Siggers v. Thornton High School, No. 1:2012cv09042 - Document 71 (N.D. Ill. 2015)
Court Description: ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Signed by the Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 11/24/2015: Civil case terminated. Mailed notice(wp, )
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Siggers v. Thornton High School Doc. 71 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION THOMAS J. SIGGERS, Plaintiff, Case No. 12 C 9042 v. Judge Harry D. Leinenweber THORNTON HIGH SCHOOL DISTRCT 205, Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 60]. For the reasons stated herein, the Motion is granted. I. The following facts BACKGROUND are undisputed except where noted. During the 2008-2009 school year Plaintiff, Thomas J. Siggers, was employed by Defendant, Thornton High School District 205 (“the District”) as a “permanent substitute” working at Thornton High School. the substitute At 76 years of age, Plaintiff was the oldest of teachers, and the substitute at Thornton High School. longest serving permanent Plaintiff’s qualifications and educational experience included a Master’s Degree, a Type 75 Certificate, which is a necessary prerequisite for Dockets.Justia.com administrative responsibilities, two years as a school principal, and over five years as a college administrator. Plaintiff was one of two permanent substitutes at Thornton during the 2008-2009 school year. The second, Mr. Powell, was over 40 years of age, a retired Marine, and longtime substitute at Thornton. As a permanent substitute, Plaintiff reported to work daily, regardless of need, and was paid $216.00 per day. Whereas day-to-day substitutes were called in only as needed and paid $100.00 for every day worked. The events leading to this lawsuit took place starting in the spring of 2009. Near the end of the 2008-2009 school year, Thornton High School Principal Betheny Lyke had a meeting with Thornton’s Administrative Intern, Wanda Russell’s secretary, Shavonna Nelson. Russell, and Ms. Principal Lyke informed Ms. Russell and Ms. Nelson that, for the coming school year, to be hired as a permanent substitute, a candidate had to be enrolled in a graduate program in the field of education and desire employment in that field. She stated that the new requirements came from the District, but neither Ms. Russell nor Ms. Nelson could recall ever seeing anything in writing from the District confirming this. Principal Lyke directed Ms. Russell and Ms. Nelson to inform the substitute teachers of the change, and noted that if Plaintiff and Mr. Lawrence were not enrolled - 2 - in an educational degree program they would no longer qualify for the permanent substitute positions. Ms. Russell then called a meeting to explain the new permanent substitute requirements to the substitute teachers who regularly worked at Thornton High School. the meeting. Plaintiff attended After explaining the changes, Ms. Russell told everyone that they were welcome to apply and that they could do so by submitting to Principal Lyke a resume, transcript, or other document proving their enrollment in an education degree program. Several substitutes applied for the position, but Plaintiff chose not to because he did not meet the newly imposed requirements. three people From for the 2009-2010 school year: the applicants, permanent Principal substitute Lyke positions selected for the Ouida Dyer-Bradford, a woman in her 40’s and an acquaintance of Principal Lyke; Lynell Ingram, a nephew of Ms. Russell; and Dontrell Jackson, a man in his 20’s and the son of one of the deans at Thornton. At the end of the 2008-2009 school year, before the staff left for the summer, Ms. Russell approached Plaintiff and told him that she had been asked to get his mailbox key and his keys to the building. Plaintiff testified that in the past he had always kept his keys over the summer. that summer, eligibility Plaintiff form received requesting that - 3 - he It is disputed whether, from the affirm or District the disaffirm his desire to be kept on the approved-substitute list for the 20092010 school year. A copy of the form was produced by the District, but is dated November 13, 2009, which is incongruous with the form’s early summer completion deadline. Plaintiff did not submit the form on time, despite having done so every summer for the 13 prior years he was employed at Thornton. When Plaintiff returned to the school in fall 2009 seeking a substitute assignment he was informed by Ms. Nelson that his name did not appear on the approved-substitute list. Ms. Nelson brought this to the attention of Ms. Russell, who telephoned the District office and was informed that Plaintiff was not on the list because Plaintiff he also had not completed the issue raised the with eligibility Principal form. Lyke, who indicated that she thought he was supposed to be there every day, and said she would talk to Ms. Russell. Although the exact timeline is unclear, three significant events occurred in the following weeks. At some Plaintiff was given a substitute teacher assignment. point, He taught a full day and was issued a check on September 11, 2009, in the amount of $91.66. On September 15, 2009, after receiving only the one assignment, Plaintiff decided to file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”). Thereafter, Plaintiff went to the District office to obtain the eligibility form in order to be - 4 - placed on the approved- substitute list, but he was refused because he had a pending EEOC complaint. Plaintiff then called the EEOC investigator assigned to his case, Mr. Lane, who instructed the District to issue Plaintiff the form. Thereafter, Plaintiff Thornton High School and obtained the form. went to During this same timeframe, Plaintiff was escorted from the school building by two security guards at the request of Ms. Russell. The parties dispute whether this occurred while Plaintiff was teaching or when he came to the school to obtain the eligibility form. On November 17, 2009, Plaintiff returned the completed eligibility form to the District office and his name was added to the 2009-2010 approved-substitute list. not receive any substitute assignments. return to Thornton High School and Plaintiff still did But he also did not attempt to obtain a substitute teaching assignment directly from Ms. Nelson, nor did he utilize the electronic “sub service” list to obtain an assignment electronically. II. LEGAL STANDARD Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” facts are those that affect FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). the outcome of the Material lawsuit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine a dispute exists “if the - 5 - evidence is such that reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. The moving party may meet its burden by showing “there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the non-moving party must demonstrate with evidence “that a triable issue of fact remains on issues for which [it] bears the burden of proof.” Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 463–64 (7th Cir. 2009). The judge’s role at summary judgment is not credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Haupert, 481 F.3d 543, 550 (7th Cir. 2007). whether a genuine issue of material fact to make Washington v. In determining exists, the Court construes all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See, Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 491- 92 (7th Cir. 2000). III. ANALYSIS The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). While age need not be the sole factor motivating the employer’s decision, the plaintiff must establish that age was the determinative factor. - 6 - See, Gross v. FBL Fin., Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009) (holding that under ADEA’s language prohibiting discrimination “because of” age, plaintiff must prove that age was “the ‘but-for’ cause” of the adverse employment action); Lindsey v. Walgreen Co., 615 F.3d 873, 876 (7th Cir. 2010). Persons over the age of 40 are a protected class under the law. 29 U.S.C. § 631. A plaintiff may prove age discrimination using either the direct or the indirect (burden-shifting) method of proof. Cerutti v. BASF Corp., 349 F.3d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir. 2003). But under the either the direct or indirect ultimate standard is the same: method of proof, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer would not have made the adverse employment decision in question but for the plaintiff’s membership in the protected class. Id. at 1061. A. Direct Method To proceed under the direct method of proof, a plaintiff must show, by way of direct or circumstantial evidence, that his employer’s decision to take an adverse job action against him was motivated evidence, if by an believed impermissible by the purpose. trier of Id. fact, Direct “prove[s] discriminatory conduct . . . without reliance on inference or presumption.” admission by Id. the Direct evidence could take the form of “an decisionmaker - 7 - that the adverse employment action was motivated by discriminatory animus.” Darchak v. City of Chi. Bd. of Educ., 580 F.3d 622, 631 (7th Cir. 2009). But a plaintiff need not provide such “smoking-gun” evidence; he “can also prevail under the direct method of proof by constructing a ‘convincing mosaic’ of circumstantial evidence that ‘allows a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker.’” Id. Circumstantial evidence can include: suspicious timing, ambiguous statements or behavior directed at other employees in the protected group, evidence that similarly situated employees outside the protected class received systematically better treatment, and evidence that the employee was qualified for the job in question but was passed over in favor of a person outside the protected class. Mullin v. Temco Machinery, Inc., 732 F.3d 772, 776 (7th Cir. 2013). plaintiff method relies of on proof, circumstantial the evidence evidence must under point District’s does not have discriminatory “smoking-gun” motives in the directly discriminatory reason for the employer’s action. Plaintiff Where a direct to a Id. at 777. evidence demoting him of the from the permanent substitute position or failing to rehire him for the 2009-2010 evidence school to argue year. that Rather, the he District relies on implemented circumstantial a scheme to prevent him from continuing to work at Thornton High School due to his age. But Plaintiff’s claim suffers a fatal flaw — he has - 8 - not presented any evidence that directly points to his age being the reason for the District’s actions. relies on may show animus towards The evidence Plaintiff him, but it provides no insight as to the motivation for the District’s actions. For example, Mr. Principal Lyke’s comment that Plaintiff and Lawrence would no longer qualify for the permanent substitute position under the new requirements is factually accurate, and without more, is not enough to towards them based on their age. show discriminatory animus Similarly, the District has non-discriminatory reasons for taking the Plaintiff’s keys at the end of individuals the school hired for year. the The evidence permanent that substitute all three position had connections within the District is strong evidence that the new qualifications were created to free up the permanent substitute positions, but it does not show animus based on age, especially where at least one of those individuals was within the protected class, albeit significantly younger than Plaintiff. Even Plaintiff’s most damning evidence — that he was escorted from the building by security — has no connection to his age. There is no evidence of suspicious timing, or ambiguous statements or behavior directed at him or other employees in the protected class. Nor has employees outside Plaintiff the shown protected that class better treatment. - 9 - similarly received situated systematically Plaintiff appears to argue that the only possible reason for him to be ousted was his age. Unfortunately for Plaintiff, his suspicion that his age may have been a factor in the way he was treated is not enough. inferences in favor Court not “draw[] may speculation or Hosp., F.3d 700 of Although Plaintiff (the inferences that conjecture.” 1101, 1104 Brown (7th the nonmoving are v. Cir. Court must draw party), the supported Advocate 2012). by only S. Suburban The evidence presented is insufficient for Plaintiff to prove his case under the direct method because it does not point directly to the discriminatory reason for the District’s actions. B. Indirect Method Plaintiff also proceeds under the indirect method’s burden shifting framework, which was first set forth Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). in McDonnell Under this method, Plaintiff has the initial burden of proving a prima facie case, which consists of four elements: (1) the plaintiff was a member of the protected class, (2) the plaintiff was qualified for the position, (3) the plaintiff was rejected from the position, and (4) the employer treated other similarly situated outside of the protected class more favorably. persons Stockwell v. City of Harvey, 597 F.3d 895, 901 (7th Cir. 2010). If the plaintiff establishes those elements, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, - 10 - nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Id. If the defendant does so, the burden returns to the plaintiff to prove that the stated reason is mere pretext. Id. Plaintiff has two discrete claims of age discrimination by the District: (1) when he was demoted from the position of permanent substitute, and (2) when he was not recalled as a dayto-day substitute teacher for the 2009-2010 school year. Plaintiff, at 76 years of age, was at all relevant times a member of a protected class. And with a Master’s Degree, a Type 75 Certificate, two years as a school principal, and over five years as a college administrator, he was certainly qualified to be either a permanent or day-to-day substitute. Yet the District contends that Plaintiff has not met his prima facie burden for either of his discrimination claims because he did not apply for the positions from which he now claims to have been rejected. To claim discrimination in hiring, “the first show that [he] applied for the position.” 625 F.3d 998, 1003 (7th Cir. 2010). plaintiff must Hill v. Potter, If a plaintiff does not apply for a position, he cannot make a prima facie case for unlawful discrimination unless he can demonstrate that the employer’s discriminatory practices prevented him from applying. Hudson v. Chicago Transit Authority, 375 F.3d 552, 558 (7th Cir. 2004). It is undisputed that Plaintiff did not apply for the - 11 - permanent substitute position, or submit the eligibility form for the 2009-2010 school year in a timely fashion, or seek to obtain a substitute position once he was added to the approvedsubstitute list. But Plaintiff argues actions prevented him from doing so. that the District’s The Court will discuss each claim of discrimination in turn. 1. In regards to Discrimination Claim the permanent substitute position, it is undisputed that the requirements for the position were changed prior to the 2009-2010 school year and that Plaintiff did not qualify for the position under the new standards. claims that Principal Lyke wanted to use The District the permanent substitute position as a recruiting tool, and she instituted the graduate program requirement because it showed their desire for permanent employment in the field of education. Plaintiff contends that these reasons are pretextual, and that in reality, the changes were made to oust Plaintiff from the permanent substitute position. To establish that the District’s proffered reasons were mere pretext, Plaintiff must put forth evidence demonstrating that “not the District’s credible,” or “nondiscriminatory “factually reason baseless,” was dishonest,” and that “the employer’s true reason was based on a discriminatory intent.” Perez v. Illinois, 488 F.3d 773, 773 (7th Cir. 2007). - 12 - To do so, Plaintiff must “identify such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, or contradictions in the purported reasons that a jury could find them unworthy of credence and hence infer that [the District] did not act for the asserted nondiscriminatory reasons.” Fane v. Locke Reynolds, LLP, 480 F.3d 534, 541 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff argues that Principal Lyke changed the requirements for the permanent substitute position of her own accord, against District policy. Although Ms. Russell and Ms. Nelson testified that Principal Lyke had stated that the new requirements came from the District, neither of them could recall seeing anything in writing from the District to confirm this. But even assuming that Principal Lyke changed the requirements on her own, Plaintiff has failed to show that she was not authorized discriminatory to intent. completely within substitutes at her Thornton do so or Principal authority to possess that Lyke as she did stated that Principal additional to so it with was require qualifications beyond the minimum qualifications set by the State. Plaintiff cites the testimony of Ms. Mickels, an educational consultant for District 205, as evidence to the contrary. Ms. Mickels stated that qualifications for substitute teachers were set by the District’s regional office and were intended to be uniform throughout the District. But Ms. Mickels did not begin her - 13 - employment with the District until 2013, and has no personal knowledge of Plaintiff’s employment or the motivation for the change in requirements at Thornton in 2009. The evidence is insufficient to prove that the District’s nondiscriminatory reason for changing the requirements for the permanent substitute baseless. As such, Plaintiff cannot meet his prima facie burden because he has nondiscriminatory position failed is to reasons not credible prove or factually the District’s pretextual were that and that discriminatory actions prevented him from applying. its See, Hill, 625 F.3d at 1003. Moreover, Plaintiff’s claim must fail because he cannot satisfy the fourth element of a prima facie case — he cannot prove that people systematically outside treated the more protected favorably. class Every permanent substitute candidate was subject to new requirements. who would have been position before the enrolled in apply under an the qualified change educational new for in permanent requirements, degree requirements the program, — regardless were not of Others substitute but were were not able their to age. Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of the District on Plaintiff’s discrimination claim demotion from the permanent substitute position. - 14 - based on his 2. Failure to Recall Plaintiff’s claim based on the District’s failure to recall him as a day-to-day substitute teacher for the 2009-2010 school year suffers similar shortcomings. District prevented him from Plaintiff argues that the applying for the position withholding the all-important eligibility form. by While it is disputed whether Plaintiff received the form over the summer, it is undisputed that he ultimately did receive and return the completed form to the District. Yet after doing so, Plaintiff failed steps to take assignment. any affirmative to obtain a substitute A day-to-day substitute teacher is employed on per diem basis, which means they have no regular schedule and only work as needed. employment, Because of the unique structure of this type of Plaintiff’s complaint of being rejected from the day-to-day substitute position when he showed no interest in obtaining assignments is tenuous at best. Plaintiff’s claim suffers further damage due to his inability to prove that people outside the protected class were treated more favorably by the District. Every substitute teacher had to complete the eligibility form in order to be placed on substitute the approved-substitute teaching assignments list, either and had directly Nelson or electronically through the sub service. points to no evidence showing that - 15 - younger to obtain through Ms. Plaintiff substitutes were given assignments despite failing to complete the eligibility form. Nor is there any evidence that younger substitutes obtained assignments by any means other than directly through Ms. Nelson or through the sub service. Without this point of comparison, it is impossible for Plaintiff to meet his prima facie burden. Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of the District on Plaintiff’s discrimination claim based on the District’s failure to recall him as a day-to-day substitute. IV. For the reasons CONCLUSION stated herein, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 60] is granted. IT IS SO ORDERED. Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge United States District Court Dated:11/24/2015 - 16 -
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