Wicklund v. Huntsman et al, No. 1:2010cv00341 - Document 33 (D. Idaho 2011)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Granting 22 MOTION for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge William B. Shubb. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by jm)
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Wicklund v. Huntsman et al Doc. 33 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO 9 ----oo0oo---- 10 MARK S. WICKLUND, an individual, NO. CIV. 1:10-341 WBS Plaintiff, 11 v. 12 13 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 16 PAMELA HUNTSMAN, an individual, THOMAS HEARN, an individual, GARY O. HORTON, an individual, MOSCELENE SUNDERLAND, an individual, and KATHY BAIRD, an individual, and SEXUAL OFFENDER CLASSIFICATION BOARD, 17 Defendants. 14 15 18 / 19 ----oo0oo---20 21 Plaintiff Mark Wicklund brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 22 action against defendants Pamela Huntsman, Thomas Hearn, Gary 23 Horton, Moscelene Sunderland, Kathy Baird, and the Sexual 24 Offender Classification Board (“SOCB” or “Board”) arising out of 25 defendants’ alleged violation of plaintiff’s right to due 26 process. 27 summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 28 I. Presently before this court is defendants’ motion for Factual and Procedural Background 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Plaintiff has been convicted of multiple sexual 2 offenses in multiple states. 3 Ex. 3.) 4 he qualified as a “violent sexual predator” (“VSP”) after 5 violating his parole as to a 2001 conviction. 6 SOCB 169-71.) 7 him as VSP in a notice dated April 25, 2008. 8 9 (Baird Aff. Ex. 4 at 103, 178-314; Plaintiff was referred to the SOCB to determine whether (Id. at Ex. 4, Plaintiff was notified that the SOCB designated Defendants Huntsman, Hearn, Horton, and Sunderland were members of the SOCB when plaintiff’s VSP determination was made. 10 Baird served as secretary for the SOCB, but was not an SOCB 11 member. 12 decision to categorize plaintiff as a VSP. 13 Baird claims that she did not participate in the (Id. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff’s VSP designation was conducted pursuant to 14 the Sexual Offender Registration Notification and Community 15 Right-to-Know Act (“Act”), Idaho Code Ann. § 18-8301 (2008), 16 invalidated by Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822 (2009). 17 defined as “a person who has been convicted of an offense listed 18 in section 18-8314, Idaho Code, and who has been determined to 19 pose a high risk of committing an offense or engaging in 20 predatory sexual conduct.” 21 various factors that the SOCB could consider in making its 22 determination, id. § 18-8314(5)(b), but regardless of the 23 guideline, an offender could be designated a VSP based on a 24 determination that the offender intends to reoffend, id. § 18- 25 8314(6). 26 Id. § 18-8303(15). A VSP was The Act described On February 10, 2009, the Idaho Supreme Court held in 27 Smith v. State that there were “significant constitutional 28 shortcomings in the statutory procedure [for determining VSP 2 1 status] . . . .” 2 decision in Smith, the state district court issued an order on 3 April 3, 2009, vacating plaintiff’s VSP designation. 4 Vacating VSP Designation & Remand, No. CV OC 2008-08265 (Ada 5 Cnty. Dist. Ct. Apr. 3, 2009). 6 the order, the SOCB meeting minutes indicating that plaintiff was 7 a VSP remained public and available on the internet. 8 27.) 9 Smith, 146 Idaho at 827. As a result of the See Order Plaintiff alleges that, following (Compl. ¶ In October 2009, pursuant to plaintiff’s request, the 10 SOCB amended their meeting notes regarding plaintiff’s 11 designation to read: 12 13 Probationer Mark Wicklund, #64908 was designated a violent sexual predator. Amendment: This designation was vacated pursuant to the court’s order in Ada County Case No. CV OC 2008-08265. 14 15 (Baird Aff. ¶ 9, Ex. 9.) 16 meeting notes were not published to the internet until February 17 2010, and that the amended version of the notes continues to 18 stigmatize him. 19 Plaintiff alleges that the amended (Compl. ¶¶ 30, 31.) Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this case on July 6, 20 2010, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 21 Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated “his due process 22 rights by designating him a [VSP] without granting him the 23 opportunity to participate or otherwise defend himself in the 24 process.” 25 on the grounds that plaintiff’s claims are untimely; plaintiff’s 26 claim against the SOCB and his official capacity claims against 27 the individual defendants are barred by the Eleventh Amendment; 28 defendants are not subject to § 1983 liability; plaintiff’s claim (Id. ¶ 37.) (Docket No. 1.) Defendants now move for summary judgment 3 1 is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; defendants are entitled 2 to absolute and qualified immunity; and plaintiff fails to plead 3 facts supporting his claim for stigma damages.1 4 II. Discussion 5 Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that 6 there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 7 movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 8 P. 56(a). 9 of the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a Fed. R. Civ. A material fact is one that could affect the outcome 10 reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party’s 11 favor. 12 (1986). 13 burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material 14 fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that 15 negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s case. 16 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 17 Alternatively, the moving party can demonstrate that the 18 non-moving party cannot produce evidence to support an essential 19 element upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. 20 Id. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial 21 Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the 22 burden shifts to the non-moving party to “designate ‘specific 23 facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” 24 324 (quoting then-Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). 25 the non-moving party must “do more than simply show that there is Id. at To carry this burden, 26 27 28 1 Plaintiff has agreed to dismiss his claims against defendants SOCB and Baird. (Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J. at 7.) 4 1 some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita 2 Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 3 “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence . . . will be 4 insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could 5 reasonably find for the [non-moving party].” 6 at 252. Anderson, 477 U.S. 7 In deciding a summary judgment motion, the court must 8 view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving 9 party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Id. at 10 255. 11 and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury 12 functions, not those of a judge . . . ruling on a motion for 13 summary judgment . . . .” 14 “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, A. Id. Absolute Immunity 15 Defendants contend that they are entitled to absolute 16 judicial immunity because they perform quasi-judicial functions 17 as members of the SOCB. 18 “entitled to absolute immunity as their actions meet the 19 definition of quasi-judicial functions.” 20 Mot. for Summ. J. at 5.) 21 law surrounding quasi-judicial immunity “is ripe to be overturned 22 and/or further limited.” 23 Plaintiff concedes that defendants are (Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Instead, plaintiff argues that the case Id. It is well-established that judges and those performing 24 judge-like functions are absolutely immune from damage liability 25 for acts performed in their official capacities. 26 Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 27 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986). 28 protections of absolute immunity to qualifying state officials Stump v. “[C]ourts have extended the 5 1 sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” 2 363 F.3d 916, 923 (9th Cir. 2004). 3 immunity is a question of law.” 4 Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., “The determination of Id. at 921. “Absolute immunity flows not from rank or title . . . 5 but from the nature of the responsibilities of the individual 6 official.” 7 Supreme Court has developed the “functional approach” in 8 determining if immunity is appropriate. 9 The court “must consider whether the actions taken by the Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 201 (1985). The Olsen, 393 F.3d at 923. 10 official are ‘functionally comparable’ to that of a judge or a 11 prosecutor.” 12 judicial. 13 2008). 14 factors that are characteristic of judicial decisionmaking under 15 the functional approach: 16 17 18 Id. Such activities are referred to as quasi- See Miller v. Davis, 521 F.3d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir. The United States Supreme Court has outlined several (1) the need to insulate the official from harassment or intimidation; (2) the presence of procedural safeguards to reduce unconstitutional conduct; (3) insulation from political influence; (4) the importance of precedent in the official’s decision; (5) the adversary nature of the process; and (6) the correctability of error on appeal. 19 20 Id. at 1145 (citing Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 202). 21 factors is nonexhaustive, however, and an official need not 22 satisfy every factor to be entitled to absolute quasi-judicial 23 immunity.” 24 “This list of Id. The factual allegations against defendants concern only 25 their role as official decisionmakers on the SOCB. 26 bears significant resemblance to the decisionmaking conducted by 27 parole board officers, for which the parole board officers are 28 entitled to absolute judicial immunity. 6 This role See Sellers v. 1 Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1303 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that 2 parole board members are entitled to absolute immunity); Miller, 3 521 F.3d at 1145-46 (holding that the governor’s review of parole 4 board decisions is entitled to absolute immunity); see also 5 Stafford v. Powers, No. 10-35356, 2011 WL 3585621, at *1 (9th 6 Cir. Aug. 16, 2011) (holding that parole board members are 7 entitled to absolute immunity for their decision to designate an 8 individual as a predatory sex offender without an evidentiary 9 hearing). 10 i. The Need to Insulate the Official from Harassment or Intimidation 11 12 As members of the SOCB, defendants were charged with 13 “determin[ing] whether the offender should be designated as a 14 violent sexual predator presenting a high risk of reoffense.” 15 Idaho Code Ann. § 18-8314(1) (2008). 16 were subject to suit by every disgruntled sexual offender who 17 came before the SOCB, the Board’s functioning would have been 18 significantly impaired. 19 members, if Board members knew they could be dragged into court 20 over each VSP designation, “there is the same danger that the 21 decision-maker might not impartially adjudicate the often 22 difficult cases that come before them.” 23 1303. 24 25 26 ii. If individual board members Just as with judges or parole board Sellers, 641 F.2d at The Presence of Procedural Safeguards to Reduce Unconstitutional Conduct The Idaho statute establishing the SOCB requires the 27 Board to promulgate and use “guidelines to determine whether an 28 offender who meets the criteria of this section is a violent 7 1 sexual predator presenting a high risk of reoffense.” Idaho Code 2 Ann. § 18-8314(5) (2008). 3 written findings that included the Board’s risk assessment, the 4 basis for the risk assessment, the Board’s determination, and the 5 basis for the determination. 6 Consistent with the Idaho statute, the Board promulgated rules to 7 determine if an offender’s “risk of re-offending sexually or 8 threat of violence is of a sufficient concern to warrant the 9 [VSP] designation for the safety of the community.” The Board was also required to make See id. § 18-8314(5)(b). Smith, 146 10 Idaho at 826. To make this determination, the Board “assess[ed] 11 how biological, psychological, and situational factors, may cause 12 or contribute to the offender’s sexual behavior.” 13 the Board’s determination, it was required to provide the 14 offender with notice of the proceeding’s outcome. 15 Ann. § 18-8319(1) (2008). 16 the Board’s determinations, including the requirement to make 17 written findings, closely resembles judicial decisionmaking. 18 iii. Insulation from Political Influence 19 Defendants were appointed by the governor by and with Id. Following Idaho Code The procedural safeguards governing Id. § 18-8312(1). 20 the advice and consent of the Idaho Senate. 21 Board members could only be removed “for reasons of inefficiency, 22 neglect of duty, malfeasance in office, commission of a felony or 23 inability to perform the duties of office.” 24 SOCB thus was insulated from political influence because 25 individual Board members could not be removed at will. 26 27 28 iv. Id. § 18-8313. The Importance of Precedent in the Official’s Decision While defendants do not argue that the SOCB was 8 The 1 required to consider precedent, it does appear that the Board was 2 required to consider the application of its promulgated rules in 3 making its determination as to an individual’s VSP status. 4 suggests that defendants were indeed required to consider 5 precedent in reaching their decisions. This 6 v. 7 The SOCB procedures were not adversarial in nature as 8 The Adversary Nature of the Process offenders are not invited to participate in the proceedings. 9 vi. The Correctability of Error on Appeal The SOCB was required to provide the offender notice of 10 11 its determination. 12 to challenge the VSP designation by judicial review. 13 8319(a); Lichtner v. Idaho, 142 Idaho 324, 326 (Ct. App. 2005) 14 (“An offender’s challenge to being designated as a VSP initiates 15 a ‘nonadversarial’ proceeding which is civil and remedial in 16 nature.”). 17 review process was imperfect and violated offenders’ procedural 18 due process rights because “the offender is provided only a 19 summary of the information considered by the Board, presenting 20 little meaningful opportunity to respond to specific information 21 considered by the Board.” 22 problem, errors by the SOCB were subject to judicial review and 23 were correctable on appeal. 24 Id. § 18-8319(1). An offender was then able Id. § 18- The Idaho Supreme Court noted in Smith that this Smith, 146 Idaho at 830. Despite this Id. at 1226-29. The need to insulate Board members from harassment, the 25 statutorily imposed procedural safeguards, the Board’s political 26 independence, the importance of precedent, and the availability 27 of judicial review all functionally resemble judicial 28 decisionmaking. Board members’ determinations of offenders’ VSP 9 1 status “shares enough of the characteristics of the judicial 2 process,” Butz, 438 U.S. at 513, to warrant absolute quasi- 3 judicial immunity. Despite the fact that defendants are entitled to 4 5 absolute immunity, plaintiff urges this court to overturn or 6 narrow the scope of the existing case law. 7 argues that current case law on absolute immunity should be 8 overturned because it ignores the fact that “[s]imply because a 9 choice involves discretion does not mean it is a judicial act.” First, plaintiff 10 (Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 6.) 11 contention oversimplifies the absolute immunity jurisprudence -- 12 discretion alone is not determinative of whether a decision is 13 quasi-judicial, rather courts apply a “functional approach” to 14 distinguish whether an action is comparable to those taken by 15 judges. 16 Board’s work classifying individuals, they “act[ed] more [as] 17 psychologists or mental health professionals than judges” and 18 were not engaged in factfinding. 19 Summ. J. at 5.) 20 professional judgments as mental health professionals is not 21 determinative, as professional judgment is often required by 22 judges and prosecutors in their decisionmaking. Olsen, 393 F.3d at 923. Plaintiff’s Plaintiff argues that in the (Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. for The fact that SOCB members are exercising their 23 Second, plaintiff argues that his VSP designation, and 24 the Board’s actions generally, violate his Sixth Amendment right 25 to have findings of fact made by a jury.2 26 Mot. for Summ. J. at 6.) (Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Plaintiff fails to address how this is 27 2 28 Plaintiff’s has not alleged a § 1983 claim based on a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. 10 1 relevant to absolute immunity. This argument directly 2 contradicts plaintiff’s contention above that the SOCB was not 3 engaged in factfinding, by contending that Board’s determination 4 was based on factfinding that should have been done by a jury. 5 Furthermore, plaintiff’s reliance on Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 6 584 (2002), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), is 7 misplaced because those cases dealt with non-jury factfinding 8 being used to expose the defendant to a higher penalties under 9 federal sentencing guidelines. In other words, the decisions in 10 Ring and Apprendi objected to the punitive nature of the 11 determination. 12 been upheld as both nonpunitive and not violations of the Ex Post 13 Facto clause. 14 v. Bonner, 356 F.3d 955, 961-67 (9th Cir. 2004). 15 not determine if an offender should be registered as a sexual 16 offender, it determines whether the offender should be registered 17 at a higher classification as a VSP. 18 must update their registration more often than non-VSP sexual 19 offenders, but it is still a nonpunitive registration 20 requirement. 21 Sexual offender registration laws have previously Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105-06 (2003); Hatton The SOCB does Offenders classified as VSP Finally, plaintiff “asks this Court to carve out an 22 exception from current case law for instances where agencies act 23 outside a proper delegation of judicial authority.” 24 to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 6.) 25 a new exception, as such an exception already exists in the case 26 law. 27 judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took 28 was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his (Pl.’s Resp. There is no need to carve out See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 349-50 (1978) (“A 11 1 authority, but rather he will be subject to liability only when 2 he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” 3 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 351 (1871))). 4 case, however, plaintiff does not claim that defendants’ action 5 exceeded their delegation of authority from the legislature. 6 the contrary, plaintiff argues that defendants acted pursuant to 7 that delegation, and it is the delegation which he contends was 8 unconstitutional. 9 defendants acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. 10 In this To This is not a case where it can be argued that Plaintiff’s arguments for overturning existing 11 precedent are not compelling. 12 precedent established by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and 13 the United States Supreme Court. 14 are entitled to absolute immunity, the court will grant 15 defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 16 B. 17 This court is bound to follow the Accordingly, because defendants Remaining Summary Judgment Arguments Because the court will grant defendants’ motion for 18 summary judgment on absolute immunity grounds, it need not 19 address defendants’ other arguments. 20 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion for 21 summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. 22 DATED: October 28, 2011 23 24 25 26 27 28 12
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