. May 15, 2020) ( quot ing Savina v. St erling Drug, I nc., 247 Kan. 105, 795 P.2d 915, 931 ( 1990) ) . Medt ronic first argues t hat defendant Price cannot qualify as a “ product seller” under t he KPLA in t hat she did not and could not sell t he insulin pum p t o t he plaint iff. The plaint iff Walswort h alleges t hat Price as “ Medt ronic Senior Territ ory Manager ( sales rep.) ” had “ m arket ed and prom ot ed t he Medt ronic insulin pum p Plaint iff was using t o healt hcare providers including St . Luke’s Sout h” and t hat Price “ advised Plaint iff on how 8 t o use t he pum p when it was first inst alled on Plaint iff.” ECF# 1- 1, ¶ 7. The com plaint fairly alleges t hat Price was in t he business of m arket ing t he sale of insulin pum ps t o physicians who apparent ly prescribed t hem for t heir pat ient s and t hen Price arguably assist ed t he sales t ransact ion by inst ruct ing pat ient s on t he pum ps. The KPLA defines t he t erm , “ product seller,” t o include “ any person or ent it y t hat is engaged in t he business of selling product s” and specifically m ent ions a “ dist ribut or.” K.S.A. 60- 3302( a) . Applying Kansas product liabilit y law, Judge Lungst rum recent ly rej ect ed t he argum ent t hat a sales represent at ive of a m edical device m anufact urer could not be a product seller under t he KPLA or under Kansas law: As quot ed above, t he KPLA defines “ product seller” t o include anyone engaged in t he business of selling product s and expressly includes dist ribut ors. S&N has not even at t em pt ed t o explain why Mr. Swindle, as a m at t er of law, could not be considered a person engaged in t he business of selling t he BHR syst em . I n Cooper, t his Court conduct ed a t horough analysis, rej ect ed t he argum ent t hat t he KPLA definit ion requires passing of t it le t o t he product , and concluded t hat t he defendant had not shown t hat it was not possible t hat a claim under t he KPLA could be st at ed against it in st at e court . See Cooper, [ v. Zim m er Holdings, I nc.,] , 320 F. Supp. 2d [ 1154] at 1157- 62 [ ( D. Kan. 2004) ] . S&N has not m ade any at t em pt t o explain how t his Court erred in t hat analysis or how t he present case m ay be dist inguished. I n addit ion, plaint iff has alleged t hat Mr. Swindle was involved in t he sale of t he product in t his case, and t hat allegat ion m ust be deem ed t rue for purposes of t his analysis. Accordingly, t he Court rej ect s t his argum ent by S&N based on t he definit ion of “ product seller.” I n addit ion, even if Mr. Swindle could not be considered a “ product seller” under t he KPLA, t hat fact would not necessarily m ean t hat plaint iff could not pursue a product liabilit y claim against Mr. Swindle under Kansas law. As t his Court not ed in Cooper, t he KPLA m ay m erely lim it t he liabilit y of “ product sellers” wit hout foreclosing product liabilit y claim s against ot her defendant s. See id. at 1158 n.7. I ndeed, t he Kansas Suprem e Court has quot ed t hat analysis from Cooper wit h 9 seem ing approval. See Gaum er v. Rossville Truck and Tract or Co., I nc., 292 Kan. 749, 757- 58 ( 2011) ( quot ing Cooper, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1158 n.7) . S&N has not addressed t hat issue in opposing rem and. That legal issue m ust be resolved in plaint iff’s favor in t his analysis, and for t his reason as well, S&N has not shown t hat plaint iff could have no product liabilit y claim against Mr. Swindle. Schehrer v. Sm it h & Nephew, I nc., 19- 2003- JWL, 2019 WL 1002419, at * 3 ( D. Kan. Mar. 1, 2019) . The court is not persuaded by Medt ronic’s effort t o dist inguish Schehrer based on t he sales represent at ive t here providing advice on t he choice of t he device. The decision in Schehrer does not hang it s ruling on t he sales represent at ive having advised t he buyer on w hich device t o choose. Nor does t he Schehrer ruling exclude ot her possible “ sales” involvem ent by a sales represent at ive. I n t he case at hand, t he plaint iff alleges Price direct ly m arket ed t he insulin pum p t o physicians responsible for select ing and prescribing equipm ent for pat ient s based in part on t he sales represent at ive’s m arket ing effort s. The plaint iff also alleges t hat Price played a cont em plat ed role in t he sales t ransact ion in t hat she was present follow ing t he inst allat ion t o inst ruct pat ient s on t he proper use of t he purchased equipm ent . Following Schehrer, t he court rej ect s t his argum ent t hat t he quest ion whet her t he defendant Price qualifies as a “ seller” under t he KPLA necessarily precludes t he plaint iff from bringing a claim against Price. Medt ronic next argues t hat t he plaint iff cannot bring a claim against Price because she is shielded from liabilit y under t he “ int erm ediat e seller defense” in t he KPLA. I t is t he product seller’s burden t o est ablish all 10 five elem ent s t o t his affirm at ive defense, t wo of which are t hat t he “ seller had no knowledge of t he defect ” and t hat “ such seller in t he perform ance of any dut ies t he seller perform ed, or was required t o perform , could not have discovered t he defect while exercising reasonable care.” K.S.A. 603306( a) ( 1) and ( 2) . Medt ronic argues t he plaint iff’s pet it ion does not allege t hat Price was aware or could have been aware of t he adverse event s or com plaint s prior t o t he plaint iff’s use of t he insulin pum p. On t he weight of t hese sam e fact ual argum ent s, Medt ronic concludes t he plaint iff cannot allege any dut y on Price t hat she violat ed which is independent of Medt ronic’s dut ies as t he m anufact urer and seller. The plaint iff’s pet it ion plainly alleges t hat m any “ report s of insulin overdose and m alfunct ion were com ing in . . . prior t o Plaint iff’s use of t he product beginning in April of 2018.” ECF# 1- 1, ¶ 28. This allegat ion is m ade against all nam ed defendant s. Therefore, t he knowledge of t he defendant Price “ present s a clear quest ion of fact , and all fact ual disput es m ust be decided in plaint iff’s favor for purposes of t he j urisdict ional analysis.” Schehrer, 2019 WL 1002419, at * 4. The court is t o resolve all disput ed quest ions of fact and all am biguit ies in t he cont rolling law in favor of t he non- rem oving part y. More im port ant ly, Medt ronic has not com e forw ard wit h evidence or argum ent on which t his court can discredit t he allegat ion of knowledge, part icularly when t he defendant Price’s affidavit is carefully worded only t o 11 deny a “ role in t racking pat ient com plaint s” and only t o deny advance knowledge of “ product safet y not ificat ions.” ECF# 1- 3, ¶¶ 3 and 5. These carefully worded averm ent s are what m ake t his case dist inguishable from t he decisions cit ed by Medt ronic. See, e.g., Elrod v. Bayer Corporat ion, 2020 WL 4284416, at * 1 ( N.D. I ll. Ju. 27, 2020) . Neit her averm ent on it s own or t oget her necessarily cut off t he possibilit y of t he plaint iff proving Price knew or could have know n of t he defect and/ or consum er com plaint s from knowledge gained in t he perform ance of her ot her j ob dut ies. Specifically, Price’s role as Senior Clinical Territ ory Manager presum ably ent ailed int eract ing wit h physicians and hospit als and wit h knowledgeable superiors from Medt ronic about all relevant aspect s of t he pum p’s operat ion and success in t he consum er healt h m arket . At t his j unct ion of t he lit igat ion, t he court cannot say t he plaint iff lacks a reasonable fact ual or legal basis for bringing a cause of act ion against Price. She was direct ly and affirm at ively involved in m aking represent at ions t o t he physicians, in m eet ing wit h t he plaint iff, and in giving inst ruct ions t o t he plaint iff on t he pum p’s int ended use and feat ures. Her involvem ent would necessarily include assurances and inst ruct ions over feat ures t hat m ay have been defect ive, including t he pum p’s abilit y t o inj ect a correct flow of insulin t hat cont rolled her blood glucose and t he pum p’s abilit y t o set off an audible alarm t o indicat e a low blood sugar episode. These allegat ions t aken on t heir face dist inguish t his case from Culbert son v. 12 Great Wolf Lodge of Kansas Cit y, LLC, No. 16- 2297, 2016 WL 6822656 ( D. Kan. Nov. 18, 2016) ; Boyce v. Wal- Mart St ores, I nc., No. 16- 2221- JWL, 2016 WL 2941339 ( D. Kan. May 20, 2016) . The court is not saying t hat t he plaint iff’s claim is “ a sure- t hing” but t he com plaint alleges som e basis bot h in law and fact for a claim . Nerad, 203 Fed. Appx. at 913. Resolving t he disput ed quest ions of fact in t he plaint iff’s favor, t he court rej ect s Medt ronic’s argum ent s for fraudulent j oinder based on t he int erm ediat e seller defense, t he lack of a dut y t o warn, and t he lack of an independent dut y. Thus, Medt ronic has failed t o carry it s heavy burden of showing t hat t he plaint iff has no possibilit y of est ablishing, in law or fact , a cause of act ion against t he defendant Price. Because Medt ronic has not dem onst rat ed t hat Price was fraudulent ly j oined, t his case m ust be rem anded t o st at e court for lack of com plet e diversit y of cit izenship. The plaint iff has filed a separat e m ot ion for sanct ions “ [ p] ursuant t o FRCP 11 and Local Rule 11.1 . . . due t o Defendant s’ inappropriat e Rem oval of t his case and ‘inappropriat e’ use of Cooper v. Zim m er Holdings, I nc., 320 F.Supp.2d 1154 ( D. Kan. 2004) , and Schehrer v. Sm it h & Nephew, I nc., No. 19- 2003- JWL, 2019 WL 1002419 ( D. Kan. Mar. 1, 2019) , t o support rem oval.” ECF# 15. Because t he plaint iff’s m ot ion for sanct ions does not show com pliance wit h t he requirem ent s of Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 11( c) ( 2) , it m ust be denied. See Rot h v. Green, 466 F.3d 1179, 1192- 93 ( 10t h Cir. 2006) , cert . denied, 552 U.S. 814 ( 2007) . I T I S THEREFORE ORDERED t hat t he plaint iff Walswort h’s m ot ion t o rem and t his case t o t he Dist rict Court of Johnson Count y, Kansas, ( ECF# 10) is grant ed. The Clerk of t he Court shall m ail a cert ified copy of t his rem and order t o t he Clerk of t he Dist rict Court of Johnson Count y, Kansas. I T I S FURTHER ORDERED t hat t he plaint iff Walswort h’s m ot ion for sanct ions ( ECF# 15) is denied. Dat ed t his _9t h__ day of Oct ober, 2020, Topeka, Kansas. _/ s Sam A. Crow____________________________ Sam A. Crow, U.S. Dist rict Senior Judge 14
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
