Simmons v. Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC, No. 4:2014cv00294 - Document 41 (D. Idaho 2016)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER denying 21 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (cjs)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO BRIAN SIMMONS, Case No. 4:14-cv-00294-BLW Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER v. BATTELLE ENERGY ALLIANCE, LLC, Defendant. INTRODUCTION Pending before the Court is defendant Battelle Energy Alliance’s motion to reconsider. The motion is fully briefed and at issue. For the reasons explained below, the Court will deny the motion. ANALYSIS Battelle seeks reconsider of the Court’s decision denying Battelle’s motion to dismiss. See Memorandum Decision & Order (Dkt. No. 19). Battelle claims that this Court overlooked Idaho case law in holding that plaintiff Brian Simmons is not relegated to his worker’s compensation remedies at this stage of the litigation. Plaintiff Simmons is a nuclear operator employed by Battelle. On November 8, 2011, Simmons was exposed to radioactive dust while repackaging radioactive fuel plates at Battelle’s facility. He sued Battelle, claiming that he was injured by the exposure and Memorandum Decision & Order – page 1 the subsequent medical treatment rendered by Battelle. He has made claims under the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA), the Price-Anderson Act (PAA), and various Idaho state laws. Battelle responded by filing a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Simmons’ only remedy is through Idaho’s worker’s compensation system. Generally, that system provides the exclusive remedy for injuries occurring on the job. See Idaho Code §§ 72-201, 72-209. But there is an exception “in any case where the injury or death is proximately caused by the willful or unprovoked physical aggression of the employer . . . .” See Idaho Code § 72-209(3). Battelle argued that even if Simmons’ allegations were true, they did not rise to the level of a “willful or unprovoked physical aggression” by his employer. The Court disagreed, relying on Dominguez ex rel. Hamp v. Evergreen Res., Inc., 121 P.3d 938, 942 (Idaho 2005), to hold that Simmons had at least alleged sufficient facts to overcome a motion to dismiss. In Dominguez, an employee filed a tort action against his employer in state court after he was seriously injured when his employer sent him to work in a confined space containing cyanide sludge. The employer knew of the sludge and its danger but concealed that from the employee. The question before the Idaho Supreme Court was whether “the district court was without jurisdiction to hear Dominguez’s suit because a worker’s compensation claim was Dominguez’s only available remedy.” Id. at 941. The court held that “Dominquez has alleged a willful or unprovoked physical aggression by Memorandum Decision & Order – page 2 his employer, and therefore his claim falls into a statutory exception [for willful or unprovoked physical aggression] to the exclusive remedy rule.” Id. at 943. Thus, under Dominquez, Simmons can avoid a motion to dismiss by alleging that his employer intentionally caused him to encounter a known hazard that would cause substantial physical harm while concealing the danger from Simmons. Because Simmons alleged those facts, the Court denied the motion to dismiss. In seeking reconsideration, Battelle argues that Simmons has failed to match the allegations in Dominquez. Battelle claims that Simmons is not definitively alleging that Battelle knew the full risk but is instead vaguely alleging that Battelle knew some undefined risk. See Defense Brief (Dkt. No. 24) at p. 6. The Court disagrees. The complaint alleges that Battelle management (1) was well-aware of “the known extremely dangerous hazard associated with damaged fuel plates,” (2) knew that protective clothing “did not work properly,” (3) concealed the danger from Simmons, and (4) “intentionally ignored a known risk from the damaged fuel plates and directed the work to proceed in spite of the known risks of exposure to and inhalation of radioactive particles.” See Complaint, supra, at ¶¶ 22, 26 & 91. These allegations place this case squarely within Dominquez. Battelle argues next that Dominquez did not deal directly with the aggression exception, and that the Court should have relied instead on two earlier cases, Kearney v. Denker, 760 P.2d 1171 (Id.Sup.Ct. 1988) and DeMoss v. City of Coeur d’Alene, 795 P.2d 875 (Id.Sup.Ct.1990). But this argument ignores the statement in Dominquez – quoted Memorandum Decision & Order – page 3 above – that the complaint’s allegations fell within the aggression exception. That statement applies directly to this case and cannot be ignored. In contrast, Kearney and DeMoss were decided on summary judgment, both holding that the plaintiffs failed to produce sufficient evidence to fall within the aggression exception. This case has not yet reached that stage – the Court is evaluating the sufficiency of allegations on a motion to dismiss, and Dominquez controls the outcome. For all of these reasons, the Court will deny the motion to reconsider. ORDER In accordance with the Memorandum Decision set forth above, NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the motion to reconsider (docket no. 21) is DENIED. DATED: April 12, 2016 _________________________ B. Lynn Winmill Chief Judge United States District Court Memorandum Decision & Order – page 4
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