Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. et al v. Kansas Department of Transportation et al, No. 2:2012cv02699 - Document 76 (D. Kan. 2013)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 60 Motion for Reconsideration. See order for details. Signed by U.S. District Senior Judge Sam A. Crow on 10/2/2013. (mb)
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Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. et al v. Kansas Department of Transportation et al Doc. 76 I N THE UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE DI STRI CT OF KANSAS MARTI N MARI ETTA MATERI ALS, I NC., and HUNT MARTI N MATERI ALS, LLC, Plaint iffs vs. Case No. 12- 2699- SAC KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATI ON, and MI KE KI NG, in his individual and official Capacit y as Kansas Secret ary of Transport at ion, and JERRY YOUNGER, in his individual and official capacit y as Deput y Secret ary of Transport at ion St at e Transport at ion Engineer, Defendant s. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER The court filed a lengt hy order back in May t hat decided t he defendant s’ m ot ion for j udgm ent on t he pleadings pursuant t o Fed. R. Civ. P. 12( c) ( Dk. 22) , and t he plaint iffs’ m ot ion for leave t o file first am ended com plaint pursuant t o Fed. R. Civ. P. 15( a) ( 2) ( Dk. 31) . ( Dk. 59) . The plaint iffs have filed a m ot ion for reconsiderat ion ( Dk. 60) support ed by a det ailed m em orandum ( Dk. 61) . Wit h t he defendant s’ opposit ion on file ( Dk. 67) , t he court will address t he pending m ot ion. The plaint iffs ( collect ively, “ Mart in Mariet t a” ) ask t he court t o reconsider it s ruling t hat t hey do not have libert y or propert y int erest in being on t he Kansas Depart m ent of Transport at ion’s ( “ KDOT” ) approved or Dockets.Justia.com pre- qualified list ( “ A- List ing/ PQL” ) of concret e aggregat e suppliers. They say t heir m ot ion is necessary because t he court ’s order does not expressly m ent ion or apply t he t est im ony by KDOT’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 30( b) ( 6) wit ness. Mart in Mariet t a presum es t his t est im ony was overlooked in t hat t hey underst and t he court ’s int erpret at ion and applicat ion of KDOT’s policies and rules t o be cont rary t o t he t est im ony. The record should be clear at t he out set . The court was not rem iss in it s handling of t he deposit ion of Richard E. Kreider, Jr. I ndeed, t he court did review and consider carefully all of t he plaint iffs’ cit at ions t o t hat deposit ion as part of t he m at erials subm it t ed. The plaint iffs offer no aut horit y for t he proposit ion t hat all evidence subm it t ed wit h t he briefing of disposit ive m ot ions should be discussed separat ely in t he court ’s ruling and if it is not , t hen a part y m ay presum e and be right ly concerned t hat t he court was unaware of t he evidence or overlooked it . What t he plaint iffs repeat edly quot e in t heir m ot ion for reconsiderat ion is Kreider’s t est im ony t hat t he St andard Specificat ions were used in det erm ining which suppliers m ade t he A- List ing/ PQL and t hat he did not regard him self as having t he personal and unfet t ered discret ion t o decide which suppliers m ade t his list . The court believes t his t est im ony is consist ent wit h t he plaint iffs’ fact ual allegat ions in t he com plaint s. Consequent ly, when t he court sum m arized t hose fact ual allegat ions, it necessarily considered t his t est im ony. For t hat m at t er, t he court did not regard Kreider’s t est im ony t o add any crit ical or cont radict ory 2 elem ent s t o t he court ’s analysis and conclusions, so it chose not t o ext end t he lengt h of it s order wit h a separat e discussion of t he t est im ony. STAN D ARD S GOV ERN I N G RECON SI D ERATI ON As t his court has observed, it s rulings “ ’are not int ended as first draft s, subj ect t o revision and reconsiderat ion at a lit igant 's pleasure.’” Koch v. Koch I ndust ries, I nc., 6 F.Supp.2d 1207, 1209 ( D.Kan. 1998) ( quot ing Quaker Alloy Cast ing v. Gulfco I ndust ries, I nc., 123 F.R.D. 282, 288 ( N.D. I ll. 1988) ) , aff’d, 203 F.3d 1202 ( 10t h Cir. 2000) , cert . denied, 531 U.S. 926 ( 2000) . A m ot ion t o reconsider a non- disposit ive order “ m ust be based on: ( 1) an int ervening change in cont rolling law; ( 2) t he availabilit y of new evidence; or ( 3) t he need t o correct clear error or prevent m anifest inj ust ice.” D. Kan. Rule 7.3( b) . A m ot ion t o reconsider is not appropriat e if t he m ovant only want s t he court t o revisit issues already addressed or t o hear new argum ent s or support ing fact s t hat could have been present ed originally. Koch, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1209; Fulghum v. Em barq Corp., - - - F. Supp. 2d- - - , 2013 WL 589611 at * 35 ( D. Kan. 2013) . I n it s m ot ion and m em orandum , Mart in Mariet t a does not cit e or apply t hese st andards from t he court ’s local rules. The m ot ion does not argue any int ervening change in cont rolling law or t he availabilit y of new evidence. I t m ay be t hat t he plaint iffs perceive “ t he need t o correct clear error or prevent m anifest inj ust ice.” The m ot ion and m em orandum , however fail t o fram e t he argum ent s as est ablishing “ clear error” or “ m anifest 3 inj ust ice.” Not all disagreem ent s wit h t he court ’s reasoning and conclusions are clear error or m anifest inj ust ice. The plaint iffs’ m ot ion sim ply revisit s t he court ’s analysis and, using again t he sam e or recast argum ent s, seek t o have t he court change it s m ind. This is not a proper purpose for t he plaint iffs’ m ot ion t o reconsider. AN ALYSI S Because Mart in Mariet t a’s m ot ion t o reconsider is out side t he proper scope of t he court ’s local rules, t his order will not address all of t he argum ent s offered over t he span of t hirt y- t wo pages. What Mart in Mariet t a cit es as t he crit ical t est im ony from Kreider’s deposit ion does not cont radict what t he court underst ood and sum m arized as t he plaint iffs’ allegat ions in t his case. ( Dk. 59, pp. 24- 25) . The court accept ed t he plaint iffs’ allegat ions as t rue t hat KDOT, having writ t en and published it s St andard Specificat ions, would look t o t hem in m aking decisions about whet her a supplier should be on an approved list . The court never found, nor assum ed, t hat KDOT officials had t he unbridled discret ion t o ignore t hese crit eria or t hat t hey would apply t hem arbit rarily in m aking t hese decisions. The court , inst ead, considered all relevant st at ut es and St andard Specificat ions cit ed by bot h sides. I t did not rely on j ust t hose provisions t hat t he plaint iffs isolat ed and const rued as t rum ping all ot hers. The court ’s underst anding cam e from a reasonable reading and const ruct ion of t he whole. The court decided t hat t he governing st at ut e, t he St andard Specificat ions, and t he alleged underst andings from 4 t hem , considered t oget her as a whole, did not so lim it KDOT’s discret ion in select ing and using concret e aggregat e suppliers on st at e road const ruct ion proj ect s as t o creat e a legit im at e claim of ent it lem ent in sim ply being on t he A- List ing/ PQL. The court believes it s approach and reasoning is apparent and adequat ely explained in t he order. Thus, Mart in Mariet t a’s st at ed reason for filing t he m ot ion t o reconsider is wide of t he m ark and arguably m ay be a pret ext for having t he court revisit it s rulings. Mart in Mariet t a m akes a blanket charge t hat t he court ’s order cont ains several legal errors beginning wit h it s disregard of t he plaint iffs’ fact ual allegat ions and t he evidence support ing t hem . Purport edly, t he order draws inferences or m akes assum pt ions cont rary t o t he plaint iffs’ allegat ions and evidence, and it also const rues t he plaint iffs’ allegat ions m ost favorably for t he defendant s. While all of t hese argum ent s are m ade, t he plaint iffs’ real disput e is wit h t he court ’s refusal t o accept Mart in Mariet t a’s alleged legal conclusion t hat it possessed a propert y int erest in being on t he AList ing/ PQL by reason of it s fact ual allegat ions. “ [ T] he t enet t hat a court m ust accept as t rue all of t he allegat ions cont ained in a com plaint is inapplicable t o legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. I qbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 ( 2009) . The court is “ not bound t o accept as t rue a legal conclusion couched as a fact ual allegat ion.” Bell At lant ic Corp. v. Tw om bley, 550 U.S. 544, 555 ( 2007) . The court ’s ruling t hat denied a propert y int erest did not involve disregarding, weighing, or rej ect ing t he plaint iff’s fact ual allegat ions or, for 5 t hat m at t er, t he drawing of inferences or const ruing t hem unfavorably t o t he plaint iffs. The plaint iffs bring t heir m ot ion rearguing t hat t hey have a propert y int erest sim ply because KDOT uses subst ant ive, obj ect ive crit eria in evaluat ing whet her a quarry m ay appear on a pre- approved list of aggregat e suppliers. This argum ent was rej ect ed for several reasons t hat are sound in t his court ’s j udgm ent . While t he plaint iffs now challenge t hose reasons on t he sam e grounds and m ore, t he court rem ains convinced of t he soundness of it s ruling. Nor does t he court see any real value from ext ending t his order wit h a review and rest at em ent of all of it s reasons and conclusions. Suffice it t o say, t he st at ut ory and regulat ory fram ework, as well as t he indust ry underst anding of it as alleged, shows KDOT had broad discret ion in det erm ining t he accept able qualit y of road const ruct ion m at erials and it did not const rain t his discret ion t hrough it s ongoing developm ent , use, and review of t hose st andards. I nst ead, KDOT first est ablished in t he st at ut e and preserved in t he regulat ory fram ew ork t he discret ion necessary t o insure t hat only qualit y m at erials are used in st at e highway const ruct ion. The court does not find in t his fram ework a m eaningful and subst ant ive lim it at ion on KDOT’s unilat eral discret ion t o est ablish or change t hose st andards and t o enforce t he sam e t hroughout t he applicat ion and const ruct ion process. The plaint iffs did not allege “ t hat KDOT’s discret ion t o change or add t o t he specificat ions or t o t he 6 requirem ent s found in cont ract docum ent s is subj ect t o any procedural lim it at ions out side of a specific cont ract ual relat ionship which has not been alleged here.” ( Dk. 59, p. 35) . KDOT put in place a “ process of inspect ion, t est ing and approval . . . t o benefit KDOT, not t he cont ract or or it s t hirdpart y suppliers.” ( Dk. 59, p. 34) . The fram ework “ cannot be plausibly int erpret ed as m eaningfully lim it ing KDOT’s discret ion as t o allow rem oval only upon what could be likened t o j ust cause.” I d. at 36. On t hese grounds and t hose m ore fully st at ed at pages 29- 42 of it s prior order, t he court rej ect s t he plaint iffs’ legal conclusion as alleged t hat it has a propert y and libert y int erest as claim ed. The plaint iffs’ m ot ion for reconsiderat ion is denied. I T I S THEREFORE ORDERED t hat t he plaint iffs’ m ot ion for reconsiderat ion ( Dk. 60) is denied. Dat ed t his 2nd day of Oct ober, 2013, Topeka, Kansas. s/ Sam A. Crow Sam A. Crow, U.S. Dist rict Senior Judge 7
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