Wyatt v. Atchison et al, No. 1:2012cv04906 - Document 23 (N.D. Ill. 2013)
Court Description: Enter MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 1/30/2013. Mailed notice (jdh)
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Wyatt v. Atchison et al Doc. 23 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex rel. BRANDON V. WYATT Petitioner, v. MICHAEL P. ATCHISON, Warden, Menard Correctional Center, Respondent. No. 12 C 4906 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER At the conclusion of a bench trial in February of 2005, petitioner murder Brandon and Wyatt attempted consecutive terms was armed of convicted robbery thirty-six of and and first degree sentenced six years to of incarceration for the July 17, 1999, shooting of Metra train ticket agent conviction appeals Wilbert and and state courts. Hooten. sentence Petitioner without post-conviction success proceedings challenged in in both the his direct Illinois Having no further avenues for relief in the state courts, petitioner now seeks a federal writ of habeas corpus. He asserts two claims: first, that the trial court violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment when it denied his motion to suppress his confession; and second, 1 Dockets.Justia.com that his trial counsel’s refusal to call him to testify at the suppression counsel. hearing violated his right to effective For the reasons that follow, I deny his petition and decline to issue a certificate of appealability. I. The following facts are taken--but for a few undisputed details gleaned Illinois from Appellate petitioner’s my review Court’s conviction of Rule and the record--from 23 Order sentence on the affirming direct appeal, People v. Wyatt, No. 1-05-0819 (Ill. App. Ct. Sept. 17, 2008), Resp. Ans., Exh. A (hereinafter, “Wyatt”).1 On July 10, 2000, almost a year after Hooten’s shooting, and a few months shy of petitioner’s eighteenth birthday, petitioner was awakened in the middle of the night at a friend’s house and arrested by Chicago Police Detective McVicker and another officer. Petitioner was arrested, handcuffed, taken to a squad car, and advised of his Miranda rights before being transported to Chicago’s Area 2 police station. At interview around room 2:40 at a.m., Area petitioner 2. Detective 1 was taken McVicker to removed The state court’s factual findings are presumed correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, of which, as discussed in a later section, petitioner offers none. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 324 (2003). 2 an petitioner’s handcuffs and again advised him of his Miranda rights. McVicker was wearing his firearm and did not remove it from its holster. fall asleep during At some point, petitioner began to the interview, so McVicker stopped questioning him, gave him a bathroom break, and left the interview room, telling petitioner to “yell or knock on the door if he needed anything.” McVicker checked on petitioner periodically over the next few hours and observed that he was sleeping. The Illinois Appellate Court made no mention of what, if anything, took place from that point until 2:55 the next afternoon, when it noted that petitioner was again allowed to use the bathroom. and a soda (at fingerprinted at Thereafter, petitioner was given food around some 3:30 point p.m.), palm-printed thereafter, physical lineups from 10:30 to 11:30 p.m. and placed and in After police advised petitioner that he had been identified in a lineup, petitioner confessed to Hooten’s murder. McVicker then contacted Assistant State’s Attorney Beth Pfeiffer, who interviewed petitioner at around 1:00 a.m. on July 11, 2000. Pfeiffer again advised petitioner of his Miranda rights and explained that she was not his attorney and that he could be tried as an adult. Petitioner said he understood his rights, then made inculpatory statements, 3 including a videotaped statement filmed at about 4:15 a.m. The video memorializes petitioner being orally Mirandized. Petitioner did not, however, receive written Miranda warnings. The Illinois Appellate Court summarized petitioner’s videotaped confession: [Petitioner] stated that he had a conversation with a friend and they planned the robbery. [Petitioner] stated that he shot and killed the victim when he attempted to rob him. [He] stated that he was armed with a .32 caliber revolver that he had taken from his father’s tool chest and was dressed in black jeans and a black jacket to avoid standing out. He waited on the train platform for a long time for a train which appeared to be good to rob. When the victim asked [petitioner] for his fare, [petitioner] took out his gun, pointed it at the victim and demanded his money. The victim dropped his fares and receipts but no money. [Petitioner] told the victim it was not a joke and the victim held up his keys and jingled them at [petitioner], then took a step toward [petitioner]. [Petitioner] shot the victim and then tried to open the doors. [Petitioner] tried to shoot out the windows when the doors would not open. When the doors opened, the other conductor jumped off the train and [petitioner] chased him before hiding in a garage and then returned home. [Petitioner] stated that he did not know where the gun went and that when his father asked, he told him that he was in the alley shooting with friends and threw the gun away when the police came. [Petitioner] apologized to the victim’s family and his own family for his actions. [Petitioner] stated that he was treated “fairly good” and with respect and dignity by the police. [Petitioner] stated that no threats or promises were made in exchange for his statement. 4 Before the start of the trial, petitioner moved to suppress the inculpatory arrest. A following factual review of statements he petitioner’s allegations: 1) made after his reveals the petitioner was motion that seventeen years old and living with his parents at the time of his arrest; 2) that he was awakened from sleep by the arresting officers; 3) that he was deprived of sleep and continuously interrogated by members of the Chicago Police Department and ASA Pfeiffer during his custody; 4) that his waiver of his Miranda rights was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; 5) that his statements were the “product of coercion” by the police and were “induced by overcoming his will to resist through sleep deprivation, refusal to afford him the opportunity to confer with counsel and his lack of experience with criminal matters” and “by direct and indirect promises of leniency by ASA Pfeiffer;” 6) that he was denied bathroom privileges for over fourteen hours; 7) that he was in custody for over twenty-two hours; and 8) that he was interrogated outside the presence of a youth officer or concerned adult. As noted suppression evidence. above, hearing, The petitioner nor trial did court 5 did his did, not testify attorney however, at the on any treat the put allegations in petitioner’s motion as petitioner’s sworn statement of the facts. The court denied the motion, petitioner’s statement was voluntary. concluding that The court rejected the argument that the confession was “clearly an act” and that petitioner had “merely regurgitated a script created by the police.” state’s The court found that the testimony of the witnesses--including Pfeiffer, both of whom Detective denied McVicker that and petitioner ASA was interrogated for twenty-two hours, and denied that they had deprived credible. him of sleep or of bathroom privileges--was The court further found that the state had shown that petitioner had been properly advised of his Miranda rights and had knowingly waived them, and that no “improper actions” by the state had been established. At trial, petitioner’s videotaped confession was shown, as was the testimony of McVicker, Pfeiffer, and several eyewitnesses to the events surrounding Hooten’s shooting: train conductors who had seen Dace and petitioner on the train platform; the train conductor who worked with Hooten at the time of the shooting, and who identified petitioner, in a lineup and at trial, as the shooter; and a passenger on the train, who testified that she saw petitioner running 6 after the conductor and who likewise identified him, in a lineup and at trial, as the man with a gun. The trial court also considered evidence that fingerprints taken from the crime scene matched only Dace, and not petitioner; that a .32 caliber bullet was found in the victim and .38 caliber bullets were recovered from the train vestibule; recovered. referred In to and that rendering petitioner’s the its murder verdict, videotaped weapon the was never trial court confession as the “linchpin” of the State’s case. Petitioner asserted various claims on direct appeal and in post-conviction proceedings. Relevant to the instant petition are his claim, on direct appeal, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress based on the erroneous determination confession was voluntary, that and petitioner’s his claim, videotaped in a post- conviction petition, that his trial counsel was ineffective for refusing to let suppression motion. him testify at the hearing on his Both claims were rejected in Rule 23 Orders by the Illinois Court of Appeals, the last state court to issue an opinion in his case. II. Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a federal court may not grant a state 7 prisoner habeas relief unless the decision of the highest state court to adjudicate the petitioner’s claims on the merits, “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Smiley v. Thurmer, 542 F.3d 574, at 580 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). Moreover, “[w]hen the last state court to issue an opinion on a petitioner’s federal claim has resolved that claim on an adequate and independent state ground, foreclosed. federal Miranda habeas v. review Leibach, of 394 the F.3d claim 984 is (citing Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 523, 117 S.Ct. 1517, 137 L.Ed.2d 771 (1997) (collecting cases)). In this case, respondent argues that petitioner’s first claim-—that the trial court erroneously failed to suppress his confession--is procedurally defaulted because the Illinois Appellate Court rejected it based on a state law procedural ground, namely petitioner’s failure to abide by 725 ILCS 5/116-1(c). court held, “any issue Under that statute, the appellate that is not specifically raised during trial by motion or proper objection and by written 8 posttrial motion is considered waived.” Wyatt, at 7. The court went on to hold that “this rule is grounded in sound policy and must be strictly followed,” quoting at length from the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186-88 (1988). The court considered and rejected petitioner’s argument that he had preserved his claim with the assertion, in his motion for a new trial, that he “did not receive a fair and impartial trial as guaranteed by the Illinois and federal constitutions.” specificity The required court must held, be however, beyond that broad, “the general statements or boiler-plate language,” and concluded that petitioner’s allegation “in no way contains any specific claim of error to put the trial court or the State on notice” of the specific claim he raised on appeal, and thus “cuts clearly against the policy” set forth in Enoch. It is true that the Illinois Appellate Court went on to consider the merits of petitioner’s claim. But as the Seventh Circuit has repeatedly acknowledged, “when a state court decides the merits and asserts a procedural bar, the federal court must respect both rulings.” Brooks v. Walls, 279 F.3d 518, 522 (7th Cir. 2002); Prihoda v. McCaughtry, 910 F.2d 1379, 1383-84 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[s]ometimes the court gives alternative procedural and substantive grounds 9 (‘The claim has been waived; but even if it had not been we would find no error.’)… [I]n alternative-grounds cases the federal court must respect the procedural basis, so long as the state court says that each ground is sufficient.”); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n. 10 (1989) (“a state court need not fear reaching the merits of a federal claim in an alternative holding. By its very definition, the adequate and independent state ground doctrine requires the federal court to honor a state holding that is a sufficient basis for the state court’s judgment, even when the state court also relies on federal law.”). Petitioner argues that his case is not like Brooks and Prihoda, in which the petitioners’ claims were defaulted, but instead is like Harris, in which the Court held that procedural default did not bar consideration of the petitioner’s federal claims because the Illinois Appellate Court had not “clearly and expressly” rested its holding on a state procedural ground. 489 U.S. at 263. Petitioner insists that similarly in his case, the Illinois Appellate Court did not rely on the state forfeiture law as a ground for its decision, but merely “note[d] a procedural default and then ignore[d] it,” preserving his claim under Harris. Petitioner’s proposed interpretation of the appellate decision in his case cannot be squared with the court’s 10 thorough discussion of the waiver issue. Unlike in Harris, where the Illinois Appellate Court had merely “stat[ed] that most of petitioner’s allegations “could have been raised [on] direct appeal,” 489 U.S. at 266, the court in this case cited the controlling state statutory and case law; explained the policy considerations underlying the law; and expressly applied the law in rejecting petitioner’s argument for non-waiver. notwithstanding,” claim. Wyatt, Only then did the court go on, “[w]aiver to at address 8. the Viewed merits as a of whole, petitioner’s the Illinois Appellate Court’s decision plainly sets forth alternative procedural and substantive bases for its holding, which I am compelled by respect. Accordingly, I conclude that petitioner’s claim that trial the Prihoda, court Brooks, violated and, his indeed, Fourteenth Harris to Amendment rights by failing to suppress his confession is procedurally defaulted.2 I now turn to petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which I review on the merits. To prevail on this claim, petitioner must meet the well-known, two-prong standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), 2 Petitioner does not claim that the default is excused by “cause and prejudice,” or that the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception to the procedural default rule applies. See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536 (2006). 11 under which he “must show both that his lawyer’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as measured by prevailing professional norms, and also that the petitioner errors.” 2009). either suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s Pole v. Randolph, 570 F.3d 922, 940 (7th Cir. If petitioner fails to make an adequate showing on component, I need not consider the other before rejecting his claim. Id. at 934 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 and Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 241 (2009)). The Illinois Appellate Court in this case correctly cited Strickland as the governing standard and accurately quoted from Strickland in holding that petitioner was required to show “(1) that his counsel’s ‘representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness;’ and (2) that there is a ‘reasonable counsel’s unprofessional proceeding would have probability errors, been the different.’” that, but for of the result Rule 23 Order, People v. Wyatt, No. 1-09-3244 (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 3, 2011), Resp. Ans., Exh. K, at 6-7 (“Wyatt II”). The court went on to analyze petitioner’s claim, including his argument that he was prejudiced by his attorney’s failure to call him at the suppression hearing because “[petitioner] and only [petitioner] could provide testimony and evidence in support of the claim that his statement was involuntary and should 12 be suppressed.” ultimately Wyatt rejected II at 8. petitioner’s The claim, appellate court concluding that nothing in the record, including the affidavits petitioner submitted in “indicate[d] support that of the his post-conviction proceedings would have petitione, changed if defendant would have testified” at his suppression hearing.” Id. at 9. Petitioner argues that the Illinois Appellate Court’s decision amounts Strickland to because an its unreasonable conclusion application omits the of “reasonable probability” portion of the controlling standard. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has held that this omission “is not a mere detail or a quibble over word-smithing,” and that a state court decision resting on a standard that omits the phrase is “contrary to” clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)(1). Mosley v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 838, 850 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). The Seventh Circuit has also held, however, that “[w]e have noted numerous times that there is no error when a court has correctly noted the Strickland standard and then used an incorrect shorthand version when stating its conclusion.” Woods v. Schwartz, 589 F.3d 368, 378 n. 3 (7th Cir. 2009). That is plainly what happened in this case. 13 Moreover, the Illinois Appellate Court’s application of Strickland was reasonable on the record before it. In view of the deficiency petitioner attributes to his counsel--counsel’s refusal to allow petitioner to testify at the suppression hearing--petitioner “must demonstrate that, had he testified, there was both a reasonable probability that he would have prevailed on the motion to suppress and a reasonable probability that he would have been acquitted.” Pole, 570 F.3d at 943. The Illinois Appellate Court considered petitioner’s argument that “had he been allowed to testify, he would have clarified his emotional state while in custody, his lack of experience with the criminal justice system and the promises made by his interrogators, while also providing more specificity about the amount of time, sleep and bathroom breaks he was afforded while in custody,” but concluded that none of the evidence in the record rebutted the evidence of voluntariness that the State had presented suppress. at the hearing Wyatt II, at 9. on petitioner’s motion to Indeed, the affidavit supporting petitioner’s post-conviction petition states only, “[i]f I had been allowed to testify, I would of (sic) given information/testimony on assurances of leniency and coercion by Detectives Donald Buis, Robert McVicker, and Assistant State’s Attorney Beth Pfeiffer, while in custody at Area Two 14 police station.” Petitioner did not specify, however, what his testimony would have been, or explain how it would have tipped the scales in his favor at the suppression hearing. Whether a confession is voluntary totality of the circumstances. depends on the Pole, 570 F.3d at 941. Petitioner does not dispute that the trial court treated the factual allegations in his petitioner’s sworn statements. motion to suppress as These allegations included the very factors about which petitioner claims he would have testified: his youth, his inexperience with the criminal justice system, the length of his incarceration, and the alleged coercion by the police and the Assistant State’s Attorney. The Illinois Appellate Court reasonably concluded that generalities petitioner affidavit not the conviction were asserted reasonably in his likely turned the tables at his suppression hearing. to posthave And because petitioner has not shown a reasonable probability that he would have prevailed on his suppression motion, he has not established prejudice under Strickland. Pole, 570 F.3d at 943. III. For the foregoing reasons, petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied. For the same reasons, I conclude that petitioner has not made “a substantial showing 15 of the denial of a constitutional right” as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) and decline to issue a certificate of appealability. ENTER ORDER: _____________________________ Elaine E. Bucklo United States District Judge Dated: January 30, 2013 16
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