Waters v. Georgia Department of Juvenile Justice, No. 6:2014cv00010 - Document 53 (S.D. Ga. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER granting 44 Motion for Summary Judgment. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of the Defendants' and closed this case. Signed by Judge J. Randal Hall on 4/14/16. (cmr)
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Waters v. Georgia Department of Juvenile Justice Doc. 53 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA STATESBORO DIVISION JOHNNY DARNELL WATERS, Plaintiff, * V. * * GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE * JUSTICE, * et al., Defendants. 6:14-cv-10 * * * ORDER This case concerns a dispute between a state employee and his supervisors and coworkers over what personal activity should occur at work. specialist ("DJJ") that with Evans his Plaintiff the Georgia County coworkers were Plaintiff prohibited content Office, misusing and his work a probation Juvenile of their Justice's time and management violating his supervisors did not accusations; discovered on his Waters, complained to To his surprise, investigate instead Darnell Department Services department policies. immediately Johnny that he computer. they investigated frequently After viewed preliminary reports were verified by the DJJ's Office of Investigations, the DJJ terminated press release. Plaintiff and announced his termination in a This case soon followed. Dockets.Justia.com Presently before summary judgment. on Plaintiff's (Doc. claim Whistleblower Act claims under Jeffery 1983 Timothy Plaintiff Johnny Parole Plaintiff. District DJJ under § 45-1-4, against for the Georgia and on Plaintiff's the DJJ Strickland. and The Defendants Court GRANTS BACKGROUND Darnell Waters Probation began his Specialist I County Services Office on March 1, 2007. Strickland, motion motion. I. Juvenile Defendants' Defendant O.C.G.A. § is Defendants seek summary judgment against 42 U.S.C. and Court 55.) ("GWA"), Alligood Defendants' the the office's Strickland, Director Juvenile in Rusty turn, Rogers, with the DJJ's as a Evans At the office, Timothy Program Manager, reported who employment to reported supervised DJJ Assistant to Southeast Regional Administrator Defendant Jeffrey Alligood. Plaintiff's position required the supervision of children between the ages of seven and eighteen to ensure they comply with probation conditions. DJJ policy required Plaintiff to log every contact made with children under his supervision into an internal Plaintiff tracking failed system to within meet required child contacts. policy 72 hours. standards During in 2009, documenting Strickland first discussed this with Plaintiff in June 2009 and gave him two formal reminders in July and September. Strickland placed Plaintiff on decision-making leave for the repeat documentation violations from January 2010 through January 2011. His performance evaluation for July 1, 2009 through June 30, 2010 indicated that Plaintiff did not meet performance expectations. Plaintiff's evaluation indicated that Plaintiff met he improvement needed regarding July 2011 performance expectations, logging child but contacts that within the 72-hour documentation period. In other 2011, DJJ made employees. following: coworker, Plaintiff (1) In that Malcolm the Evans CSO his state his vehicle; particular, coworker Tucker, office; a (2) and complaints Plaintiff Michael double-barrel Clark (3) concerning conduct alleged Clark sold shotgun in transported shotgun Strickland permitted by the another front of shells in Clark to view interview questions for a position he applied for and view other applicants' resumes. complaints, At the time Plaintiff made these Strickland did not pursue any investigation into the alleged incidents. On December explained included Wednesday, scheduled have his in 6, concern his case December audit found that 2011, of Strickland over the notes. According 14, 2011, the office's noticed Plaintiff left to Plaintiff and descriptions he Strickland, on Strickland conducted a regularly cases. This concerned had not with inadequate Plaintiff failed to prior three days. met the Strickland claims record any contacts to in the Strickland because he had office on Monday or Tuesday of that week. left Because Plaintiff does not work Wednesdays, Plaintiff with only Thursday and Friday to have any child contacts. For his part, Plaintiff maintains well-within the allotted 72 hours to document Ostensibly had done the his purpose time computer to numerous among Strickland created a of and, "Special Incident Report" Alligood of material Alligood the directed Rogers Sheila Phillips. at his Plaintiff approached web browsing websites, and and Rogers call DJJ baconlube.com. included direction, on print completed a then Plaintiff's Principal informed computer. Investigator Phillips drove to the Evans County Services Georgia Bureau Investigation's investigation. what non-work-related found Plaintiff's to child contacts. Plaintiff ("SIR"). to remained discovered Rogers's confiscated Alligood he websites Office, forensic audit. search and the he Strickland clickandflirt.com list from certain ones to Strickland, others, that determining week, began inappropriate including, of that and According history.1 visited for with Plaintiff's outs this of computer, and ("GBI") crime DJJ Deputy Commissioner Carl suspend Plaintiff with sent pay it to lab for the a Brown instructed pending the Alligood then relayed the suspension directive to Rogers and Strickland. Plaintiff, who typically does not work 1 The parties dispute whether Plaintiff s computer was unlocked when Strickland approached it or whether Strickland necessarily asked Michael Clark for his password. This dispute is immaterial for this motion. on Wednesdays, Strickland came to informed the him office that that he day, was at which suspended point pending investigation. Investigator Phillips Michael Maybin to assigned DJJ Senior Investigator investigate Plaintiff's computer use. obtained Strickland's his investigation. Maybin SIR and interviewed Strickland concerning On December 19, Maybin interviewed Plaintiff and gave him the opportunity to prepare a written statement. In his to statement, Plaintiff claimed that he did not subscribe clickandflirt.com and had only visited the website in an attempt to unsubscribe. acknowledged Facebook, During the course of visiting Bass Pro the interview, non-work-related Shop, and Georgia websites, Wildlife, Plaintiff including and a website where he viewed a video of how to make a "drain oh bomb." Concurrently with Maybin's investigation, GBI Agent Matthew Heath conducted a forensic examination of Plaintiff's computer. Heath summary excel detailing prepared a Plaintiff's internet use. report and an file Heath determined that [Plaintiff] extensively visited numerous non-work related and personal websites, to include www.clickandflirt.com, a dating website; www.baconlube.com, a website advertising a www.facebook.com, sexual a social lubricant; networking website; and www.theoutdoorstrader.com, forum swap and to outdoor items. sell firearms [Heath] also and a other determined through [his] audit that [Plaintiff] had viewed pictures sexually posed women. Further, [Plaintiff's] computer use produced a combined total of ten thousand (10,000) hits on www.theoutdoorstrader.com, about eleven (11) hits on www.baconlube.com, and approximately (448) (Heath Aff., four hundred and forty-eight hits on www.clickandflirt.com. Doc. 44, Ex. 4 S[ 6.) Heath gave his report to final report of Maybin and also discussed its finding by phone. On January investigation Strickland's 25, that Maybin includes SIR, memorandum of 2012, an prepared Maybin's report Maybin's interview with Plaintiff, report"). Maybin gave the summarizing report the Office of Internal and Sarah to a Notice, letter a from (collectively the "DJJ Phillips findings Plaintiff violated DJJ•policies. Brown investigation, Investigative and the GBI's forensic report memorandum to of Administrative Strickland, memorandum a and who prepared concluding a that Phillips sent the report and Draper, Director Two Investigations. the days of later, the DJJ Draper informed Commissioner Gale Buckner of the investigation and sent the DJJ report to DJJ Staff Attorney Andre Castaing. Draper later investigation Commissioner met and Buckner with Commissioner explained the testified that Buckner GBI's she Brown and regarding forensic "trusted the the audit. unbiased information" the GBI found on the computer. On February 7, 2012, Buckner emailed Draper regarding the status of the case. Draper replied to Brown and advised him that the Office of Legal Services was reviewing the case. At the same time, Castaing prepared a termination review and gave it to DJJ General Counsel Tracy Masters. Castaing Commissioner Buckner a copy of the review and, no one else informed did Castaing immediately. Buckner her either. of That her afternoon, decision did not to his knowledge, Commissioner to give terminate Buckner Plaintiff When she made the decision to terminate Plaintiff, had not decision read was the based reports on principally that the misused his state computer Additionally, she generated what Draper investigation had to no view by the and DJJ or GBI; told her, Brown indicated that Plaintiff sexually explicit knowledge of Plaintiff's websites. complaints regarding his coworkers' policy violations. After meeting with Commissioner Buckner, Castaing called Alligood to notify him that Buckner wanted Plaintiff terminated that day. He termination then letter emailed for Alligood Alligood's Strickland met with Plaintiff, and gave him the and Strickland signature. informed him of his termination letter, which was draft that Later a day, termination, signed by Alligood. Two days later, Office "no of Human rehire" Then, which on Resources, designation February was Sam Clonts, 15, inappropriate of placed 2012, the to local termination use informed Plaintiff by was transmitted Plaintiff's the Acting Director of the DJJ on DJJ property employment issued media following state his the and letter a press outlets, that a record. release, announcing investigation violations of into DJJ policies. DJJ Public Affairs Officer Jim Schuler testified that Commissioner Buckner decided to issue a press release concerning the on termination. information letter, later In drafting from the the press release, Commissioner's office, Schuler the termination and a synopsis of Strickland's investigation. learned about articles in the newspaper relied Plaintiff regarding his termination. Concurrent computer use, to the DJJ's investigation into Plaintiff's Strickland and Alligood also began to investigate Plaintiff's allegations of rule violations by his coworkers. January 13, 2012, Special Incident allegations the Report concerning investigated these them. Each of DJJ Office Investigations from Strickland Michael accused received containing Clark's gun but was unable denied the purchase. to a Plaintiff's misconduct, allegations, the of On Maybin substantiate and Maybin found no other evidence to corroborate Plaintiff's allegations. Plaintiff against him believes for that reporting Plaintiff initially filed suit County, Georgia. That Strickland policy in the and Clark violations retaliated to Alligood. Superior Court of DeKalb suit was voluntarily dismissed, and the present litigation alleging retaliation in violation of the GWA and denial 2014. of procedural due process was filed on February 2, II. Summary genuine 56(a). the judgment dispute entitled to under the party, in the appropriate any as a material matter in [its] only fact of if "there and law." (1986), substantive Fed. is no movant the is R. law. U.S. 242, 248 light Elec. favor." 1437 477 the Matsushita 587 governing Inc., facts 574, 1428, to judgment Liberty Lobby, U.S. as is STANDARD Civ. P. Facts are "material" if they could affect the outcome of suit view SUMMARY JUDGMENT most favorable Indus. Co. Anderson (1986). v. The Court must the non-moving to Zenith v. Radio Corp., 475 and must draw "all justifiable inferences U.S. (11th Cir. v. 1991) Four Parcels (en banc) of Real Prop., 941 F.2d (internal punctuation and citations omitted). The Court, by motion. How moving to party reference Celotex carry Corp. this proof at trial. 1115 (11th Cir. to has the initial materials v. burden Catrett, depends Fitzpatrick v. 1993) . on burden file, 477 on the U.S. who of basis 317, bears non-movant has the for 323 the City of Atlanta, When the showing the (1986). burden of 2 F.3d 1112, the burden of proof at trial, the movant may carry the initial burden in one of two ways: by negating an essential element of the non- movant's case or by showing that there is no evidence to prove a fact necessary to the non-movant's case. Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, Adickes v. S.H. Kress 606-08 & Co., 398 9 See Clark v. (11th Cir. 1991) U.S. 144 (1970) Coats & (explaining and Celotex, 477 U.S. 317). response in Before opposition, movant has met genuine its issues judgment as of a F.3d 248, 254 statement insufficient. law. is non-movant's consider whether the showing that there are no and that v. it meet is City of (per curiam). cannot the entitled Columbus, to 120 A mere conclusory the burden at trial is 929 F.2d at 608. avoid indeed trial, 1997) evaluate first Jones if—the movant summary judgment." proof at of fact non-movant may there can must material Clark, If—and only that it (11th Cir. the Court initial burden of matter that non-movant the summary a Id. carries its judgment material initial only by issue of burden, the "demonstrating] fact that precludes When the non-movant bears the burden of the non-movant must tailor its method by which the movant carried its response to initial burden. the If the movant presents evidence affirmatively negating a material fact, the non-movant withstand fact a "must directed sought to be the movant shows non-movant must respond verdict negated." with motion evidence at trial Fitzpatrick, sufficient on the 2 F.3d at either show that the record material 1116. an absence of evidence on a material fact, contains to If the evidence that was "overlooked or ignored" by the movant or "come forward with additional verdict motion deficiency." burden by evidence at Id. relying sufficient trial at on based 1117. the on to the withstand alleged The non-movant pleadings 10 or by cannot repeating a directed evidentiary carry its conclusory allegations contained in the complaint. See Morris v. Ross, F.2d Rather, 1032, 1033-34 (11th Cir. 1981). the 663 non-movant must respond with affidavits or as otherwise provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure In action, notice this of 56. the Clerk Defendant's motion of for the other materials default. in (Doc. 45.) 772 F.2d Wainwright, therefore, notice 822, 825 Plaintiffs the right to file affidavits opposition, The gave summary judgment and informed them of the summary judgment rules, or Court and the consequences requirements (11th Cir. of 1985) Griffith (per of v. curiam), are satisfied and the motion is ripe for review. III. DISCUSSION Plaintiff's original complaint named the DJJ as a defendant for two counts. Count One alleged that the DJJ deprived Plaintiff of his constitutionally protected reputational liberty interest Count under Two violation (Id. II 42 U.S.C. alleged of the 43-46.) that § 1983. Defendant (Compl., DJJ later 1 terminated Georgia Whistleblower Act, Plaintiff Doc. amended II Plaintiff O.C.G.A. his 35-42.) § in 45-1-4. complaint to add Defendants Strickland and Alligood to the § 1983 claim. A. Reputational Liberty Claim Count One of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is a procedural- due-process claim constitutionally for protected deprivation reputational 11 of liberty Plaintiff's interest under 42 U.S.C. the § 1983 against DJJ directly. Below, adequate state mandamus is summary claim law an judgment on the Court remedies. adequate judgment against Defendants in all the addresses Because state law Defendants' Defendants. alternate Alligood, ground on Court of the the finds Court Plaintiff's also GRANTS sovereign and existence of Court remedy, favor The the Strickland, that GRANTS § 1983 summary immunity with respect to Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against the DJJ. 1. Exhaustion of Adequate State Law Remedies To prove: prove "(1) attending (5) by a a reputational a false statement governmental the liberty (2) a plaintiff of a stigmatizing nature employee's governmental claim, employer discharge (6) (4) made without a opportunity for employee name clearing." Cotton v. F.3d present 1328, Court 1330 assumes five. (11th that Cir. Plaintiff 2000). can For satisfy state remedies were available but the plaintiff (3) public meaningful Jackson, 216 purposes, the elements Narrowing the focus to the sixth element, must one through "[i]f adequate failed to take advantage of them, the plaintiff cannot rely on that failure to claim that Id. at the state deprived him of procedural due process." 1331. Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to pursue state law remedies to clear his name before filing suit. In particular, Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not request a name-clearing 12 hearing from the DJJ and did not file a mandamus action in state court following his contend that termination. Plaintiff Relying on Cotton, possesses an adequate Defendants state-law remedy, requiring summary judgment in their favor. In Cotton, receiving South Georgia College fired the plaintiff after EEOC complaints harassing two coworkers. requested a hearing and, subsequently, then filed Circuit suit held to in that hearing, process claim." plaintiff Id. at 1329. contest the federal charge, court. "because adequate Id. has failed at 1330. which denied. On sexually to the College The plaintiff appeal, state Plaintiff with the he with The plaintiff repeatedly the Board of Regents available to provide clearing charging law the Eleventh remedies were opportunity for a name state a procedural In particular, the Court found that the plaintiff could have sought a writ of mandamus Georgia Superior Court. Georgia later under confirmed O.C.G.A. § clearing hearing. Id. at 1332-33. The Supreme that mandamus 9-6-20 for Joiner v. the an available purpose of seeking 702 S.E.2d 194, in a Court of is Glenn, due remedy a name- 196 (Ga. 2010). Ordinarily, failure to seek a writ of mandamus "deprives a claimant Cty., 14, Ga., of No. an actionable 5:13-cv-82, cause of action." 2014 WL 3974668, Harris at *3 v. Pierce (S.D. Ga. Aug. 2014). Plaintiff asserts that this is not an ordinary case for two reasons. First, once the press release issued, 13 mandamus would be inadequate, his ability directly. and, to second, request The Court a because Plaintiff name-clearing disagrees: both lacked notice hearing reasons from are the of DJJ typical of reputational liberty claims. The Court release begins defeats established the that with Plaintiff's adequacy of argument mandamus post-publication that relief. the press It name-clearing is well- hearings may satisfy due process and that a writ of mandamus ordering one is an adequate procedure 1983. state-law need not Instead, the remedy. provide state "[T]o all be relief procedure adequate, available must be the under able state Section to correct whatever deficiencies exist and to provide with what process is due." v. Cotton, Wille, process 132 due 216 F.3d F.3d at 679 Plaintiff 1331 (11th to (citations Cir. protect 1998) his omitted). noted liberty Harrison that "the interest only was a ^name clearing hearing,'" and that such a hearing "need not take place before termination information." Campbell v. Id. Pierce 1984)). Cotton "can held be publication." Harrison, at or 683 the n.9 publication (first Cty. , Ga. , 741 itself either states before that or citation F.2d the after 1342, of the omitted) 1345 hearing termination Cotton, 216 F.3d at 1330 (emphasis added) 132 F.3d at 683 n.9). (citing (11th Cir. name-clearing the damaging or (citing Here, Plaintiff was due a name- clearing hearing, not the non-issuance of the press release 14 Read together, Cotton and Harrison stand for the proposition that a post-publication mandamus action to receive a name-clearing hearing Plaintiff has or even not an adequate supported his assuming publication is that context. remedy. position with any case mandamus Cotton state-law is inadequate controls this case in holding the and post- the Court finds that mandamus is an adequate remedy. Having found that mandamus is an adequate state-law remedy, the Court does not address Plaintiff's argument that he should be excused from asserting an otherwise adequate state-law remedy because the DJJ did clearing hearing. Because not notify him of his right to a name- See id. at 1332 n.3. "mandamus would be an adequate remedy to ensure that Plaintiff was not deprived of his due process rights . . ., Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for a procedural process violation . . . ." Cotton, 216 F.3d at 1333 omitted). The Court favor on Plaintiff's § GRANTS summary judgment in due (citations Defendants' 1983 claims. 2. Sovereign Immunity Plaintiff's § additional reason: 1983 claim against the DJJ fails for an Plaintiff pled the claim against a sovereign state and not a "person" under § 1983. Defendants did not mention this claim in their opening brief because they believed Plaintiff abandoned the claim in his 15 brief opposing Br., Doc. Defendants' 52 at 17.) motion to There, dismiss. Plaintiff (Def.'s Reply acknowledged that "Defendant Georgia DJJ cannot be liable under his § 1983 claim." (PL's Opp. Br., response brief Defendant DJJ apparently Doc. claims in Eleventh Amendment Defendants that its because argue 13 at 4.) Nevertheless, "Defendants' analysis of Defendants the Motion does 42 U.S.C. believe Immunity." (Doc. that the DJJ is claim for 50 equitable Plaintiff's DJJ at immune not 1983 § is 13 claim, entitled n.4.) even include In from to reply, claims for equitable relief. Plaintiff's the DJJ, a not one of state its [Plaintiff] has officials, the prospective Authority, v. Pugh, department officials sued an relief." 713 438 in an 781, the v. 1523 782 brought Jekyll (11th Cir. (per rather bars against immunity capacity. state also (1978) is sovereign official Amendment Fouche F.2d 1518, U.S. possessing agency of Eleventh relief "Because than state injunctive Island 1983) and or State-Park (citing Alabama curiam)). judgment is therefore GRANTED in Defendant DJJ's Summary favor on this claim. B. Georgia Whistleblower Act Claim Count the DJJ two of Plaintiff's terminated Whistleblower Act, original Plaintiff O.C.G.A. in § violation 45-1-4. 16 Complaint of Georgia alleged the that Georgia courts have applied under the the (Ga. Ct. McDonnell GWA. App. Douglas Touhy v. framework to City of Atlanta, retaliation 771 S.E.2d claims 501, 504 2015). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff must first make a prima facie case. If the plaintiff makes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision. If the employer successfully meets the burden of production, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that each proffered reason was pretext. Id. a at 505. prima Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate facie case and cannot demonstrate that their nondiscriminatory reason to terminate Plaintiff was pretextual. 1. Prima Facie Case To prove a prima facie retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that "(1) he was employed by a public employer; a protected disclosure or objection; employment between action." action; the and protected (4) there activity (3) 523 (Ga. Ct. App. he made he suffered an adverse is some and the causal adverse Albers v. Ga. Bd. of Regents of Univ. S.E.2d 520, (2) Sys. relationship employment of Ga., 7 66 2014). Defendants only challenge the fourth element of the prima facie case: the existence of a causal typical whistleblower retaliation claim, relationship. In a to establish a causal relationship a plaintiff must show that the decision maker knew that the plaintiff engaged in protected whistleblowing activity. 17 Forrester v. Ga. Ct. App. Dept. 2011) . Commissioner fired him. of Human Servs., Here, Buckner Instead, however, knew of 708 S.E.2d 660, 670 Plaintiff does not argue that Plaintiff s complaints when investigation termination. she Plaintiff argues that Commissioner Buckner was the "cat's paw" of Defendants Strickland and Alligood, biased (Ga. is Defendants the true insist cause that the of GWA whose Plaintiff's does not allow cat's-paw causation because the GWA requires "but-for" causation and does See not Sims follow v. MVM, 2013) (distinguishing causation former Title under Inc., whether ADEA requires VII's from motivating-factor 704 F.3d cat's Title "but-for" paw VII 1327 may on causation the and causation. (11th be used to grounds the Cir. show that latter the only "motivating factor"). Whether the cat's-paw theory of causation is available under the GWA is a question of law that appears to be of first impression.2 2 Powell 5791563 v. For present purposes, the Court assumes— Valdosta City Sch. (M.D. Ga. Nov. 6, 2014) paw theory under the GWA. causation was available (Ga. App. Dist., No. 7:13-cv-53, 2014 WL is the only case applying the cat's- In Powell, the court assumed that cat's-paw under Title VII, which Georgia link element. a matter the GWA because it is available under courts have looked to regarding the causal Id^ (citing Freeman v. Smith, 750 S.E.2d 739, 741-43 2013) . In Sims v. MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2013), the Eleventh Circuit articulated one possible explanation for not applying a cat's-paw theory under the GWA. under the Sims concerned a retaliation claim American Disabilities Act. The court distinguished claims under the ADEA from the USERRA retaliation claims at issue in Staub v. Proctor Hosp., explained, 562 U.S. 411, 421 (2011). requires "but-for" causation, 18 The ADEA, the court while USERRA and Title VII but does not find—that cat's-paw causation the GWA and analyzes Plaintiff's claim. that Plaintiff cat's-paw cannot theory, make the a Court prima does is permitted under Because the Court finds facie not case decide even whether under a cat's-paw causation is available under the GWA. In the Title VII, context when recommendation 1328, decisionmaker paw." decisionmaker a non-decisionmaker complaint." under the 1332 acts (11th as the followed without Stimpson v. Cir. 1992). biased FMLA and City In a biased independently of Tuscaloosa, those cases, non-decisionmaker's the "cat's "But where the ^decisionmaker conducts his own evaluation and makes an independent decision, taint claims a from investigating the F.3d retaliation the Eleventh Circuit has held that "causation may be established 186 of of a biased subordinate his decision is free of the employee.'" Caldwell v. Clayton both require retaliation to be only a motiving factor. Sims, 704 F.3d at 1335. The court found that cat's-paw causation was not allowed in "but-for" statutes and held that it was not available under ADEA. at Id. 1336. Defendant causation. argues See that O.C.G.A. the GWA 45-1-4(d)(2) similarly ("No requires public but-for employer shall retaliate against a public employee for disclosing a violation" (emphasis added)). The Supreme Court of Georgia and Court of Appeals of Georgia appear to have never directly addressed whether but-for or motivating factor causation is required under the GWA, much less whether cat's-paw causation is allowed. In this case, the only way Plaintiff can establish a causal relationship is through a cat's-paw theory. The Court assumes that theory is allowed, but finds that it is not satisfied on these facts. 19 Cty. Sch. curiam) Dist., (quoting 1262, 1270 cat's paw behind 604 F. Pennington (11th Cir. theory the App'x 855, v. City 2001)). must (11th Cir. of the other Foster v. 2013) party's Thomas Cty., that and decision 927 (quoting Stimpson, In Staub v. Supreme Court (per 261 F.3d Huntsville, the not discriminatory the underlying misconduct identified in the recommendation, of 2015) "A plaintiff operating under a 'prove recommendation, 861 to employee was an actual cause terminate F. Supp. animus 2d 1350, the employee.'" 1360-61 (M.D. Ga. (2011), the 186 F.3d at 1331). Proctor explained Hosp., the 562 U.S. 411, relationship 421 between independent investigations and facts provided by biased supervisors: [I]f the independent investigation relies on facts provided by the biased supervisor—as is necessary in any case of cat's-paw liability—then the employer (either directly or through the ultimate decisionmaker) will have effectively delegated the factfinding portion of the investigation to the biased supervisor. Id. at 421. not In this way, delegate between the fact an independent investigation that does finding cuts non-decisionmaker's off the biased causal relationship investigation and the termination. The knew of Court assumes Plaintiff's that Strickland complaints and Alligood, regarding conducted a biased initial investigation. rule who each violations, The question becomes whether Maybin and Heath's investigations, the contents of which 20 were reported to Commissioner Buckner by Brown and Draper, were similarly tainted by their reliance on facts relayed to them by Strickland and Alligood or whether their factfinding was sufficiently independent. Maybin's DJJ report included the following: investigation Strickland; to created (3) Plaintiff; and facts (4) (2) (5) a letter report. are the from The the of a report of SIR created notice by directed interview between Maybin Strickland; SIR and result the investigative a memorandum of computer which Maybin; an administrative Plaintiff; forensic by (1) and (6) Strickland's Strickland's the GBI's email relay assumedly biased investigation. But Maybin's report includes two documents that are the assuredly memorandum of result Maybin's of independent interview with factfinding: Plaintiff, and the the GBI's forensic report. In the of the facts instance, hunting did, interview, relayed Plaintiff and insisted that unsubscribe admissions contest his from in of the facts Maybin in that he interview websites to visited amount to emails. to Plaintiff baconlube.com independent contained in Strickland's SIR. For devoted clickandflirt.com unsolicited 21 SIR. outdoortrader.com. ever visit website's Strickland's visiting including only the the to admitted firearms, however, Plaintiff acknowledged the truth of most was and to Plaintiff's verification The GBI's report is also independent. In mid-January 2012, Heath conducted the forensic audit of Plaintiff's state computer and summarized spreadsheet. social had to audit, have sites, nuclear in Doc. Heath "was used a report 44, Ex. access informative documents of the 4 SI Ex. assumedly A at biased dating The Prior to computer was websites online 1.) Heath, fact from of therefore, Strickland's tools such as "Encase which include the v6, IEF v4, and (Id.) Encase consistent 5. ) Heath then conducted his investigation using the software NetAnalysis." associated detailing the usage standard procedure to collect evidence, of and informed that the to (Heath Aff., investigation. use Aff., been and bombs." knowledge GBI's findings (Heath beginning the suspected his and NetAnlysis with that reports described in towards internet radio hunters service, non-work-related and were gun (Id.) activity SIR. Heath's "a social forum website owners," among the websites. internet Strickland's report notes that theoutdoorstrader.com, targeted found and most big983.com, an frequently visited Although the excel spreadsheet containing the entire results does not appear to be in the record, Heath states that he theoutdoorstrader.com, approximately 448 11 hits personal internet activity. hits on found over on hits baconlube.com, clickandflirt.com, (Heath Aff. SI 6.) 22 10,000 among on and other Additionally, the To visual Heath images viewed do this, Encase files, which includes browsing but Encase of report sexually for not the searches images determine internet browsing. computer's a to Plaintiff's during Encase temporary that were software viewed intentionally saved by a indicated posed dating, used that women, hunting, Plaintiff's Facebook and during computer's files profiles, firearm internet internet user. included and The images advertisements websites. Heath also discovered pictures of deer and firearms that were intentionally saved to Plaintiff's "My Pictures" folder. that no pornographic images bombs were discovered. or images (Heath Aff., The report indicated depicting Ex. explosives or A at 1.) In her memorandum to Brown and Draper attached to Maybin's investigation, Sheilla forensically examined found that he Phillips [Plaintiff's] "visited numerous explained that "Heath state desktop computer" and non-work related and personal websites" and "viewed pictures of sexually posed women in under garments and bikinis ClickandFlirt.com." Plaintiff question, the caveat that unsubscribe. his on (Doc. 44, Ex. 27 at 18.) explained that with extensively admitted to viewing exception only Phillips's of visit to Facebook Further, the baconlube.com memorandum, in with clickandflirt.com introductory Phillips websites and and the was to therefore, summarizes the two key pieces of independent investigatory work performed by Maybin and Heath: the interview with Plaintiff and 23 the forensic affidavit clear audit and that of his deposition it was state computer. testimony, the facts Finally, Commissioner discovered in in Buckner the her makes independent investigation conducted by Heath, as relayed to her by Brown and Draper, which led her to terminate Plaintiff.3 Because independent determination that and factfinding Commissioner because investigation, relationship established. Plaintiff the The Buckner Court necessary visited finds for Court, a led the prima therefore, websites relied that to on the facie GRANTS the the in question, independent required case same causal cannot summary judgment be in favor of Defendant DJJ on Plaintiff's GWA retaliation claim. IV. As discussed, the CONCLUSION Court GRANTS summary judgment on all counts. Defendants' motion for The Clerk SHALL enter judgment 3 The Court notes that Plaintiff disputes whether he visited clickandflirt.com more than on a single occasion to unsubscribe. Plaintiff does not, however, dispute that Commissioner Buckner relied on Draper and Brown's description of Heath's investigation that found Plaintiff did visit the therefore, relied on websites were visited website more often. Commissioner Buckner, Heath's independent factfinding into what on the state computer in question. It is possible Heath's investigation was inaccurate, as Plaintiff maintains, and that Commissioner Buckner's decision was a mistake. But retaliation laws do not check to see whether the decisionmaker made a substantively correct decision; discrimination laws, ensures the GWA, that like most retaliation and a decisionmaker does not take an adverse action based on improper reasons. See Brown v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 939 F.2d 946, 951 (11th Cir. 1991) (a defendant may act "for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as it [] is not for a discriminatory reason."). 24 in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff and CLOSE this case, ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georg ia, this (4^ *^^ day of April, 2016. HONORAB]*BOlr RANDAL HALL UNITED STATES SOUTHERII 25 DISTRICT DISTRICT JUDGE OF GEORGIA
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