Hampton v. County Of Cook et al, No. 1:2018cv06346 - Document 160 (N.D. Ill. 2020)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 10/31/2020: For the reasons set forth in the attached Opinion and Order, defendant Steinke is dismissed from Counts I and IV. Defendant Steinke's motion for summa ry judgement (Doc. 127) is denied. Defendants County of Cook, Bouziotis, and McDonough's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 131) is granted with respect to the denial of medical care claim and denied with respect to the remaining claims. Mailed notice (cn).
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Hampton v. County Of Cook et al Doc. 160 Case: 1:18-cv-06346 Document #: 160 Filed: 10/31/20 Page 1 of 13 PageID #:2238 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION MARCUS HAMPTON, Plaintif, v. COUNTY OF COOK, ALEXANDRA BOUZIOTIS, CHRISTOPHER MCDONOUGH, BRUCE STEINKE, Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. 18 C 6346 Judge Robert W. Gettleman MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER Plaintif Marcus Hampton brought a ive count complaint against the County of Cook, Oicer Alexandra Bouziotis, Oicer Christopher McDonough, and Oicer Bruce Steinke, alleging failure to provide medical care under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I), unlawful pretrial detention under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count II), indemniication (Count III), malicious prosecution under state law (Count IV), and intentional inliction of emotional distress (Count V).1 On January 21, 2020, the Court dismissed Count V. (Doc. 95). Defendants County of Cook, Oicer Bouziotis, and Oicer McDonough have moved for summary judgment on the remaining counts. Defendant Steinke iled a separate motion for summary judgment. For the reasons discussed below, defendant Steinke’s motion (Doc. 127) is denied, and defendants County of Cook, Bouziotis, and McDonough’s motion (Doc. 131) is denied in part and granted in part. Plaintif states that he is proceeding against defendant Steinke only on the unlawful pretrial detention claim (Count II) and stipulates to the dismissal of all other Counts against defendant Steinke. 1 1 Dockets.Justia.com Case: 1:18-cv-06346 Document #: 160 Filed: 10/31/20 Page 2 of 13 PageID #:2239 BACKGROUND 1) Local Rule 56.1 As a preliminary matter, plaintif failed to include a statement of facts section in his response briefs, electing instead to leave it to the court to sift through the Local Rule 56.1 statements, and the underlying exhibits, to determine the factual background and sequence of relevant events. Courts in this district have repeatedly informed litigants that a Local Rule 56.1 statement of facts is not a substitute for a statement of facts section contained in a supporting memorandum of law. See e.g., FirstMerit Bank, N.A. v. 2200 Ashland, LLC, No. 12 C 572, 2014 WL 6065817 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2014); Cleveland v. Prairie State College, 208 F.Supp.2d 967, 972-73 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Duchossois Indus. v. Crawford & Co., No. 99 C 3766, 2001 WL 59031 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 2001) (“Local Rule 56.1 statements are not intended to be substitutes for a statement of facts section in a memorandum of law. Rather, their purpose is to assist the court in identifying those material, uncontested facts in the record that entitled the movant to summary judgment.”). Plaintif’s briefs assume the court is as familiar with the underlying events as the authors, jumping right into legal arguments without even a cursory explanation of the case. More troubling is plaintif’s failure to cite to his Local Rule 56.1 statement of facts in his response briefs. Plaintif makes statements about the record and events, including the content of deposition testimony and radio transmissions, without citing to his Local Rule 56.1 statement of facts. his failure puts an undue burden on the court to sift through mounds of paper to determine whether the record supports plaintif’s characterization of events. he Seventh Circuit has “consistently upheld district judges’ discretion to require strict compliance with Local Rule 56.1.” Flint v. City of Belvidere, 791 F.3d 764, 767 (7th Cir. 2015). Consequently, the court 2 Case: 1:18-cv-06346 Document #: 160 Filed: 10/31/20 Page 3 of 13 PageID #:2240 will consider only plaintif’s factual assertions to the extent they are described in plaintif’s Local Rule 56.1 statement of facts and supported by the record. 2) Facts for Summary Judgment On June 18, 2016, plaintif was driving his girlfriend’s car in Chicago Heights, Illinois. Plaintif’s friend, Abagail Green, was in the passenger seat. At approximately 11:00 p.m., plaintif was pulled over by Lieutenant Jackson of the Cook County Sherif’s Police Department for failing to have his headlights on. According to defendants, as Jackson approached plaintif’s vehicle, Jackson noticed the passenger make movements under her seat.2 Jackson asked plaintif for his license and registration at which point plaintif stated that his driver’s license was revoked. Plaintif also stated that he was driving to pick up food so he could take his medication. Jackson placed plaintif under arrest and put him in a squad car. At some point, Oicers Steinke, Bouziotis, and McDonough arrived at the scene. he oicers searched the vehicle and found a black box under the passenger seat containing a loaded handgun, a scale, and clear plastic wrap containing cannabis. he oicers then placed Green under arrest as well. According to plaintif, he began to experience chest pain and dizziness while waiting in the squad car. Plaintif maintains that he informed the oicers that he sufered from heart issues, end stage renal failure, and needed his medication. Green further testiied that she told the oicers that plaintif needed medical help and needed his medication. he last thing plaintif clearly remembers is sitting in the back of the squad car. At 11:35 p.m., Bouziotis informed dispatch that she and plaintif were leaving the scene. he parties contest whether Green and plaintif were transported in the same vehicle. Green testiied that they were transported together, while McDonough testiied that they were 2 Green maintains that she had a cup of water that she placed on the loor of the car when pulled over. 3 Case: 1:18-cv-06346 Document #: 160 Filed: 10/31/20 Page 4 of 13 PageID #:2241 transported separately. Green stated that they stopped at the Chicago Heights Police Department before heading to the Sixth District lockup located in the basement of Markham Courthouse.3 By the time they arrived at Markham Courthouse, plaintif could not walk and needed assistance. At 12:20 a.m., oicers attempted to take plaintif’s statement confessing to possessing the handgun and marijuana. According to Green, plaintif’s condition had deteriorated to the point that he was incoherent and had his head down on the table. Green saw a male oicer put a pen in plaintif’s hand and move it across a sheet of paper. Plaintif claims that the oicers forced him to sign a statement he did not give, that the signature on the statement is not his, and that the signature and initials match Oicer McDonough’s handwriting. Plaintif further claims that the oicers involved denied medical attention until plaintif agreed to sign a statement. At 12:35 a.m., McDonough requested an ambulance, stating that plaintif was feeling faint and could not walk. Paramedics worked on plaintif for nineteen minutes before leaving for the hospital. he paramedics’ records indicate that plaintif’s blood pressure had risen to 180/112. At the hospital, plaintif had surgery on his heart valves. he Cook County State’s Attorney’s Oice charged plaintif with several crimes, including aggravated unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon and possession of cannabis.4 After being discharged from the hospital on June 20, 2016, Hampton was placed into custody at Cook County Jail. He was subsequently released on electronic monitoring on November 3, 2016. Plaintif was removed from electronic monitoring on released on an “I-Bond” on January 18, 2017. Defendants appear to contest this assertion. Plaintif notes that it takes about 10-15 minutes to drive from the scene of the arrest to Markham Courthouse. he parties left the scene at 11:35 p.m. and did not arrive until 12:07 a.m. 4 Defendants state that plaintif was charged with aggravated unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, possession of cannabis, and driving on a suspended license. In support, Defendants point to the arrest report which lists all three ofenses. Plaintif states that he was charged only with irearm and gun charges, and points to the criminal complaint and indictment. Upon the court’s own review of the record, it appears that plaintif was charged only with the irearm and cannabis ofenses. 3 4 Case: 1:18-cv-06346 Document #: 160 Filed: 10/31/20 Page 5 of 13 PageID #:2242 On November 7, 2017, the state court held a hearing on plaintif’s motion to suppress certain evidence. hat motion was denied. Plaintif iled an additional motion to suppress his statement. he state court granted that motion on June 11, 2018, stating: I ind that after [Bouziotis] read [plaintif’s] Miranda rights his condition worsened. He talked about being light-headed. He was so bad the oicer on her own called the ambulance. And after she called the ambulance, that is when the defendant gave the statement. I don’t ind this to be a voluntary statement, but I do believe the oicer and I think the oicer was very very credible. Motion to suppress will be granted. 5 One June 21, 2018, the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Oice dropped the charges against plaintif. Plaintif iled suit against Oicer Bouziotis, County of Cook, and unknown oicers on September 18, 2018. On September 5, 2019, and after taking some discovery, plaintif amended his complaint to add McDonough and Steinke as a party. Steinke admits that he was not disclosed as a possible witness until December 14, 2018. Plaintif claims that McDonough was not disclosed as a possible witness until February 4, 2019—a claim defendants dispute. he parties then iled the instant motions for summary judgment. LEGAL STANDARD Summary judgment is proper where there is “no dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). he party seeking summary judgment has the burden of establishing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In determining In the underlying state court case, defendant Bouziotis claimed that she called the ambulance. She testiied to this efect at the motion to suppress hearing. Defendants now admit, and a recording of the radio transmission indicates, that defendant McDonough called the ambulance. he radio transmission was not disclosed to plaintif in the underlying state court case. 5 5 Case: 1:18-cv-06346 Document #: 160 Filed: 10/31/20 Page 6 of 13 PageID #:2243 whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must construe all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See CTL ex rel. Trebatosky v. Ashland Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 2014). But the nonmovant “is only entitled to the beneit of inferences supported by admissible evidence, not those ‘supported only by speculation or conjecture.’” Grant v. Trus. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2017). DISCUSSION 1) Statute of Limitations Both motions seek summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. Speciically, defendants argue that the following claims are time-barred: (1) the denial of medical care claim under § 1983 against all defendants; (2) the unlawful pretrial detention claim under § 1983 against McDonough and Steinke; and (3) the malicious prosecution claim against McDonough. A. Section 1983 Claims he statute of limitations period for § 1983 claims is two-years. Owens v. Evans, 878 F.3d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 2017). Defendants contend that the denial of medical care claim accrued on June 19, 2016, when the constitutional violation was complete. See, Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). According to defendants, the limitations period expired two years later on June 19, 2018. Plaintif iled his complaint on September 18, 2018. Consequently, defendants argue that plaintif’s denial of medical care claim is untimely for all defendants. For the unlawful pretrial detention claim, defendants argue that the claim accrued when plaintif’s detention ended—here, when plaintif was released from Cook County Jail on November 3, 2016, or when he was released from electronic monitoring on January 18, 2017. According to defendants, the latest the claim expired was on January 18, 2019. Plaintif did not 6 Case: 1:18-cv-06346 Document #: 160 Filed: 10/31/20 Page 7 of 13 PageID #:2244 add defendants McDonough and Steinke until September 5, 2019. hus, defendants argue that the unlawful pretrial detention claim is untimely as to those two defendants. Plaintif counters that he could not have brought either the unlawful pretrial detention claim or the denial of medical care claim during the pendency of his criminal proceedings because they were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Under Heck, a § 1983 claim that implicates the validity of an underlying criminal proceeding cannot accrue until the detention or proceeding terminates in the accused’s favor. Id.; see also Savory v. Cannon, 947 F.3d 409, 423 (7th Cir. 2020). Plaintif’s theory is that defendants denied him medical care in order to obtain a false confession, and that the false confession invalidated any probable cause to detain him pretrial. he court agrees that plaintif’s unlawful pretrial detention claim was Heck-barred until the underlying criminal proceedings terminated. Because success on the unlawful pretrial detention claim would be incompatible with a conviction on the charges for which plaintif was arrested, detained, and prosecuted, “there is no logical way to reconcile the claim[s] with a valid conviction.” Culp v. Flores, 454 F.Supp.3d 764 (citing Savory, 947 F.3d at 417); see also, Serrano v. Guevara, No. 17 C 2869, 2020 WL 3000284, at *18 (N.D. Ill. June 4, 2020)). Consequently, plaintif’s unlawful pretrial detention claim did not accrue until June 21, 2018— the day he received a favorable termination. Plaintif iled his complaint on September 18, 2018. He amended his complaint to add Steinke and McDonough on September 5, 2019. His unlawful pretrial detention claim is timely as to all defendants. However, plaintif’s denial of medical care claim was not Heck-barred because it was suiciently distinct from the underlying conviction. Although plaintif attempts to tie his allegedly false confession to defendants’ motive to deny medical care, plaintif’s claim for denial 7 Case: 1:18-cv-06346 Document #: 160 Filed: 10/31/20 Page 8 of 13 PageID #:2245 of medical care is independent of the criminal charges about which he complains. Plaintif could have succeeded on his denial of medical care claim without implicating the validity of the underlying criminal proceedings.6 Consequently, that claim accrued on June 19, 2016, when the alleged constitutional violation was complete. he limitations period expired two years later on June 19, 2018. Plaintif iled his complaint three months after the limitations period expired. His denial of medical care claim is thus untimely. B. Malicious prosecution he statute of limitations for a malicious prosecution claim is one year. 745 ILCS 10/8101. A malicious prosecution claim generally accrues once the criminal proceedings are terminated in the plaintif’s favor. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489 (1994). Here, plaintif’s case was dismissed on June 21, 2018. He iled his original complaint three months later on September 18, 2018. Defendants argue that the malicious prosecution claim is untimely against defendant McDonough because McDonough was added to the case in September of 2019—three months after the limitations period expired. Plaintif responds that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled based on the discovery rule and because defendants actively concealed McDonough’s identity. See U.S. v. Norwood, 602 F.3d 830, 837 (7th Cir. 2010) (“he discovery rule starts the statute of limitations running only when the plaintif learns that he’s been injured and by whom.”); American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Plunkett, 14 N.E.3d 676, 681 (Ill. App. 2014) (“Equitable tolling of a statute of limitations may be appropriate if the defendant has actively misled the plaintif….”). Plaintif notes that the police reports did not identify McDonough’s involvement in plaintif’s arrest or interrogation. Further, plaintif argues that he could not remember all of the oicers present 6 Of course, plaintif may ofer evidence of defendant’s lack of medical care to support his claim of a false confession. 8 Case: 1:18-cv-06346 Document #: 160 Filed: 10/31/20 Page 9 of 13 PageID #:2246 because he was in and out of consciousness on the night in question, and that he was otherwise diligent in identifying the participating oicers. See Plunkett, 14 N.E.3d at 681 (extraordinary barriers warranting equitable tolling include situations where the plaintif could not learn the identity of the proper defendants through the exercise of due diligence). Finally, plaintif notes that McDonough was not identiied until defendants answered plaintif’s interrogatories on February 4, 2019, and that plaintif added McDonough as a party several months later. Defendants counter that the discovery rule does not apply because plaintif was aware of his injury as it occurred and because a document in plaintif’s underlying criminal case referenced McDonough. Based on the record, the court inds that equitable tolling is appropriate. he statute of limitations on the malicious prosecution claim did not begin to run until McDonough was disclosed to plaintif on February 4, 2019. His malicious prosecution claim is timely. 2) Unlawful Pretrial Detention Unlawful pretrial detention claims are governed by the Fourth Amendment. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir. 2019). In Manuel v. City of Joliet, the Supreme Court clariied that a claim for wrongful pretrial detention rests on the fundamental principle that pretrial detention is a “seizure,” both before legal process and after, and is justiied only by probable cause. 137 S.Ct. 911, 920 (2017). Wrongful pretrial detention “can happen when the police hold someone without any reason before the formal onset of a criminal proceeding. But it can also occur when the legal process itself goes wrong—when, for example, a judge’s probable cause determination is predicated solely on a police oicer’s false statements.” Id. at 918-19. he existence of probable cause defeats a claim for unlawful detention. Probable cause exists 9 Case: 1:18-cv-06346 Document #: 160 Filed: 10/31/20 Page 10 of 13 PageID #:2247 when the oicer reasonably believes that the individual has committed or is about to commit a crime. Holmes v. Vill. of Hofman Estates, 511 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2007). Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because they had probable cause to arrest plaintif. Probable cause existed for the arrest, defendants claim, because plaintif was driving with a revoked license. Defendants further argue that a grand jury indicted plaintif on ten separate counts, indicating probable cause existed for the arrest. Plaintif’s arguments in response are somewhat unclear. Plaintif repeatedly states that he is not contesting the initial stop or the arrest; he is contesting only the prolonged detention based on the irearm and cannabis charges.7 According the plaintif, the only probable cause tying plaintif to the irearm and the cannabis was his false confession. Plaintif argues that there was no other basis connecting plaintif to those items because the vehicle was not his, he had never driven it before, and there was another passenger in the vehicle. he court agrees with defendants that there was probable cause to arrest and detain plaintif for driving with a revoked license. However, the record indicates that plaintif was not charged with that ofense. Plaintif was charged only with irearm and cannabis charges, and those charges were the sole basis for plaintif’s ive-month detention and subsequent electronic monitoring. he record further indicates that there were few facts connecting plaintif to those items, other than his confession. Defendants thus conlate probable cause for the arresting ofense of driving with a revoked license, and probable cause for detention based on the irearm and cannabis charges. Probable cause for the former says little about probable cause for the latter. Further, defendants’ arguments regarding the validity of the indictment—which was based Plaintif does not identify the prolonged detention. It is unclear to the court if plaintif merely means the time at the Markham Courthouse before plaintif went to the hospital, or plaintif’s time in Cook County Jail after being discharge from the hospital. he court assumes the latter. 7 10 Case: 1:18-cv-06346 Document #: 160 Filed: 10/31/20 Page 11 of 13 PageID #:2248 on plaintif’s allegedly false confession—are similarly unavailing. See Manuel, 137 S.Ct. at 91819. his case presents the precise scenario articulated in Manuel in which the legal process itself goes wrong. he indictment cannot act as a bar to plaintif’s claim. Based on the foregoing record, a reasonable jury could conclude that defendants lacked probable cause to detain plaintif for the irearm and drug charges. Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 3) Malicious Prosecution Under Illinois law, a malicious prosecution claim requires a plaintif to establish: “(1) the commencement or continuation of an original criminal or civil judicial proceeding by the defendant; (2) the termination of the proceeding in favor of the plaintif; (3) the absence of probable cause for such proceedings; (4) the presence of malice; and (5) damages resulting to the plaintif.” Holland v. City of Chicago, 643 F.3d 248, 254 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Swick v. Liautaud, 662 N.E.2d 1238, 1234 (1996)). For purposes of a malicious prosecution claim, probable cause exists where the facts “would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to believe or to entertain an honest and sound suspicion that the accused committed the ofense charged.” Williams v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 749, 759 (7th Cir. 2013). he court considers whether probable cause for the prosecution existed as of the iling of the charging document, not at the time of arrest. Holland, 643 F.3d at 254. Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because: (1) plaintif sued only police oicers, and police oicers don’t prosecute criminal cases; (2) the proceedings did not terminate in plaintif’s favor in a manner indicative of innocence; (3) there was probable cause to arrest plaintif; and (4) plaintif cannot demonstrate malice. 11 Case: 1:18-cv-06346 Document #: 160 Filed: 10/31/20 Page 12 of 13 PageID #:2249 Although generally “the State’s Attorney, not the police, prosecutes a criminal action,” Reed v. City of Chicago, 77 F.3d 1049, 1053 (7th Cir. 1996), liability may extend to anyone, including police oicers, if they played a “signiicant role” in causing the prosecution, Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 131 N.E.3d 488, 498 (Ill. 2019). Defendants play a signiicant role when they “improperly exerted pressure on the prosecutor, knowingly provided misinformation to him or her, concealed exculpatory evidence, or otherwise engaged in wrongful bad-faith conduct instrumental in the initiation of the prosecution.” Id. at 500 (citations omitted). A jury could reasonably ind that such is the case here, given defendants’ active involvement in soliciting plaintif’s false confession. For the second element, plaintif received a favorable termination when his charges were dismissed. he Illinois Supreme Court has held that, except in limited circumstances, a nolle pros is considered a termination in favor of the accused. Swick v. Liautaud, 662 N.E.2d 1238, 1243 (1996). hose exceptions include, “when the nolle prosequi is the result of an agreement or compromise with the accused, misconduct on the part of the accused for the purpose of preventing trial, mercy requested or accepted by the accused, …or the impossibility or impracticality of bringing the accused to trial.” Id. None of those exceptions are present here. As for probable cause, courts consider whether probable cause existed at the time of charging, not at the time of arrest. hus, defendants’ arguments regarding probable cause at the time of arrest (for an ofense not charged) are inapposite. Defendants have provided no arguments suggesting that they had probable cause to charge plaintif for the irearm and cannabis ofenses. Holland, 643 F.3d at 254. In fact, it appears that the only probable cause stems from plaintif’s allegedly false statement. Finally, “malice can be inferred when a 12 Case: 1:18-cv-06346 Document #: 160 Filed: 10/31/20 Page 13 of 13 PageID #:2250 defendant lacks probable cause and the circumstances indicate a lack of good faith.” Id. at 255. Again, a reasonable jury could ind malice based on the record. For the foregoing reasons, a jury could ind for plaintif on the malicious prosecution claim. Plaintif’s claim survives summary judgment. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, defendant Steinke is dismissed from Counts I and IV. Defendant Steinke’s motion for summary judgement (Doc. 127) is denied. Defendants County of Cook, Bouziotis, and McDonough’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 131) is granted with respect to the denial of medical care claim and denied with respect to the remaining claims. ENTER: October 31, 2020 __________________________________________ Robert W. Gettleman United States District Judge 13
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