Conwell v. Cook County et al, No. 1:2012cv10062 - Document 65 (N.D. Ill. 2014)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Ruben Castillo on 10/14/2014. (jh, )
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Conwell v. Cook County et al Doc. 65 ^a€ UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIYISION DONALD COIYWELL, Plaintiff, No. 12 C 10062 Y. Chief Judge Rub6n Castillo COOK COIINTY, et aL, Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION Ai\D ORDER Before the Court is an amended complaint filed by Donald Conwell (*Plaintiff'), apro se prisoner, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. $ 1983, naming a host of defendants located at the Cook County Jail ("the jaif'). and dismiss (R. 60, Compl.) Under 28 U.S.C. $ l9l5A, the Court must screen the complaint it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. In deterrnining whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard as when deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure l2(b)(6), accepting the PlaintifPs allegations as tue and drawing all inferences in his favor. See Vesely v. Armslist LLC,762 F.3d 661, 664 (7thCir. 2014); Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621,624 (7th Cir. 2006). To survive dismissal, a complaint must state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. .Bissessur v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trs.,58l F.3d 599,602 (7th Cir. 2009). ooA claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." /d. (quoting Ashuofi v. Iqbal,556 U.S. 662,678 (2009)). Thus, a plainfiff'omust do better than putting a few words on paper ttrat, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has happened to her that might be redressed by Dockets.Justia.com the law." Swansonv. Citibanh N.A.,614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010). Nevertheless, apro se complaint is entifled to liberal construction, oohowever inartfully pleaded." Ericksonv. Pardus, s51 U.S.89,94Q007). PROCEDURAL HISTORY This is PlaintifPs third attempt to state his claims. He originally brought this actionpro se, and after reviewing the complaint the Court recruited counsel to represent him. (R. 5, Min. Entry.) Counsel later sought to withdraw, and the Court granted his motion. (R. 8, Min. Entry.) New counsel was recruited to represent Plaintifl and counsel subsequenfly filed an amended complaint on PlaintifPs behalf.t (1d; R. 12, Compl.) After an answer was filed and various other proceedings occurred, counsel sought to withdraw, due to an apparent disagreement over the scope of counsel's representation and the stategies to be employed in this case. (See R. 46, Mot. to Withdraw; see also R. 58, Mot. for Appoint. of Counsel at 8.) The Court granted counsel's request to withdraw, and directed Plaintiffto file an amended complaint if he intended to proceed with this action. (R. 49, Min. Enty.) Plaintitrresponded by filing the present complaint. (R. 60, Compl.) RELEVAIIT FACTS In the detailed 36-page complaint, Plaintiffclaims he was subjected to a sampaign harassment by staffat the of jail during 2012 arrd2}13..2 (R. 60, Compl.) He sues more than 30 different members of the correctional staff, as well as Cook County SheriffTom Dart and I Per the Court's instructions, counsel filed a consolidated complaint that encompassed Plaintiffs claims inthis case, as well as rnCorwellv. County of Coolc, et al., No. 1:12cv10063 CN.D. Ill. filed Dec. I 8, 2012) and Conwell v. County of Cook" et al., No. I : 13cv355 (N.D. ru. filed Jan. L6,2013). (,See R. 8, Minute Entry.) 2 plaintiffis no longer at the jail, as he was tansferred to the custody of the Illinois Deparfinent of Corrections ("IDOC") in June 2014. (R. 54, Notice of Address Change.) various other jail officials. Qd. at 4-8.) Plaintiffclaims that during a prior period incarceration at the jail lrr,2007 , he was beaten by has impairments with his hands and eye. (Id. at jail guards; as a result of he is in a wheelchair and 9.) He claims that he filed a lawsuit pertaining to the beating, which was ultimately dismissed for lack of prosecution. Qd. at9-10.) He alleges that because of his prior lawsuit, as well as numerous grievances he filed during his incarceration at the jail, jail staffdeveloped an o'animosity" toward hln,. Qd. at 9.) Because of this animosity, he claims numerous jail staffpurposely allowed him to be attacked by other inmates, subjected him to incidents of excessive force, and exposed him to substandard conditions of confinement. (Id. at9-35.) He describes several discrete incidents in support of his claims, which are outlined below. In February 2012, jarl guard LieutenantN. Bowens allegedly announced in front of other inmates that Plaintiffwas a'osnitch." (Id. at t l.) Plaintiffthereafter requested to be placed in protective custody, but Lieutenant Bowens denied his request, as did Officers R. Smith and an unnamed jail guard (identified as ooJohn Doe #1"). (/d.) Plaintiffremained in the general population, and shortly thereafter was attacked by another inmate, Richard Brooks. (Id.) He claims to have suffered a fractured facial bone and other iqjuries as a result of the attack. (Id.) In March 2012, Plaintiffgot in a dispute with another jail guard, Officer Jennifer Jefferson, about his housing assignment. (Id. at 12.) Officers William Baker, Jose Tiscareno, and M. Olavarria allegedly overheard this dispute, became ffigry, and pulled Plaintiffout of his wheelchair. (Id.) He claims they choked him and kicked him in the face while he was lying on the ground. Qd. at12-13.) Officer Ramonita Perez,anotherjail guard, atlegedly stood by during this beating and did nothing to intervene, instead acting as a oolook out." (Id. at 13.) Plaintiff claims to have lost consciousness and suffered multiple injuries, including "blood clots in both eyes," bruising on his face, and severe pain in his neck and back. (Id. at 13-14.) ln October 2012, Plaintiffwas allegedly attacked by another inmate, Kevin Dawson, he was being tansported to the as jail's medical facility. (Id. at 14.) He claims jail officials previously ordered that he and Dawson be kept apart because Dawson had threatened him, but Officers Jimmy Chapman, John Malloy, Darnice Wiggins, R. Romero, and two unnamed officers (identified as o'John Does #2 and #3) failed to heed this order. Qd. at 14.) All of these Defendants allegedly stood by and watched while Dawson stabbed Plaintiffin the forearm with a knife. (Id. at 16.) Upon seeing PlaintifPs injuries, Officer Malloy allegedly commented, "Hopefully Dawson cut the vein." (1d.) Plaintiff alleges that the officers then refused to take him for medical teatuent for 45 minutes, even though the incident occurred right outside the jail's medical facility. (Id. at 1,7.) ln December 2012, Plaintiffwas tansported to an outside clinic for medical treatnent. Qd. at 17.) When his teatuent was over, ofEcers arrived to ftansport him back to the jail, but they would not allow him to ride in the jail's wheelchair-accessible van, even though the van was at the facility picking up other inmates. (Id. at 19.) The officers allegedly insisted instead that Plaintiffexit his wheelchair and ride in a squad car, which Plainfifffelt was unsafe. Qd. at 1718.) Officers Johnson and Rooney (first name unknown), and an unnamed officer ("John Doe #4"), were all present during this incident, and denied PlaintifPs repeated requests to be transported in the va.'" (Id. at 17-18.) Officer Doe #4 then car, causing Plaintiffto stike his head on the door of the tied to force Plaintiffinto the squad vehicle. (Id. at 19.) He fell to the ground and called for help, at which point the officers allegedly began beating him. (/d.) He claims he was wearing handcuffs and leg shackles at the time. (Id.) He asserts that Officer Johnson stood by laughing while the beating occurred. Qd. at20.) As a result of the beating, he claims to have suffered a bloody nose and cuts, among other iqiuries. (Id. at 19-20.) Plaintiffclaims that after he returned to the jail, Lieutenant Martinez (first narne unknown), communicated with the officers involved in the beating, and tied to cover up what had occurred by telling jail staffthat Plaintiff"had a little fall." Qd. at2l.) ln addition to Martinez, Plaintiffsaw Officers Conley, Johnson, Ervin, and Eppes-Davis (first names unknown), and requested medical care from each of them. (Id.) He alleges that they ignored him, and in the case of Officers Eppes-Davis and Ervin, "laugh[ed] and walked away." Ud. at 21.) Plaintifflater came in contact with a jail nurse, Ayeshah Toney, and explained that he had been beaten and was in need of medical treatnent, but she allegedly declined to provide him with any teatnent. (Id. at22.) He claims Nurse Toney did not like him because he previously complained about her sleeping on the job. (/d.) PlaintifPs difficulties continued, and in July 2013, he had another run-in with inmate Dawson. (/d.) Plaintiffasserts that he was receiving a breathing teatnent which required that the food slot on his cell door be propped open. Qd.) Otrrcers Begley and Koch (first names unknown) were on duty at the time, and he claims they were aware that he was supposed to be separated from Dawson. (Id.) Despite this, the officers allegedly allowed Dawson to get close enough to spit on Plaintiffthrough the opening in the about the spitting incident to Sergeant door. (/d.) Plaintifflater complained Kolnicki (first name unknown), but he merely "thought the situation was firnny." (Id. at23.) The final incident occurred in October 2013, when Plaintiffclaims Officer Begley purposely ordered him to enter the cell of a dangerous inmate, David Miller, who was being detained on murder charges. (Id. at 25.) Plaintiffclaims that he told Officer Begley he did not feel safe around this inmate, but she allegedly ignored his concerns, instead locking him inside the cell 'owith a smirk" on her face. Qd. at26.) Miller then attacked Plaintifl cutting and scratching him on the face, pulling him out of his wheelchair, and injuring his arm, back, and hrp. Qd.) He alleges that Officer Begley and Officer Bailey (first name unknown) purposely delayed in removing him from the cell to prolong the attack. (Id. at27.) He further claims that these officers, as well as Commander Hudik, Sergeant Cntz, Sergeant McGee, and Officer Ortell (first names unknown), were awaxe of his injuries from this incident but purposely delayed in sending him for medical teatuent for over two hours. Qd. at28.) In addition to these incidents of excessive force and assaults by other inmates, Plaintitr alleges that he was subjected to substandard conditions of confinemerfi. Qd. at23-24.) Specifically, he alleges that during March 2012, he was forced to live in a cell that was not handicapped accessible, which caused him to injure himself several times when he was attempting to tansfer out of his wheelchair. Qd. at24.) He further alleges that the cell had dried blood, feces, and food smeared on the walls, was excessively cold, had no hot water, and had leaking pipes, among other problems. (/d.) Finally, Plaintiffalleges that his due process rights were violated in connection with disciplinary proceedings conducted at the jail. (Id. at 29.) Among other issues, he claims that ooGeneral Order" the hearing board members routinely violate a Cook County SherifPs Office governing disciplinary proceedings. (Id. at 30-31.) ANALYSIS Because it appears Plaintiffwas a pretrial detainee during the bulk of these events, the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment would apply to a claim regarding his custody. Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467,473 (7th Cir. 2009). The governing standards are functionally equivalent, however, and ooanything that would violate the Eighth Amendment would also violate the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at475. l. Failure to Protect Plaintitrfirst alleges thatjail stafffailed to protect him from attacks by other inmates. Under the Eighth Amendment, correctional officials have a constitutional duty to protect inmates oofrom violence at the hand of othel inmatss." Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F .3d 7 63, 777 (7th Cir. 2008). Nevertheless, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has observed, ooprisons are dangerous places. Inmates get there by violent acts, and many prisoners have a propensity to commit more." oomerely Id. T\erefore, a failure-to-protect claim on knowledge of general risks of violence in a detention cannot be predicated facility." Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 913 (7th Cir. 2005). To state a claim, the plaintiffmust "allege facts sufficient to show that the defendant had actual knowledge of an impending harm easily preventable, so that a conscious, culpable refusal to prevent the harm can be inferred from the defendant's failure to prevent rt." Santiagov. Wells,599 F.3d 749,756 (7th Cir.2010). Here, taking PlaintifPs allegations as true, he alleges that Defendants Bowen, Smith, John Does #l-3, Begley, Koch, Kolnicki, and Bailey were personally aware that he was at risk of being hurt by other inmates, but purposely ignored his please for assistance, and in some instances actually exacerbated the problem by calling him a snitch or intentionally putting him with dangerous inmates. As a result he was beaten by other inmates. (R. 60, Compl. at 10-12, 14-16,22-23,25-27.) Giving Plaintiffthe inferences to which he is entitled at this stage, he has alleged a plausible claim against these defendants. 2. Excessive Force Plaintiffalso alleges incidents of excessive force. The "core requiremenf'for an excessive force claim is that the defendant ooused force not in a good-faith eflort to maintain or restore discipline, but maliciously and sadistically to cause hann." Hendricksonv. Cooper,589 F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hudsonv. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1,7 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Several factors guide the inquiry of whether an officer's use of force was legitimate or malicious, including the need for an application of force, the amount of force used, and the extent of the injury suffered by the prisoner. /d. Further, an officer who had o'a realistic opportunity to step forward and prevent a fellow officer from violating the plaintifPs rights through excessive force but failed to do so" may also be held liable. Miller v. Smith,220 F.3d 491, 495 (7th Cir. 2000). Here, the complaint can be read to allege that Plaintiffwas not resisting during either of the incidents he describes, and thatjail staffused more force than was necessary in a conscious effort to cause him pain and injury. (R. 60, Comply. at 13-74, 17-20.) Plaintiffclaims to have several physical impaimrents, and in one of the incidents, he alleges that he was wearing handcuffs and leg shackles, and was beaten while lying on the ground. Qd. at 19.) Giving him the inferences to which he is entitled at this stage, he has alleged enough to proceed against Defendants Baker, Tiscareno, Olavarri4 Perez, Chapman, Malloy, Wiggins, Romero, and John Doe #4 for excessive force. 3. Conditions of Confinement Plaintitralso comFlains about the conditions under which he was housed. (See R. 60, Compl. at23-25.) In evaluating a conditions-of-confinement claim, the Court conducts both an objective and a subjective inquiry. Farmer v. Brennan" 5l I U.S. 825,834 (1994). The objective prong inquires whether the alleged deprivation is oosufEciently serious" so that a prison official's act or omission results in oothe denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." .Id. *[T]he Constifution does not mandate comfortable prisons," Rhodes v. Chapman,452U.S.337, 349 (1981), but inmates are entitled to adequate food, clothing, heat, shelter, bedding, hygiene materials, and sanitation, Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458,463 (7th Cir. 2009); Gillis v. Litscher,468 F.3d 488,493 (7th Cir. 2006). Conditions of confinement may establish a constitutional violation in combination when each condition alone would not safisff the standard. Gillis,468 F.3d at493. On the subjective prong, the prisoner must show that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to the inmate's health or safety. Farmer,sl1 U.S. at834. This is a high standard: [C]onduct is deliberately indifferent when the official has acted in an intentional or criminally reckless manner, i.e., the defendant must have known that the plaintitr was at serious risk of being hamred and decided not to do anything to prevent that harm from occurring even though he could have easily done so. Board v. Farnham, 394 F .3d 469, 47 8 (7th Cir. 2005). As outlined above, Plaintiff alleges that he was housed in a cell with human feces, dried blood, and food smeared on the wall, had no hot water, and was subjected to excessively cold temperatures. (R. 60, Compl. at24-26.) The complaint can be plausibly read to allege that Plaintiffwas housed under these conditions for Acceping these allegafions as true, a period of at least a month. (See id. at24.) Plaintiffsatisfies the objective prong of the inquiry. See Vinning-El v. Long,482 F.3d 923,923-25 (7t1t Cir.2007) (reversing summary judgment for defendant where prisoner was deprived of basic sanitation items and incarcerated for six days in a cell in which blood and feces were smeared on the waIls, water covered the floor, and the sink andtoiletdidnotwor$; Johnsonv. Pelkcr,8gl F.2d 136,139-40 (7thCir. 1989) (prisonerstated an Eighth Amendment claim where he was incarcerated for three days in a cell that was smeared with human feces and had no running water). On the subjective prong, the complaint can be plausibly read to allege that Commander Hudik, Officer Koch, and Officer Begley were personally aware of these conditions but did nothing to remedy them despite PlaintifPs complaints. See Reedv. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 855 (7th Cir. 1999) (where inmate complained about severe deprivations but was ignored, he established a "prototypical case of deliberate indifference"). Giving Plaintitrthe inferences to which he is entitled at this stage, he has stated enough to proceed on a conditions-of-confinement claim against these Defendants. 4. Medical Care Plaintiffs complaint can also be read to allege the denial of medical care. Under the Eighth Amendment, inmates are entitled to adequate medical care. Estelle v. Gamble,429U.S. 97,104 (1976). To establish liability, a prisoner must show he had an objectively serious medical need, and the defendant acted with deliberate indif;lerence to that need. Farmer,5ll U.S. at 8341' Greeno v. Daley,4l4 F.3d 645,653 (7th Cir. 2005). A medical need is ooserious" it is one tlat a if physician has diagnosed as mandating treatnent, or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would recognize the need for a doctor's attention. Greeno,4l4F.3d at 653. A delay in providing medical treatnent can constitute deliberate indifference where it causes unnecessary pain or suf[ering. Grieveson,538 F.3d at779. For a medical professional to be held liable for deliberate indifference to an inmate's medical needs, he or she must make a decision that represents "such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment ." Jackson y. Kotter,54l F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2008). Here, Plaintiffalleges that he suffered significant injuries from the incidents outlined above, but Lieutenant Marirnez, Officer Chapman, Officer Malloy, Officer Wiggins, Officer Romero, Officers John Does #2-4, Offrcer Conley, Officer Johnson, Officer Ervin, Officer 10 Eppes-Davis, and Nurse Toney purposely delayed or refused to provide him with medical teatnent; the Complaint can be read to allege that this was done not for any legitimate reason but solely to cause him furttrer pain and suffering. (R. 60, Compl. at 74-17,20-22.) Accordingly, Plaintiffwill be permitted to proceed against these Defendants on a denial of medical care claim. Plaintiffalso lists two jail doctors, Dr. Yu and Dr. Ting (first narnes unknown), as Defendants, presumably in connection with this claim. (Id. at 7.) Dr. Ting does not appear to be mentioned in the narrative section of the complaint, and thus it is not clear how, if at all, the doctor was personally involved in these events. See Alejo v. Heller,328 F.3d 930,936 (7th Cir. 2003) ("A plaintiffbringing a civil rights action must prove that the defendant personally participated in or caused the unconstitutional actions."). Dr. Yu is mentioned only in passing; appears the doctor it teated Plaintifffollowing one of the attracks by another inmate. (R. 60, Compl. at28.) Plaintiffclearly disagrees with the doctor's assessment, but a mere disagreement over the proper course of teatnent does not give rise to a constifutional claim. Greeno,4l4 F.3d at 653. Nor does incompetence, negligence, or even medical malpractice, because oothe Eighttt Amendment does not codiff corlmon law torts." Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742,751 (7th Cir. 2011). Plaintiffhas not alleged circumstances from which the Court could plausibly infer that Dr. Yu made "such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment." Jacl$on,541 F.3d at697. Accordingly, Plaintiffwill not be permitted to proceed against the doctors. 11 5. First Amendment Retaliation The complaint can also be read to tigger First Amendment concems. Specifically, Plaintiffalleges that a number of these incidents were attributable to the animosity staff developed toward him based on his prior lawsuit and grievances. (R. 60, Compl. at 9-10.) To establish a claim of retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, the plaintiffmust allege: (1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the defendant's action was motivated by the protected activrty. Gomez v. Randle,680 F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir. 2012). A prisoner has a First Amendment right to use the prison grievance process and a right of access to the courts, and cannot be punished for exercising these rights. See id.; Marshall v. Knight,445 F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2006); Higgasonv. Farley,83 F.3d 807, 810 (7th Cir. 1996). Here, Plaintiffalleges that due to his grievances and a prior lawsuit he filed, several members of the jail staffsought to retaliate against him by housing him under substandard conditions, subjecting him to excessive force, and deliberately placing him in situations where he was likely to be attacked by other inmates. (R. 60, Compl. at 9-35.) It is reasonable to presume that these types of severe deprivations might discourage a prisoner from engaging in First Amendment activrty. Giving Plaintitrthe inferences to which he is entitled at this stage, he has alleged enough to proceed further against Commander Hudik, OfEcer Koch, Officer Begley, Lieutenant Bowen, Officer Smith, Officer Bailey, Officer Baker, Officer Tiscareno, Officer Perezo Officer Chapman, Officer Malloy, Officer Wiggins, OfEcer Romero, and Officers John Does #1-4 for a violation of his First Amendment rights. t2 6. Due Process Violations Plaintitralso complains that his due process rights were violated in connection with disciplinary hearings conducted at the jail. (R. 60, Compl. at29-31.) Most of Plaintiffs allegations are of a general nature, as he purports to bring this claim on behalf of a'oclass" of otlrer inmates. (R. 60, Compl. at29.) However, as apro se litigant, Plaintiffis not permitted to represent anyone other than himself in this proceeding. See In re 315, 318-19 (7th Cir. 20ll) ("individuals are permitted to litigate IFC Credit Corp.,663 F.3d pro se, though not to represent other litigants"). Further, to the extent Plaintiffis seeking to challenge the result of a particular proceeding in which he was found gullty of a disciplinary infraction, he is barred from doing so under Heckv. Humphrey,512 U.S. 477 (1994). See Matzv. Klotka, --- F.3d ---,2014WL 4960311, at when a *ll (7th Ctr.2014) (ooUnder Heck, aplaintiffmaynotrecoverdamagesunder $ 1983 judgment in his favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of a criminal conviction or sentence that has not been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or otherwise called into question."); see also Edtvards v. Balisok,520 U.S. 641,643 (1997) (extended the holding of Heckto prison disciplinary proceedings). To the extent his allegafions survive these barriers, they fail for other reasons. His chief complaint appears to be that hearing officers routinely fail to follow a'ogeneral order" issued by the Sheriffregarding how the hearings are to be conducted. (R. 60, Compl. at 31.) However, a Section 1983 claim does not lie for violations of state or local law. See Scott v. Edinburg,346 F.3d752,760 (7thcir.2003) ("42 U.S.C. $ 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state laws or . . . departnental regulations and police practices"). He mentions other concems, including that he was denied an appeal form; that the hearing officers are not as racially diverse as the inmate population; and that the hearings are sometimes 13 conducted where other inmates can overhear. (R. 60, Compl. at29-31,.) The due process protections to which an inmate is entitled in connection with a disciplinary hearing are outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court inWolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (describing inmate's right to advance written notice of the charge, a hearing before an imFartial decision-maker, an opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence consistent with institutional safety, and a written statement of the reasons for the decision). The issues raised by Plaintiffdo not implicate any Wolffights, and the Court is not permitted to require due process protections other than those specified in WoW See White v. Ind. Parole (observing that courts may not ooadd 8d.,266F.3d759,767-68 (7th Cir. 2001) to the procedures required by Woffi" which oorepresents a balance of interests that should not be further adjusted in favor of prisoners"). For these reasons, Plaintiffwill not 7. be permitted to proceed on a due process claim. High-RankingOfficials Plaintitralso seeks to hold a number of high-ranking jail officials liable in connection with these events, including Cook County SheriffTom Dart; Jail Director Miller (fust name unknown); Jail Superintendents Reyes, Brown, and Bratlien (first names unknown); and Jail Assistant Executive Director Daniel Moreci. (See R. 60, Compl. at 4-8.) It appears he is seeking to hold these officials liable because they oversee operations at the jail, but there is no general respondeat superior liability under Section 1983. Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F .3d 672, 651 (7th Cir. 2001). These officials can only be held liable for their own misconduct, not for an act oromissionofanotherjailemployee. SeeBurksv.Raemisch,555F.3d592,594(7thcir.2009) ("Liability depends on each defendant's knowledge and actions, not on the knowledge or actions of persons they supervise."); Alejo,328 F.3d a1936 ("A plaintiffbringing a civil rights action must prove that the defendant personally participated in or caused the unconstifutional actions."). t4 There is no plausible basis in the complaint to infer that these officials participated in or were otherwise personally involved in these events, and accordingly, Plaintitrwill not be pemritted to proceed against these officials. 8. Monell Claim Giving the complaint liberal construction, it appears Plaintiffis also trying to assert a claim against Cook County ('1he County") under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,436 U.S. 658 (1978). (R. 60, Compl. at4,33-35.) To state a claim against a municipal entity under Monell, the plaintiffmust allege that he or she suflered an injury caused by the municipality's policies or customs. Monell,436 U.S. at 694. A plaintiffcan establish a policy or custom in three ways: (1) bV establishing the existence of an express policy; Q)by establishing the existence of a widespread practice that is so pennanent and well-settled that it constitutes a custom or practice; or (3) by showing that the constitutional injury was caused by aperson with final policymaking authority. Estate of Sims v. Cnty. of Bureau,506 F.3d 509, 515 (7th Cir. 2007). Here, Plaintitralleges that the County has a widespread practice of failing to properly screen, hain, and discipline its employees so as to prevent incidents of retribution for an inmate's use of the grievance process or other First Amendment activity. (R. 60, Compl. at 34.) As outlined above, Plaintiffdetails several incidents occurring on different dates and involving many diflerent jail staffin which he claims to have been mistreated because of his First Amendment activity. See Thomas v. Cook County Sheriffs Dep't,604 F.3d 293,303 (7th Cir. 2010) ("there is no clear consensus as to how frequently such conduct must occur to impose Monell liability, except that it must be more than one instance"). Giving him the inferences to which he is entitled at this stage, the Court concludes that he has alleged enough to proceed further on a claim against the County under Monell. 15 9. Request For Injunctive Relief At the end of his complaint, Plaintiffmakes reference to seeking preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against Defendants, in addition to seeking damages. (R. 60, Compl. at 36.) It is unclear exactly what type of injunctive relief he is seeking, but Plaintiffis no longer housed at the jail. (See R. 54, Notice of Change of Address.) "If a prisoner is transferred to another prison, his request for injunctive relief against officials of the fust prison is moot unless he can demonstate that he is likely to be retansferred." Higgason, 33 F.3d at 8l l. Here, Plaintiffdoes not claim, nor is there any plausible basis in the complaint to infer, that he is likely to be transferred back to the jail anytime in the near future. (See R. 60, Compl.) Accordingly, he has no claim for injunctive relief against Defendants, all of whom are located at the jail. APPOINTMENT OX' COUNSEI, Plaintitralso filed three separate motions asking for new counsel to be appointed. (R. 58, Pl.'s Mot. for Counsel; R. 59, Pl.'s Mot. for Counsel; R 63, Pl.'s Mot. for Counsel.) Unlike criminal defendants, indigent civil litigants have no constitutional or statutory right to courtappointed counsel in federal court. Jackson v. CounSt of Mclean, 953 F .2d 1070, I 071 (7th Cir. 1992). Nevertheless, the Court may in its discretion'oask lawyers to represent indigent litigants on a volunteer basis" when the circumstances warrant (7th Ch. 2il$; see also it. Olson v. Morgan,750 F.3d 708,717 Pruitt v. Mote,503 F.3d 647,654 (7thci.2007) (en banc) (describing court's authority to recruitpro bono counsel under 28 U.S.C. $ 1915(eXl).) In an exercise of the Court's discretion, the Court will make one final attempt to find a lawyer willing to represent Plaintiffon a volunteer basis. If Plaintifffails to fully cooperate with new counsel, or otherwise hinders counsel's ability to litigate the case resulting in counsel's withdrawal, the Court will not recruit any additional attomeys to represent Plaintiffin this matter. The Court admonishes 16 Plaintiffthat if that occurs, he will be required to litigate this case on his own from that stage forward. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffis pemritted to proceed on the claims ouflined herein pursuant to 28 U.S.C. $ 1915A. Summons shall not issue at this time. PlaintifPs motions for recruitnent of pro bono courrsel (R. 58, 59, 63) are GRANTED. James T. Newman of Cooney & conway, 120 North Lasalle steet, 30th Floor, chicago, lL 60602,(312)236-6166,is recruited to represent Plaintiffpursuant to counsel's trial bar obligation under Local Rule 83.11(g). Counsel is instructed to contact his client and investigate his claims pursuant to counsel's Rule 11 obligation. Counsel shall submit an amended complaint (if he so chooses), the documents needed for service of process, or other appropriate filing within 60 days of the entry of this order. ENTERED: Chief Judgb-Rub6n Castillo United States District Court Dated: October l4r20l4 t7
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
