Ketchup v. Savannah-Chatham County Public School System, No. 4:2014cv00281 - Document 25 (S.D. Ga. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER granting 16 Motion for Summary Judgment. Therefore Judgment is entered in favor of defendant and this civil action stands closed. Signed by Judge J. Randal Hall on 09/26/2016. (maa)
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Ketchup v. Savannah-Chatham County Public School System IN THE UNITED FOR THE Doc. 25 STATES DISTRICT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF COURT GEORGIA SAVANNAH DIVISION JOSEPH KETCHUP, * Plaintiff, * v. * SAVANNAH-CHATHAM COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM, CV 414-281 * * • Defendant. * ORDER Presently before the summary judgment on all of Clerk of Court gave Court is Defendant's Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff timely motion (Doc. notice of 16.) the for The summary judgment motion and the summary judgment rules, of the right to file affidavits consequences or of other default. materials (Doc. in 17.) requirements of Griffith v. Wainwright, Cir. 1985) (per curiam), response brief, for evidence, Therefore, 772 have been satisfied. in opposition has consideration. relevant law, Upon and the notice (11th The time for and the consideration of 825 the Plaintiff filed a expired, briefs and the F.2d 822, and Defendant filed a reply brief. filing materials ripe opposition, of counsel, motion is the the record Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Dockets.Justia.com I, The promote by present dispute Plaintiff, Defendant as arises out of Defendant's an African-American male an school principal BACKGROUND assistant principal, (or variations thereof) failure currently to the for four to employed position (4) of separate positions that were filled between June 2011 and December 2014. Plaintiff maintains that he was passed over for these promotions because of made his race, a complaint Employment instituted inter the alia, § inferences 200Oe, in and/or as discrimination to Opportunity discrimination, U.S.C. of gender, Commission instant suit claims on of the seg. United States ("EEOC"). race 24, most the 2014, of alleging, to gender Title evidence favorable Equal Plaintiff discrimination, in violation Viewing light the December and retaliation et retaliation for having VII, and 42 factual Plaintiff, the relevant facts of this dispute are as follows. Plaintiff has been employed by Defendant from 1996 through the present. (Ketchup Plaintiff began his school teacher at eventually promoted Aff., transferred Chatham Middle to 20, Ex. A, at tt 3-4). employment with Defendant as an elementary Thunderbolt to the an School. Elementary position of Myers Middle School in 2002. was Doc. (Id. assistant (Id. H assistant Ht 4-7). In position 2008, and was principal In 2006, principal 8.) School at Plaintiff at Plaintiff West was transferred to an assistant principal position at Garrison School of Visual Shuman Fine Arts Academy] year, Plaintiff Chatham, applied & Performing Arts ("Garrison") . for the [formerly known as (Id. f 10.) the position of That same principal for which he was not selected to interview, other positions offered by Defendant, Ester F. for at at West as well as least one of which he was selected for interview but did not ultimately receive the position.1 (Id. H 11; Ketchup Dep., Doc. 22, Ex. B, at 63:13-20, 64:9-16.) In 2009, Plaintiff was transferred to an assistant principal position at Coastal Middle School. (Ketchup Aff. 20.) to In principal Broad"). On May 2010, position the was at Broad East transferred Elementary an assistant School ("East (IcL % 22.) May 18, 2011, interim principal to Plaintiff % public of Plaintiff East Broad, by Defendant applied for the position which position was after its non-renewal sitting principal's employment contract.2 of advertised of (Id. f 27.) the then- Plaintiff 1 Plaintiff also interviewed for a principal position with Defendant in 2007. (Ketchup Dep., Doc. 16, Ex. A, at 64:25-65:7.) 2 As explained by Defendant's superintendent of schools, Dr. Thomas Lockamy, Jr., the typical procedure for "selecting" principals to serve at Defendant's schools is as follows: (1) the position is posted publicly online; (2) interested applicants apply to the posted position; (3) members of Defendant's human resources department review all applications and forward any applications meeting the position's minimum requirements to the relevant executive director; (4) the executive director screens the qualified applicants and selects from this pool a handful of the most qualified applicants for interview; (5) the selected qualified applicants are interviewed by the executive director and a panel of other individuals; (6) the executive director then reports on the results of these interviews to the chief academic officer, who in turn reports his recommendations to the superintendent; (7) the superintendent then provides a final recommendation was not On or selected to around Hamilton, a interview for June 1, 2011, Caucasian 20:14-19; was Doc. 16, Ex. that informed Plaintiff female, principal of East Broad. he this position. had learned been at 4.) would be On June Doc. 14, transferred principal position at DeRenne Middle School 2011-2012 school year. (Ketchup Aff. that interim Ex. B, 2011, at Plaintiff an assistant ("DeRenne") % 32; Doc. 2S.) Kelli as 16, to f Ms. appointed (Id. ; Lockamy Dep., D, (Id. 16, for the Ex. E, at 5.) On September Questionnaire'' employment in 21, with the 2011, EEOC Plaintiff filed in he which discrimination on the basis relation to the appointment of of Ms. his an "Intake complained race Hamilton and his as of sex interim principal of East Broad. (Ketchup Aff. 3.) Plaintiff executed and returned to the On October 27, 2011, % 37; Doc. 20, Ex. B, EEOC his verified "Charge of Discrimination" Hamilton's appointment.3 at in relation to Ms. (Ketchup Aff. % 37; Doc. 20, Ex. C, at 2.) to the school board to approve for hiring, which is then voted on by the school board. (Lockamy Dep., Doc. 16, Ex. B, at 10:4-25; Ray Dep., Doc. 16, Ex. K, at 17:21-20:4.) The superintendent, however, also has the authority to recommend an individual to the school board to "appoint" as principal at any point in the aforementioned process (or in lieu thereof), although generally any individuals appointed as principals are done so on an interim basis. (Lockamy Dep., Doc. 16, Ex. B, at 6:6-16, 20:14-19.) 3 The October 27, 2011 Charge of Discrimination was received by Plaintiff already pre-populated with information gleaned from the EEOCs review of Plaintiff's September 21, 2011 Intake Questionnaire. (Doc. 20, Ex. C, at 2.) The boxes for race discrimination and sex discrimination were both already marked and a short description stated, inter alia, WI believe that I have On April principal 15, of 2012, Garrison, Plaintiff which applied position public by Defendant. (Ketchup Aff. at 2; Am. Compl., Doc. 8, f 27.) interview for this position. July 1, 2012,4 Caucasian male Plaintiff who was Garrison, had (alongside was the position of advertised ff 50-51; Doc. 20, to the Ex. DD, Plaintiff was not selected to (Ketchup Aff. learned that then-serving co-principal was been for appointed as as Raymond t 50.) Mr. On or around Brian assistant Keefer, a principal of co-principal Patricio, a of Garrison Caucasian male then-serving as interim principal of Garrison).5 who (Ketchup Aff. K 51; Doc. 20, Ex. D, at 3; Doc. 20, Ex. E, at 2.) At the conclusion of the 2011-2012 school principal position at DeRenne became vacant. 45.) Plaintiff timely applied, interview for this position. Ex. C, ff 20-21.) learned that Ms. (Id. but H 46; was the (Ketchup Aff. not selected Garcia Aff., On or around September 6, Carol Mobley, year, 2012, Doc. t to 16, Plaintiff an African-American female, had been discriminated against because of my sex, male and race, African American . . I believe that African American males, as a class, have been discriminated against . . . ." (Id.) Plaintiff's only addition to the prepopulated form was his signature. (Ketchup Aff. ^37.) 4 Defendant argues that Plaintiff knew or should have known about Mr. Keefer's appointment as of June 6, 2 012, as Mr. Keefer's appointment was approved at the Savannah Chatham County Board of Education's "public June 6, 2012 Board Meeting, making the selection a matter of public record on June 6, 2012." (Doc. 22, at 11; Doc. 16, Ex. J, at 5.) Defendant, however, any further factual or legal support for this proposition. fails to provide 5 Plaintiff does not appear to claim that the appointment of Mr. Patricio as co-principal involved race and/or sex discrimination (See Doc. 20, at 6 ("The second employment decision that and/or retaliation. [Plaintiff] contests is the appointment of Brian Keefer, interim co-principal for Garrison on July 1, 2012.").) Caucasian male, as been selected as principal of DeRenne. 16, Ex. 0, On (Ketchup Aff. % 47; Doc. at 4.) December Questionnaire" 20, 2012, with the Plaintiff EEOC in filed which a he new "Intake complained of employment discrimination on the basis of his race and his sex, as well as "retaliation for [filing his] in relation to the appointment of Mr. Garrison and DeRenne. to from believe my selection (Ketchup Aff. Plaintiff's letter of the December Plaintiff [Defendant] sex, f male of 20, to 2012 the Keefer as co-principal of Ms. 56; Doc. EEOC charge 10/27/11," Mobley 20, Ex. Intake EEOC D, as principal at 3.) Attached Questionnaire stating, of inter was a alia, UI continues to discriminate against me because and race, African American .... I also believe this continued discrimination is retaliation for my EEOC Charge of 2011." (Doc. executed Discrimination #415-2011-01171 20, Ex. E, at 2.) and Discrimination" returned to On February 23, the EEOC in relation to Mr. Mobley's selection.6 filed his October 2013, verified 27, Plaintiff "Charge of Keefer's appointment and Ms. (Ketchup Aff. H 56; Doc. 20, Ex. F, at 2.) 6 As with the October 27, 2011 Charge of Discrimination, the February 23, 2013 Charge of Discrimination was received by Plaintiff already pre-populated with information gleaned from the EEOC's review of Plaintiff's December 20, 2012 Intake Questionnaire. (Doc. 20, Ex. F, at 2.) While the December 20, Intake Questionnaire (and Plaintiff's letter attached thereto) raised issues of race and sex discrimination as well as retaliation, box for retaliation was marked and a short description stated, inter believe that I have been discriminated against in retaliation for formal charge of discrimination with the EEOC . . . ." (Id.) 2012 arguably only the alia, "I filing a No mention of At some point in 2014, Defendant advertised for a principal position to open the known as Dep., to newly-created Rice Port Wentworth Upper School] Doc. 16, interview December Ex. for 10, S, at 18:21-23). this 2 014, ("Rice position. Creek"). (Ketchup Troy a Dr. [formerly (Levett Plaintiff was not selected Brown, appointed as principal of Rice Creek. R, Creek School Aff. f (Id. On male, Caucasian 57.) was H 58; Doc. 16, Ex. at 5.) II, Summary judgment dispute genuine entitled to 56(a). as is to judgment The pleadings, SUMMARY Court a shall depositions, admissions on file, STANDARD appropriate any as JUDGMENT material matter only fact of grant answers if and law." summary to uthere FED. no movant the is is R. judgment CIV. "if the interrogatories, together with the affidavits, P. and if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law." 1260 Hickson Corp. (11th Cir. summary judgment proof in trial." U.S. race 2004); is to to N. 587 (1986) pierce the pleadings whether Indus. P. 357 Civ. see F.3d 1256, 56(c). "purpose of and to assess genuine the there is need for Co. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 v. a The 1259, (internal citation omitted). sex discrimination Charge of Discrimination. Crossarm Co., Fed. R. Matsushita Elec. 574, or order v. is (Id.) explicitly included on the February 23, 2013 *[The] initial basis seeking responsibility for [record its motion, before absence of Catrett, movant party the of summary judgment informing and court] the district identifying which it always U.S. carries 317, its court of the of the demonstrate the Celotex Corp. v. believes 323 (1986). If initial burden, - the the portions those a genuine issue of material fact." 477 bears and only non-movant if - may the avoid summary judgment by demonstrating that there is indeed a genuine issue as Clark, to the Inc., ''material" if 929 material F.2d facts 604, 608 they could affect the governing substantive law. 477 U.S. 242, 'genuine' of 248 (1986) . . . . [only] its case. (11th the Cir. Clark v. 1991). outcome of Facts the ruling on & are suit under Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., A dispute of those material facts "is if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." When Coats the motion, evidence in the record in the the Court must Id. view all the light most favorable to the non- moving party and resolve all factual disputes in the non-moving party's favor. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. also avoid weighing conflicting evidence. 255; McKenzie 934 (11th v. Cir. Davenport-Harris 1987). Anderson, Funeral Nevertheless, The the Home, Court must 477 U.S. 834 F.2d non-moving at 930, party's response to the motion for summary judgment must consist of more than conclusory allegations, and a mere "scintilla" of evidence will not Cir. 1990); 198 9) . suffice. Walker v. Pepper v. Dougherty Cty. Cir. 887 fact through speculation, is 'merely colorable' 2010) Coates, 911 F.2d 1493, F.2d 1573, 1498 (quoting conjecture, Sch. Sys. , 382 Shiver v. F. Chertoff, App!x 549 Cir. issue of or evidence that 914, F.3d (11th (11th or 'not significantly probative.'" 917 Bryant (11th Cir. 1342, 1343 (11th 2008)). III. Title VII prohibits DISCUSSION employers from against any individual with respect to his conditions, or individual's race, 42 1577 "The non-moving party cannot create a genuine material v. Darby, U.S.C. § (employment national privileges color, of actions origin was see where a compensation, employment, religion, 2000e-2 (a) (1) ; "discriminat[ing] sex, also race, motivating because or 42 of national origin." U.S.C. employers employees or opposed any [Title VII], assisted, proceeding, 3(a) . applicants practice or from factor are or made employment an unlawful he has made participated in any a manner [Title VII] ." in or even Title VII also any of his . because he has employment because or hearing under . sex, unlawful, against . such 2000e-2(m) religion, "discriminat[ing] for § color, though other factors also motivated the action). prohibits terms, practice charge, an by testified, investigation, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- Title VII second-guess does not, however, allow federal courts an employer's nondiscriminatory business to judgment, nor does it replace an employer's notions about fair dealing in the workplace with that of judges. Sch. Dist., 136 S. Ct. F.3d 1327, 2510 department" decisions, Id. 803 (2016) . that no 1266 (11th 2015), "the prudence of cert, routine how medieval, high-handed, Developers, Royal Cir. Atl. 2010)). Employers Ga. , denied, "super-personnel v. (quoting Alvarez 1253, (11th Cir. Troup Cty. , The courts are not a assesses matter 1338 Flowers v. employment or mistaken." Inc., are 610 F.3d to make free adverse employment decisions against their employees for "a good reason, no a reason bad reason, at all, reason based on erroneous facts, as long reason." discriminatory Commc'ns, a Id. 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 as its [decision] (citing Nix . v. (11th Cir. is not or for for a WLCY Radio/Rahall 1984)). A. Plaintiff's Title VII and § 1983 Discrimination Claims Discrimination claims relating to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin brought under Title VII and Section 1983 may be considered motive" theory.7 1235 (11th Cir. under either a "mixed-motive" or "single- Quigg v. Thomas Cty. Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d 1227, 2016). A discrimination claim may be successful under the mixed-motive theory by showing that unlawful bias was 7 "Mixed-motive and single-motive discrimination are different theories of discrimination, as opposed to distinct causes of action. Specifically, they serve as alternative causation standards for proving discrimination." Quigg, 814 F.3d a t 1235 n.4. 10 a motivating factor for though other factors an adverse employment also motivated the action. omitted). Single-motive claims require a the reason" "true omitted). for the adverse proper discrimination familiar framework claims based burden-shifting for on action. Id. F.3d at 1335. framework set claims forth based asserting a of the on set 792 single-motive evidence forth in (1973). circumstantial v. Quigg, McDonnell is the McDonnell Flowers, 803 evidence the Corp., Baxter Healthcare is 533 814 P.3d at 1232. Douglas framework, an employee single-motive discrimination claim bears the initial establishing a prima 803 F.3d at 1336 Burdine, 411 U.S. in White (6th Cir. 2008). Under analyzing The proper framework for examining mixed-motive discrimination v. (citations Id. circumstantial framework Douglas Corporation v. Green, Flowers, (citations Direct or circumstantial evidence may be utilized to The burden Id. even showing that bias was establish discrimination under either theory.8 F.3d 381 action, 450 U.S. facie case of discrimination. {citing Texas Dep't of Cmty. 248, 254 (1981)). In the Affairs failure-to- 8 Direct evidence is evidence that, if believed, proves the existence of a fact without inference or presumption. Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1086 (11th Cir. 2004). "Only the most blatant remarks, whose intent could mean nothing other than to discriminate on the basis of some impermissible factor constitute direct evidence of discrimination." Id. (quotations and citations omitted); see also Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1189-90 (11th Cir. 1997) (collecting examples of direct evidence of discrimination). uIf the alleged statement suggests, but does not prove, a discriminatory motive, then it is circumstantial evidence." Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1086 (citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged or otherwise introduced any direct evidence of discrimination. 11 the prima facie case consists of four elements: promote context, (1) that the plaintiff belongs to a protected class; applied for and was qualified for a promotion; rejected despite his qualifications; or less-qualified Bryant, 382 employees F. App'x at 917 v. Mortham, 158 F.3d 1177, only prove that he establishing facie case, relative the and outside (4) his (3) class (11th Cir. element plaintiff qualifications that he was that other equally were 1998) promoted. (plaintiff need is qualified to perform the although that he (citations omitted) ; but see Walker 1193 fourth (2) of a of may coveted job in prima failure-to-promote be forced successful to address applicant if the those qualifications are presented by defendant as its legitimate non discriminatory reason). Once the employee establishes his prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, employment 450 U.S. 869 nondiscriminatory action. at 254); (11th Cir. production Flowers, F.3d at for 1336 see also Miles v. M.N.C. 1985) rather 803 reason ("The burden on the than persuasion."). the adverse (citing Burdine, Corp. , 750 F.2d 867, [employer] The is employee one of must then present evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude adverse that the reason proffered employment action is mere by the pretext reason" for the adverse employment action. 253; see also Haugabrook v. Cason, 12 518 employer and not Burdine, for the the "true 45 0 U.S. F. Appfx 803, 807 at (11th Cir. 2 013) ("The evidence implausibilities, contradictions for its elements in the employer's that a credence.") of show inconsistencies, actions unworthy of must the (citations legitimate factfinder could omitted). Douglas weaknesses, incoherencies proffered reasonable McDonnell such or reasons find them Establishing the framework alone necessarily sufficient to survive summary judgment, is not however, as the critical decision that must be made is whether the employee has "created a discriminatory Smith v. triable issue intent." concerning Flowers, Lockheed-Martin Corp., 803 644 F.3d the at F.3d 1321, employerfs 1336 1328 (quoting (11th Cir. 2011) ) . Under the motive White discrimination sufficient to [employer] took [employee]; and factor for the 814 F.3d at employee presents an (2) the (quoting Smith, a employee asserting a mixed- "need only [reasonable] adverse produce jury employment evidence that: action (1) the against the a protected characteristic was a motivating [employer's] (citing analysis "will adverse employment action." White, under always circumstantial concerning an claim convince 1232 single-motive the framework, the F.3d McDonnell survive evidence employer's 533 that 13 400). Douglas summary creates discriminatory 644 F.3d at 1328). at Quigg, Like framework, judgment a intent." the if triable Id. at he issue 1240 Here, interview Plaintiff and variations asserts promote" thereof) Rice Creek were him of that to East the Defendant's position Broad, of Garrison, "failure principal DeRenne, to (and and/or "based on his being an African American male." (Doc. 20, at 6-7; see also Am. Compl. %% 35, 41, 54.) To date, Plaintiff has not explicitly asserted that Defendant acted with mixed-motives when it aforementioned positions, failed to promote it would not and thus him be to the improper to only consider his race and gender discrimination claims under a single-motive theory. 901, of 902-903 (11th Cir. discrimination, involved See E. E. 0. C. 2013) the Regardless of which Plaintiff's race and at some theory gender App!x (to pursue a mixed-motive theory plaintiff mixed-motives v. TBC Corp. , 532 F. must point argue in Plaintiff discrimination that the the case proceedings). pursues, claims however, fail due to his failure to create a genuine factual dispute that he was not promoted, even in part, because of his race or gender. 1. Kelli Hamilton and East Broad9 Plaintiff appointing Ms. argues that Hamilton, Defendant's as opposed to proffered Plaintiff, reasons as for interim 9 Defendant disputes whether Plaintiff has sufficiently established a prima facie claim of race and/or sex discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework in each of his various claims of race and sex discrimination. (See Doc. 16.) As Plaintiff's claims fail on their merits regardless of whether Plaintiff has established a prima facie case, however, the Court will assume for the sake of its analysis, without deciding, that Plaintiff has established its prima facie case on each of his race and sex discrimination claims. 14 principal of position, Plaintiff that he East was Broad "part are first of the pretextual. argues that unsuccessful In support Defendant's [East of this assessment Broad] leadership team that was being replaced in 2011" and subsequent elimination from consideration incompatible with efforts at (or (Doc. 20, at for interim the actual least was 21-24; principal status based of on 18:12-19:13, Plaintiff's burden, 19:25-20:7; however, is East was own incomplete Doc. not Broad Broad and his East see also Lockamy Dep., 14:23-17:2, at to Doc. 20, information). 20, Ex. show Haugabrook, 518 F. App'x at at 3-4.) Defendant's but rather that unlawful discrimination was the motivating factor. 610 F.3d at 1267; J, at O, that reasons for not promoting him were ill-founded, Ex. See Alvarez, 807 ("A proffered reason is not pretext for discrimination unless it is shown both that the reason reason.") was (emphasis false and original) that discrimination (citations was omitted). the real Therefore, this argument is unavailing as it is nothing more than a claim that Defendant information. (11th Cir. made See 2000) the Chapman (XXA wrong v. AI plaintiff decision based Transp. , is not 229 on F.3d allowed to inaccurate 1012, 1030 recast an employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons or substitute his business judgment for that of the employer" and he "cannot succeed by simply quarreling with the wisdom of that reason."). 15 Plaintiff also argues that Defendant's reasoning is pretext because so, he given with the was just as his prior "unique Plaintiff, qualified as contributions needs however, of East Ms. to Hamilton, and Broad." if greater (Doc. cannot prove pretext by not more familiarity 20, at 26-27.) "simply arguing or even by showing that he was better qualified than the person who received the position he Customer Mgmt. Grp. Inc., (citations omitted). disparities between qualifications have chosen While the 509 the of See F.3d Rather, were reasonable person, coveted." 1344, 1349 Plaintiff successful such Springer v. (11th Cir. must show applicant's weight and Convergys "that the his own and significance that in the exercise of impartial judgment, candidate Plaintiff spends selected ample over time the 2007) could plaintiff." discussing no Id. his own achievements and his subjective beliefs as to why he should have been selected for qualifications how these with the position, those distinctive of Ms. qualities he fails to contrast his Hamilton or otherwise made him so own address decidedly more qualified than Ms. Hamilton that no reasonable person could have chosen her over him.10 Ex. Ms. 10 N; and Doc. Hamilton's Ms. 16, (Compare Ketchup Aff. ^ 31; with Doc. 20, Ex. T, at achievements Hamilton herself had 10-12.) at East been employed by While Plaintiff Broad Defendant and as her a attacks prior teacher for thirteen years, a director of gifted education for approximately one year, and an assistant principal for five years. (Doc. 16, Ex. T, at 10-12.) 16 activities in the school system, he provides no factual support for an his assertions Progress ("AYP") other than individual Adequate Yearly report for East Broad for the 2009-2010 school year,11 and he fails to address East Broad's continued decline while he failing at Plaintiff could was assistant his has have principal position." failed to believed (Doc. despite 20, demonstrate that Ms. at him "not 21-22.) that no Hamilton's actually Therefore, reasonable person qualifications were superior to his own, and his subjective belief that he was the most qualified Comm!n of Cir. Jefferson explanation" Plaintiff also on the Ala., argues basis 446 that it (Doc. 20, at 20-21.) 12, 2011, See F.3d Brooks 1160, Defendant process has has raised v. County 1163-64 (11th "shifted in its not in raised reasons its EEOC stated, position inter alia, "poor performance during negatively in In its EEOC position statement Defendant likely that Plaintiff's interview that that Defendant litigation dated December 11 County, irrelevant. as to the reasons for selecting Ms. Hamilton over instant statement. was is 2006). Plaintiff the candidate impacted his that it [a prior] ability to be Ms. Hamilton served as assistant principal at East Broad from August 2008 to June 2010. (Doc. 16, Ex. S, at 10.) While Plaintiff appears to pin the responsibility for East Broad's poor 2009-2010 AYP report on Ms. Hamilton alone, he does not similarly give her credit for the passing 2008-2009 AYP report or take credit for East Broad's poor 2010-2011 AYP report (i.e., the year when Plaintiff was assistant principal at East Broad). (Doc. 20, at 2122; Doc. 20, Ex. R; Doc. 20, Ex. S.) 17 selected to interview (Doc. Ex. O, not 20, renewed that assuming reasoning, genuine F. of App'x 202, 210 fundamentally Inc. , 129 F.3d 1453, for candidates' and performance would Compare Bechtel 1995) 16, renewed See past this ignores interview qualifications. Ex. Phillips v. 2008) H, K 6) . specific Even line of (citing 1458-59 not Const. be Co. employee, in Zaben v. (11th Cir. based on fundamentally v. Sec'y of (finding evidence of those order Air to Inc., reasons constitute Prods. 1997)). Defendant (Garcia Aff. candidate Aaron Rents, ("If an employer offers an inconsistent interview/hire, a litigation relative Doc. terminating qualifications excluding (11th Cir. for pretext.") candidates their (11th Cir. must of instant "candidates' had not pretext. reasons evidence positions."12 i t still would not be sufficient to create a different be the Wichman Aff., Defendant however, issue in determining % 14; principal Plaintiff's argument that Defendant has considered in that subsequent reasoning Defendant (Garcia Aff. 262 at 4.) this performance" for & Chems., In selecting considered f 14; Wichman Aff. their the i[ 6), past interview inconsistent therewith. Labor, pretext 50 F.3d due to 926, 935 shifting explanations where employer explicitly denied in district court 12 Plaintiff states that, contrary to Defendant's claims, he did not actually interview in 2009 for the position which is the basis of Defendant's "poor [prior interview] performance" reasoning. (Doc. 20, at 2 0 & Ex. P; Ketchup Aff. f 13.) Plaintiff does admit, however, that he previously interviewed for two different positions with Defendant in 2007 and 2008. (Ketchup Dep. Doc. 16, Ex. A, at 64:25-65:7.) 18 action that termination, employee's job performance was basis for but on appeal argued that employee's layoff was due solely to poor performance). Plaintiff Defendant's an to evidentiary matter, support appointment process, in favor thereof, Nevertheless, Defendant's for its assuming policies, this Springer, F.2d Aurora, 69 337, only to purpose or 341 454 has not (Doc. failed that from process 20, to and at 25-26.) provide any use the the for is indeed does F.3d not at (4th Cir. a of See upon 1350 (citing 1979)); Randle 1995)). its Randle, the violation necessarily 69 F.3d procedure ultimate of indicate Kennedy v. v. City of Such evidence goes the employment action, relying reason it (10th Cir. motivation. a inferred selection conclusion alone 509 the procedure of F.3d 441, is be or the abandonment of the selection process 598 as the Plaintiff Landon, action abandon can is in contravention of Defendant's policies.13 even See Defendant pretext Hamilton as interim principal. initial pretext. argues decision appoint Ms. As also of decision and not at 454. the to to its As employment choose Ms. 13 The only evidence cited by Plaintiff for this position is a statement by a member of Defendant's human relations department, Mr. Ramon Ray, that the abandonment of the selection process in favor of the appointment process is ttrare." (Ray Dep., Dec. 20, Ex. V, at 34:10-19). This testimony, however, neither necessarily contradicts Mr. Lockamy's testimony as to the superintendent's authority to appoint principals nor establishes that the use of said authority is in deviation of Defendants internal policies. See note 2, supra. 19 Hamilton over Plaintiff,14 Plaintiff cannot show pretext without a further uniquely Here, showing disadvantaged the disregarded certain process protected directly classes. process otherwise disadvantaged argument also fails to show pretext. See Springer, race favor id. Plaintiff and of gender Ms. eradicating on classes basis, or this 509 F.3d at 69 F.3d at 454. Finally, his See protected discriminatory Randle, based certain an unlawful 1350; and as Plaintiff has provided no evidence that the use of the appointment was that were Hamilton, the rosters."15 speculates and summarily concludes African (Doc. 20, the as reason for being Defendant American at 25.) male "was passed in the administrators that over midst from in of its Yet Plaintiff has produced no 14 Plaintiff's reference to Williams v. Georgia Public Safety Training Center, 5:ll-CV-445/ 2013 WL 4505816 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 22, 2013), is inapposite because unlike the employer in Williams, Defendant does not base its reasons for appointing Ms. Hamilton on the claim that it undertook structured procedures to determine who to appoint. See Williams, 2013 WL 4505816 at *4-6. 15 Plaintiff has provided unsubstantiated claims that, from 2005 to 2011, the number of ''decreased African-American from 40% to 0%" males and that employed he was by "the Defendant lone African as principals American male assistant principal in the K-8/middle school division." (Ketchup Aff., Doc. 20, Ex. A, i[ 36.) Even assuming arguendo that these figures are correct and properly before the Court, Plaintiff has not controlled for external factors or applied rigorous statistical analysis to these anecdotal figures that would indicate their reliability. See Mitchell v. City of LaFayette, 504 F. App'x 867, 870 (11th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted) ("Absent any analytical foundation, statistical evidence is virtually meaningless, and thus, cannot have any probative value."); see also Howard v. BP Oil Co., 32 F.3d 520, 524 (11th Cir. 1994) (that no black employees were present in predominately white area is only relevant to discrimination analysis if plaintiff presents evidence as to how many black applicants applied and were rejected along with evidence of the success rate of equally qualified white applicants, as u[a]necdotal information is no substitute for meaningful statistical analysis"); Hinson v. Clinch County, Georgia Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 821, 82728 (11th Cir. 2000) (that plaintiff was first female principal in county was not evidence of gender discrimination absent evidence of how many other women 20 evidence demonstrating that actually factored Defendant's Hamilton over indicative existence Americans Plaintiff, of of into an race- such impermissible or gender-based decision as remarks males.16 Therefore, facts, to summary survive 1555, 1564 n.6 Inc. , 999 F.2d 331 applied have judgment. (11th Cir. F.2d 133 (5th Cir. and what unremoved males); no probative value See 1997) (6th Cir. nature the conclusory without specific and are insufficient Reno, (citing Gordon v. Pitts v. or against African- Holifield v. 1993); Ms. statements Plaintiff's allegations of race and/or sex discrimination, supporting choose or discriminatory any harbored race or gender bias or to animus 115 F.3d Barnes Pumps, Shell Oil Co., 463 1972)). their qualifications Evans v. were McClain of Georgia, or of Inc., the track record 131 F.3d 957, 962 of (11th Cir. 1997) (employee's anecdotal evidence that, despite employing 650 employees in eight plants, employer had only had three black supervisory employees, was not evidence of discriminatory motive with respect to employee's claims of failure to promote absent analytical foundation). Here, Plaintiff has not provided any information on the total number of AfricanAmerican or male applicants for principal positions, let alone information concerning the overall demographics of qualified applicants or other relevant statistics, during the highlighted time period. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff's figures are unavailing to the discrimination analysis and do not show either that Defendant's proffered reasons for not hiring/promoting Plaintiff is pretext for discrimination or that Defendant harbors race or gender bias. See Mitchell, 504 F. App'x at 870. 16 Plaintiff's counsel also raises allegedly relevant figures and statistical analysis through the body of its brief and exhibits thereto (Doc. 20, at 1617, 25 & Ex. I), but has failed to properly introduce these figures and analysis. See Mitchell, 504 F. App'x at 870 (11th Cir. 2013) (« [T] o be accepted, statistical calculations must come from a witness, not a party's lawyer.") (citing Watkins v. Sverdrup Tech., Inc., 153 F.3d 1308, 1315 n. 16 (11th Cir. 1998)); see also Lugue v. Hercules, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1355-56 (S.D. Ga. 1997) ("Documents which are not properly authenticated and verified do not meet the requirements of Rule 56(e) and should not be considered when evaluating Nat'l Co. Life Ins. v. a motion California (11th Cir. 1989); Davis v. Howard, for Pacific summary Life 561 F.2d 565, 21 judgment.") Ins. 569 Co., 876 (citing F.2d (5th Cir. 1977)). First 877, 881 As Plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence that would allow a given by reasonable Defendant Plaintiff were a factfinder to conclude for their pretext choice for race of or that Ms. gender the reasons Hamilton over discrimination, Plaintiff's related single-motive race and gender discrimination claims with respect to this position fail. 2. Brian Keefer and Garrison17 Plaintiff argues that appointing Mr. Keefer, as opposed to Plaintiff, of Garrison are pretextual. Defendant's proffered reasons as for co-principal As to Plaintiff's repeated argument 17 Viewing the evidence and factual inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has alleged charge to the EEOC alleging race, regard to the appointment of Mr. relates to Defendant's arguments second EEOC charge with regards that he submitted a timely and sufficient gender, and retaliation discrimination with Keefer and selection of Ms. Mobley. As it concerning the timeliness of Plaintiff's to the appointment of Mr. Keefer, it is unclear the from the evidence before Court the exact date Plaintiff learned of Mr. Reefer's appointment, and the Court cannot state as a matter of law that a reasonable person would have known of Mr. Keefer's appointment solely from the school board's minutes dated June 6, 2012 announcing the appointment. Compare Stafford v. Muscogee Cty. Bd. of Educ., 688 F.2d 13 83, 1387-88 (11th Cir. 1982) (assistant principal should have known by beginning of school year (i.e., September) that he did not receive position of principal to which he had applied). As it relates to Defendant's arguments concerning the scope of Plaintiff's second EEOC charge with regards to race and/or sex discrimination claims, the Court is hesitant to dismiss these claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies given that it appears reasonable in this case for Plaintiff's claims of continued race and sex discrimination to be considered to be "like or related to, or [to grow] out of" the allegations of retaliation for prior complaints of race and sex discrimination contained in his second charge. See Pizzini v. Sec'y for Dep't of Homeland Sec, 495 F. App'x 991, 994 n.3 (11th Cir. 2012); see also Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 460-61, 465 ("The scope of an EEOC complaint should not be strictly interpreted" as courts are "extremely reluctant to allow procedural technicalities to bar claims brought under Title VII.") (internal quotations and citations omitted); Gregory v. Georgia Dep' t of Human Res., 355 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2004) (employee's retaliation claim not administratively barred by her failure to only mark "race" and "sex" boxes on EEOC charge where employee's retaliation claim was "inextricably intertwined with her complaints of race and sex discrimination" and any subsequent EEOC investigation would have "reasonably uncovered any evidence of retaliation."). Accordingly, claims on their merits. 22 the Court will consider these that the process, appointment process, as opposed to the selection is a violation of Defendant's own internal policies and therefore evidence of pretext (doc. 20, at 27-28), it fails for the same reason articulated in Section III.A.l, See Springer, 509 F.3d at 1350; Randle, that Plaintiff principal (doc. 20, was more qualified) at 28-29), Keefer was unqualified to for the Ex. V, evidence that position of at evidence Mr. 50:11-51:16), as to Keefer principal whether of have Garrison Garrison). Further, tenure alleges of (Ray while Mr. in Dep., Plaintiff Keefer's a Keefer Doc. 16, complains previous conclusory co- fails was that to unqualified the at 20, any for the co-principal 48:25-50:1)18 relatively with Mr. Doc. introduce (i.e., K, employment fashion been unqualified Ex. about While Plaintiff (Ray Dep., position to which he was actually appointed of appointed as supra. may Plaintiff Mr. be it also fails for similar reasons as those articulated in Section III.A.l, introduces supra. 69 F.3d at 454. As to Plaintiff's argument that Mr. (or again short Defendant Keefer and lacked 18 As explained by Mr. Ray, a "co-principal is not a dual principal" and "his pay is not inline [sic] with a principal." (Ray Dep., Doc. 16, Ex. K, at 48:25-50:1.) Rather, a "co-principal is more of a title to align with a requirement by [the Teacher Retirement System of Georgia] more so than to say that we had two principals." (Id.) As further explained by Mr. Ray, the Teacher Retirement System of Georgia will only allow a principal to come out of retirement if they return as "a teacher full time, as a counselor full time, as a media specialist full time, as a principal full time in a different school, [or] as a superintendent full timet] in a different school system." (Id.) As such, Defendant used the title of co-principal, as opposed to "center leaders" or some other designation, because Mr. Patricio, the other co-principal at Garrison, was a previously-retired principal. (Id.) 23 experience with sufficient evidence relative engage to in those a otherwise the of Plaintiff substantive 509 Plaintiff regarding determine Springer, arts, at or 1349; also Nichols v. (u[A]n to unpersuasive.") equate as East was Broad however, years one must cannot F.3d F.3d 563, served at 569 with Also, DeRenne for "purposes similar appoint Mr. of might that succeed reason by ("Provided that motivate a head simply on reasonable and while of argument, the wisdom of to evidence (11th Cir. of 2013); the proffered reason employer, rebut quarreling is Keefer principal This opposed 518 F. App!x at 807 1030 see 1998) stability" decisions that 1163-64; qualifications employment F.3d at or See (5th Cir. reasons. as to Plaintiff points out decision to for motive. than a complaint against 229 meet qualifications similarly appointed/selected as See Haugabrook, Chapman, is Garrison fact-finder little more Defendant's pretext. not or is of their 446 (citations omitted). co-principal Plaintiff would allow a of introduce qualifications discriminatory 138 an inconsistency in Defendant's to Keefer's Brooks, Lewis Grocer, attempt that comparison pretext F.3d Mr. fails with it, and the an employee the employee wisdom of that reason."). Finally, Plaintiff has that race or decision to demonstrating Defendant's produced no gender-based choose Mr. 24 Keefer probative animus over evidence factored into Plaintiff, such as remarks or statements indicative discriminatory nature or the of existence of an any harbored race or gender bias against African-Americans or males. makes bias conclusory allegations held by relevant While Plaintiff regarding alleged decision makers, impermissible the race and gender admissible evidence used to support these conclusions does not bear out these claims even on their face, probative value. and thus Plaintiff's See Holifield, allegations have no 115 F.3d at 1564 n.6. As Plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence that would allow a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the reasons given by Defendant for its appointment of Mr. Keefer as opposed to Plaintiff Plaintiff's was race a pretext for race or gender discrimination, and gender discrimination claims with respect to this position fail. 3. Carol Mobley and DeRenne In arguing that Defendant's proffered reasons for selecting Ms. Mobley are pretextual, Plaintiff repeats similar arguments as as such, as with his supra, those addressed in Sections III.A.l and III.A.2, his appointment, arguments arguments Ms. Plaintiff that no for similar reasons. against Ms. Hamilton's Furthermore, and Mr. Keefer's Plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence regarding that fail and Mobley's would reasonable qualifications allow a person reasonable could 25 relative to fact-finder have selected those to of conclude her over Plaintiff.19 1163-64; See Springer, 509 F.3d at 1349; Brooks, 446 F.3d at Nichols, 138 F.3d at 569. Also, Plaintiff's recycled arguments that he would have been a better fit or that selecting him would have provided better stability are again nothing more than an impermissible attempt to substitute Defendant's business judgment with his Chapman, 229 sufficient conclude of Ms. own. F.3d at evidence that See 1030. that Haugabrook, As would 518 F. App!x at 807; Plaintiff has failed to present allow a reasonable the reasons given by Defendant factfinder for its to selection Mobley as opposed to Plaintiff were a pretext for race or gender discrimination factored into Ms. or that Mobley's discriminatory selection, input otherwise Plaintiff's race and gender discrimination claims with respect to this position fail. 4. Troy Brown and Rice Creek?0 In arguing that Defendant's proffered reasons for appointing Dr. Brown as principal of Rice Creek are pretextual, Plaintiff recycles fail the for same many of reasons his prior arguments articulated in which Sections in turn III.A.l, 19 Notably, before her selection as principal at DeRenne, Ms. Mobley had been employed in Florida as a "Coordinator of School Improvement for Turnaround Schools" for approximately three years, a middle school principal for three years, an assistant principal for four years, and a teacher for six years, among other roles. (Doc. 16, Ex. U, at 9-12.) 20 Plaintiff implicitly concedes that, having failed to administrative remedies under Title VII, the only claim exhaust available his to Plaintiff against Defendant in relation to the appointment of Dr. Brown is a 42 U.S.C. § 1981 race discrimination claim brought pursuant to Section 1983. (Doc. 20, at 7; Am. Compl. ^ 54.) Yet, where Title VII and Section 1981 claims are based on the same set of facts, they have the same elements and are subject to the same legal analysis. omitted). 26 Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1235 (citations III. A. 2, that and III. A. 3, pretext is supra.21,22 evident As to Plaintiff's from Defendant's subjective criteria in appointing Dr. even if true decisions upon discriminate at as 1034 subjective against (UA legitimate, it a base their criterion so long as reason See is a subjective Chapman, if clear and reasonably specific subjective were that Dr. known throughout the people together well" community," and (Levett Dep., who Doc. F.3d defendant basis upon Defendant's Brown experienced principal who was "very organized," not sufficient, factual Here, do 229 the opinion."). criteria of employment they legally reason use they are unavailing to a protected class. its alleged free subjective based allegedly are nondiscriminatory articulates which employers Brown, arguments was an "very active and was "able 16, Ex. to bring S, at 18:4-20), all of which are eminently reasonable bases upon which to choose between job ("Personal applicants. qualities factor See Springer, heavily into 509 employment concerning supervisory or professional positions. common sense, good judgment, tact often must be originality, F.3d at 1349 decisions Traits such as ambition, loyalty, and assessed primarily in a subjective fashion, 21 Plaintiff's complaints regarding the use of the appointment process as compared to the selection process fail for the same reasons articulated in Section III.A.l, supra. See Springer, 509 F.3d at 1350; Randle, 69 F.3d at 454. 22 Plaintiff again has failed to present sufficient evidence regarding Dr. Brown's qualifications relative to those of his own that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that no reasonable person could have selected Dr. Brown over Plaintiff. 1163-64; Nichols, See Springer, 509 F.3d at 138 F.3d at 569. 27 1349; Brooks, 446 F.3d at yet they are supervisory That essential or professional Plaintiff other lawful disagrees criteria capabilities is impermissible to not an position.") with or the the to See Chapman, to Joshi v. Florida State Univ. 1985) is qualifications were to his prior to (Levett Dep., but or own rather Defendant's an employment Plaintiff's citation Health Ctr., reviewed interview or promotion. these applied because unlike a omitted). to 229 F.3d at 1030. inapposite, in attached pretext, second-guess decisions. Cir. weight of success (citations analysis evidence attempt individual's 763 F.2d 1227 in Joshi, his Doc. (11th Plaintiff's non-selection for 16, Ex. S, at 21:8- 22:13) . As with present for otherwise evidence of race that Dr. Brown related into Dr. race Plaintiff would allow has a failed as opposed or Brown's that to Plaintiff discriminatory appointment. discrimination claim to reasonable reasons given by Defendant discrimination factored Plaintiff's sections, conclude that the appointment pretext preceding sufficient factfinder to its the for were input Accordingly, with respect to this position fails. B. Plaintiff's Title VII Retaliation Claims In contrast to other discrimination claims under Title VII, retaliation considered claims under a brought under single-motive 28 Title theory. VII may Univ. of only be Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, retaliation claims 133 S. must Ct. be 2517, proved principles of but-for causation, stated in § 2000e-2(m). retaliation would 2533 (2013) according ("Title to traditional not the lessened causation test This requires proof that the unlawful not have occurred in the absence of alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer."); Suburban 2014) Propane, ("To demonstrate for Inc., establish that cause 577 a the omitted). As such, analysis applies to 1181 establish a App'x causal 951, the in of unlawful adverse employment between the Douglas also Quigg, 814 Telecomm., Inc., 2010) facie plaintiff bears preponderance of at F.3d the the burden-shifting retaliation that (citations omitted). case for retaliation In order using the employee must show that: and practice; (3) a and activity 231 (citation 597 action; F.3d a but- Brown v. Alabama Dep't of Transp., employment protected must action.") engaged in statutorily protected activity, an Cir. plaintiff a (11th on McDonnell Douglas framework, reporting Jones v. retaliate was adverse the rely (11th Cir. prima to McDonnell cases 954-55 connection, materially circumstantial evidence. F.3d 1160, F. the employer's desire of VII adverse 1244 798 ultimate evidence that 29 (2) causal (citing 791, such as (11th burden the suffered connection action. Cir. of he opposing or he Brungart (1) the v. an exists Id. ; see BellSouth 2000)). proving The by a reason provided by the employer is Olmsted pretext Taco v. a Bell for prohibited, Corp., 141 retaliatory F.3d 1457, 1460 conduct. (11th Cir. 1998) . Here, similar to his claims of race and sex discrimination, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant's "failure to interview and promote" him to the position of co-principal at Garrison and/or principal at DeRenne protected activity "in (i.e., his retaliation October for 27, established prima assuming he however, Plaintiff dispute as to has failed to pretext selected/appointed as or facie cases demonstrate that he (co-)principal a prior Charge 47-48.) of of Even retaliation, genuine was in his 2011 (Doc. 20, at 6-7; Am. Compl. ^ Discrimination)." has were factual otherwise retaliation for not his having engaged in protected activity. 1. As regard an to Garrison initial the fail Brian Keefer and Garrison matter, appointment because he Plaintiff's of has Mr. not retaliation Keefer established of his prima facie case, namely causation. to prove proximity causation can be between the statutorily adverse-employment action. at 955 1364 (citing Thomas v. (11th Cir. 2007)). met by showing 30 the third a close protected Cooper Lighting, there at was a element A plaintiff's burden Suburban Propane, If in co-principal as claims activity Inc., Inc., temporal and 577 F. App'x 506 F.3d 1361, significant time gap between the protected expression and the adverse action, the plaintiff must offer additional evidence to demonstrate a causal connection, such as adverse action was retaliate. Id. Here, the "pattern of antagonism" "first opportunity" or for the that the employer to (citations omitted). Plaintiff filed his first Charge of Discrimination on October 27, 2011. Mr. was Keefer delay selected for 2012. between employment action is show causation. % 37; Doc. 20, (Ketchup Aff. Garrison on June 6, month a the the (Doc. position 16, Ex. protected J, of See Cooper Lighting, C, at 2.) co-principal at 5.) activity too attenuated, Ex. and This seven- the adverse absent other evidence, Inc., of 506 F.3d at 1364 to ("A three to four month disparity between the statutorily protected expression and the support a causation.) adverse employment action retaliation claim without (citations omitted). "the appointment adverse of Mr. actions Keefer as not further for [Defendant] to evidence to of there is a causal connection complained co-principal of of selection of Ms. Mobley as principal of DeRenne] opportunity enough" Plaintiff argues that despite this attenuated temporal proximity, because is retaliate, as [i.e., the Garrison and were the first these were the first principal positions that [Plaintiff] applied for following his EEOC complaint." however, that (Doc. 20, at 33.) Plaintiff was an 31 active This argument ignores, employee of Defendant during have the taken relevant any seven-month number of gap other against Defendant during that time, suspension, or termination.23 not the first opportunity and adverse for explaining between his protected Keefer, of employment could actions demotion, As such, appointing Mr. Keefer was for Defendant the retaliate against Having presented no other attenuated activity to and temporal the association appointment of Mr. Plaintiff's relevant retaliation claim fails as a matter law due to his failure See Suburban Propane, arguendo claim, Defendant such as reprimand, Plaintiff for his protected activity. grounds that that however, Inc., Plaintiff his is to establish his 577 F. App'x at able to prima 955. establish as set forth in Section III.A.2, supra, case. Even assuming prima his retaliation claim would still facie facie fail because, Plaintiff has failed to present evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the reasons proffered by Defendant for appointing Mr. Keefer were mere pretext or, more importantly, to create a 23 Compare Dale v. Wynne, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1346 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (sixweek gap between protected activity and adverse employment action not significant delay to defeat a finding of causal connection where the employee was on medical leave during the entirety of the gap); Porter v. Cal. Dep' t of Corr., 419 F.3d 885, 895 (9th Cir. 2005) (significant delay between protected activity and adverse employment actions did not defeat a finding of a causal connection where the defendant did not have the opportunity to retaliate until he was given responsibility for making personnel decisions); Ford v. GMC, 305 F.3d 545, 554-55 (6th Cir. 2002) (although there was a five-month gap between the protected activity and the adverse employment actions, the employee was under the control of a different supervisor during the gap). 32 genuine issue concerning Defendant's alleged unlawful intent.24 See Burdine, Haugabrook, 450 U.S. Plaintiff of has (i.e., Flowers, 803 F.3d for similarly facie failed to establish retaliation case Mobley as principal of DeRenne. the position of principal on Ms. 1336; over ten months after Plaintiff's October 27, This is ten-month delay to show causation. explained too attenuated, in Section III.B.l, selection of Ms. retaliate absent See Cooper Lighting, Inc., Plaintiff's causation to the Mobley was September (Ketchup Aff. f 47; Doc. 16, to the in regards of Discrimination). As at Carol Mobley and DeRenne prima his selection of Ms. selected 253; 518 F. App'x at 807. 2. element at 5, 2012 2011 Charge Ex. O, at 4.) other evidence, 506 F.3d at 1364. argument that the Mobley was the first opportunity for Defendant is factually incorrect, as Defendant had the opportunity to take adverse employment actions against Plaintiff during this Defendant. ten-month period where he temporal and selection retaliation claim Nevertheless, 24 Plaintiff actively employed by Having presented no other grounds for explaining the attenuated the was has association between of Ms. fails as his Mobley, a protected Plaintiff's matter of law. activity relevant See id. even assuming that Plaintiff is able to establish set forth no additional or alternative facts or legal argument in support of his retaliation claim in relation to Mr. Reefer's appointment than those proffered in support of his related claims for race and sex discrimination. (See Doc. 20, at 32-34.) 33 a prima facie claim with regards to Ms. retaliation claim Section III.A.3, sufficient the to reasons were issue mere would supra, permit concerning Burdine, a reasonable by or, more at 253; assuming as factfinder for set alleged Flowers, to forth conclude appointing importantly, IV, Even because, Defendant Defendant's 450 U.S. fail his in Plaintiff has failed to present evidence proffered pretext still Mobley's selection, to Ms. create unlawful a that Mobley genuine intent.25 See 803 F.3d at 1336. CONCLUSION arguendo that Plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies and has presented a prima facie case of discrimination unrebutted the required, nondiscriminatory relevant primarily where individuals takes issue qualifications of Defendant reasons instead with of for has proffered appointing/selecting Plaintiff. Defendant's Plaintiff analysis of the the employees ultimately hired or promoted or other similar reasons given for choosing these individuals over Plaintiff. Plaintiff also disapproves of the process used choose which individuals would be selected or appointed. are all disagreements however, and not unlawful reasons. with evidence More Defendant's that Defendant importantly, business was Plaintiff These judgment, motivated has to failed by to 25 Again, Plaintiff has set forth no additional or alternative facts or legal argument in support of his retaliation claim in relation to Ms. Mobley's selection than those proffered in support of his related claims for race and sex discrimination. (See Doc. 20, at 32-34.) 34 provide evidence, input factored Plaintiff has as opposed to conjecture, into Defendant's provided no employment evidence that that discriminatory decisions. casts the Indeed, slightest doubt upon Defendant's actions or reasons for those actions. As such, of Defendant Plaintiff's is entitled to summary all Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on All of Plaintiff's Claims (doc. directed in to enter Plaintiff's claims, this JUDGMENT 16) favor is GRANTED. of The Clerk is Defendant on TERMINATE all other pending motions, all of if any, case. ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, September, on claims. For these reasons, and CLOSE judgment Georgia, this C><&^ day of 2016. HONOMBie^J. RANDAL HALL UNITED SPATES DISTRICT JUDGE SOUIBET^N DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 35
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