Hassett v. Beam Suntory,, No. 1:2019cv08279 - Document 21 (N.D. Ill. 2019)
Court Description: OPINION. Signed by Judge Joseph H. Rodriguez on 12/18/2019. (rss, ) [Transferred from New Jersey on 12/18/2019.]
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Hassett v. Beam Suntory, Doc. 21 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW J ERSEY HASSETT, Plaintiff, v. BEAM SUNTORY, INC. : Hon. J oseph H. Rodriguez : Civil Action No. 19-8364 : OPINION : Defendant. : This m atter is before the Court on a Motion to Transfer [Dkt. No. 6] and a Motion to Dism iss [Dkt. No. 7] filed by Defendant, Beam Suntory, Inc. (“Defendant” or the “Com pany”). The Court has considered the written subm issions of the parties, as well as the argum ents advanced at the hearing on Novem ber 21, 20 19. For the reasons stated on the record that day, as well as those that follow, Defendant’s Motion to Transfer [Dkt. No. 6] will be granted. Accordingly, the pending Motion to Dism iss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) is not considered herein. I. Background This case arises out of the failure of an em ployer to award its em ployee bonus paym ents allegedly owed upon his departure from the com pany. Plaintiff, Timothy Hassett (“Plaintiff” or “Mr. Hassett”) entered into an em ploym ent agreem ent (“Letter Agreem ent”) with Defendant on or about J une 25, 20 14. (Com pl. ¶ 9). Plaintiff was em ployed by Defendant as the Senior Vice President and President of Am ericas. (Id. at ¶¶ 7,8). At the tim e Plaintiff was hired, he was residing in New J ersey with his fam ily; Defendant is located in Chicago, Illinois, the location where Plaintiff worked from 20 14 through 20 17. (Id. at ¶ 4). 1 Dockets.Justia.com According to the Com plaint, “[p]ursuant to the Letter Agreem ent, as Senior Vice President and President of Am ericas, Mr. Hassett’s com pensation included but was not lim ited to the following: (i) a Base Salary in the am ount of $ 50 0 ,0 0 0 , reviewable on an annual basis; (ii) participation in the com pany’s Executive Incentive Plan (EIP) bonus program , also called the Annual Incentive Plan(AIP) program ; and(iii) an annual Long Term Incentive award (LTI).” (Id. at ¶ 13). As Senior Vice President and President of Am ericas, Plaintiff reported directly to the Chairm an and Chief Executive Officer, Matthew Shattock (“Mr. Shattock”). (Id. at ¶ 10 ). “On or about October 20 17, Beam issued a Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTI) Award Statem ent to Mr. Hassett, inform ing him that his 20 15-20 17Award was $ 1,250 ,0 0 0 .0 0 . Upon inform ation and belief, Mr. Hassett’s 20 17 AIP bonus was valued at approxim ately $ 60 0 ,0 0 0 .0 0 ).” (Id. at ¶¶ 14-15). Around the sam e tim e, Plaintiff was afforded a position with a different com pany, and his father becam e term inally ill. (Id. at ¶¶ 16-17). As a result, Plaintiff advised Mr. Shattock that he intended to leave the Com pany in early October. (Id. at ¶ 19). According to Plaintiff, “Mr. Shattock asked him to extend his departure date on m ultiple occasions in order to assist with the transition to Mr. Hassett’s replacem ent and to accom m odate Mr. Shattock’s schedule.” (Id.). He and Mr. Shattock ultim ately agreed that he would resign in m id-Novem ber and Plaintiff would assist in the transition. “In exchange, Mr. Shattock prom ised that Mr. Hassett would be entitled to either all or a portion of his LTI and 20 17 AIP bonuses.” (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s “practice was to pay Senior Executive em ployees both their LTI and AIP bonuses even though such em ployees were not em ployed by the Com pany at year-end.” (Id. at ¶ 30 ). “Based on” his agreem ent, Plaintiff decided to forgo his other available leave tim e under Com pany policies and the Fam ily Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). (Id. at ¶ 21). 2 Before resigning, Plaintiff requested paym ent of his bonuses; but on the date of his departure, the Com pany “would not pay him any portion of his LTI and AIP bonuses, on the purported basis that Mr. Hassett was not em ployed as of Decem ber 31, 20 17.” (Id. at ¶ 23). After his resignation, Plaintiff returned to his hom e in New J ersey but continued to conduct em ployee reviews for Defendant at its request. (Id. at ¶ 27). Plaintiff initiated this action against Defendant on March 11, 20 19. [Dkt. No. 1]. Plaintiff’s Com plaint alleges claim s for Breach of Contract (Count I), Good Faith and Fair Dealing (Count II), Unjust enrichm ent (Count III), and failure to pay wages under Illinois Wage Paym ent and Collection Act (“IWPCA”) (Count IV). On May 15, 20 19 Defendant filed a Motion to Transfer this action to the Northern District of Illinois [Dkt. No. 6] and a Motion to Dism iss the Com plaint for failure to state a claim [Dkt No. 7] pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6). The m otions have been fully briefed and the Court heard oral argum ent on both m otions at a hearing held on Novem ber 21, 20 19. II. Standard of Review Section 140 4 provides: “for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court m ay transfer any civil action to any other district . . . where it m ight have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 140 4(a). Analysis under § 140 4 is flexible and m ust be m ade on the unique facts of each case. Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Honeywell, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 473, 479 (D.N.J . 1993). The m oving party bears the burden of establishing that the transfer is appropriate and must establish that the alternate forum is m ore convenient than the present forum . J um ara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir. 1995). The Third Circuit has enum erated a num ber of private and public factors to be weighed when deciding a m otion to transfer venue under § 140 4(a). 3 The private interest factors incorporate the preferences of the parties in the context of the litigation, and include (1) the choice of forum of the plaintiff; (2) the defendant's preference; (3) the ease of access to sources of proof; (4) the convenience of the witnesses-only to the extent that a witness m ay actually be unavailable for trial in one of the fora; and (4) where the claim arose. The second category analyzes the public interest including (1) practical considerations which could m ake the litigation easier and m ore expeditious, or inexpensive; (2) court congestion and adm inistrative difficulties; (3) the local interest in resolving local controversies at hom e; and (4) the public policies of the fora. Mendoza v. U.S. Custom & Border Protection, No. 0 5– 60 17, 20 0 7 WL 8420 11, at *3 (D.N.J . March 19, 20 0 7) (citing J um ara, 55 F.3d at 879) (internal citations om itted). III. Analysis As an initial m atter, this case could have been brought in the Northern District of Illinois. When jurisdiction is based on the diversity of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, such as the present case, a civil action m ay be brought in: (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the sam e State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or om issions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the tim e the action is com m enced, if there is no district in which the action m ay otherwise be brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Here, venue would be proper in the Northern District of Illinois because Defendant's headquarters are located in Chicago, and to a large extent, the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claim s occurred there. Accordingly, the Court turns to the next inquiry, whether transfer to the Northern District of Illinois would be in the interest of justice and for the convenience of the parties and witnesses. 4 A. Private In te re s ts Defendant argues that the private interests weigh in favor of transfer to the Northern District of Illinois because: (1) Plaintiff’s claim s arose in the Northern District of Illinois; (2) relevant em ployee witnesses work in Illinois, (3) related docum ents are located in Illinois, and (4) Defendant’s principal place of business is located in Illinois. (Def. Brf. [Dkt. No. 6-1] at 6-9). 1. Plaintiff’s forum Preference and Defendant’s forum Preference In the Third Circuit, “Plaintiffs' choice of forum is a param ount consideration that should not lightly be disturbed.” Clark v. Burger King Corp., 255 F. Supp.2d 334, 338 (D.N.J .20 0 3) (quoting Ayling v. Travelers Prop. Casualty Corp., No. 99– 3243, 1999 WL 99440 3, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct.28, 1999)). Unless the defendant can show that the inconvenience to the parties strongly favors another forum , plaintiff's choice of forum should prevail. Shutte v. Arm co Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22, 25 (3d Cir. 1970 ). However, courts give substantially less weight to a plaintiffs forum choice when the dispute at the heart of a lawsuit occurred alm ost entirely in another state. See, e.g., NCR Credit Corp. v. Ye Seekers Horizon, Inc., 17 F. Supp.2d 317, 321 (D.N.J .1998); Ricoh Co., 817 F. Supp. at 481– 482. Here, Plaintiff has selected his hom e forum , New J ersey, to litigate his claim s. Plaintiff argues that his choice of forum should be upheld and afforded deference as it is a proper and reasonable choice. Plaintiff has “lived in and was a resident of New J ersey for the entire period of his roughly three-year em ploym ent with [Defendant].” (Hassett Decl. ¶ 3). He claim s that his fam ily never relocated upon his agreem ent to work for Defendant in Illinois. Currently, Plaintiff rem ains a resident of New J ersey, in close proxim ity to this Courthouse. (Id.). 5 Defendant prefers, however, to defend this action in the Northern District of Illinois. Defendant is a Delaware Corporation, with its headquarters in Chicago, Illinois. Defendant stresses that the Northern District of Illinois is a m ore convenient forum than Plaintiff’s choice of forum , New J ersey, which “has little connection with the operative facts of the lawsuit.” Wm . H. McGee & Co. v. United Arab Shipping Co., 6 F. Supp. 2d 283, 290 (D.N.J . 1997). In that regard, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s choice of forum is not entitled to deference. The Court would be rem iss if it did not acknowledge that the m ajority of events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claim s, arose in the state of Illinois. Because the operative facts of this lawsuit have a m uch greater connection to Illinois, as explained below, Plaintiff’s forum preference should be afforded less weight. 2. W here the Claim Arose In support of transfer, Defendant’s argue that “the events alleged in [Plaintiff]’s lawsuit have virtually nothing to do with New J ersey.” (Def Brf. [Dkt. No. 6] at 7). Plaintiff strongly contests that argum ent. stressing that his perm anent residence was at all tim es New J ersey—where Defendant recruited him from . What is clear in this case, is that all of Plaintiff’s claim s center around the alleged breach of certain contracts. In a breach of contract case, courts “consider several specific factors that relate to where the claim arose, including (1) where the contract was negotiated or executed; (2) where the contract was to be perform ed; and (3) where the alleged breach occurred.” Advanced Technologies and Installation Corp. v. Nokia Siem ens Networks US, L.L.C., 20 10 WL 3522794, at *8 (D.N.J . Sep. 2, 20 10 ). There are two potential contracts at issue here. The first contract is Plaintiff’s written Letter Agreement. That agreem ent, an offer of em ploym ent with Defendant, was 6 negotiated and executed in the state of New J ersey. (Hassett Decl. ¶¶ 4-5). However, the Letter Agreem ent was fully perform ed in Illinois, where Plaintiff was em ployed. The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff’s job necessitated a lot of travel. Plaintiff states that upwards of 40 % of his tim e was spent travelling. (Id. at ¶ 11). As such, approxim ately 60 % of the contract was perform ed in Illinois. At no tim e did Plaintiff perform work in New J ersey. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant breached this Letter Agreem ent by failing to pay him two bonuses, which he claim s he was entitled to under the Agreem ent. The decision not to award Plaintiff any portion of those bonuses occurred in Illinois, therefore, the alleged breach occurred in Illinois. 1 Stalwart Capital, LLC v. Warren Street Partners, LLC, No. 11– 5249, 20 12 WL 1533637, *4 (D.N.J . Apr. 30 , 20 12) (“Where a party has [ ] failed to m ake a paym ent, the locus of the action is where the party failed [to] take that action rather than where the result is felt.” (citing Cottm an Transm ission System s, Inc. v. Martino, 36 F.3d 291, 295 (3d Cir. 1994)). The second basis for Plaintiff’s contract claim s (and unjust enrichm ent and IWPA claim s) stem s from an alleged oral contract. As Defendant suggests, “the focus of Hassett’s com plaint is a series of conversations and actions that took place in October and Novem ber 20 17, between the tim e [Plaintiff] announced his intention to resign from Beam Suntory and his last day of em ploym ent with Beam Suntory, all of which took place in Chicago.” (Def Brf. [Dkt. No. 6] at 6-7; Com pl ¶¶ 18-23). Based on those conversations, Plaintiff claim s that he and his CEO form ed an oral agreem ent for 1 Plaintiff alleges that his Letter Agreem ent of Em ploym ent with Defendant entitled him to two bonuses, which Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff at his resignation. This is highly contested by the Defendant, who argues that the 20 14 contract did not entitle Plaintiff to the paym ent of 20 17 bonuses. Defendant argues that Plaintiff entered into subsequent agreem ents pertaining to his AIP and LTI bonuses. Those agreem ents were entered into in Illinois. 7 paym ent of his 20 17 LTI and AIP bonuses. Accordingly, Plaintiff entered into and executed that agreem ent in Illinois. According to Plaintiff’s com plaint, under the alleged oral contract, he would rem ain with the Com pany, resign at a later convenient date, and assist in his replacem ent’s transition. Plaintiff perform ed these prom ises entirely in Illinois. No part of the contract was perform ed in New J ersey. Sim ilarly, the alleged breach of the oral contract—the sam e failure to pay bonuses— occurred in Illinois. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of transfer to the Northern District of Illinois where the m ajority part of events and om issions from which Plaintiff’s claim s arise, took place. It follows that the heart of Plaintiff’s law suit, which resolves around the failure to pay bonuses allegedly owed to Plaintiff, is the Northern District of Illinois, where Plaintiff was em ployed between 20 14 and 20 17. McNulty v. J .H. Miles and Co., 913 F. Supp. 2d 112, 119 (D.N.J . 20 12) (finding where plaintiff’s claim s arose outside of New J ersey, this factor “weighs heavily in favor of transfer”). 3. Convenience of the Parties and W itnesses & Location of Books and Records In its opposition to transfer Plaintiff contends that Defendant is sim ply attem pting to shift any inconvenience in litigating in this venue to Plaintiff. To be sure, under the circum stances in this case, either forum would create som e type of inconvenience for either party, and “[t]ransfer is not about shifting inconvenience from the party being sued to the party suing.” Quintiles IMS Inc. v. Veeva Sys., Inc., No. CV 17-177, 20 17 WL 2766166, at *5 (D.N.J . J une 23, 20 17). In considering the “convenience of the parties” district courts should focus on the relative physical and financial condition of the parties. See J um ara, 55 F.3d at 879. 8 Plaintiff represents that he is just on e individual while Defendant is a global corporation—one that conducts business in the State of New J ersey, and derives revenue from its products sold here. As such, Defendant’s resources are vast, while Plaintiff has m ore lim ited finances and resources to litigate this case in Illinois. In his declaration, Plaintiff avers that he has “no counsel in the Northern District of Illinois and [he] no longer ha[s] any ties to the State of Illinois.” (Hassett Decl. ¶ 8). Meanwhile, he argues Defendant’s outside counsel, who practices in New J ersey, m aintains a New York office. In sum , Plaintiff claims that the transfer of this case would cause him m ore hardship. (Id. at ¶ 9). Defendant argues that Plaintiff, as evidenced by his docum ented com pensation, is a wealthy individual whose burden in travelling to Illinois, if necessary, would be de m inim is. While Plaintiff m ay, in fact, be well off, and m aintain a high position in a large corporation as of date, the Court acknowledges that litigating in Illinois will weigh m ore heavily on him . Therefore, the convenience of the parties weighs against transfer. Next, Defendant subm its that key em ployee witnesses and docum ents relevant to the proofs in this litigation are present in Illinois. Notably, Mr. Shattock rem ains em ployed and living in Illinois, along with other potential em ployee witnesses. Though these witnesses are central to the issues presented, “[Defendant] has not shown the unavailability of these witnesses in New J ersey. There is no indication that ‘any witnesses would be unable or unwilling to travel to [this District], which is the sole relevant consideration for this factor.’” MaxLite, Inc. v. ATG Elecs., Inc., 193 F. Supp. 3d 371, 394 (D.N.J . 20 16) (citing J um ara, 55 F.3d at 879). Plaintiff nam es three past executive em ployees, who would testify, that do not reside in Illinois. Two of these individuals reside in New York (Hassett Decl. ¶ 10 ); and the third, resides in California. 9 While New J ersey appears m ore convenient, if not just as convenient, for these nonparty witnesses, Plaintiff also fails to represent that his witnesses are only available in the New J ersey forum . Sim ilarly, the fact that the docum ents pertinent to the case are located in Illinois, albeit true, is inapposite, as they could easily be produced “in the age of electronic discovery.” Id.; see also J um ara, 55 F.3d at 879 (lim iting convivence of location of books and records “to the extent that the files could not be produced in the alternative forum ”). Therefore, with regard to witness convivence and location of records, the Court finds that neither forum is m ore convenient than the other. As to transfer, these factors are neutral. B. Pu blic In te re s ts Defendants argue that the public interest factors favor transfer because the Northern District of Illinois (1) “is significantly less congested than the District of New J ersey” (2) “has a significant local interest in the case,” and (3) is the court that is m ost fam iliar with the applicable law of the case. 1. Court Congestion and Adm inistrative Difficulties It is clear that both Districts have large civil dockets. (Def. Brf. [Dkt No. 6-1] at 9). This District, however, is m ore “congested” than the Northern District of Illinois to the extent that the District of New J ersey has m ore pending cases than the Northern District of Illinois. “For the 12-m onth period ending Decem ber 31, 20 18, the total num ber of cases pending in the District of New J ersey was 11,210 , com pared with 8,0 87 for the sam e period in the Northern District of Illinois.” (Def. Brf. [Dkt. No. 6-1] at 9-10 (citing U.S. COURTS, U.S. DISTRICT COURTS– M EDIAN TIME I NTERVALS FROM F ILING TO DISPOSITION OF CIVIL CASES TERMINATED, BY D ISTRICT AND M ETHOD OF D ISPOSITION , D URING THE 12- M ONTH P ERIOD E NDING DECEMBER 31, 20 18)). Still, this District has a shorter disposition 10 rate for civil cases. (Pl. Brf. at 13). “For the 12-m onth period ending March 31, 20 19, the m edian time interval from filing to disposition in civil cases in the District of New J ersey was only 5.1 m onths. In the Northern District of Illinois, for the sam e tim e period, the m edian time interval from filing to disposition in civil cases was 7.9 m onths.” (Id. (citing U.S. DISTRICT COURTS – COMBINED CIVIL AND CRIMINAL F EDERAL COURT M ANAGEMENT STATISTICS (M ARCH 31, 20 19))). Therefore, Court congestion is neutral to transfer, and the parties do not further argue that either court will experience any adm inistrative difficulties. 2. Local Interest in Resolving Local Controversies Illinois’ local interest in resolving this controversy is very apparent. Defendant is a corporation headquartered in Chicago and Plaintiff asserts a statutory claim under Illinois law. Defendant further contends that “[Plaintiff] worked throughout his em ploym ent in Chicago and his claim s don’t fall within the scope of New J ersey laws and, in turn, New J ersey has no local interest in resolving this controversy.” (Def. Brf. [Dkt. No. 6-1] at 10 ). In contrast, Plaintiff argues that Defendant reached into the State of New J ersey to recruit him , “and m ade prom ises to him in the Letter Agreem ent that it is now refusing to honor.” (Pl. Brf at 14). The Court cannot find that New J ersey has “no” interest in this case, as not only did Defendant recruit Plaintiff from New J ersey but Defendant was com pensating Plaintiff who was paying New J ersey taxes on those wages and bonuses earned. At oral argum ent, Plaintiff further reasoned that New J ersey has an interest in this case, as it has an interest in providing its residents, who work out of state, with a forum to resolve em ploym ent disputes. Nonetheless, Illinois m aintains a greater interest in rem oving this controversy. Within the United States, Plaintiff worked exclusively out of Illinois, where he m aintained an apartm ent, and where Defendant’s 11 principal place of business is located. The m ajority of Plaintiff’s claim s arise out of an alleged oral contract entered into and executed in Illinois, and all of Plaintiff’s claim s center on the failure to pay plaintiff certain bones, which occurred in Illinois. Furtherm ore, now Plaintiff brings claim s under that state’s law. Sim ply put, New J ersey is not the state in which the “locus of the m ajority of the relevant conduct” took place. See Ferratex, Inc. v. U.S. Sewer & Drain, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 3d 432, 442 (D.N.J . 20 15) (“As the agreem ents here transpired prim arily in New J ersey and not in Pennsylvania, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has little local interest in adjudicating this dispute despite the Pennsylvania residencies of Defendants.” (em phasis added)). Thus, the Court finds Illinois has a greater local interest in the resolution of this m atter, despite Plaintiff’s residence in this district. 3. Law of the Case Here, there is a dispute regarding what state law is applicable to Plaintiff’s claim s. Specifically, Plaintiff does not concede that Illinois law will apply to all of his claim s— apart from his statutory claim —and argues that applying the law of a different state regularly occurs in federal Court. Quintiles IMS Inc. v. Veeva Sys., Inc., No. CV 17-177 (CCC), 20 17 WL 2766166, at *6 (D.N.J . J une 23, 20 17) (“[T]he parties disagree whether New J ersey or California law will ultim ately apply in the case, but it m akes little difference, as a federal judge in either state can apply the law equally.”). Under the circum stances, the Court finds that despite which state law applies, this factor has little weight. See Saland Stacy Corp. v. Freeney, No. CIV.A. 11-3439, 20 12 WL 5451522, at *7 (D.N.J . Nov. 5, 20 12) (“[Defendant] argues that it will be easier for California courts to apply California law, but federal courts are accustom ed to applying the law of various states, and this factor has little weight.”). 12 IV. Conclusion In sum , the Court finds that the Northern District of Illinois is the district in which the substantial events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claim arose, and the district with the greater interest in resolving this case. Though Plaintiff m ay be inconvenienced in travelling to Illinois, to an extent, this Court has previously acknowledged that the “fact that Defendant has substantially m ore resources than Plaintiffs should not be the sole reason for refusing a transfer.” Santi v. Nat'l Bus. Records Mgm t., LLC, 722 F. Supp. 2d 60 2, 60 8 (D.N.J . 20 10 ) (citing Nat'l Mortgage Network, Inc. v. Hom e Equity Ctrs., Inc., 683 F. Supp. 116, 119 (E.D. Pa. 1988)). Moreover, like in Santi, and under the circum stances of this particular case, New J ersey has little connection to Plaintiff’s cause of action other than the fact that it is Plaintiff’s state of residence. See McNulty, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 124. To reiterate, Plaintiff was em ployed by Defendant at its headquarters in Illinois, Plaintiff reported to the CEO in Illinois (who rem ains in Illinois), perform ed under his contract(s) in Illinois; and furtherm ore, all relevant conversations and, im portantly, any failure to pay Plaintiff his bonuses occurred in Illinois. Therefore, considering all of the relevant private and public interest factors, the Court finds that the convenience of the parties and interest of justice weighs in favor of transferring this case to the Northern District of Illinois. For these reasons, the Court will grant Defendant’s Motion to Transfer [Dkt. No. 6]. Accordingly, because Defendant's Motion to Transfer this case to the Northern District of Illinois will be granted, the Court declines to decide “any other issues presented in the m otion to dism iss, which should be decided by the transferee court.” Gianakis v. Hilton Tucson El Conquistador Golf and Tennis Resort, No. 12– 4268, 20 12 WL 5250 463, at *4 (D.N.J . Oct. 22, 20 12). Therefore, the Court will refer the pending 13 Motion to Dism iss [Dkt. No. 7] under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) to the transferee court. See McNulty, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 124. An appropriate Order shall follow. Dated: Decem ber 18, 20 19 _ _ _ _ / s/ J oseph H. Rodriguez_ _ _ _ _ _ _ J OSEPH H. RODRIGUEZ United States District J udge 14
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