Ivy v. United States of America, No. 1:2013cv00058 - Document 7 (N.D. Iowa 2014)

Court Description: ORDER denying 1 MOTION to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence (2255)(Criminal Case No. 11-cr-55-LRR) filed by Rashad Ivy. A certificate of appealability is denied. Signed by Chief Judge Linda R Reade on 1/6/14. (ksy)(copy w/NEF to Plf)
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Ivy v. United States of America Doc. 7 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA CEDAR RAPIDS DIVISION RASHAD IVY, Movant, No. C13-00058-LRR No. CR11-0055-LRR vs. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. ORDER ____________________________ This matter appears before the court on Rashad Ivy’s motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (civil docket no. 1). On June 5, 2013, Rashad Ivy (“the movant”) filed his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. On September 30, 2013, the court, among other things, directed the parties to brief the claims that the movant included in his motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (civil docket no. 2). On October 30, 2013, counsel filed an affidavit (civil docket no. 4). On November 21, 2013, the government filed a resistance (civil docket no. 6). The movant did not file a reply. The court now turns to consider the movant’s motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. A district court is given discretion in determining whether to hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See United States v. Oldham, 787 F.2d 454, 457 (8th Cir. 1986). In exercising that discretion, the district court must determine whether the alleged facts, if true, entitle the movant to relief. See Payne v. United States, 78 F.3d 343, 347 (8th Cir. 1996). “Accordingly, [a district court may summarily dismiss a motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 without an evidentiary hearing] if (1) the . . . allegations, accepted as true, would not entitle the [movant] to relief, or (2) the allegations cannot be accepted as true because they are contradicted by the record, inherently incredible, or conclusions rather than statements of fact.” Engelen v. United States, 68 F.3d 238, 240-41 Dockets.Justia.com (8th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); see also Delgado v. United States, 162 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary where allegations, even if true, do not warrant relief or allegations cannot be accepted as true because they are contradicted by the record or lack factual evidence and rely on conclusive statements); United States v. Hester, 489 F.2d 48, 50 (8th Cir. 1973) (stating that no evidentiary hearing is necessary where the files and records of the case demonstrate that relief is unavailable or where the motion is based on a question of law). Stated differently, a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion can be dismissed without a hearing where “the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255; see also Standing Bear v. United States, 68 F.3d 271, 272 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). The court concludes that it is able to resolve the movant’s claims from the record. See Rogers v. United States, 1 F.3d 697, 699 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding “[a]ll of the information that the court needed to make its decision with regard to [the movant’s] claims was included in the record . . . .” and, therefore, the court “was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing”) (citing Rule Governing Section 2255 Proceedings 8(a) and United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 674, 100 S. Ct. 2406, 65 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1980)). The evidence of record conclusively demonstrates that the movant is not entitled to the relief sought. Specifically, the record indicates that the movant’s claims are without merit, especially considering that it is clear that counsel represented the movant in a manner that exceeded constitutional requirements. As such, the court finds that there is no need for an evidentiary hearing. With respect to the merits of the movant’s claims, the court deems it appropriate to deny the movant’s motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 for the reasons stated in the government’s resistance. The government’s brief adequately sets forth the law that is applicable to the facts in the movant’s case. Specifically, the government correctly concluded that counsel provided professional and effective assistance to the movant and the movant suffered no prejudice as a result of counsel’s actions. 2 Moreover, the court thoroughly reviewed the record and finds that the denial of the movant’s motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 comports with the Constitution, results in no “miscarriage of justice” and is consistent with the “rudimentary demands of fair procedure.” Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428, 82 S. Ct. 468, 7 L. Ed. 2d 417 (1962); see also United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1076 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for a narrow range of injuries that could not have been raised for the first time on direct appeal and, if uncorrected, would result in a complete miscarriage of justice.” (citing Poor Thunder v. United States, 810 F.2d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 1987))). It is not subject to debate that the movant knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement that he entered into with the government. See Walker v. United States, 115 F.3d 603, 604 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[A] valid guilty plea forecloses an attack on conviction unless ‘on the face of the record the court had no power to enter the conviction or impose the sentence.’”); United States v. Jennings, 12 F.3d 836, 839 (8th Cir. 1994) (a voluntary and unconditional guilty plea waives all defects except those related to jurisdiction). The parties’ plea agreement addressed, among other things, the fact that he faced a sentence of up to ten years in prison, the fact that he possessed a firearm as an unlawful use of marijuana and the fact that nobody threatened or forced the movant to plead guilty. It is undeniable that the movant could have faced a lengthier sentence if he did not plead guilty. In the event that the movant elected to go to trial or he tried to withdraw his guilty plea, it is a near certainty that the movant would have received a longer sentence. This is especially so because the movant’s stipulation of the facts could be used against him during trial and the movant would have lost acceptance of responsibility. Further, the court’s application of the advisory sentencing guidelines, consideration of the parties’ arguments and application of the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) violated no constitutional right. See United States v. Villareal-Amarillas, 562 F.3d 892, 898 (8th Cir. 2009) (observing that a sentencing judge is only constrained by the statutory maximum and minimum for an offense and the factors included in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). None of the 3 terms that the parties included in their plea agreement restricted the court’s discretion during the sentencing hearing. The parties stipulated to the application of particular sentencing guidelines, and the court imposed a sentence that reflected the parties’ understanding of their agreement. Given the record, the court concludes that the sentence that the movant received is appropriate. Lastly, it is apparent that the conduct of counsel fell within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984), and counsel’s performance did not prejudice the movant’s defense, id. at 692-94. Considering all the circumstances and refraining from engaging in hindsight or second-guessing counsel’s strategic decisions, the court finds that the record belies the movant’s claims and no violation of the movant’s constitutional right to counsel occurred. The court finds that counsel’s account of his representation of the movant is credible. On the other hand, the movant’s assertions regarding his race, his religion, the searches, his statements, the collection of a urine sample, his access to the discovery file, the investigation by counsel, the voluntariness of his guilty plea, his contact with counsel pre-judgment, his review of and objections to the pre-sentence investigation report, his sentence and his contact with counsel post-judgment are frivolous. Contrary to the movant’s assertions, counsel reviewed the discovery file, counsel did not coerce or threaten the movant into pleading guilty, counsel made strategic decisions that tremendously benefitted the movant and counsel did not fail to raise any viable sentencing argument. There is no credible basis to conclude that counsel’s review of the discovery file was inadequate, that counsel should have sought suppression of certain evidence and/or statements or that counsel pressured the movant into pleading guilty. Moreover, the movant’s assertions as to what counsel did or failed to do would not have changed the outcome. In sum, the alleged errors that are asserted by the movant do not warrant relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The movant’s claims are baseless and devoid of merit. None of the movant’s assertions in support of his request for relief lead the court to conclude that a 4 violation of the Constitution occurred. Based on the foregoing, the movant’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion shall be denied. In a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding before a district judge, the final order is subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a). Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A district court possesses the authority to issue certificates of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) and Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). See Tiedeman v. Benson, 122 F.3d 518, 522 (8th Cir. 1997). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), a certificate of appealability may issue only if a movant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1039, 154 L. Ed. 2d 931 (2003); Garrett v. United States, 211 F.3d 1075, 1076-77 (8th Cir. 2000); Carter v. Hopkins, 151 F.3d 872, 873-74 (8th Cir. 1998); Cox v. Norris, 133 F.3d 565, 569 (8th Cir. 1997); Tiedeman, 122 F.3d at 523. To make such a showing, the issues must be debatable among reasonable jurists, a court could resolve the issues differently, or the issues deserve further proceedings. Cox, 133 F.3d at 569 (citing Flieger v. Delo, 16 F.3d 878, 882-83 (8th Cir. 1994)); see also Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 335-36 (reiterating standard). Courts reject constitutional claims either on the merits or on procedural grounds. “‘[W]here a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy [28 U.S.C.] § 2253(c) is straightforward: the [movant] must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.’” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338 (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 146 L. Ed. 2d 542 (2000)). When a federal habeas petition is dismissed on procedural grounds without reaching the underlying constitutional claim, “the [movant must show], at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. 5 Having thoroughly reviewed the record in this case, the court finds that the movant failed to make the requisite “substantial showing” with respect to the claims that he raised in his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). Because he does not present a question of substance for appellate review, there is no reason to grant a certificate of appealability. Accordingly, a certificate of appealability shall be denied. If he desires further review of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, the movant may request issuance of the certificate of appealability by a circuit judge of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in accordance with Tiedeman, 122 F.3d at 520-22. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: 1) The movant’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion (civil docket no. 1) is denied. 2) A certificate of appealability is denied. DATED this 6th day of January, 2014. 6