Vazquez v. Village Of Bensenville et al, No. 1:2012cv09759 - Document 52 (N.D. Ill. 2014)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Ruben Castillo on 5/5/2014. Mailed notice(tg, )
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Vazquez v. Village Of Bensenville et al Doc. 52 cLL UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION wrLLrAM vAzeunz, Plaintiff, v. No. 12 C 09759 THE VILLAGE OF BENSENVILLE, OFFICER RICHARD LAPORTE, OFFICER KEVIN DRISCOLL, OFFICER SAUL HERRERA, and DETECTIVE MIKE PTAK, Chief Judge Ruben Castillo Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff William Ydzquez brings this action against the Village of Bensenville (the "Village") as well as Officer Richard LaPorte, Offrcer Kevin Driscoll, Officer Saul Herrera, and Detective Mike Ptak (collectively, the "Defendant Officers"), alleging deprivation of his constitutional right to equal protection under the law in violation of 42 U.S.C. $ 1983. Presently before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss the second amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure l2(b)(6). For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. RELEVANT FACTS Ydzquez is a resident of the Village. (R. 25, Second Am. Compl.,lT4.) He has lived at Mason Manor Condominiums (the "Condominium") for over five years and holds a position with the Mason Manor Condominium Association (the "Association"). (Id. n B) From 2010 to the present,Yiaquez recommended that the Association perform several repairs and improvements to the building, and the Association consequently imposed fees and special Dockets.Justia.com assessments upon unit owners to fund the improvements. (Id. n rc.) Yinquez alleges that unit owners and residents Pawel Kruk, Agnieszka Kruk, Iowna Plaza, and Ernest Skotnicki (collectively, the "Residents") were upset by the fees and special assessments and began a campaign of harassment against him and other Association members in 2010. (Id.1117.) Pawel Kruk and Agnieszka Kruk live together in Qd. n A.) a unit one or both of them own in the Condominium. Iowna Plaza and Ernest Skotnicki live together in a unit Plaza owns in the Condominium. (Id. ''1T 15.) Since 2010, the Residents have made several complaints about Yinqvezto various Village departments, including the Police Department. (Id.n 20.) Police officers, including the Defendant Officers, often came to the Condominium in response to the Residents' complaints, which Yinquez alleges were o'false and baseless" as a result of the Residents' animosity towards him. (Id. fl'tT 20, 23-24.) In response to the volume of complaints, Officer Herrera contacted the Association's then-president, Scott Beaderstadt, several times in2012 to request an election of the Association's members. (Id. '1T21.) Officer LaPorte went to the Condominium in late 201I and told Yinquez that if the police received more calls or reports involving the Condominium, they would be "pinned on [Vrlzquez.f" (Id.llfl 31-32.) Yizquezalleges that Officer LaPorte's statement indicated thatVazquez would not be treated in the same manner as his neighbors. (/d. fl 33.) Yiaquez alleges that the Defendant Officers filed criminal charges against him without following the appropriate investigative protocol. On January l1,z\l2,Pawel Kruk reported to Officer Herrera thatYdzquez was "pounding on Kruk's door and looking through the peep hole." 9d.1134.) Yinquez was subsequently arrested and charged with disorderly conduct. (/d.) Ydzquez alleges that Officer Herrera failed to adequately investigate the complaint before filing charges, as neither Yinquez nor Piort Zaranski, the person he was with that day, were interviewed by Officer Herrera. (Id. n36.) Yiaquezalleges that he did not engage in disorderly conduct and that he and Zaranski were instead gathering signatures from the residents for a City of Chicago window and door replacement project. (Id.nn 35-36.) On July l,2012,Plaza and Skotnicki reported to a police officer thatYinquezhadpushed and threatened to ktllPlaza. (ld. 1T38.) Yinquez was arrested later that day by the same officer and charged with two counts of battery. Qd.) Yinquez maintains that he did not commit battery or threaten to kill Plaza. (Id.n 39.) On September 26,2012, Pawel Kruk and his minor son reported to a police officer that Yiuquez had threatened to kill them at an Association meeting on September 20,2012. 41.) Yazquez was subsequently charged, pursuant to a (1d.. n complaint prepared by Detective Ptak, with aggravated assault and assault. (Id.ll41.) Yizquezagain alleges that the incident was inadequately investigated before charges were filed as ooseveral people present at the meeting . . . would have told [Detective Ptak] that Yinquez made no threats to Pawel Kruk or his son." (Id.n 43.) Pursuant to a complaint prepared by Officer Driscoll on May 29,2Ol3,V6zquez was charged with disorderly conduct for purportedly making vulgar statements and gestures towards Agnieszka Kruk and pounding on Pawel Kruk's door on March 25,2013. (Id. n 45.) Before filing charges, Officer Driscoll did not speak with Vrlzquez or the friend he was with that day. Qd. n47.) Ydzquez alleges that his friend would have told Officer Driscoll thatYizquez had no interaction with the Kruks on March 25,2013. (Id.) Finally, on July l,2}l3,Yizqtezwas charged with battery in another complaint prepared by Officer Driscoll relating to a June 25,2013 incident involving Skotnicki. (Id. 11 4g.\ Yiaquez denies committing battery upon Skotnicki that day, (id.,1l 50), and he contends that Skotnicki has previously made false statements to the police: Yizquezalleges that on December 21,2010, Skotnicki came into his apartment and physically assaulted him without provocation, (id. nzr. Skotnicki then left and falsely reported to the Police Department that he was assaulted by Vazquez in the Condominium's stairwell. (1d.1126.) A police officer investigated the incident and arrested Skotnicki for assault. (Id. n29.) On June 25,2013, Skotnicki allegedly emerged from his unit and attempted to punch Yilzquez in the hallway. (Id. n60.) On June 27, 2013,Yizquez and Beaderstadt went to the Police Department and reported the incident to Officer Driscoll and a sergeant. (Id. n6I.) Officer Driscoll told Vazquezthat Skotnicki claimed thatViaqrezhad punched hrm. (Id.n 62.) Yizquez denied this and alleged that his hands were full carrying groceries. (Id.) Yizquezalso reminded Officer Driscoll about Skotnicki's previous false assault claim on December 21,2010. (Id.) Inresponse, Officer Driscoll stated that the "past is the past" and brought up the frequent complaints Skotnicki and Pawel Kruk made against Yinquez. (Id. n $.) Beaderstadt told Officer Driscoll that Skotnicki should not be believed because he had claimed publicly that he would continue to file false reports about Yiaquezuntil Vazquez resigned from the Association. (Id.) In response, Officer Driscoll told YLzquez '1hat maybe fYir;quez] should move and that the Village of Bensenville Police Department [was] 'tired' of all the calls about lYinquezl." (Id.) Further, Officer Driscoll stated that Skotnicki's wife, Plaza, o'backed up [Skotnicki's] story, and therefore it was 'two against one."' (Id.) Offrcer Driscoll subsequently refused to file criminal charges against Skotnicki and instead filed a battery complaint against Y6zquez. (Id. n64.) Yinquezdenies all charges in these five inciderlts. (Id. t|'tl 35, 39,42,46,50.) Aside from the July 1, 2012 and June 25, 2013 incidents, he was either found not guilty or his criminal charges were dismissed nolle tried for the July prosequi. (1d.nn37,44,48.) on Apil22,2ol3,Vifuquez was l, 2012 incident. (Id. n 40.) He was found not guilty of the count one battery charge of causing bodily harm, but guilty of the count two battery charge of making physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature. (Id.) Yazquez has appealed the conviction. (Id.) Yiaquez alleges that, in contrast to their reaction to complaints against him, the Defendant Officers failed to investigate or file criminal charges in complaints he filed. In addition to the June 2013 incident with Skotnicki, Vazquezand other Condominium residents reported that Skotnicki had admitted to breaking a Condominium window in the summer of 2010. (Id. n fi.) Skotnicki was not charged. (Id. n 54.) Additionally, in June z\l2,Yiaquez heard a car tire pop, the rear common door to the building hallway open, and someone enter the apartment of Plazaand Skotnicki. (Id. 'l!T57.) The next morning, he discovered that his two front tires were slashed. (1d. fl 58.) Yinquezreported this to the Police Department, but no one was charged for the damage. (Id.nn 58-59.) PROCEDURAL HISTORY Proceeding pro se,Yinquez filed a three-count complaint on December 7,2012, (R. 1, Compl.), which the Court dismissed without prejudice on March 27,2073, (R. 6, Min. Entry). Ydzquez filed his first amendedpro se complaint on May 1,2013, (R. 8, First Am. Compl.), which the Court also dismissed without prejudice on May 29,2013, (R. 15, Min. Entry). After being appointed counsel, Ydzquez filed a second amended complaint on July 3l,2A1f.. (R. 25, Second Am. Compl.) In Count I,Yiaquez alleges a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection under the law against Officer Driscoll, Officer Herrera, and Detective Ptak, (id. ln 66- 76);in Count ll,Yizquez alleges a conspiracy to violate his equal protection against Officer Driscoll, Officer Herrera, Detective Ptak, and Officer LaPorte, (id.fln77-80); and in Count III, Yiaquez alleges a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection under the law against the Village, (id.nn 81-86). On October 22,2013, Defendants moved to dismiss the second amended complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(bX6). (R. 38, Defs.' Mot. Dismiss.) YinquezrespondedtoDefendants'motiontodismissonNovember27,20l3,(R.45, Pl.'s Resp.), and Defendants replied on December 11, 2013, (R. 46, Defs.' Reply). Defendants' motion to dismiss is presently before the Court. LEGAL STANDARD A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) "challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7,570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). When reviewing a Rule 12(bX6) motion to dismiss, the Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and draws all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F .3d 107 4, 1 0S 1 (7th Cir. 2008). Pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain'oa oshort and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' sufficient to provide the defendant with 'fair notice' of the claim and its basis." /d. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(aX2) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, s55 (2007)). "Detailed factual allegations" are not required, but the complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."' Ashcroft v. Iqbal,556 U.S. 662,678 (2009) (quoting Twombly,55O U.S. at 570). Plausibility in this context does not imply that acourt "should decide whose version to believe, or which version is more likely than not." Swansonv. Citibank, N.A.,614 F.3d 400,404 (7th Cir. 2010). Rather, to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "the plaintiff must give enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that holds together. In other words, the court will ask itself could these things have happened, not did they happen." Id. ANALYSIS I. Whether Yinquez has sufficiently pleaded a "class-of-one" claim (Count I) In Count I, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. $ 1983, Yinquezalleges that Officer Driscoll, Officer Herrera, and Detective Ptak (collectively, the "Arresting Officers") violated his constitutional right to equal protection under the law. (R. 25, Second Am. Compl.nnT-76.) In order to successfully state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must plead two elements: "(l) the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) the activity deprived [the plaintiff] of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Case v. Milewski,327 F.3d 564, 566 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "guard[s] against state and local government discrimination on the basis of . . . class-based distincti ons." GeinoslE v. City ofChL,675F.3d743,747 (7thCir.2012). It"hasalsocometobeunderstoodtoprotect individuals against purely arbitrary government classifications, even when a classification consists of singling out just one person for different treatment for arbitrary and irrational purposes." that he oohas Id. To state this kind of "class-of-one" equal protection claim, a plaintiff must allege been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment." Vill. of ltillowbrookv. Olech,528 U.S. 562, s64 (2000). The Seventh Circuit has not resolved its split over whether a plaintiff alleging a class-ofone equal protection claim must establish animus or improper motive. Knaus v. Town of Ledgeview, No. 13-2956,2014WL 1378128, at *3 (7th Cir. Apr. 9, 2014) (citing Del Marcelle v. Brown Cnry. Corp., 680 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc)). fn Del Marcelle,the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, split three ways on the issue: Some members of the court thought the plaintiff should be required to plead and prove that the disparate treatment was motivated by personal ill will or other illegitimate purpose; that is, a purpose unrelated to public duty. See lDel Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 8891 (Posner, J.) (plurality opinion) (writing for four members of the court). Others expressed the view that personal animus or other improper motive is not an element of the claim but just one way to prove that the defendant's action lacked a rational basis. See id. at913-14 (Wood, J., dissenting) (writing for five members of the court). One member of the court concluded that motive or intent oohas no role at all" in class-of-one litigation. See id. at 900 (Easterbrook, C.J., concurring in the judgment). D.B. ex rel. Kurtis B. v. Kopp,725 F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir. 2013) cert. denied,134 S. Ct. 1308 (2014). ooAt aminimum, however, [a plaintiff] must show that [he] was intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. Those requirements are well-established." Billington v, Vill. of Armington, 111.,498 F. App'x 572,574 (7thCir.2012) (citing Thayerv. Chiczewski,705F.3d237,254(7thCir.2012); Olech, 528 U.S. at 563-64). A. Whether Y{zquezwas intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated Defendants argue thatYdzquezhas failed to sufficiently plead that "he has been intentionally treated different from others similarly situated[.]" (R. 38-2, Defs.' Mem. at 13.) A plaintiff and his comparators are similarly situated when they are "identical or directly comparable in all material respects." LaBella Winnetlm, Inc. v. VilL of Winnetka, 628 F .3d 937 , 942 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Reget v. City of La Crosse,595 F.3d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 2010)). While the determination of whether a comparator is similarly situated is usually a question for the fact- finder, a complaint is subject to dismissal when the plaintiffhas provided comparators in his complaint and has "failed to allege facts tending to show that [he] was similarly situated to any of the comparators." Id. Here, Yizqrc2 alleges that the Residents are similarly situated to him. (R. 25, Second Am. Compl. !173.) Defendants do not challenge Yinquez's assertion that the Residents are similarly situated. The Residents and Yizquezall live in the Condominium. (Id. !f!J 13-15.) The Residents and Vazquezwere subject to the Association's imposition of fees and special assessments. (Id.1T1T 16-17.) The Residents and Ydzquezfiled complaints against each other with the Police Department. (1d.nn20,23,54, 58, 61.) Accordingly, the court finds that Yiaquez has sufficiently pleaded that the Residents are similarly situated to him. v. Lieblick, See Muczynski No. 10-CV-0081, 2012WL 5470738, at*2-3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 8,2012) (allegations that the plaintiff "was similarly situated to other citizens who were stopped and investigated by police officers" were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss); Messner v. Calderone, No. 07 C 893, 2008 wL 696909, at*4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2008) ("[a]lthough [the plaintiff] must eventually meet a heavy burden in establishing that such individuals [were] actually similarly situated," allegations that "all other residents, property owners, and business licensees" were similarly situated were "adequate at [the motion to dismiss] stage to state an Equal Protection claim under a class of one theory" (internal citations omitted)). Yinquez alleges that the Arresting Officers treated him differently from the similarlysituated Residents because he was "subject to arrest and criminal charges based upon the mere reports of unreliable witnesses without adequate investigation by the police," while his "legitimate complaints" and his nn.) ooaccounts of events" were ignored. (R. 25, Second Am. Compl. Defendants argue thatYizquez's ooallegations do not meet the requirement of being more than conclusory." (R. 46, Defs.' Reply at8.) Yazquez alleges that of the six complaints the Residents made against 201,2; September him-for incidents on December 2l,20lO; January 10,20l2;July l, 20,2012; March 25"2AL3; and June 25,2013-the Arresting Officers filed charges against him in all except the December2l,2010 incident. (R. 25, Second Am. Compl. 1n25-26,34,38,41,45,49,64.) Conversely,ofthethreecomplaintsmadebyVazquezagainst Skotnicki-for incidents in the summer of 2010, in June 2012, and on June 25, 2013-Yazquez alleges that the Arresting Officers did not file any charges against Skotnicki. (Id.nn 53-54, 58- 59,64.) Additionally, Vrizquez alleges that when conflicting versions of the incidents were presented, the Arresting Officers weighted the Residents' and their witnesses' versions more favorably than Vazquez's and his witnesses' . (Id.,,!lt| 36, 43,47,63.) For example, Yizquez alleges that he reported to Officer Driscoll that Skotnicki attempted to punch Y|zqruezin the hallway on June 25,2013. (Id.nn 60-61.) Despite Beaderstadt telling Officer Driscoll that "Skotnicki should not be believed because he has made it public knowledge that [Vrizquez] must resign from the Association or Skotnicki [would] continue to file false police reports about lYinquezf," Officer Driscoll told V6zquezthat it was "two against one" since Plaza backed up Skotnicki's story. (Id. 1163.) Yiaquez also alleges that the Arresting Officers failed to interview witnesses that could corroborate Yizquez's denial of three incidents for which he was charged. Qd.\n36,43,47.) For instance, on January 10,2012, Pawel Kruk reported to Officer Herrera that Vazquez was "pounding on Kruk's door and looking through the peep hole." (Id. n34) Officer Herrera failed to interview Ylzquez or the friend he was with at the time of the alleged incident before filing charges against Yizquez. (Id. n36.) On September 26,2012, Pawel Kruk and his minor son reported to the Police Department that Vazquezhadthreatened to kill them both at an Association meeting. (1d.n41.) Detective Ptak failed to interview several people present at the meeting before filing charges against Yiaquez. (Id. n$) Finally, Officer Driscoll charged Yiaquez with disorderly conduct for allegedly making vulgar statements and l0 gestures towards Agnieszka Kruk and pounding on Pawel Kruk's door on March 25,2013,but Officer Driscoll did not interview Yizquez or the friend he was with that day before charging him. (1d.nn45,47.) These allegations are not merely conclusory, but allege specific instances of disparate treatment. Viewing all these facts in the light most favorable to Yiaquez,the Court finds that Yizquez has sufficiently pleaded facts to support his allegations that the Arresting Officers oohave enforced the law one-sidedly and have not been impartial and evenhanded in arbitrating the disputes between lYinquey' and [the Residents]." (1d.n67.) Seeking to avoid this result, Defendants argue that Skotnicki's arrest for the December 21,2010 incident undermines Yinquez's class-of-one claim because Skotnicki's arrest demonstrates that Skotnicki was not treated more favorably than Yinquez. (R. 46, Defs.' Reply at 8.) Vazquez does not allege, however, that the unequal treatment between him and Skotnicki stems solely from arrests made. He alleges that the unequal treatment also stems from the way the Arresting Officers handled and investigated complaints made by the Residents against Vasquez compared to complaints made by Vazquez against the Residents. (R. 25, Second Am. Compt. tT,lT25-65). Accordingly, the Court finds that Yinqtezhas plausibly alleged that the Arresting Officers intentionally treated him differently from the Residents. B. Whether there was a rational basis for the differences in treatment between Yinquez and the Residents Defendants argue thatYinquezhas failed to show that there was no rational basis for the alleged differences in treatment between him and the Residents. (R. 38-2, Defs.' Mem. at 13.) A plaintiff bringing a class-of-one claim must allege that he was treated differently and that o'there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment ." GeinoslE,675 F.3d at747 (finding that a plaintiff may bring a class-of-one claim "based on allegations of the irrational or malicious ll application of law enforcement powers"). "A perplexing situation arises when a lawsuit challenging a govemment action subject only to rational basis review is evaluated under the deferential standard of a Rule 12(bX6) motion to dismiss. A class-of-one plaintiff must anticipate this dilemma." Kopp,725F.3dat 686 (internal alterations, citations, and quotation marks omitted) (quoting Flying J Inc. v. City of New Haven,549 F.3d 538, 546 (7th Cir. 2003)). To survive a motion to dismiss, "a plaintiffmust allege facts sufficient to overcome the presumption of rationality that applies to govemment classifications." /d. (quotingWroblewski v. City of Washburn,965 F .2d 452, 460 (7th Cir. 1992)). "[T]he test for rationality does not ask whether the benign justification was the actual justification. All it takes to defeat the plaintiffs' claim is a conceivable rational basis for the difference in treatm ent." Id. Here, Yinquez alleges that the Arresting Officers' "unequal treatment of [him] has no rational reason and/or was motivated by personal animus unrelated to their official duties." (R. 25, Second Am. Compl.n74.) Defendants argue thatYazquez has alleged facts to support personal animus only against Officer LaPorte, who is not named in Count I, and Offrcer Driscoll. (R. 46, Defs.' Reply at 7.) They argue that Officer Driscoll's statements toYinquez"[do] not rise to the level of more than an unfortunate flippant response" and that Yiuquez's"remaining allegations of animus are conclusory" and conflate the Residents' animus against Viizquez with the Arresting Officer's motives. (Id.) As explained above, Yinquezis not required to show that the Arresting Officer's unequal treatment of him was motivated by personal animus. Kopp,725 F.3d at 685-86. Thus, the question the Court will focus on is whether the complaint "eliminate[s] any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for', the difference in treatment between Yinquezand the Residents. Id. at 686 (quoting Srail v. Vill. Lisle, 111.,588 F.3d 940,946-47 (7th Cir.2009)). t2 of Yi.zquez alleges that the Arresting Officers conducted inadequate investigations of complaints he and the Residents filed by favoring the Residents' versions of events and ignoring Yinquez's accounts of events and by failing to interview witnesses. (Id.nn 6S-73.) Specifically, the Arresting Officers failed to interview witnesses before arresting Yiaqtezfor the incidents on January 1 0, 2012, September 20, 2012, and March 25, 2013 . (Id. fllt 34-36, 4l -43, 45 -47 .) Officer Driscoll arrested Yiaquez for the incident on June 25,2013 because he favored Skotnicki's and Plaza's versions of events over V6zquez's and Beaderstadt's. (Id.,llfl 60-64.) Further, the Arresting Officers did not investigate or arrest anyone for the incidents Yinquez complained about in the summer of 2010 and June 2012. (Id.nn 53-59.) Assuming the truth of all these facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in V6zquez's favor, the Court cannot conceive of any rational reason why the Arresting Officers consistently favored the Residents' versions of events over V6zquez's accounts, or why the Arresting Officers did not thoroughly investigate the complaints before arresting Yizqtez. From Yinquez's allegations, it appears as though the Arresting Officers used a lower standard to file charges against Yinquezthan against the Residents; the Court cannot hypothesize a rational reason for this disparate treatment See Hakim v. osborne, No. 13 c 50067,2013 wL 6162s63, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 22,2013) (assuming the truth of plaintiff s allegations that defendants knowingly gave him false disciplinary tickets and finding that these allegations were sufficient to overcome the presumption of rationality and allege a class-of-one claim). Defendants argue that the Arresting Officers exercised proper police discretion when determining who to arrest for the incidents. (R. 46, Defs.' Reply at 8.) Specifically, Defendants argue that Officer Driscroll exercised his discretion and arrested Yinquezfor the June 25, 2013 incident'obased on the complaints of [Skotnicki and his wife] who he apparently determined to l3 be more credible thatlYazquezf." Qd.) Yazquez alleges that Officer Driscoll knew that Skotnicki was not a reliable witness because Skotnicki had previously provided the police false information about another incident. (R. 25, Am. Compl. at lffl 62-65.) Defendants do not provide the Court with a rational reason for why Officer Driscoll found Skotnicki to be more credible than Vazquez, and the allegations in the complaint suggest there was no rational reason. "If there was no rational basis for the treatment of the plaintiff, then the motives [of a public official] must be irrational and improper. Swanson v. City of Chetek,7l9 F.3d 780,784 (7th Cir. 2013). The Court thus finds thatYinquez has met his heavy burden of suffrciently alleging that there was no rational basis for the difference in treatment between him and the Residents. Accordingly, the Court finds that Yinquezhas alleged sufficient facts to plead a class-of-one claim and thus declines to dismiss Count I. III. Whether Yinqaez has sufficiently pleaded a claim of conspiracy among the Defendant Officers (Count II) In Count ll,Yinquez alleges that the Defendant Officers engaged in a conspiracy to deprive him of equal protection of the law. (R. 25, Second Am. Compl. tT,lT77-80.) Specifically, he alleges that the parties to the conspiracy-the Defendant Officers---conspired to violate the Equal Protection Clause by enforcing the law one-sidedly and not being impartial and evenhanded in handling disputes between him and the Residents. (Id.) Yiaquezcontends that the conspiracy began in October or November of 2011 with Officer LaPorte's statement that further calls "will be pinned on [VrLquezf" and lasted at least until Vazquez's June 2013 arrest. Qd.nn3t-33,60-6s.) To allege a section 1983 claim for civil conspiracy, a plaintiff must show "an express or implied agreement among defendants to deprive plaintiffof his or her constitutional rights." t4 Scherer v. Balkema, 840 F.2d 437,442 (7th Cir. 1988). A o'mere oobare allegation of conspiracy" or a suspicion that persons adverse to the plaintiff had joined a conspiracy against him" is not enough to survive a motion to dismiss. Cooney v. Rossiter,583 F.3d 967,970-71 (7th Cir. 2009). Rather, a plaintiff must allege "the parties, the general purpose, and the approximate date of the agreement to form a conspiracy." Estate of sims ex rel. sims v. cnty. of Bureou, 506 F.3d 549,517 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Walker v. Thompson,288 F.3d 1005, rc07 QthCir.2002)). Defendants argue that Vrizquez's conspiracy claim should be dismissed because he has failed to allege an essential element: an express or implied agreement among the Defendant Officers to arrest Yinquez in violation of his constitutional rights. (R. 38-2, Defs.' Mot. Dismiss at 10; R. 46, Defs.' Reply at3-4.) Defendants argue thatVazquezhas only alleged that Officer LaPorte "indicated he would arrest lYazquez] in the future if the police received more complaints, and that he would not treat lYazquezl in the same manner as his neighbors." (Defs.' Reply at 4.) They additionally argue thatYazquezhas failed to allege that Officer LaPorte made any subsequent arrests after this comment, or that the other Defendant Officers were "aware of the alleged statement or agreed to act in concert with Officer LaPorte." (/d.) Defendants argue that Vazquez's allegations merely establish that the Defendant Officers individually arrested YAzquez over a two-year period. (Id. at 4-5.) Yinquez alleges that the Defendant Officers agreed to violate the Equal Protection Clause by treating him differently than the Residents. (R. 25, Second Am. Compl.l[!178, 80.) He fails to allege, however, any specific facts demonstrating the existence of an express or implied agreement among the Defendant Officers. The only facts in the complaint that can be construed to possibly support his conspiracy claim are his allegations that in October or Novemb er 2011, Officer LaPorte told him that "if the police received any more calls or reports involving the l5 Mason Manor Condominiums[,] 'they [would] be pinned on [him],"' (id.n32), and in June 2013, Officer Driscroll told him the police department was oo'tired' of all the calls about [him]," (id. n $). Officer LaPorte's comment, however, does not indicate that the other three Defendant Officers also wanted to pin the complaints on Yizquez; the Court can only infer from this comment that Officer LaPorte intended to treat Yinquez difilerently. Similarly, the Court cannot plausibly infer that the four Defendant Officers agreed to conspire against Yiaquezbecause, according to Officer Driscoll, the police department as a whole was tired of receiving calls about Yinquez. There are no allegations in the complaint from which the Court can infer that the other officers were aware of Officer LaPorte's or Officer Discroll's comments, or that the other officers agreed with Officer LaPorte's and Officer Discroll's sentiments. Aside from the fact that they are all Village police officers, there are no allegations in the complaint indicating that the Defendant Officers interacted with each other. Importantly, there are no alleged facts indicating that all four officers acted together or communicated in any way when inadequately investigating the various complaints and arresting Yinquez; instead, Officer Herrera, Officer Driscoll, and Detective Ptak each individually filed charges against Yitzquez, (id.ffii36,41,45, 49,64). Viewing all the facts in the complaint in the light most favorable toYazquez, the Court cannot plausibly infer that the four Defendant Officers had an implicit agreement to treat Y{zquez differently than the Residents. Without more than a conclusory allegation that the Defendant Officers had an agreement, Yiaqtez's conspiracy claim cannot survive a motion to dismiss. See Gomez v. Garda CL Great Lakes,Inc., No. t3 C 1002,2013 WL 4506938,at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23,2013) (the plaintiffs failed to offer any factual allegations suggesting that the defendants were associated or communicated with each other and so the court found that their t6 allegation of an agreement between the defendants was conclusory and insufficient to set forth a plausible conspiracy claim); Roehl v. Meruilees, No. 11 C 4886, 2012WL 1192093, at *8 (N.D. Ill Apr. 10,2012) ("Plaintiff alleges the parties, purpose and date of the conspiracy, but fails to allege facts or circumstances upon which either an express or implied agreement between Defendants could be inferred ooabove the speculative level." (quoting Twombly,550 U.S. at sss)). Accordingly, the Court dismisses Count II. Vazquezmay amend Count II if he is able to provide the Court with additional facts, which may be discemed during discovery, from which the Court can plausibly infer the existence of an agreement among the Defendant Officers. IIL Whether Yiaquez has sufficiently pleaded a Monell claim against the ViIIage for municipal tiability (Count IIf In Count III, Vazquez alleges a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection under the law against the Village. (R. 25, Second Am. Compl. lTfl 8l-86.) Specifically, he alleges that the Village, by and through its Police Department,'odeliberately engaged in a policy and practice of enforcing the law one-sidedly and not being impartial and evenhanded in arbitrating disputes between [him] and his neighbors!' (Id. flfl 83-34.) A municipality "cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor----or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under $ 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,436 U.S. 658,691(1978). In order to hold for a section 1983 violation under Monell, a a municipality liable plaintiff must show: "(l) an express policy that causes a constitutional deprivation when enforced; (2) a widespread practice, that, although unauthorized, is so permanent and well-settled that it constitutes a ocustom or usage' with the force of law; or (3) an allegation that a person with final policymaking authority caused the injury." Chortekv. City of Milwaukee,356F.3d740,748 (7thCir. 2004). Here, Viizquez t7 does not allege that the Village had an express policy that caused his constitutional deprivation. Nor does Vrlzquez allege that aperson with final policymaking authority caused his constitutional deprivation. Thus, the Court must determine whetherYiaquezhas alleged a widespread practice that is sufficiently permanent and well-seuled to constitute a Monell claim against the Village. Defendants argue thatYdzquez's Monell claim should be dismissed because he has not alleged facts to plausibly support a claim that he was subject to unconstitutional arrests as a result of a widespread practice. (R. 38-2, Defs.' Mot. Dismiss at7-9.) The Seventh Circuit has not adopted "any brightJine rules defining a 'widespread custom or practice"'and "there is no clear consensus as to how frequently such conduct must occur to impose Monell Thomas v. Cook Cnty. Sheriffs liability.' Dep't,604 F.3d 293,303 (7th Cir. 2009). Howevero to allege a widespread practice, a plaintiffmust plead facts that show "that there is a true municipal policy at issue, not a random event. If the has acquiesced in the outcome, at same problem has arisen many times and the municipality it is possible (though not necessary) to infer that there is a policy work." Calhoun v. Ramsey,408 F.3d 375, 380 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Hall v. City of Chi., No. 12 C 6834,2013 WL 5835932, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3A,2Ol3) (A plaintiffmust allege "facts tending to show that the City policymakers were aware of the behavior of officers, or that the activity was so persistent and widespread that City policymakers should have known about the behavior." (quoting Latuszkin v. City of Chi.,250 F.3d 502,505 (7th Cir. 2001)). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must "plead factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the City maintained a policy, custom, or practice" that caused the violationoftheplaintifPsconstitutionalrights. McCauleyv.CityofChi.,67lF.3d6ll,616(7th Cir.20ll) (internal quotation, citation, CV 1384 -- and alteration omitted); see also F. Supp.2d ---,2013 WL 5230632, at *13 (N.D. 18 Falkv. perez,No. l2 Ill. Sept. 12,2013) (holding that "bare allegations of a policy or custom are not . . . sufficient to satis$" the showing of a widespread practice). Yiaquez alleges that the Village has ooa policy and practice of enforcing the law onesidedly and not being impartial and evenhanded in arbitrating disputes between [him] and his neighbors," thereby causing his constitutional deprivation. (R. 25, Second Am. Compl. tTS4.) Yiaquez does not specifically allege in his complaint that this alleged policy is widespread; in his response, however, he appears to argue that it is. (R. 45, Pl.'s Resp. at 8-10.) Additionally, Yinquez argues that he "has alleged a series of bad acts which suggest that an offrcial at the policy level of the Defendant Village was bound to have been aware of the individual Defendants' wrongdoing." (Id. at 10.) The factual support Yinquezprovides for this claim are his allegations that the three Arresting Officers failed to adequately investigate four incidents before filing charges against him based on the Residents' complaints, (R. 25, Second Am. Compl. fln34-36,41-43,45-47,49-51,60-65), and that they failed to adequately investigate three incidents before deciding not to file charges against Skotnicki based on Viizquez's complaints, (id.nn 53-55, 57-59,80-65). Yinquezfails to allege, however, that other officers violated his constitutional rights. He also fails to allege that any supervising officer or police chief knew of or supported the Arresting Offrcers' actions. Further, he fails to allege that any Village official was aware of the Arresting Officers' actions. The allegations of unconstitutional misconduct on the part of three officers do not support Yir:quez's allegations of a widespread practice. Nor can the Court infer from these allegations that any Village official was aware or should have been aware of the individual officer's wrongdoing. Simply put, the facts alleged do not allow the Court to oodraw the reasonable inference that the [Village] maintained a policy, custom, or practice" that caused the violation of Vazquez's constitutional rights. See McCauley, t9 671 F.3d at 616; see also White v. City of Chi., No. I I C 7802,2014 WL 958714, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar.I2,20l4) ("[p]laintiff has pleaded no facts that support a reasonable inference that the City engaged in a widespread practice" (internal quotations and citations omitted)); Blakey v. City of CftI., No. 07 CV 1880,2009 WL 28518367, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28,20A9) @laintiff failed to ooallege that the policymakers of the municipality were the moving force behind the conduct, or that the conduct was so widespread that the policymakers should have been aware of it" and so his conclusory allegations were not sufficient to support a Monell claim). Accordingly, the Court finds that Yinquezhas not alleged sufficient facts to plead a Monell claim against the Village. The Court thus dismisses Count Count III if III. Vr2quezmay amend he is able to provide the Court with additional facts from which the Court can plausibly infer the existence of a widespread practice that caused his constitutional deprivations. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint (R. 38) is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. In particular, Counts II and III are dismissed without prejudice. The Court grants Yinquez leave to amend these counts. Count I survives. The parties are directed to fully exhaust all settlement possibilities for the remaining claim prior to the next status date, which will be held on May 20,2014, at9:45 a.m. ENTERED: Chief Judge Dated: May 5,2014 20 Castillo
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