Alcocer v. Bulloch County Sheriff's Office et al, No. 6:2015cv00094 - Document 109 (S.D. Ga. 2017)

Court Description: ORDER granting in part and denying in part 57 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 71 Motion to Strike 57 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 72 MOTION to Strike 55 Expert Witness Report, 51 Expert Witness Report, 65 Notic e of Filing, (Daubert Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Robert Yarbrough, 71 MOTION to Strike 57 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 51 Expert Witness Report, 56 Expert Witness Report, 65 Notice of Filing, (Daubert Motion to Exclude Expert Witness Testimony by Richard Milligan) ; denying 72 Motion to Strike. Signed by Chief Judge J. Randal Hall on 9/29/17. (jrb)
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Alcocer v. Bulloch County Sheriff's Office et al IN THE UNITED Doc. 109 STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA STATESBORO DIVISION FILED Scott L. Poff, Clerk United States District Court JUDITH ALCOCER, * By James Burrell at 4:55 pm, Sep 29, 2017 Plaintiff, * CV * BULLOCH COUNTY SHERIFF'S 615-94 * OFFICE et al. , * Defendants. * ORDER Presently before the Court is a motion for summary judgment (doc. 72) 57) and two motions to exclude expert testimony (docs. 71, filed by Defendants, Randall Norman, Captain John Plaintiff, Sergeant Staten, Sheriff Kent Munsey, and Captain Judith Alcocer, Lynn Jason M. Anderson, Jailer Ashley Kearney. Deputy Mills, (Doc. 57.) has sued for damages under § 1983 alleging that Defendants committed a variety of constitutional violations. Defendants claim that they constitutional violations and that they cannot for damages under 18 U.S.C. § 1983. and DENIES IN PART Defendants' committed no be found liable The Court GRANTS IN PART motion for summary judgment and it DENIES Defendants' motion to exclude expert testimony. Dockets.Justia.com I. At approximately Randall Norman and Sheriff's Office east on U.S. at 2.) p.m. Sergeant Highway 80 on Kent January Munsey Plaintiff's Information that the license. (Doc. 57-1 at vehicle's owner, he of 2.) the license County vehicle the road (Doc. plate ("GCIC"), the onto Deputy Bulloch Georgia. 94-2 through Deputy had Suspecting that pulled 2014, observed Plaintiff driving Center owner 30, of in Bulloch County, running Crime discovered 1:30 ("Sheriff's Office") After Georgia BACKGROUND a the Norman suspended Plaintiff was the to stop Plaintiff. (Id.) Before Deputy Norman could activate his lights, however, Plaintiff pulled into a convenience store parking lot and went inside to followed store. make her a into (Doc. (Doc. purchase. the parking 57-1 at 2.) 105 at 4.) Deputy lot and confronted Plaintiff license, a arrested transported her citation her to Detention driving the misdemeanor Bulloch including GCIC, a He then suspended offense, Detention and Center (Id. ) Center "automatically with County staff booked Plaintiff fingerprints into the computer system. then (Id. ) for for the ("Detention Center") . in the Deputy Norman confirmed Plaintiff's identify and that she was the vehicle's owner. issued her Norman sent NCIC, and to 2 scanned her Plaintiff's prints were several federal and different law databases, enforcement agency databases." Office (Doc. 57-1 at 4.) received a ("I.C.E."). (Doc. fax Around 2 p.m., the from Immigration and Customs 97-1 at 2.) Sheriff's Enforcement It stated: I.C.E. records indicate that this subject is not legally in the United States and appears to be subject to removal proceedings. . . . This is not a government detainer. This information is for law enforcement use and is being provided for informational purposes only. This response is not supported by fingerprints. (Id.) While sister, 96 at Detention Center Susana Hinojosa, 8-11.) Mrs. staff were booking Plaintiff, attempted to secure her release. Hinojosa asked Detention Center she needed to do to get Plaintiff out of jail. They told Mrs. (Id. ) Mrs. her (Doc. staff what (Id. at 10.) Hinojosa that Plaintiff needed a $2,000 bond. Hinojosa walked across the street to a bonding company, secured a bond for Plaintiff, returned to the Detention Center, and awaited Plaintiff's release. After waiting several Mrs. Hinojosa. (Id. at 12) Center would not release hours, (Id. at 10-12.) the bonding company called It informed her that the Detention Plaintiff because Plaintiff was an I.C.E. hold. (Id.) Mrs. Hinojosa once again Detention Center staff about Plaintiff's release. Detention Center staff confirmed that they would Plaintiff because I.C.E. had placed a hold on her. Naturally, informed Mrs. Detention Hinojosa protested. Center staff that (Id. Plaintiff under questioned (Id. ) not release (Id.) at was 13.) She a United States citizen born in South what documentation she (Id.) Detention Hinojosa. Carolina. (Id.) Center Ultimately, staff, she The next morning, efforts. (Id. however, failed to 11 a.m. the January 31, at every fifteen minutes 15-16.) Franks, Sheriff's Mrs. an I.C.E. asked Office agent. Mrs. called until at Plaintiff's Mrs. release (Id. at 13-14.) Hinojosa continued the 11 finally (Id. ignored a.m. gave 16.) Sheriff's (Id. ) her a Office Around number for She eventually reached (Id. at 17, 19.) Mr. Franks told Hinojosa that he would contact the Sheriff's Office to see why it was would She largely secure 2014, from 8 a.m. I.C.E.'s Savannah office. Mr. also needed to prove Plaintiff's citizenship. and had to return home for the evening. her She holding look into Lastly, he certificate, sending an told (Id. at 20.) order to release Plaintiff. (Id. ) take Plaintiff's birth Plaintiff. Mrs. social Hinojosa security card, medical records to the Sheriff's Office. Mrs. Hinojosa to He also records, said he and school (Id.) followed Mr. Frank's instructions and took the suggested paperwork to the Detention Center around 12 p.m. that day. (Id. at 15, 23.) According to Mrs. Hinojosa, when she tried to show the paperwork to the Detention Center staff, "they didn't want to look at it because they told me ICE had a hold. look So they were very rude. at that. So I can't They were like we don't need to even tell you who paperwork to because they didn't look at it." I showed (Id. the at 24.) Still unable to secure Plaintiff's release, Mrs. the paperwork with her and returned to her job. Later in the day, her that he release sent was Mr. Frank's called Mrs. sending a fax ordering the Plaintiff. by Mr. (Id. Franks at 21.) states The 3:39 2014 — (Id. at 23.) Hinojosa to tell Detention Center to time stamp p.m. Plaintiff left the Detention Center at Hinojosa took (Doc. 5:44 p.m. on the 94-5 order at 2.) on January 31, approximately 25 hours after her initial arrival. (Doc. 94-1 at 2.) Defendants, for their part, never explicitly deny that they were holding Plaintiff because of the detainer. deny that Hinojosa. after they refused Plaintiff's that [I.C.E.] office arrest the secured a bond — was .... judgment dispute the bond as "received previously a placed by Mrs. notification by the from Savannah "in any [ ] left and the [Detention Center] event, Plaintiff at (Doc. 57-6 at 5.) STANDARD OF REVIEW is appropriate to any material only fact if "there and the entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 56(a). secured and cancelled," II. genuine they detainer approximately 5:45 p.m." Summary post they state only that on January 31 — the day Rather, [I.C.E.] to Neither do they Fed. is no movant is R. Civ. P. Facts are "material" if they could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law, and a dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable return a verdict for the non-moving party." Lobby, Inc., factual party, U.S. in U.S. disputes in Matsushita 574, [the Parcels banc) 477 587 not Anderson, Court, moving by motion. Because the Indus. v. party's] 941 the party to Zenith favor." must view the non-moving Radio United F.2d 1428, and 1437 citations evidence has to Corp. standard directed verdict, Co. Court Corp., 475 or States v. (11th Cir. omitted). determine Four 1991) The (en Court credibility. at 255. reference Celotex The favorable punctuation weigh (1986). and must draw "all justifiable inferences Prop., 477 U.S. The 248 Anderson v. Liberty light most Elec. non-moving (internal should the (1986), of Real 242, jury could the initial materials v. for on Catrett, summary burden file, 477 the U.S. judgment of showing basis 317, for 323 mirrors the the (1986). that of the initial burden of proof required by either party depends on who carries the burden of proof at trial. at 323. a When the movant does not Id. carry the burden of proof at trial, it may satisfy its initial burden in one of two ways — by negating an essential element of the non-movant's case or by showing that there is no evidence to prove a fact necessary to the non-movant's F.2d 604, Kress 317). 606-08 & Co., case. See (11th Cir. 398 U.S. The movant 144 Clark v. 1991) (1970) cannot meet Coats & Clark, Inc., (explaining Adickes v. 929 S.H. and Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. its initial burden by merely declaring trial. that Clark, If — the issue of fact non-movant must that its its the movant "demonstrate precludes the burden response initial affirmatively cannot meet its burden at 929 F.2d at 608. bears tailor carried non-moving party and only if — non-movant must the of to a that there its is initial burden, indeed summary judgment." burden. negating carries proof the If at method the material movant fact, When the the non-movant which the presented the material Id. trial, by a movant evidence non-movant "must respond with evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial Fitzpatrick 1993) . fact, v. on City the of material Atlanta, fact 2 sought F.3d to 1112, be 1116 negated." (11th Cir. If the movant shows an absence of evidence on a material the non-movant must either show that the record contains evidence that was "overlooked or ignored" by the movant or "come forward directed with additional verdict evidence motion evidentiary deficiency." at Id. sufficient trial at 1117. based The to on withstand the non-movant a alleged cannot carry its burden by relying on the pleadings or by repeating conclusory allegations contained in the complaint. v. Ross, 663 F.2d 1032, 1033-34 (11th Cir. 1981). See Morris Rather, the non-movant must respond with affidavits or as otherwise provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. In this action, the Clerk of Court gave Plaintiff notice of the motion for summary judgment and informed her of the summary judgment rules, the right to file affidavits or other materials in and opposition, Therefore, 772 the F.2d 822, the notice 825 consequences requirements (11th Cir. 1985) of of default. Griffith (Doc. v. (per curiam), 59.) Wainwright, are satisfied. The time for filing materials in opposition has expired, and the motion is now ripe for consideration. III. In her seizures. arrest the First, for Plaintiff complaint, DISCUSSION Plaintiff Plaintiff driving challenges challenges without the challenges a the suspended validity of her two separate validity license. of her Second, extended detention at Detention Center. Plaintiff brings suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 allows citizens to sue state governments and state officials for violations of Constitution. rights granted them under the To succeed in a § 1983 action, make a prima facia showing of two elements: omission deprived plaintiff of a right, United States "a plaintiff must (1) that the act or privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, (2) and that the act or omission was done by a person acting under color of law." Dist., 1983) . Marshal Cty. 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 Bd. of Educ. (11th Cir. v. Marshall Cty. Gas 1993) (citing 42 U.S.C. § Plaintiff claims violations. Sergeant Plaintiff Munsey through results Captain free (doc. John from 26 Staten seizure Norman right to ran her they and her seizure seized her (2) 108-112); violated when constitutional Deputy Fourth Amendment database unreasonable (1) and GCIC 11 that: four her search the committed alleges violated from unreasonable plate Defendants Jailer Ashley Fourth when based Amendment they (3) Deputy Fourteenth targeted Amendment's her for (id. profiling Norman a SISI probable Anderson, are Sergeant Equal search 93-109); Fourteenth Amendment without and due cause Captain Staten, Protection and and process (id^ Munsey M (4) on the and to to post violated based Defendants be her (id. SIS! 72- Clause seizure license right refused free Mills bond until they could verify her immigration status 76) ; be and when upon the they racial violated her rights when they detained her 139-158); Captain Kearney, and and (6) Sheriff Sergeant Munsey subject to supervisory liability for the unconstitutional actions of their subordinates (id. SI 5 8-9) . In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants make three arguments. First, all Defendants challenge the legal factual basis of the alleged constitutional violations. Sheriff Anderson, Captain Staten, and Jailer Mills and Second, argue they are entitled to qualified immunity with regards to their role in detaining Plaintiff. Third, Sheriff Anderson, Captain Staten, Captain Kearney, and Sergeant Munsey argue that they are not subject to supervisory liability. Because whether with first If Court step constitutional Defendants' claims. the a the in a § violation challenges to 1983 action occurred, is the Plaintiff's determining Court begins constitutional Plaintiff establishes any constitutional violations, will consider Defendants' arguments that they are entitled to qualified immunity and thus exempted from liability under § they § 1983. should It will not be also consider Defendants' subject to supervisory arguments that liability under 1983. A. Constitutional Violations 1. Unconstitutional Stop and Seizure Claim Plaintiff claims Deputy Norman and Sergeant Munsey violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure when her at the they store, ran her license and when they plate, arrested when they seized her. The Court previously concluded that Deputy Norman and Sergeant Munsey did not violate (Doc. the Constitution when 60 at 9-10.) they ran her the only plate. It also concluded that they did not violate the Constitution when they stopped her at the Thus, license question is whether Constitution when they arrested Plaintiff. 10 they store. violated (Id. ) the To make a officer must F.App'x constitutional arrest establish probable cause. 523, 526 (11th Cir. 2009). without a Poulakis v. An warrant, an Rogers, 341 officer establishes probable cause when he has "facts and circumstances within knowledge suspect had Gonzalez, Ohio, sufficient committed 969 F.2d 379 U.S. information the 89, or was 1002 91 a (11th owner that crime." 1992) the U.S. Beck (citing v. v. of Plaintiff s vehicle had a Plaintiff has not challenged the reliability records vehicle, Cir. a belief Deputy Norman received reliable upon which Deputy Deputy Norman confirmed Plaintiff's of the reasonable committing (1964)). the that GCIC warrant 999, suspended license. of to [his] Norman relied. After identity and her ownership he had more than a reasonable belief that was driving with a suspended license. she Thus, Deputy Norman and Sergeant Munsey had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, and they did not violate the Constitution. Because the Fourth Plaintiff Deputy Norman Amendment cannot Accordingly, the when succeed Court and Sergeant Munsey did not violate they on seized and her GRANTS arrested respective summary § judgment Plaintiff, 1983 in claim. favor of Defendants with respect to Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment illegal search and seizure claim against Munsey. 11 Deputy Norman and Sergeant 2. Unconstitutional Detention Claim Defendants make unconstitutional may detain a posted bond detention subject for up cause hearing. if they did three detain claims. arrested to (Doc. arguments 48 First, without hours 57-6 at before based Second, her argue introduction that of "Plaintiff evidence in has the that who her a they has not probable they argue that, immigration status, (Doc. 70 at 5.) they had probable cause to detain her. they warrant granting on Plaintiff's they argue a 10-12.) Plaintiff refuting Third, not record shown that through she was held the after her bond posted," nor has she shown in the record that "she was in fact subject response from System] to the system." a. Defendants' in judicial hours," first limits [Automated and detention Fingerprint based on a Identification County of discussed claim should fail. relies Riverside claim of v. that upon the McLaughlin probable was released cause released by the (Id. "well Supreme at 11.) 12 on 500 only within 48 U.S. 44 requires a hours a of They then assert that bond after within Court Supreme Court's McLaughlin, (Doc. 57-6 at 10-11.) "Plaintiff was 48-Hours argument determination she arrest of Less Than person's arrest. because AFIS Defendants (1991). second (Id.) Detentions decision a in the approximately permissible McLaughlin," and 25 time her Defendants' McClaughlin is argument probable warrant? a the present reasons. case. First, The question how quickly must a jurisdiction provide hearing at two to 55-57. a suspect arrested without a The question posed in the present how long may a jurisdiction refuse to post the bond of suspect not cause 500 U.S. case is: for inapplicable to the posed in McLaughlin was: a fails arrested without same. Thus, a warrant? McLaughlin does These not two entitle questions are Defendants to summary judgment. Second, and jurisdictions without a 48-hour warrant. that provides 48 hours a relatedly, of blank to U.S. did hold declared determinations arrest will, 500 check McLaughlin judicial Constitution. McLaughlin 56 suspects that "a grant arrested jurisdiction of probable cause within as a general matter, at not (emphasis comply" with the added). The Court specifically noted that a probable cause determination does not pass "constitutional muster simply because it is provided within 48 hours. Such Constitution] if the a hearing may nonetheless violate arrested individual can prove that [the his or her probable cause determination was delayed unreasonably." at Id. 56. The 48-hour mark is merely a useful tool to determine the presumptive probable reasonableness cause reasonable. Id. of the within disputed hours is A hearing held at 57. A probable cause hearing held outside 13 48 detention. presumed of 48 hours contrived is the presumed 48-hour unreasonable. mark because it Id. had The to. Court See only id. at 56 ("Although we hesitate to announce that the Constitution compels a specific time limit, certainty with Thus, so that confidence the it is important to provide some degree of State that and counties may establish they fall within constitutional bounds."). pertinent question is not whether a provided a probable cause hearing within 48-hours, jurisdiction reasonable provided amount Because procedures a probable cause jurisdiction but whether a hearing within a of time. McLaughlin detention period, does not permit Defendants cannot a blanket rely on the released Plaintiff in only 25 hours. Instead, 48-hour fact that they they must assert that Plaintiff has not produced sufficient evidence to prove her detention was Plaintiff has unreasonable. presented As discussed significant unreasonably delayed her release. below, evidence Thus, that however, Defendants even if McLaughlin was applicable to Plaintiff's case, Defendants could not prevail at the summary-judgment Defendants' claim stage. that Accordingly, McLaughlin entitles the Court them to DENIES summary judgment. b. Sufficiency of Evidence Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not provided sufficient evidence that they held her after they posted her bond or that they held her because of an I.C.E. hold. 14 But to establish a Fourth Amendment violation for unreasonable detention, Plaintiff does not have to show that Defendants held her after they posted her bond or Plaintiff eligible that need for Defendants only prove release held her because Defendants and lacked probable after she was 793 217 (1st Cir. 2015) an her I.C.E. after cause v. hold. she was detain to See Morales eligible for release. F.3d 208, held of her Chadbourne, (''Because Morales was kept in custody for a new purpose after she was entitled to release, was subjected to one that a new seizure must be for supported Fourth Amendment by a new she purposes — probable cause justification."); Mercado v. Dallas Cty., Texas, 229 F. Supp. 3d 501, 513 (N.D. jurisdiction's probable would that Texas Jan. detention cause after violate the 17, 2017) of a suspected she was Fourth illegal otherwise Amendment). (holding that alien eligible Defendants for do without release not claim Plaintiff failed to produce evidence she was held without probable cause. The Court, therefore, must only decide whether Plaintiff provided sufficient evidence that a reasonable could a find Defendants held her after she was eligible jury for release. Plaintiff offers two lines of evidence that Defendants held her after evidence she was is incarceration. "contact notes eligible for release. taken by Defendants The first during line of Plaintiff's The first entry, dated January 30, 2014, states [I.C.E.] in Atlanta GA for pick up before releasing." 15 (Doc. 95-1 at 3.) The second states "[p]er Captain Staten, entry, dated if I.C.E. does January not 31, 2014, send a hold on subject by 02/03/2014, subject can post bond. Bond is in file." 1 (Id. (emphasis 2014, states from [I.C.E.] (Id.) sent added).) "[p]er Captain by Monday, The final entry, a release subject's The on file. third Staten entry, if we do dated not January hear 31, anything then subject can post bond on Monday." dated January 31, their Subject detainer was for 2014, states "[I.C.E.] subject. Paperwork bonded by Akins in Bonding Company." (Id.) The second line of evidence is the deposition testimony of Plaintiff's that after sister, Susana Defendants told Hinojosa. her "that Mrs. the Hinojosa bond was testified going to be about 2,000 dollars," she "went across the street to talk to the bails bond man lady to see if she could help me." 11-12.) (Doc. 96 at She further testified that: I got everything took care of with the bond lady. She told me I had to sign the bond and everything. And I said okay. She said she would take care of it. I walked back over to the jailhouse and I sit there and I'm waiting for them to release her and then come about I think it was between 5:00 and 6:00 o'clock they told me that ICE has a hold on her after I had been sitting there for four hours. They told me they're not releasing her because ICE has a And I only found that out because the bonds hold on it. 1 The Court notes that Plaintiff was arrested on January 30, 2014 - a Thursday. February 3, 2014 was a Monday. Thus, Defendants were considering jailing Plaintiff - an ostensible American citizen - an additional 48 hours not because of an I.C.E. hold, but merely in anticipation of an I.C.E. hold. 16 lady called me and told me and then I went up to the window and asked. (Id. at 12 The (emphasis added).) Court conclude that Defendants finds both that of a these reasonable lines improperly refused to post of fact-finder evidence their Defendants' claim that motion for Plaintiff summary did not demonstrate Plaintiff's bond and thus held her after she was eligible for release. DENIES could Accordingly, judgment provide with Court regards sufficient to evidence that Defendant held her after she was eligible for release. c. Probable The Cause Court must now determine whether Defendants had probable cause to continue detaining Plaintiff despite the fact she had posted nontechnical practical and citations Probable conception considerations prudent Pringle, bond. men, 540 not U.S. omitted). circumstances that of legal 366, It cause deals everyday with life technicians, 370 (2005) asks "is the on factual act." there practical, which (internal whether a reasonable Maryland quotations are and "facts v. and and 'sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the (suspect) had committed or was committing an offense.'" Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112 (1975). When answering this question, "totality courts circumstances" and must look at decide whether the the facts "viewed of the from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, 17 amount to probable cause." Pringle, 540 U.S. at 370 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Defendants Plaintiff, First, argue they they probable had claim cause illegally. even probable the to if cause initial believe Second, to detain persons that they to fax did delay continue sent by Plaintiff releasing detaining I.C.E. was in her. gave the them country they claim that Georgia law allows officers while investigating their immigration status. The Court rejects both arguments. i. The I.C.E. Court Defendants. subject is Fax begins The not fax with stated: legally in the initial "I.C.E. the fax records United removal proceedings. . . . This detainer. This for being provided information for is informational other relevant The not Court contain First, finds enough official I.C.E. sent detainer. and is that appears to this to be not a government enforcement only. (Id.) sent use This and is response The fax contained no information. establish probable I.C.E. law purposes is not supported by fingerprints." indicate States subject to I.C.E. that, multiple information to reasons, support this fax probable did cause. detainers require the issuing officer to cause. specifically Defendants for Morales, 793 stated that therefore F.3d at it was should have did not have probable cause and that, 216. not assumed without an The fax official that I.C.E. an independent basis, neither information country about of removal. did they. the origin, In the Plaintiff's or other Second, why I.C.E. words, the fax gives immigration believed fax gave specific background, she was her subject Defendants justification for why they should continue to Third, no no to factual detain Plaintiff. the fax didn't even definitively state that Plaintiff was subject to removal. It stated subject to removal" without only that she elucidating why "appears she be subject was to to removal. The Court most also favorable sufficient support to finds Plaintiff information probable that — to cause taking the — even Cir. 2004) the establish probable when viewed evidence available to officers. (11th if facts in (holding that officers fax it totality 382 may the did cause, the Kingsland, in light contain did not of the F.3d 1220, not "turn a blind eye to exculpatory information that is available to them"). addition to the fax, Defendants had affirmative Plaintiff was not only in the country legally, most likely a United arrested, she had license. (Doc. States citizen. in her possession Georgia driver's 94-3 at 2.) evidence In that but that she was When a valid 1228 Plaintiff Georgia was driver's licenses are not given to persons in the country illegally, see O.C.G.A. § 19-119.1(a)(2), Plaintiff's and Defendants license was do not fake. her social security number. argue Plaintiff (Id.) 19 that also they gave believed Defendants Defendants, however, did not use this number to double check her status with I.C.E. Finally, Plaintiff's sister verbally attested to Plaintiff's status as an American citizen and brought to the Detention Center Plaintiff's "birth certificate, records from the her health from the school Because Defendants evidence, from the had social security department in card, Metter, Board of Education." access to all her and her (Doc. of this 96 382 that appellees1 the deficient in F.3d at 1230 ("[A] reasonable investigation [of jury probable papers at 15.) exculpatory they did not have probable cause to detain Kingsland, medical Plaintiff. could find cause] was that the officers consciously and deliberately did not make an effort to uncover reasonably discoverable, material information."). Ultimately, the detaining officer is responsible ensuring that he has probable cause to detain a suspect. v. Evans, officer 133 is F.3d required establish probable 1521, 1525 1425, (11th 1435 (11th to conduct a cause."); Cir. Cir. 1998) reasonable see Ortega v. 1996) (finding no ("An for Rankin arresting investigation Christian, probable to 85 F.3d cause for arrest based on a tip given by a confidential informant in part because the arresting officer did not steps to investigate the informant's take "any independent tip or had any evidence prior to arresting [the plaintiff] which would have corroborated the informant's identification of [the perpetrator in the commission of the crime"). 20 plaintiff] as a He cannot rely on unsubstantiated allegations, conclusory as the Had Defendants most likely status. not initial have required been to able of an to verify and innocence, officer may obtain and an investigation easily discoverable quotations suffered an fundamental DENIES in unacceptable Defendants' the cause . . to .") they rights. that an ignore fashion deprivation for probable . to immigration arrest. information . . . [n]or may the officer Because motion claim established 1525. theoretically making choose biased facts omitted). constitutional Defendants' at police officer is every before not a ("[A] eliminate that has been offered to him or her conduct See id. Plaintiff's 382 F.3d at 1229 explore claim Nevertheless, fax sent by I.C.E. conducted any amount of investigation they would See Kingsland, plausible especially allegations as vague and of or elect (internal did most Accordingly, summary initial detain judgment fax with sent Plaintiff to citations not, her not Plaintiff basic the and Court respect by after to I.C.E. she was otherwise eligible for release. ii. In addition Georgia to the I.C.E. fax, Defendants law allowed them to detain Plaintiff. O.C.G.A. (b) Georgia Law § also claim that They point to 17-5-100(b)-(c): . . . during any investigation of a criminal suspect by a peace officer, when such officer has probable cause to believe that a suspect has committed a criminal violation, the officer shall be authorized to seek to 21 verify such suspect's immigration status when the suspect is unable to provide one of the following: (2) A valid Georgia driver's license (6) Other information as to the suspect's identity that is sufficient to allow the peace officer to independently identify the suspect. (c) When attempting to determine the immigration status of a suspect ... a peace officer shall be authorized to use any reasonable means available to determine the immigration status of the suspect, including: (1) Use of any federal identification database; (4) Contacting an appropriate federal agency. Defendants claim that § 17-5-100(b)-(c) to detain Plaintiff for gave them probable cause purposes of investigating her immigration status. Defendants, Section have misinterpreted § 17-5-100(b)-(c). 17-5-100(b)-(c) persons solely illegally. It immigration First, however, the does because they only not allows status officer if must he suspect cause violation. sufficient to meets have believe they officers the to three already suspect for a criminal violation. probable allow officers are in verify the a specific been to detain country suspect's conditions. investigating the Second, the officer must have suspect committed a criminal Third, the suspect must have been unable to provide identification to 22 confirm her identity and immigration status. Section 17-5-100(b), therefore, does not stand for the proposition asserted by Defendants. But, detain even a if § suspect solely immigration status, opportunity to Plaintiff for 17-5-100 (b) - (c) do it for would so driving with have When a allow purposes not here. did of license is specifically suspended license, identification detention under Plaintiff investigation of listed § suspended Defendants' investigation, Plaintiff's bond § 17-5-100(b) Plaintiff or while did not the motion respect with 100(b)-(c) grant Court to an occur hear Defendants probable DENIES their cause Plaintiff during it gave form the refused that the post Thus, to her after to I.C.E. ability for of Defendants' occurred from Defendants' assertion confronted Additionally, Defendants to the accepted license; when waiting establish Accordingly, did not Defendants A Georgia driver's 17-5-100(b)(2). challenges her as her Norman the Deputy a valid Georgia Driver's license. to verifying allowed Deputy Defendants detain detention. summary judgment O.C.G.A. § 17-5- gave them probable cause to detain Plaintiff. 3. Equal Protection Claim Plaintiff Protection claims Clause investigation. by that using Defendants racial violated profiling to target Equal her for "The Equal Protection Clause requires government entities to treat similarly situated people alike." Rainbow City, the Ala., 434 F.3d 1306, 23 1313 (11th Cir. Campbell v. 2006). To succeed on an enforcement, a differently that equal protection plaintiff from other [the defendant] must claim show similarly that "(1) that situated unequally applied a evidence claim that demonstrating (Doc. she at (Doc. breakdown 60% of 105 57-6 at 21.) has on Bulloch County is 60% Id. not the 17.) She was] treated individuals, [her]." discrimination [Sheriff's Office]." has. Plaintiff [she selective and facially neutral for the purpose of discriminating against Defendants alleges [law] at 1314. provided part "any of the Plaintiff asserts that claims white that and "[t]he 40% racial non-white but of the traffic citations are issued to the non-white group, of which [Plaintiff] are comparators the asserts that is a member, to The therefore, [Plaintiff]." Court finds the white motorists (Id.) "Defendants hold road blocks white neighborhoods." Plaintiff the Court does assertion because (Doc. 91.) selective best, (Id.) that not Plaintiff accept Plaintiff Second, has not it does Plaintiff's includes Plaintiff's enforcement. and also in predominately non- shown that she treated differently than similarly situated individuals. The nothing no statistical citation evidence statistical to show does to not disparity that race disparity the record. demonstrate is was is true for the alleged road blocks in mild, the non-white Based upon the evidence presented by Plaintiff, 24 was First, at factor responsible for the disparity of traffic citations issued. same (2) The areas. no reasonable jury could conclude that which violated the Defendants' Defendants engaged in racial profiling Fourteenth Amendment. motion for summary Thus, judgment the Court GRANTS with regards to Plaintiff's equal protection claim. 4. Substantive Due Plaintiff due process [her] her also makes personal claims process autonomy of that and Procedural under Due the Process Fourteenth Amendment's Plaintiff claims that Defendants due actions claims two clause. substantive arbitrary Process rights the have from preserved to the Defendants." "Defendants (Doc. violated her "violated dignity, unnecessary 1 26 procedural Plaintiff's is repetitive constitutional provision, hold." substantive due process of her claim due such as the Amendment covered by Fourth or a She process on an (Doc. 105 at 22.) claim fails because it Fourth is and 142.) when she was illegally held in jail after obtaining bond, erroneous Immigration Customs (I.C.E.) and claim. specific Eighth xx[I]f a constitutional Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, Cty. Of not under Sacramento Graham v. Connor, the v. rubric Lewis, 490 U.S. of 523 386, 395 substantive U.S. 833, (1989) due 843 process." (1998); see ("Because the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against governmental conduct, notion of this sort of that Amendment, 'substantive due process,' 25 physically intrusive not the more generalized must be the guide for analyzing these search and "dignity, claims."). seizure and her The Fourth Amendment's provision personal already autonomy . unreasonable protects . from the . Plaintiff's unnecessary and arbitrary actions of the Defendants." See Mendoza v. United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 849 F.3d 408, (8th attempt Cir. 2017). substantive Thus, due illegal search, process seizure, Plaintiff's claim also Defendants Plaintiff violation because for Amendment cause already Thus, Plaintiff's process similar Cir. requires any reasons. arrest See it government under be allegedly due process Plaintiff also Thus, is to claims establish probable Gerstein, concerning the at of Amendment's of Plaintiff's Milewski, 327 F.3d 564, passes muster under that satisfy the requirements if this court upholds reviewed 420 U.S. legitimacy the Fourteenth duplicative Case v. seizure should when plaintiff] would ("[A] process clause. the determination claim. 2003) Amendment a The Fourth Amendment, extended detention. detention clause Amendment assert violated her right to procedural due process because prior to any 114. her procedural they detained her without probable cause. however, of to or detention. Fourteenth fails cannot 420-21 under Fourth Fourth 568 the of due (7th Fourth the due [the plaintiff's] Amendment rules, [the will not succeed by recasting his challenge in the language of due process."); see Lawson v. City of Coatesville, 42 F. Supp. 3d 664, 676-77 (E.D. 26 Pa. 2014); Crouse v. South Lebanon Tp., that the criminal for 668 F. Fourth justice seizures Supp. Amendment system" of 2d 664, is and persons or 674 (M.D. "explicitly governs "the property"). Pa. 2009) (noting tailored process for that Plaintiff, the is due therefore, must challenge the legitimacy of her detention under the Fourth Amendment, not the Case, 327 F.3d at 1120, 1129 (D. Fourteenth 568; Colo. Amendment's Shimomura 2014) v. due process Carlson, ("Considering that 17 F. his clause. Supp. due 3d process claim effectively mirrors his allegation of illegal arrest under the Fourth claim Amendment, under the [the Fifth plaintiff] and has Fourteenth failed Amendments to state upon a which relief can be granted."); Meketa v. Kamoie, 955 F. Supp. 2d 345, 365-66 (M.D. Pa. 2013) Fourteenth Amendment, any unlawful ("[I]t is the Fourth Amendment, which is the proper vehicle for addressing pretrial deprivations of liberty criminal proceedings."); Sayan-Resto v. Berrios, 252, 265 (D. P.R. not the 2013) incidental to 933 F. Supp. 2d (holding that a plaintiff must pursue her illegal detention claim under the Fourth, not the Fourteenth Amendment); Crouse, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 674 ("[A] pretrial deprivation of liberty that is related to a criminal proceeding is addressed not through procedural due process, but the Fourth Amendment."). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion for summary judgment with regards to Plaintiff's substantive and procedural due process claims. 27 B. Qualified Immunity and Supervisory Liability Because Plaintiff successfully established that Defendants violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure when they refused to release her on bond, now consider the doctrine consider whether of Defendants' qualified Plaintiff's Kearney, and immunity. claim Captain liability that Staten is The Sheriff should be the Court must extinguished Court must Anderson, subject to by also Captain supervisory liability. 1. Qualified Immunity Sheriff Anderson, Captain immunity Qualified immunity government officials by allowing them to their Anderson conduct v. their aims may omitted). performing discretionary violate of civil clearly which a limit rise to U.S. provides functions damages liability 646 their established statutory or reasonable person would Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) 28 Plaintiff. liability for (1987) "government generally as assert of "reasonably anticipate that insofar Mills detaining 635, It Jailer personal 483 Creighton, for in give quotations liability to role and qualified when for Staten, have are damages." (internal officials shielded conduct does constitutional known." from rights Harlow (citations omitted). not v. Establishing First, the qualified official must immunity "prove is that a he two-step was acting process. within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred." Cir. 2002) Cir. 2002)). within (quoting his If to Id. prove "the show v. that 311 violated 1346 (11th F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th the is plaintiff that he burden immunity immunity the 1340, establishes authority, a F.3d 284 Ferraro, qualified stage, actions Wilson, defendant qualified summary-judgment officer's Lee discretionary plaintiff To Vineyard v. is not must shifts not appropriate prove Constitution, (1) and of the probable alleged cause, constitutional however, immunity standard. courts violation use Under this standard, a acting to the appropriate." at the that the that the (2) constitutional right violated was clearly established. When was See id. concerns special a lack qualified "[o]fficers who make an arrest without probable cause are entitled to qualified immunity if there was arguable probable cause for the v. Miami, City Arguable same of probable arrest could F.3d 1220, 1232 (11th and have Plaintiff . possessing believed . . the that ." Id. same Cir. 2004). officers cause exists if "reasonable circumstances Defendants 382 arrest." Kingsland in the knowledge probable cause (internal as existed quotations the to and citations omitted). Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendants were their discretionary authority. Thus, 29 the burden acting in shifts to Plaintiff cause to to prove detain that her. Defendants If she makes lacked this arguable showing, probable she must also prove that the right violated was clearly established. The Court favorable to arguable probable from that, Plaintiff, detained her, fax finds taking she cause. has the established According a United States citizen, I.C.E. stating, without facts any to in the light Defendants Plaintiff, most lacked Defendants for 25 hours based upon a supporting that Furthermore, Plaintiff appeared to be subject to removal. evidence, they detained her in spite of the fact that she had in her possession a valid which the Georgia is not United driver's knowingly States — and license given in to spite procured and proffered a copy of security card, and school records. — a form persons of the of identification unlawfully fact that present in her sister her birth certificate, social No reasonable officer in the same circumstances could have believed probable cause existed to detain Plaintiff for being in the country illegally. 382 F.3d at 1233 disregarded cause or officers knowledge ("If the defendants certain arguable in as the the pieces of same fabricated or unreasonably evidence cause, as circumstances and probable defendants could Kingsland, not to establish alleged, possessing have probable reasonable the same believed that probable cause existed to arrest the plaintiff."). The only remaining question is whether Defendants violated a clearly established right. The right to be free from arrest 30 or extended detention See Gerstein v. is the and Pugh, standard officers threshold Kingsland, before 382 in on ample at 103, notice an cause textbook law. (1975). Probable cause all arrests or that they individual 1232. is 114 justifying detaining F.3d probable 420 U.S. used are absent Thus, the detentions, must clear without Court a warrant. finds right to be free from arrest absent probable cause is that that the a clearly established constitutional right. Because that Plaintiff Defendants has detained produced her sufficient without arguable evidence probable violation of a clearly established constitutional right, are not Court entitled to DENIES qualified immunity at Defendants' summary this judgment show cause in Defendants time. motion to Thus, for the qualified immunity as it relates to Plaintiff's unconstitutional detention. 2. Supervisory Liability Supervisory defendants may not be held liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of or respondeat Jenne, 326 superior F.3d 1352, 1360 of their subordinates vicarious (11th Cir. on the basis liability. 2003). Cottone v. They may only be held liable under § 1983 "if they personally participated in the allegedly connection unconstitutional between conduct [their] actions constitutional deprivation.'" 1328 (11th Cir. 2007) or if . West v. (quoting Cottone, establish a causal connection, . there . and Tillman, 326 is ^a the causal alleged 496 F.3d 1321, F.3d at 1360). a Plaintiff must show either 31 To (1) "a history of supervisor a the and to inference of need or policy puts to that the rights" or deliberate supporting the subordinates 326 F.3d by any event, subordinates to Cottone, In the in unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so." 1360. that so"; act at knew alleged facts (3) directed the fails to do results supervisor responsible would act or the correct [that] constitutional unlawfully [that] [that the alleged supervisor] "custom indifference "an abuse notice on deprivation, (2) widespread "[t]he standard which a supervisor is held liable in his individual capacity for actions of a subordinate is extremely rigorous." Sheriff Anderson, that they Anderson are and not Captain Kearney, subject Captain to Staten they Captain are not Kearney, assert and causally and Captain Staten argue supervisory participate in detaining Plaintiff. Anderson, Id. they did not Sheriff personally (Doc. 57-6 at 15.) Captain connected liability. Staten to Sheriff further Plaintiff's assert alleged unconstitutional detention because "[p]laintiff has not produced any evidence that Sheriff Anderson, Captain Kearney, Staten were violations aware of ^obvious, of constitutional rights, resulted in deliberate indifference, jailers to act unlawfully." have asserted a lack of flagrant, rampant' implemented a policy that or directed the deputies or (Id^ at 16.) evidence, [or] or Captain the Because Defendants Court must determine whether Plaintiff's reply briefs point to evidence demonstrating 32 that any Defendant personally participated in or was causally connected to the constitutional deprivation. Plaintiff not affirmatively personally involved however, contains involved in Captain Staten, 02/03/2014, Captain if if Plaintiff. then subject can Thus, while claims does (See not do Sheriff Anderson was Plaintiff. Captain Staten Doc. send can post bond. we that detaining that I.C.E. subject Staten in evidence detaining concedes a Bond is not of anything bond post hear on personal against Sheriff Anderson, was 95-1 hold in Monday.") The personally at on 3 by . . . Per ICE by Monday, (emphasis participation ("Per subject file. from record, added)). cannot proceed the Court finds sufficient evidence to support a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Captain Staten personally participated in Plaintiff's detention. The Court, produced Kearney sufficient were (1) must evidence causally deprivation. that: however, also that connected examine Sheriff to the Anderson alleged The best the Court can discern, "Anderson [Plaintiff's and detention], Staten's or failure reprimand whether or Plaintiff or Captain constitutional Plaintiff asserts to investigate discipline Mills constituted a policy, practice or custom of deliberate indifference to Mill's misconduct toward Plaintiff"; (2) "[Jailer] Mills denied receiving much training on I.C.E. holds and I.C.E. detainers"; and (3) "The Defendants have no written policy or procedures having to do with I.C.E. holds and I.C.E. detainers or anything having to do 33 with I.C.E. annual yet, Defendant Anderson claims that his staff receives training about 15, 17). I.C.E. and immigration Plaintiff also argues that: to effectuate all detainers, (1) and (2) "Sheriff's policy or practice, officials, Plaintiff could find Anderson to did a or Captain establish it. provided evidence evidence provide causal a evidence that fix not Plaintiff's connection Kearney causal Defendants 326 no evidence. of such other F.3d at delayed Court of For the finds that jury actions must Sheriff First, provide some a problem and failed to example, releases of detention. Plaintiff, to Sheriff's reasonable a Plaintiff 1360. complaints made other the Plaintiff's were aware the (Doc. 106 at 15). between and I.C.E. had-or without asking either such that connection, Cottone, of following briefs, evidence at [sic] cause to support the re-imprisoned [Plaintiff] examining 105 "the Sheriff's policy was her or I.C.E. any additional questions." After (Doc. regardless whether [sic] [sic] even claimed to have had-probable request"; laws" however, she the police caused has provides no department, no by a suspect's uncertain immigration status, and no evidence that the training given to deputies Second, Defendants' and jailers falls below accepted alleged failure to investigate or reprimand Jailer Mills does not constitute a policy or practice. Plaintiff's claim standards. that Sheriff Anderson had a Finally, policy of detaining all suspects that triggered a detainer by I.C.E. was 34 not supported by any citation to the record. will not consider this factual assertion. Additionally, Plaintiff has Thus, (Doc. provided no the Court 91.) case law explaining why the scant evidence she has provided is sufficient to establish supervisory liability. She has the burden of demonstrating what evidence exists to show a causal connection and why that evidence is sufficient to survive summary judgment. Just as this Court will not scour the record to find evidence which supports her claims, will not supports scour her Westlaw or Lexis claims. In Nexis our responsibility belongs to Plaintiff, Plaintiff demonstrates a has failed causal to find case adversarial law which system, that evidence that not the Court. provide connection to it sufficient between the actions of Sheriff Anderson or Captain Kearney and the constitutional deprivation. She has also conceded that Sheriff Anderson did not personally participate in Plaintiff's detention. Thus, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion for summary judgment with regards to the supervisory liability claims against provides Sheriff Anderson sufficient participated in and Captain evidence detaining that Plaintiff Kearney. Captain after she Because Staten was the record personally eligible for release, however, that claim shall proceed to trial as well. IV. CONCLUSION The Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants' for summary judgment. (Doc. 57.) 35 motion It GRANTS summary judgment in favor of claim Defendants' against violating motion Deputy the and DISMISSES Norman Fourth and Sergeant Amendment's searches and seizures; (2) against Sergeant Munsey, (1) Plaintiff's Munsey prohibition for on § 1983 allegedly unreasonable Plaintiff's supervisory liability claim Sheriff Anderson, and Captain Kearney for Deputy Norman and Sergeant Munsey's alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable Plaintiff's supervisory and Captain Kearney detaining her; to and the alleged (5) (4) liability for their claims alleged substantive Plaintiff's and allows and seizures; against role in Sheriff (3) Anderson unconstitutionally Plaintiff's claims against all Defendants related and procedural claims against alleged equal protection violations. motion searches the following all due process Defendants violations; related to the The Court DENIES Defendants' claims to proceed to trial: (1) Plaintiff s claim that Jailer Mills and Captain Staten detained her in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (2) Plaintiff's supervisory liability claims against Captain Staten. The Court also DENIES as untimely exclude Plaintiff's expert testimony. ORDER September, ENTERED at Augusta, Defendants' motions (Docs. 71, 72.) Georgia, this J( *? day 2017. CHlkE^JUJDGE A. RANDAL HALL UNITEKSTATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 36 to of