Shipman-Davis v. Savannah-Chatham County Public School System et al, No. 4:2015cv00109 - Document 26 (S.D. Ga. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER granting 21 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 21 Motion to Dismiss; granting 23 Motion for Summary Judgment; terminating 25 Motion for Leave of Absence. All federal law claims are dismissed, judgment shall be entered in favor of the defendants and this case is closed. Signed by Judge J. Randal Hall on 8/29/16. (cmr)
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Shipman-Davis v. Savannah-Chatham County Public School System et al IN THE UNITED FOR THE STATES Doc. 26 DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA SAVANNAH DIVISION DR. VIVIENNE SHIPMAN-DAVIS (NEAL), Plaintiff, CV 415-109 Defendants'1 motion v, SAVANNAH-CHATHAM COUNTY SCHOOL SYSTEM; SCHOOL BOARD; PUBLIC * SAVANNAH-CHATHAM * THOMAS B. LOCKAMY,* JR.; ARETHA RHONE-BUSH; RAY; RAMON and ROB GORDON, Defendants. ORDER Presently summary before judgment Defendants' on motion state claims (id.), the Court Plaintiff's to dismiss is federal law without prejudice and Defendants' on Plaintiff's state law claims to respond to Defendants' claims motion for (Doc. 23). for (doc. 21), Plaintiff's summary judgment Plaintiff has failed summary judgment motions and/or their 1 As identified by Defendant Savannah-Chatham County Public School District ("District") misnamed in its Answer Defendant to District as Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, the "Savannah Chatham System" and/or the "Savannah-Chatham County School Board." at 1-2.) Plaintiff has County Public (Ans., School Doc. 17, Neither of said misnamed entities are body corporate nor otherwise have the capacity to sue or be sued. See Foskey v. Vidalia City Sen., 574 S.E.2d 367, 370 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (municipal board of education, unlike school district it manages, not body corporate and lacks capacity to sue or be sued). This misnomer, however, does not affect Defendant District's substantial rights given that Defendant District explicitly acknowledges service and knowledge that it was the intended defendant (Ans. at 1-2), nor has it dismiss raised (Docs. this issue in its motions for summary judgment or motion to 21 and 23). Dockets.Justia.com motion to dismiss.2 unopposed. LR applicable time opposition to Defendants' "DSMF2", this 7.5, SDGa. period a her statements opposition. because own ("Failure shall motion."). respectively) motion filing Defendants' motions, Plaintiff statement LR 56.1, material deemed of facts SDGa. not or are deemed within there facts set facts admitted has respond that material the are to indicate All of therefore, for forth ("DSMF1" the purpose controverted any is other the no in and of them by materials in ("All material facts set forth in the statement required to be served by the moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless, controverted by a statement served by the opposing party."). Upon due consideration, Defendants': (1) Motion Plaintiff's Federal for Claims; the Court Summary and (2) hereby Judgment Motion to on Dismiss GRANTS All of [Without Prejudice] Plaintiff's Remaining State Law Claims. I. The present dispute BACKGROUND arises out of the non-renewal of Plaintiff's employment contract with the District in May 2013. Shortly before receiving notice of her contract's non-renewal, 2 The Clerk gave Plaintiff appropriate notice of the Defendants' motions for summary judgment on October 26 and November 6, 2015, respectively, and at those times informed her of the summary judgment rules, the right to file affidavits or other materials in opposition, and the consequences of default. (Doc. 22; Doc. 24.) Thus, the notice requirements of Griffith v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 822, 825 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam), were satisfied. Plaintiff's responses to Defendants' motions for summary judgment were due on November 16 and 30, 2015, respectively. (Id.) Plaintiff alleged and was disciplined deficiencies in responsibilities. by her immediate Plaintiff's supervisor performance Plaintiff maintains that of her for duties her performance was not properly evaluated during the year immediately preceding her contract's and the based subsequent on notice non-renewal, that non-renewal misrepresentations, of the of her and discipline employment that said non-renewal and was she she received contract received were deficient improperly denied a hearing before the local board of education to dispute said non-renewal. Shortly before the Plaintiff instituted alleging, inter two-year the alia, anniversary instant claims suit under 42 of on her non-renewal, April U.S.C. 28, § 1983 2015, for violations of her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff was employed by the District years, for over nine (9) from July 2006 until her contract of employment was not renewed in May 2013.3 8, SI 15.) (DSMF1, Doc. 21-5, 1 1; Am. Compl., Doc. At the time of non-renewal, Plaintiff was employed by the District as a "Title I Program Manager."4 Compl. SI 14.) (DSMF1 1 2; Am. In March 2013, Plaintiff's immediate supervisor, Defendant Aretha Rhone-Bush, became concerned that Plaintiff had failed to properly perform and document her employment duties 3 Accordingly, Plaintiff's employment terminate as of June 30, 2013. with the Defendant District would (Lockamy Aff., Doc. 21-1, at 8). 4 Plaintiff admits that she, in her role as a Title I Program Manager, should be considered a "teacher" as that term is defined in O.C.G.A. § 20-2- 942(a)(4) (as opposed to a "school administrator"). (Am. Compl. 1 14.) and time 2013, reporting. Defendant Plaintiff's (DSMF2, Rhone-Bush performance and Doc. 23-2, disciplined 11 5-6.) On Plaintiff for documentation and March 20, in Plaintiff gave faults a "Notice of Serious Concern" directing remedial measures to which she was Ex. 3; Am. Compl. 11 50-51.) of to adhere. Serious work due Compl. Concern, to 1 the 54.) bereavement Defendant death leave, Thomas 7-8; of Doc. 23-1, Shortly after receiving the Notice took her 1, several 2013, Lockamy, days grandmother. Plaintiff B. Rhone-Bush Aff., prior sent Jr., a of leave (DSMF2 to her letter Defendant 1 14; return via Ramon email Ray, from Am. from to Mrs. (Defendant District's Senior Director of Internal Audit), and Mrs. Concern and Sharon Sands disputing the Notice of Serious accusing retaliation.56 April 8, leave. thereafter, however, suffering Defendant Rhone-Bush of harassment and (DSMF2 1 16; Am. Compl. 1 55 & Ex. 3.) bereavement was 11 Plaintiff On April Kelly Crosby On (DSMF2 from 2013, Plaintiff (DSMF2 1 15; Am. returned Compl. to 1 work 56.) from Shortly Plaintiff went on leave claiming that she severe emotional distress resulting from 5 Upon receipt of Plaintiff's letter, Defendant Lockamy requested that Mrs. Crosby investigate Plaintiff's claims of harassment and retaliation. (DSMF2 1 17.) After a thorough investigation of Plaintiff's claims, Mrs. Crosby was unable to find any evidence in support of Plaintiff's claims. (DSMF2 1 19.) Defendant Lockamy informed Plaintiff of the result of Mrs. Crosby's investigation by letter dated May 7, 2013. (DSMF2 1 17; Am. Compl., Ex. 8.) 6 Plaintiff also sent an email and a letter dated August 10 and 11, 2016, respectively, to Defendant Ray, Mrs. Crosby, and Mrs. Sands further disputing the Notice of Serious Concern accusing Defendant Rhone-Bush of harassment and retaliation. (Am. Compl. M 58-59; Am. Compl., Exs. 4 & 5.) Defendant While Rhone-Bush's Plaintiff members of Plaintiff's further was her on leave, department job Concern, and found 1 reasons Defendant and Because forth Rhone-Bush 1 15.) other deficiencies 21.) set (DSMF2 Rhone-Bush further (Id. the Concern. Defendant performance. deficiencies Serious Notice of Serious in the of these Notice recommended in to of the Defendant District's Human Resources department that Plaintiff's employment contract not be renewed. In April Defendant Board of contract 2013, Lockamy 31 22.) based on the recommendations of his recommended Education of (Id. that employment to notice be would not 2013-2014 school year. the Savannah-Chatham sent be (DSMF1 1 4; to Plaintiff renewed for DSMF2 31 25). staff, County that the her upcoming Accordingly, on April 30, 2013,7 a "Notice of Non-Renewal" letter was sent by the Defendant last known 31407.8 District address, (DSMF1 fll via 25 5-7; certified Springwater Lockamy Aff. mail to Drive, at Plaintiff Pt. at Wentworth, 6-19.) her GA The Notice of Non-Renewal informed Plaintiff that she had twenty days from the date that the Notice of Non-Renewal was mailed to her to inform 7 While the Notice of Non-Renewal itself is dated April 29, 2013 (Lockamy Aff. at 8), certified mail postage was not affixed to the envelope in which the letter was sent until April 30, 2013 (Id. at 6) . Accordingly, the Notice of Non-Renewal was not actually sent to Plaintiff until April 30, 2013. See O.C.G.A. § 20-2-940(c). 8 Plaintiff failed to sign for and/or collect the Notice of Non-Renewal, and it was returned attempts. Plaintiff (DSMF1 to the 1 11; received actual contract was not renewed. Defendant District Lockamy Aff. notice from a at after 6.) friend several On May that 1, failed delivery 2013, however, Plaintiff's (DSMF1 1 12; Am. Compl. 1 16.) employment the Defendant Lockamy, by District's certified school mail or superintendent, statutory overnight Defendant delivery her intent to assert her right to notice of the reasons of for her non-renewal and of her right to a hearing on the same. (DSMF1 1 6; of Lockamy Aff. at 6-8.) Enclosed with the Notice Non- Renewal was a Georgia Department of Labor Separation Notice,9 as well as through copies 20-2-947 (Lockamy Aff. On Lockamy of May in stated that Sections of the 20-2-211, Official 20-2-940, Code of and Georgia Annotated. at 9-19.) 6, 2013, which "my Plaintiff sent she contested her attorney will be an email to non-renewal sending the Am. Lockamy Compl. 11 26-27 & Ex. sent a letter to 7.) Defendant and further certified requesting a formal hearing with the board members." 13; 20-2-942 On May 7, 2013, Plaintiff in response letter (DSMF1 1 Defendant to her email dated May 6, 2013, in which he confirmed that Defendant had been provided appropriate notice of her non-renewal for failure to perform the duties of her job.10 28-30 & Ex. 8.) On May 22, then-attorney for Plaintiff, 9 On 2013, Mr. Shaun C. states "From 8/11/98 Southworth, as sent a letter by certified mail to Plaintiff's separation notice, Employment" (DSMF1 II 14-15; Am. Compl. II the section entitled "Period of Last To 6/30/2013", signifying the fact that Plaintiff's Notice of Non-Renewal would not result in immediate termination. (Lockamy Aff. at 9.) 10 Defendant Lockamy's letter to Plaintiff dated May 7, 2013, which Plaintiff does not dispute receiving, was also mailed to Plaintiff's aforementioned last known address. (DSMF1 11 14-15; Am. Compl. M 28-30 & Ex. 8.) Defendant Lockamy in which Mr. of Plaintiff's non-renewal Southworth contested the validity and requested "written notice and a full hearing according to the requirements of the Fair Dismissal Act." (DSMF1 I 17; 2013, counsel for Am. Compl. Defendants II sent 31-32 a & Ex. letter 9.) to On May 29, Mr. Southworth stating that Plaintiff's May 22, 2013 request for a hearing was untimely and therefore was denied. 33-34 & Ex. Summary 56(a). as Court is depositions, admissions on file, material as a matter shall STANDARD appropriate to any judgment The pleadings, SUMMARY JUDGMENT judgment dispute entitled to II 13.) II. genuine (DSMF1 I 18; Am. Compl. only fact if answers summary to FED. is no movant and the of law." grant "there is R. judgment CIV. "if interrogatories, together with the affidavits, if any, P. the and show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law." Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 1259, The "purpose of summary judgment is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to trial." see whether there Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. U.S. 574, 587 (1986) v. is a genuine need for Zenith Radio Corp., 475 (internal citation omitted). "[The] initial basis party seeking responsibility for [record its motion, before the of summary judgment informing and court] the district identifying which it always those Catrett, movant 477 U.S. carries 317, its 323 (1986). If initial burden, the - the court of the portions of the demonstrate the believes absence of a genuine issue of material fact." bears Celotex Corp. and only non-movant if - may v. the avoid summary judgment by demonstrating that there is indeed a genuine issue as Clark, to the Inc., "material" 929 material F.2d facts 604, of 608 (11th if they could affect the governing substantive law. 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). its case. Cir. Clark 1991). the outcome of the v. Coats Facts suit & are under Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., A dispute of those material facts "is 'genuine' . . . [only] if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." When ruling on the motion, evidence in the record in the the Court must Id. view all the light most favorable to the non- moving party and resolve all factual disputes in the non-moving party's favor. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. also avoid weighing conflicting evidence. 255; McKenzie 934 (11th v. Cir. Davenport-Harris 1987). Anderson, 477 U.S. at Funeral Home, Nevertheless, The Court must the 834 F.2d 930, non-moving party's response to the motion for summary judgment must consist of more than conclusory allegations, and a mere "scintilla" of evidence will not Cir. 1990); 1989) . suffice. Pepper v. v. Darby, Coates, 887 911 F.2d 1493, F.2d 1573, 1498 1577 (11th (11th Cir. Despite the liberality with which courts are obliged to interpret pro se the Walker essential complaints, burden "a pro se under litigant does not escape summary judgment standards of establishing that there is a genuine issue as to a fact material to his case Crawford, in to avert 906 F.2d 667, 670 v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 148 F.3d 1262, As order the satisfied, materials 1263 89, 94 (11th Cir. (11th Cir. supra, judgment." 1990); Brown v. see also Erickson (2007); Tannenbaum v. United States, requirements see summary 1998). of n.2, and Griffith v. Wainwright Plaintiff's in opposition has expired, time Defendants' for were filing motions are ripe for consideration. III. DISCUSSION Where a party "fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact . . . , the court may . . . grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials . . . show that the movant is entitled to it." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). Thus, the Court "cannot base the entry of summary judgment on the mere fact that the motion was unopposed, the merits of the motion." (11th Cir. 2013) but, rather, must consider Howard v. Gee, 538 F. App'x 884, 891 (internal quotation marks omitted). thus addresses the merits of Defendants' motions The Court in the context of Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Georgia state law. A. Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. Plaintiff Defendant District, Defendant Lockamy, and Defendant Robert and official alleging process Process Clause that guaranteed any State 1983 Claim sued Ray, individual § under of the deprive Gordon capacities, Defendants the Defendant as Fourteenth person of life, both as her right turn "provides two different kinds of due Due "nor or without due process of law," U.S. Const, amend. XIV, in to The provides liberty, their Defendant Amendment. Fourteenth Amendment any in well violated Rhone-Bush, shall property, § 1, which constitutional protection: procedural due process and substantive due process." McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1555 (11th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Substantive due process rights do not exist for substantive property rights in employment that are created only by state law. exist Id. at 1556. in the Procedural due process rights, context of state-created property however, do rights in employment as "an employee's right to employment may be abridged so long as the procedures used to abrogate that right satisfy constitutional minima." Id. at 1561 (emphasis added). Procedural due process requires that before a state agency may terminate a tenured employee, that "employee is entitled to oral 10 or written notice of the charges against him, the employer's evidence, of the story." Loudermill, Id. and an opportunity to present his at 470 U.S. an explanation of 1561 532, (citing Cleveland Bd. 546 of side Educ. v. (1985)). Under Georgia's "Fair Dismissal Act," located at O.C.G.A. 20-2-940 et seq. (the "Act"), state-created property rights upon state-created property rights exist accepted four or more contracts from the same § 20-2-942(d) July 1, 2000, which which for consecutive local board forms the of Plaintiff teachers11 "school of basis education. the relies, who year" § have employment See O.C.G.A. ("A person who first became a teacher on or after shall acquire rights under this Code section to continued employment as a teacher."); see also O.C.G.A. §§ 20-2940(a) and 20-2-942(b)(1) employment contracts may (tenured only be contract prior written contract Act, and of a tenured notice the of teacher, the manner of and/or terminated, suspended, or non-renewed for cause). the teachers their discharged, In order to fail to renew the teacher non-renewal exercising of must be given their rights their employment under the and such written notice must be given by certified mail or statutory overnight 11 "Teacher" is certificated by administrators." qualifies as a delivery. defined under the the Act Professional O.C.G.A. § as the Act, § 20-2-942(b) (2) . "any professional Standards 20-2-942(a)(4). teacher under contest this categorization. O.C.G.A. Commission, but Plaintiff and Defendant 11 employee not including contends does (Am. Compl. at 5; DSMF1 1 3.) school not that she appear to Within twenty (20) days of service of the notice of non-renewal, a tenured teacher written notice desiring of to their exercise request their for superintendent of the local board of rights a must hearing serve on the education that employs the teacher via certified mail or statutory overnight delivery. Within fourteen (14) days timely request for a hearing, provide the teacher for the teacher's and a concise teacher; and (3) will be held. of education the Id. (2) the time of the teacher's the local board of education must non-renewal; of receipt inter alia, with, summary of Id. (1) the the names evidence and place to cause of be where causes known witnesses used the or against hearing the thereon Said hearing would be before the local board (or an impartial tribunal designated thereby), and any decision resulting therefrom may be appealed to the Georgia State 1160. Board of O.C.G.A. Education § in accordance 20-2-940(e) and with (f) . In O.C.G.A. the party disagreed with the state board's decision, event § 20-2- that any said party may appeal the state board's decision to the superior court of the county wherein situated. the O.C.G.A. relevant § local 20-2-1160(c). board The of Court education of Appeals is for the Eleventh Circuit has previously held that the procedures set forth in the Act "provides constitutionally required." all the Sharpley v. 12 due process Davis, that is 786 F.2d 1109, 1112 (11th 456 U.S. Cir. 461, 1986) 483-85 (citing Kremer v. Chemical Const. Corp., (1982)). In the instant action, Plaintiff was provided timely notice of the intent to non-renew her contract of employment that fully satisfied the Lockamy Aff. via requirements at 6-19.) certified mail As with perfected on that date. ("Service the notice sufficient known address on April 30, 20-2-940(a) of the Act.12 2016, be of DSMF1 II 5-7; was sent Plaintiff's last non-renewal postage to service of the same was deemed O.C.G.A. shall (See § 20-2-942(b) (2); deemed to be O.C.G.A. perfected when § the notice is deposited in the United States mail addressed to the last known address of the affixed to the envelope."). addressee with Accordingly, sufficient postage Plaintiff was required by the Act to provide notice of her request for a hearing via certified mail or statutory overnight delivery to the superintendent, Defendant Lockamy, by no later than May 20, 2013 (i.e., within twenty Renewal). 12 Each O.C.G.A. notice of (20) days of service of the Notice of Non- § 20-2-942(b) (2) . non-renewal must "contain a conspicuous statement in substantially the following form": "You have the right to certain procedural safeguards before you can be demoted or dismissed. These safeguards include the right to notice of the reasons for the action against you and the right to a hearing. If you desire these rights you must send to the school superintendent by certified mail or statutory overnight delivery a statement that you wish to have a hearing; and such statement must be mailed to the school superintendent within 20 days after this notice was mailed to you. Your rights are governed by subsection (b) of Code Section 20-2-211, Code Section 20-2-940, and Code Sections 20-2-942 through 20-2-947, and a copy of this law is enclosed." O.C.G.A. § 20-2-942(b)(2). The Notice of Non-Renewal provided to Plaintiff contained this statute-mandated statement verbatim, and enclosed therewith were copies of the specified statutes. Lockamy Aff. at 6-19.) 13 (DSMF1 1 5-7; Because of her Plaintiff did not request for a hearing send notice via overnight delivery until May 22, 32 & Ex. 9), O.C.G.A. § Plaintiff's Plaintiff's email to certified 2013 request 20-2-942 (b) (2) . Defendant mail or (DSMF1 I 17; for Even Defendant to a hearing assuming Lockamy dated statutory Am. was Lockamy Compl. untimely. arguendo May I 6, that 2013, stating that "[m]y attorney will be sending the certified letter requesting a formal hearing intended as a request was not sent via with the for a hearing, board was it was ineffective as it certified mail or statutory overnight delivery as is explicitly required under the Act. 942(b)(2) members", {"In order to be effective, See O.C.G.A. § 20-2- such written notice that the teacher requests implementation of such procedures must be served by certified mail or statutory overnight delivery as provided in subsection (c) of Code Section 20-2-940." (emphasis added)). Accordingly, Defendants had no obligation to honor such request for a hearing or otherwise provide Plaintiff with a notice that complies with the requirements of O.C.G.A. 940(b). § 20-2- IdL While the " [e]xhaustion of remedies is not required before bringing a Section 1983 action," courts must consider "the adequacy of all remedies available to plaintiff and not just those remedies [s]he elected to pursue" to ascertain whether an individual's right to procedural due process has been violated. 14 Bussinger v. City of New Smyrna Beach, (11th Cir. 1995) (citations Fla., omitted). 50 F.3d 922, To do 925-26 otherwise would permit individuals to ignore or circumvent the provided remedies for redress immediately Authority, due of in 726 process deprivations federal F.2d of their court. Lewis 667 (11th Cir. 664, violations do remedies are available, rights not exist v. and to Hillsborough 1983). unless As no sue Transit procedural adequate state "the state must have the opportunity to remedy the procedural failings of its subdivisions and agencies in the appropriate fora - agencies, review boards, and state courts - before being subjected to a claim alleging a procedural due process violation." (11th Cir. 2000) Here, remedies would at law fails give and an to for state to rise existed charges against her, evidence, a Section is remedy the the a Plaintiff 216 F.3d 1328, procedural 1983 to opportunity to present state's due suit. obtain 1331 failure otherwise to her See Cotton, provide procedurally side Adequate of of the District's the story 216 F.3d at 1331 adequate flawed process notice an explanation of the Defendant prior to her actual termination. ("It Jackson, (internal quotations and citations omitted). Plaintiff claim that Cotton v. procedures deprivation of to a protected interest that gives rise to a federal procedural due process claim."). District's If Plaintiff disagreed with the Defendant non-renewal of her employment 15 contract, she should have (and could have) timely requested a hearing before Savannah-Chatham County Board of Education. See O.C.G.A. 2-942 (b)(2); she O.C.G.A. Savannah-Chatham § 20-2-940 (e). County Board of Had Education would required to provide Plaintiff with, inter alia, her of non-renewal, a concise summary against her, and a hearing thereon. O.C.G.A. 20-2-940(b). adverse § decision O.C.G.A. § to Dean, the See O.C.G.A. have State Board of to 1527 due process). so, the have been to be for used § 20-2-942(b); could ultimately, appealed Education, the Superior an see Court See also Narey (review by Georgia courts of employment decisions rights to evidence see O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1160(c). 32 F.3d 1521, agency's and § 20- the cause (s) she Georgia 20-2-940(f), for Chatham County, v. Then, the done the state is an adequate remedy to protect Where adequate state remedies were available to Plaintiff but she failed to take advantage of them, she cannot denied rely due on such process. failure See Cotton, to claim 216 that F.3d she at 1331 has been (citing McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1565). disposal; any deprivation of that due process clearly resulted from Plaintiff's own inaction." B. In "Due process was at Plaintiff's See Lewis, 726 F.2d at 667. Plaintiff's State Law Claims addition asserted several to state her Section law claims. 1983 The claim, Court jurisdiction over these state law claims. 16 Plaintiff has also supplemental 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Nevertheless, having summary judgment declines to law may on exercise claims. decline See to dismissed all 28 2004) remaining been dismissed prior when, to Inc., Judgment on the All jurisdiction GRANTS over Defendants' Co., as resolve entitled the that jurisdiction 370 the (citing 735 F.2d 414, 428 to federal L.A. court it has jurisdiction); F.3d 1086, courts state a if to Court Plaintiff's (indicating here, trial.") 1089 dismiss claims Draper (11th Cir. (11th & any have Son v. 1984)). CONCLUSION foregoing, Federal federal law claims. to encouraged district claims upon claim, 1367(c) Ins. IV. Based federal supplemental Allstate Wheelabrator-Frye, § are under which it has original have state Defendants jurisdiction U.S.C. claims ("We that Plaintiff's exercise see also Raney v. Cir. found Defendants' Claims (doc. Motion 21) for Summary is GRANTED on all The Court declines to exercise supplemental Plaintiff's state law claims, Motion to Dismiss and therefore [Without Prejudice] Plaintiff's Remaining Law Claims (doc. 21), and those claims are DISMISSED JUDGMENT WITHOUT in favor PREJUDICE. of The Defendants Clerk on all is directed federal to law TERMINATE all other pending motions, and CLOSE this case. 17 enter claims, ORDER August, ENTERED at Savannah, Georgia, th is J&* day 2016. HONO^ABLE^T. RANDAL HALL UNITElT~SrrATES DISTRICT JUDGE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA of
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