McDaniel v. Commissioner of Social Security, No. 5:2019cv04043 - Document 22 (N.D. Iowa 2020)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION Accepting Report and Recommendations 18 : The Commissioner's determination that McDaniel was not disabled is reversed and this matter is remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings as described by Judge Rob erts. Judgment shall enter in favor of McDaniel and against the Commissioner. If McDaniel wishes to request an award of attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, an application may be filed up until 30 days after the judgment becomes "not appealable," i.e., 30 days after the 60-day time for appeal has ended. [see ORDER] Signed by Chief Judge Leonard T Strand on 7/30/2020. (kms)
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McDaniel v. Commissioner of Social Security Doc. 22 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA WESTERN DIVISION CHRISTY A. McDANIEL, Plaintiff, No. C19-4043-LTS vs. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Defendant. I. INTRODUCTION This case is before me on a Report and Recommendation (R&R) by United States Magistrate Judge Mark A. Roberts. See Doc. No. 18. Judge Roberts recommends that I affirm in part and reverse and remand in part the decision by the Commissioner of Social Security (the Commissioner) denying Christy A. McDaniel’s applications for disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI) benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-34, 1381-85. Neither party has objected to the R&R. The deadline for such objections has expired. II. A. APPLICABLE STANDARDS Judicial Review of the Commissioner’s Decision The Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed “if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” Pelkey v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 575, 577 (8th Cir. 2006); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . .”). “Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but enough that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Lewis v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 642, 645 (8th Cir. Case 5:19-cv-04043-LTS-MAR Document 22 Filed 07/30/20 Page 1 of 5 Dockets.Justia.com 2003). The Eighth Circuit explains the standard as “something less than the weight of the evidence and [that] allows for the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions, thus it embodies a zone of choice within which the [Commissioner] may decide to grant or deny benefits without being subject to reversal on appeal.” Culbertson v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 934, 939 (8th Cir. 1994). In determining whether the Commissioner’s decision meets this standard, the court considers “all of the evidence that was before the ALJ, but it [does] not re-weigh the evidence.” Vester v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 886, 889 (8th Cir. 2005). The court considers both evidence that supports the Commissioner’s decision and evidence that detracts from it. Kluesner v. Astrue, 607 F.3d 533, 536 (8th Cir. 2010). The court must “search the record for evidence contradicting the [Commissioner’s] decision and give that evidence appropriate weight when determining whether the overall evidence in support is substantial.” Baldwin v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 549, 555 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Cline v. Sullivan, 939 F.2d 560, 564 (8th Cir. 1991)). In evaluating the evidence in an appeal of a denial of benefits, the court must apply a balancing test to assess any contradictory evidence. Sobania v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 879 F.2d 441, 444 (8th Cir. 1989). The court, however, does not “reweigh the evidence presented to the ALJ,” Baldwin, 349 F.3d at 555 (citing Bates v. Chater, 54 F.3d 529, 532 (8th Cir. 1995)), or “review the factual record de novo.” Roe v. Chater, 92 F.3d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Naber v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 186, 188 (8th Cir. 1994)). Instead, if, after reviewing the evidence, the court finds it “possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the Commissioner’s findings, [the court] must affirm the [Commissioner’s] denial of benefits.” Kluesner, 607 F.3d at 536 (quoting Finch v. Astrue, 547 F.3d 933, 935 (8th Cir. 2008)). This is true even in cases where the court “might have weighed the evidence differently.” Culbertson, 30 F.3d at 939 (quoting Browning v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 817, 822 (8th Cir. 1992)). The court may not reverse the Commissioner’s decision “merely because substantial evidence would have supported an opposite decision.” Baker v. 2 Case 5:19-cv-04043-LTS-MAR Document 22 Filed 07/30/20 Page 2 of 5 Heckler, 730 F.2d 1147, 1150 (8th Cir. 1984); see Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[A]n administrative decision is not subject to reversal simply because some evidence may support the opposite conclusion.”). B. Review of Report and Recommendation A district judge must review a magistrate judge’s R&R under the following standards: Within fourteen days after being served with a copy, any party may serve and file written objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as provided by rules of court. A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Thus, when a party objects to any portion of an R&R, the district judge must undertake a de novo review of that portion. Any portions of an R&R to which no objections have been made must be reviewed under at least a “clearly erroneous” standard. See, e.g., Grinder v. Gammon, 73 F.3d 793, 795 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that when no objections are filed “[the district court judge] would only have to review the findings of the magistrate judge for clear error”). As the Supreme Court has explained, “[a] finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). However, a district judge may elect to review an R&R under a more-exacting standard even if no objections are filed: Any party that desires plenary consideration by the Article III judge of any issue need only ask. Moreover, while the statute does not require the judge to review an issue de novo if no objections are filed, it does not preclude 3 Case 5:19-cv-04043-LTS-MAR Document 22 Filed 07/30/20 Page 3 of 5 further review by the district judge, sua sponte or at the request of a party, under a de novo or any other standard. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). III. DISCUSSION Because the parties did not object to the R&R, I have reviewed it for clear error. Judge Roberts applied the appropriate legal standards in considering whether substantial evidence in the record as a whole supported (1) the ALJ’s determination that McDaniel could perform other work available in the national economy given the vocational expert’s testimony on impacts due to social limitations, (2) the ALJ’s evaluations of certified advanced registered nurse practitioner Jamie Billings’ opinion and McDaniel’s credibility and (3) the ALJ’s residual functional capacity determination related to McDaniel’s alleged standing and walking limitations. With regard to her Appointments Clause challenge, the Eighth Circuit has now determined that Social Security disability claimants waive appellate review of Appointments Clause challenges if they fail to raise the issue during agency proceedings. See Davis v. Saul, 963 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 2020). This holding is consistent with Judge Roberts’ recommendation not to remand on this basis but to allow McDaniel to raise the issue if the case is remanded on other grounds. Based on my review of the record, I find no error – clear or otherwise – in Judge Roberts’ recommendation. As such, I adopt the R&R in its entirety. IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth herein: 1. I accept Judge Roberts’ R&R (Doc. No. 18) without modification. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 2. Pursuant to Judge Roberts’ recommendation: 4 Case 5:19-cv-04043-LTS-MAR Document 22 Filed 07/30/20 Page 4 of 5 a. The Commissioner’s determination that McDaniel was not disabled is reversed and this matter is remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings as described by Judge Roberts. b. Judgment shall enter in favor of McDaniel and against the Commissioner. c. If McDaniel wishes to request an award of attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, an application may be filed up until 30 days after the judgment becomes “not appealable,” i.e., 30 days after the 60-day time for appeal has ended. See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 296 (1933); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2412(d)(1)(B), (d)(2)(G). IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED this 30th day of July, 2020. __________________________ Leonard T. Strand, Chief Judge 5 Case 5:19-cv-04043-LTS-MAR Document 22 Filed 07/30/20 Page 5 of 5
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