Wilson v. United States of America et al, No. 3:2021cv00019 - Document 76 (S.D. Ga. 2022)
Court Description: ORDER granting Defendants' 69 Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's claims. The Clerk is directed to enter final Judgment in favor of Defendants with costs taxed against the Plaintiff and close this case. Signed by Judge Dudley H. Bowen on 10/21/2022. (jlh)
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Wilson v. United States of America et al Doc. 76 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA DUBLIN DIVISION RHONDA MACHELLE WILSON, * Individually and as Administrator for the Estate of Gary Steven Pressley, Plaintiff, V. * CV 321-019 "k ELAINE CARSWELL, BOBBY DODD * * * INSTITUTE, INC., and DOES 1-50, k Defendants. * ORDER Plaintiff Rhonda Machelle Wilson filed the instant case on February 25, 2021, against the United States of America under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). The case involves the death by suicide of Plaintiff's decedent, her son Gary Steven Pressley, in the parking lot of the Carl Vinson VA Medical Center. settled her claims against the United States, the Having Court has supplemental jurisdiction over her negligence claims against the non-FTCA defendants. Defendant Elaine Carswell and her employer. Defendant Bobby Dodd Institute, Inc. ("BDI"). Presently, Defendants Carswell and BDI have moved for summary judgment. The Clerk gave Plaintiff notice of the summary judgment Dockets.Justia.com motion and affidavits the summary or other judgment materials consequences of default. rules, in of the right to file and of the opposition, (Doc. No. 70.) Therefore, the notice requirements of Griffith v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 822, 825 (11^^ Cir. 1985) (per curiam), are satisfied. Plaintiff has filed a response, and Defendants have replied. The motion is ripe for consideration. I. BACKGROUND1 Mr. Pressley became a patient of the Carl Vinson VA Medical Center (the "VA") in Dublin, Georgia Material Facts, Doc. No. 72, f 12.) for several years thereafter pain medication, pharmacy. inter alia, that 2013. (Pl.'s St. of The VA treated Mr. Pressley because ideations associated with the pain. in of his pain and suicidal Mr. Pressley was prescribed he had filled at the VA's (See generally id. 551 13-21.) On April 5, 2019, Mr. Pressley sought to get his prescription for pain medication refilled except that the received a prescription order from his doctor. pharmacy never (Id. 55 19, 22- 1 Unless otherwise indicated, the facts set forth herein are not in dispute. 2 23.) For more than three hours prior to his suicide that day, Mr. Pressley exchanged text messages with his girlfriend informing her that he planned to commit suicide at the VA at 5:00 p.m. (Defs. ' St. of Material Facts, Doc. No. 69, M 6-7.) At 4:47 p.m., Mr. Pressley's sister called the VA and talked to the switchboard operator. Defendant Elaine Carswell. St. of Material Facts f 29.) two additional calls. dispute. (Pl.'s The two would speak again during The conversations that they had are in Defendant Carswell has stated that the sister told her Mr. Pressley had told his family that he loved them and that they would find a dead body at the VA. L, Doc. No. 69-14.) (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. The sister testified that she told Defendant Carswell that Mr. Pressley was in the parking lot with a gun and that he was going to shoot himself by 5:00. Doc. No. 69-6, at 47-50.) (Dep. of Lisa Johnson, The sister further testified that she asked Defendant Carswell to send someone out to find him. 52.) Defendant Carswell did not contact the VA Police Department about the call. a (Id. at description It is undisputed that the sister did not provide of Mr. Pressley or his vehicle, did not tell Defendant Carswell that the family had confirmed Mr. Pressley was at the VA by use of a tracking device, and did not tell her which parking lot he was in. (Defs.' St. of Material Facts 1 5.) At 8:07 p.m., a police sergeant of the VA Police found Mr. Pressley with a note in his vehicle in the VA parking lot 8.) Shortly thereafter, Mr. Pressley apparent suicide by the county coroner. was (Id.) pronounced (Id. 5 dead by The county coroner opined that Mr. Pressley had been dead for 2.5 to 3 hours before the body was found. (Id. i 9.) Further, while Mr. Pressley was a current patient at the VA on the day of his death, he was an outpatient. (Id.) Defendant Bobby Dodd Institute, Inc. ("BDI") is a nonprofit organization that people disabilities with employment provides training to while securing integration into society. contractual relationship and empower job them self-sufficiency, (Id. with f the 1.) VA to opportunities to maximize provide BDI of and had a "switchboard services for the effective operations of th[e] facility." 2.) their independence, Defendant for (Id. i Defendant Carswell, a switchboard operator, was an employee Defendant BDI. "emergency calls." One of her essential duties was (Pl.'s St. of Material Facts 1 26.) to handle According to the BDI contract with the VA, the operators were required to be 4 "trained and have the ability to handle emergency calls" and "problem solve and make decisions in emergency situations." SI 27.) In fact, the (Id. VA provided some of Defendant Carswell's training as a switchboard operator to include "Suicide Prevention Simulation" and "S.A.V.E. training." Based claim of (Id. SI 28.) upon these factual allegations, negligence against Defendant Plaintiff alleges a Carswell in failing to properly respond to the crisis call from Mr. Pressley's sister. Plaintiff alleges a claim of negligence against Defendant BDI in its failure to properly train its employees. judgment. Defendants Carswell and BDI In moving for summary contend that Plaintiff cannot establish the elements of a negligence claim as a matter of law. II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD The Court should grant summary judgment only if "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The purpose of the summary judgment rule is to dispose of unsupported claims or defenses, which, as a matter of law, raise no genuine issues of material fact suitable for trial. 5 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. they could affect the substantive law. 248 (1986). 317, 322—24 (1986). Facts outcome of the suit are "material" if under the governing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, A dispute of those material facts "is 'genuine' . . [only] if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a existence verdict of a for the nonmoving scintilla of party." evidence in Id. "The support of mere the [nonmovanfs] position will be insufficient" for a jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 252; accord Gilliard v.. Ga. Dep't of Corrs., 500 F. App'x 860, 863 (11^"^ Cir. 2012) (per curiam). Additionally, the party opposing summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials in its pleadings. Rather, [his] responses . . . must set forth showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." 911 F.2d 1573, 1576—77 (ll^h cir. 1990). specific facts Walker v. Darby, As required, this Court will view the record evidence "in the light most favorable to the [nonmovant]," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986), and will "draw all justifiable inferences in [Plaintiff's] favor." United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11*^^ Cir. 1991) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). 6 III. In Georgia, to LEGAL ANALYSIS recover for injuries caused by another's negligence, a plaintiff must show a duty, a breach of that duty, causation and damages. Johnson v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 578 S.E.2d 106, 108 (Ga. 2003) (citation omitted). summary judgment. Defendants Through their motion for contend that Plaintiff cannot establish the duty and causation elements as a matter of law. On the element of duty. Defendants claim they owed no duty to Mr. Pressley because they did not have any relationship or prior contact with Mr. Pressley and had exercised no control over Mr. Pressley. On the causation element. Defendants claim that Georgia's "suicide rule" defeats any potential proximate cause. Upon strict application of Georgia law, the Court concludes that Mr. Pressley's suicide is an unforeseeable intervening cause of his death, barring any recovery from Defendants. Negligence is not actionable unless it is the proximate cause of the injury. Id. (citation omitted). "Proximate cause is ^that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by other causes, produces an event, and without which the event would not have occurred.'" Ga. Dep't of Transp. v. Owens, 766 S.E.2d 569, 577 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). "an unforeseeable intervening connection between alleged death." 2017). Suicide, under Georgia law, is deemed cause that breaks any negligent conduct and the causal resulting City of Richmond Hill v. Maia, 800 S.E.2d 573, 576 (Ga. Thus, suicide absolves the alleged tortfeasor of liability because it is an intervening proximate cause. act that precludes a finding of Georgia law recognizes only two exceptions to the suicide rule: (1) the rage or frenzy exception, and (2) the special relationship exception. Id. at 577. Plaintiff concedes that the first exception, the rage or frenzy exception, does not apply in this case. Plaintiff, however, (Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n, Doc. No. 71, at 8.) contends that the second special relationship exception, does apply. exception, the (Id. at 8-15.) In Mala, the Georgia Supreme Court explained that the suicide rule applies in cases involving a special relationship between the tortfeasor and the decedent - "where a tortfeasor owes the unusual duty to (emphasis prevent the added). decedent Thus, as from it harm." pertains 800 to S.E.2d this at 578 case, Mr. Pressley's suicide either precludes liability as a matter of law or it does not because of a special relationship between him and the Defendants. The focus, therefore, is on the between Mr. Pressley and Defendants Carswell and BDI. the special relationship hospital-patient, See id. police exception include officer-detainee, and relationship Examples of doctor-patient, jailor-prisoner. Plaintiff could not responsibly argue that Mr. Pressley had a special especially relationship where they with never Defendants had Carswell any contact. Thus, and BDI, Plaintiff contends that Mr. Pressley's relationship as a patient of the VA qualifies as a special relationship and that Defendant Carswell was an agent of the VA. Plaintiff first cites Brandvain v. Ridgeview Institute, Inc., 372 S.E.2d 265 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988), in which the Georgia Court of Appeals explained that where there is a relationship with a health care professional, there is a duty owed to the patient "to exercise such reasonable care in looking after and protecting a patient as the patient's condition . . . may require. patient from This duty extends to safeguarding and protecting the any known or reasonably apprehended danger from himself . . . and to use ordinary and reasonable care to prevent it." Id. at 271 (quoted source omitted). In Brandvain the patient was hospitalized in a program for treatment of alcohol and drug abuse, and the staff was seeking involuntary commitment at the time of his suicide. Id. at 269. Recognizing that Mr. Pressley was not a hospitalized patient and that the VA did not exercise control over him. Plaintiff urges the Court to extend the exception to reach Mr. Pressley, citing to 9 Justice Melton's special concurrence in Maia, in which he suggests the special relationship exception may be broader than implied by the majority. See Maia, 800 S.E.2d at 579. Justice Melton, however, did not provide any further guidance on the circumstances (outside of direct supervision or exercising control) that may give rise to a special relationship warranting an exception to the suicide rule. extends the Neither could the Court find any other case that reach of the special relationship something akin to the circumstances in this case. exception to While the issue of proximate cause is generally one for the jury, and one that would prove intriguing in this case,2 the Court cannot go further than Georgia law allows. Upon consideration of the circumstances bereft of authority to find otherwise, the Pressley did not have a matter of law. His relationship and Court concludes Mr. special relationship long-term of this case, with the VA as a with the VA as an 2 The Court is particularly struck by the deposition testimony of Sergeant Joseph Lang of the VA Police Department, in that he explained that he had been involved in past situations where he searched the VA premises after he had notice that someone may be there with suicidal ideations. (See PI.'s St. of Material Fact 5 33.) It is undisputed that Defendant Elaine Carswell, the first point of contact for the VA's telephone line, did not call the VA Police Department in response to Mr. Pressley's sister's call. 10 outpatient training and of its the VA's policy to require employees and contractors suicide prevention notwithstanding, Mr. Pressley's relationship with the VA is not so unusual to warrant finding a duty to prevent Mr. Pressley from harm. Stated another way, Mr. Pressley's outpatient relationship with the VA is no more special than the hospital-outpatient relationship of thousands of veterans. Ct. App. See Ermutlu v. McCorkle, 416 S.E.2d 792, 794-95 (Ga. 1992) (finding psychiatrist and a no special relationship between a voluntary outpatient because of the lack of control over the patient's conduct). This determination obviates the Court's consideration of Defendant Carswell's agency status. In short. Plaintiff cannot establish a special exception to the suicide rule that would preclude the legal conclusion that Mr. Pressley's suicide was an unforeseeable intervening cause that breaks the causal connection between Defendants' handling of his sister's phone calls and his death. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's negligence claims.^ 3 Absent a finding of negligence on the part of Defendant Carswell, Defendant BDI cannot be held liable for negligent failure to train. 11 IV. CONCLUSION Upon the foregoing. Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claims (doc. no. 69) is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to ENTER FINAL JUDGMENT in favor of Defendants and CLOSE this case. Costs are taxed against Plaintiff. ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this day of October, 2022. UNITED STA;TES DISTRICT JUDGE 12
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