Sroga v. Hondzinski et al, No. 1:2016cv05796 - Document 118 (N.D. Ill. 2018)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: For the reasons stated in the attached order, Defendant Officer's Motion to Dismiss Count I is denied. The City's Motion to Dismiss Count III is granted. Count III is dismissed with prejudice. Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. Defendants to answer or otherwise plead on or before 7/20/18. Status hearing set for 8/1/18 at 09:00 AM. Signed by the Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 6/21/2018:Mailed notice(maf)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION KEVIN SROGA, Plaintiff, Case No. 16 C 5796 v. Judge Harry D. Leinenweber JENNIFER HONDZINSKI, et al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER The Plaintiff, a “prolific civil litigant,” originally filed an eleven-count pro se Complaint against certain Chicago police, certain sanitation workers, and a Monell claim against the City itself. In a lengthy Memorandum Opinion, the Court exhaustively recounted the facts pled in the original Complaint. The Opinion including dismissed the Monell without claim. prejudice Because most the of part the of case the case remaining included an excessive force case against certain of the Defendant Officers, represent Plaintiff. the Court appointed an attorney to This resulted in a three-count Amended Complaint: Count I against individual city police officers for the illegal seizure of his motor vehicle; Count II against certain city police officers for excessive force; and Count III against the City of Chicago under Monell. The individual officers have moved to dismiss Count I and the City of Chicago has moved to dismiss Count III. For the reasons stated herein the Court denies the Motion to Dismiss Count I but dismisses Count III with prejudice. I. BACKGROUND Since the Court presumes familiarity with the facts as set forth in the Court’s previous opinion, the Court will limit the facts to the bare minimum. On June 18, 2014, the Plaintiff’s vehicle, a seventeen-year-old Ford Crown Victoria, was parked on a Chicago street in the vicinity of 1240 N. Homan Avenue. car did not registration have license renewal was plates on hold comply with emissions testing. because, for as it Plaintiff’s turned The out, failure to In lieu of license plates the Plaintiff had affixed on the inside of a rear window a Seven-Day Permit issued by the Illinois Secretary of State. On Officers the morning made Confidential a VIN tow of June 18, request Check after 2014, for one of Plaintiff’s observing license plates and with the VIN covered. the the Defendant vehicle vehicle for a without A Confidential VIN Check is a procedure utilized by the Chicago Police “to verify that the vehicle subject to the check has (1) a VIN number and (2) verify that essential parts are not stolen.” Complaint, para. 26.) (Original A tow truck was dispatched in response to the Confidential VIN Check request. - 2 - At noon, when Plaintiff arrived at the scene, he found a tow truck parked in front of his vehicle preparing to tow it. vehicle not be towed. Plaintiff requested that the A short time later a city police vehicle arrived at the scene and was parked so as to prevent him from moving his car. tow operator Plaintiff’s vehicle. to One of the Defendant Officers instructed the wrap vehicle his and tow cable instructed Plaintiff refused. around the Plaintiff to front exit of his Because his vehicle was locked, an officer broke the rear passenger-side window and unlocked the car. The officers then proceeded forcibly to remove Plaintiff from the vehicle. the police He was arrested, handcuffed and removed to station. Neither the original nor the Amended Complaint expressly alleges that the car was actually towed; nevertheless it is clear that the City took possession of the vehicle. The Court previously ruled that Defendant Officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. II. MOTION TO DISMISS BY INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS Plaintiff admits that the VIN was covered and not readable from outside the vehicle. He, however, denies that the vehicle was he not licensed because had affixed a temporary permit issued by the Secretary of State to the window of his car. For this reason he denies that the vehicle was in violation of the law and towable. The Defendant - 3 - Officers argue that the Complaint does not allege that the temporary license was valid and therefore the car was towable as part of the Confidential VIN check. Plaintiff argues that the Confidential VIN Check is unconstitutional because there is no authority to tow a vehicle even if it had an obscured VIN and was not licensed. He cites Gable v. City of Chicago, No. 97 C 4872, 2001 WL 290607 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2001), which lists a number of bases for towing, including abandonment but, according to Plaintiff, none apply to this case. Defendant Officers list three statutory provisions, 625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(2)-(3), 625 ILCS 5/3-413(a)-(b), and 625 ILCS 5/3-403 which they claim justifies the towing of the vehicle. 625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(2)-(3) makes it illegal (1) “to remove, alter, deface, destroy, falsify or forge” a VIN of a vehicle; (2) and “to knowingly conceal or misrepresent the identity of a vehicle.” 625 ILCS 5/3-413(a)-(b) requires license plates to be attached to the vehicle. permits for vehicles 625 ILCS 5/3-403 limits short-term suspended under the Vehicle Emission Inspection Law to use to obtain repairs in order to bring the vehicle into compliance and to travel to and from a vehicle inspection station. Plaintiff argues that none of these statutory provisions apply. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the VIN - 4 - had been removed, altered, defaced, falsified, or forged and the mere fact Plaintiff that there admits, “concealing.” on was the some temporary windshield obstruction, could not be which considered Plaintiff also contests the applicability of the licensure requirement because the car had a temporary permit which excuses it from having to have valid licenses attached in the statutory manner. Plaintiff denies that his claim has anything to do with the temporary permit and therefore 625 ILCS 5/3-403 has no relevance. Defendant Officers respond by asserting that nowhere in the Complaint is it alleged that the temporary permit was valid. The Court believes Plaintiff has the better of the argument on Count I. The posture of the case is on a motion to dismiss, not for summary judgment. It appears to the Court that the two statutory provisions relied upon by Defendant Officers are at best arguably applicable under a rather strained interpretation of the facts alleged. If, as Plaintiff alleges, the obstruction resulted from the placement of a parking receipt it would be hard to argue that this was an attempt at concealing. With respect to the temporary permit, this is notice pleading and an allegation the car had a temporary permit affixed to the window would be sufficient to put Defendant Officers on notice that Plaintiff was relying on a valid permit. - 5 - It may turn out that the permit was indeed not valid but this is a question of fact. The Motion to Dismiss Count I is denied. III. The THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE MONELL COUNT Court dismissed the Monell count of the original Complaint on the ground that eight instances of the city towing Plaintiff’s insufficient widespread vehicles to over place pattern of the a more City than wrongful on ten-year notice conduct. of period a was pervasive, They were “too scattershot” to raise such an inference, citing Latuszkin v. City of Chicago, 250 F.3d 502, 505 (7th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff has in his Amended Complaint attempted to cure this deficiency by removing the time element and by alleging that the police have used the Confidential VIN Check for more than twenty years. This is a complete change in Plaintiff’s theory which was originally that the City police were targeting his vehicles in order to harass him. (Original Complaint, para. 25.) The resulting claim now is that the City has a policy of performing Confidential VIN checks when it finds vehicles parked on the street without license plates and with Plaintiff states is unconstitutional. obscured VINs, which However, the purpose of this policy, as the Court stated earlier, is twofold: (1) to determine ownership of the vehicle, and (2) to determine whether the vehicle or part thereof was stolen. - 6 - Plaintiff takes issue with the constitutionality of this policy which is the basis for his Monell claim. He however cites no authority indicating that this procedure is in fact unconstitutional. why it would be. It is hard to see How can ownership be determined when police encounter a locked vehicle parked in a public street without license plates and an facility to open it. obscured VIN without towing it to a Failure to license a vehicle or to operate a vehicle without licenses is a violation of the State Motor Vehicle Code 625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(2)-(3). It is difficult, if not impossible, to write a ticket without ownership information. Moreover a parked vehicle without license plates and with an obscured VIN number could reasonably be assumed to be abandoned. At most this could be argued that it is a violation of a city ordinance, which does not by itself raise constitutional issues. Here Plaintiff admits on eight previous occasions his vehicle was towed obscured because and he without parked it license on the plates. street If with nothing the else, VIN it appears that Plaintiff is a scofflaw. However, Plaintiff argues that on this occasion his vehicle was, in fact, licensed: he had obtained a temporary permit from the Secretary of State which meant that, while the vehicle had an obscured VIN number, it was legally licensed. While this may be true, as the Court agreed in the ruling on the Motion to - 7 - Dismiss Count I, nevertheless it does not fit in Plaintiff’s Monell claim which is that the City tows vehicles that have obscured VINs and no license plates. As far as the Complaint is concerned, this is the only allegation that the Confidential VIN check was attempted to be performed on an obscured VIN and a temporary permit. widespread practice. There is no evidence that this was a The Motion to Dismiss Count III is granted with prejudice. IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated herein, Defendant Officer’s Motion to Dismiss Count I is denied. Count III is granted. The City’s Motion to Dismiss Count III is dismissed with prejudice. IT IS SO ORDERED. Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge United States District Court Dated: 6/21/2018 - 8 -
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