McRae v. Telfair County, Georgia et al, No. 3:2018cv00077 - Document 82 (S.D. Ga. 2020)
Court Description: ORDER granting in part 53 , 66 , and 68 Motions for Summary Judgment. The Clerk is directed to enter Judgment on all of Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. Plaintiff's claims against Doe Defendants are dismissed with prejudice. The parties may submit summary-judgment-type evidence regarding the amount in controversy threshold within twenty-one (21) days of this Order. Ruling is deferred on Plaintiff's state law claims against named Defendants. Signed by Judge Dudley H. Bowen on 09/18/2020. (jlh)
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McRae v. Telfair County, Georgia et al Doc. 82 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE;"|' SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA DUBLIN DIVISION U.S.^D!STr:[CT COURT ACuUS i A 0!V. 20Z0 SEP 18 P |: 41 "k VICTOR McRAE, on k . LEK,:_ J. k Plaintiff, SO k V . k k TELFAIR COUNTY, GEORGIA; CHRIS k STEVERSON, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Sheriff * of Telfair County; JOHN and JANE * k DOES 1-10 as employees; BOBBY k MCLEMORE, Individually and in k His Official Capacity as Sheriff k of Ben Hill County; BEN HILL k COUNTY, GEORGIA; JOHN and JANE k DOES 1-10 as employees; LYNN k SHEFFIELD, Individually and k in His Official Capacity as k Sheriff of Dodge County; k JOHN and JANE DOES 1-10, as k employees; and DODGE COUNTY, k GEORGIA, CV 318-077 k k Defendants. ORDER Before the Court are three motions for summary judgment filed by: Ben Hill County, Georgia and Bobby McLemore (doc. Dodge County, Georgia and Lynn Sheffield (doc. no. County, the \\ McRae Georgia Moving and Chris Defendants") . notice of the Steverson The summary Clerk (doc. has judgment no. motions '53) ; 66) ; and Telfair 68} given no. (collectively. Plaintiff and the Victor summary judgment rules, of the right to file affidavits or other materials in and opposition, the consequences of default. Therefore, the Dockets.Justia.com notice requirements of Griffith v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 822, 825 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam), have been satisfied. have been fully briefed and are ripe for The motions decision. For the following reasons, the motions are granted in part. I. BACKGROUND A. General Background On or around September 18, 2016, Plaintiff slipped and fell in the shower at the Telfair County Jail. No. 54, at 20-21.) After the fall. (See McRae Dep., Doc. Plaintiff complained of numbness in his leg to jail officials and was transported to the Dodge County hospital on September 22 and 23, 2016. 26, 29.) (See id. at He received an x-ray which appeared normal, was given a prescription for Motrin, and released. (See Dodge County Hospital Medical Records, Doc. No. 53-3, at 72-73.) Sheriff Steverson's only interaction with Plaintiff was while Plaintiff was receiving medical care. (See McRae Dep. at 28-30.) Plaintiff did not return to the Telfair County Jail. id. at 33.) (See Instead, he was transferred to the Dodge County Jail to be placed under supervision by medical personnel onsite, where he was seen by nursing staff on multiple occasions. (See id. at 33-34, 46.) Following another transfer to the Coffee County Jail, Plaintiff was released from Coffee County on October 13, 2016, but 2 went straight to the Ben Hill County Jail because of a probation hold. In late October of 2016 while at Ben (See id. at 47-48.) Hill County Jail, Plaintiff's condition deteriorated, and he was eventually airlifted to Grady Memorial in Atlanta (See id. at 100-01; Grady following treatment at Dorminy Hospital. Record, Doc. No. 53-8.) Hospital It was not until his visit to Dorminy that Plaintiff had contact with Sheriff McLemore. (See McRae Dep. at 101-02. ) At the time relevant to the litigation, Bobby McLemore was the Sheriff of Ben Hill County; Lynn Sheffield was the Sheriff of Dodge County; On County. and Chris Steverson 14, September was 2018, the Plaintiff Sheriff filed of Telfair suit in the Superior Court of Dodge County, Georgia against each Sheriff in their individual and official capacities among other defendants. respective counties as well as their (See generally Doc. No. 1. ) Plaintiff asserts state and federal law claims against the Moving Defendants for negligent negligence. infliction of emotional distress, violations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and failure to furnish O.C.G.A. §§ 42-5-2, 42-4-4, and 42-4-32. Doc. No. 1-1.) thirty John and medical care under (See generally Compl., Beyond the Moving Defendants, the Complaint named Jane Does ten for each county. (See id.) Defendants removed to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 3 1441. Certain facts (See Notice of Removal, Doc. No. 1, at 2-3.) relevant only to a particular Moving Defendant are set forth in the following subsections. B. Telfair County and Sheriff Steverson Telfair County pays Dodge County to house and care for its inmates with medical conditions. (See Steverson Dep., Doc. No. 70-1, at 15-16.) Telfair County inmates receiving treatment in Dodge still County are considered Telfair County Telfair County retains control over those inmates. inmates, and (See Moon Dep., Doc. No. 70-2, at 33-34.) C. Dodge County and Sheriff Sheffield Dodge County contracts with Southern Correctional Medicine to (See Southern Correctional provide medical care to its inmates. Medicine Agreement, Doc. Southern Correctional No. 66-4.) Medicine. Plaintiff Nurse notes has from not sued Southern Correctional Medicine indicate that Plaintiff received extensive medical observation, examination, and treatment for his numbness complaints. (See generally Southern Correctional Medicine Records, Doc. No. 66-10.) Plaintiff never had personal contact or communication Sheriff Sheffield. with (See McRae Dep. at 64-65.) D. Ben Hill County and Sheriff McLemore Inmates booked into the Ben Hill County Jail go through a two part medical screening. (See Stokes Dep., Doc. No. 55, at 18.) 4 (See id. at First, an officer asks the inmate general questions. 18-19.) Second, a member of the medical staff contracted to work with the Ben Hill County Jail asks more detailed and potentially confidential questions. 14. ) (See id.; Winn Dep., Doc. No. 56, at 13- The screening process can take up to three days if an inmate (See Stokes Dep. at 20.) is booked on a weekend or holiday. Ben Hill County Jail policy sets out guidelines for the acceptance of inmates who are in obvious need of medical attention. and any such inmate must be cleared by a medical provider before booking. was (See McDonald Dep., Doc. No. 57, at 33-34.) booked without into medical the Ben Hill clearance County despite stating his need for medical care. 59, at 13-14.) 1 Jail his on October medical Plaintiff 13, 2016 questionnaire (See McLemore Dep., Doc. No. Plaintiff saw a nurse on October 16, 2016, but did not see a doctor until October 21. II. (McRae Dep. at 97-98.) JURISDICTION On October 18, 2018, this case was removed to this Court on grounds of both diversity and federal question jurisdiction. (See 1 The cover pages of Sheriff McLemore's and James Hudson's deposition transcripts appear to have been switched, leading to incorrect docket entries for the respective transcripts. Sheriff McLemore's transcript is found at doc. no. 59, while Hudson's is found at doc. no. 63. 5 Notice of Removal Plaintiff. It No 3.)^ motion for remand was filed by Defendants removing to federal court bear the burden See Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 of establishing jurisdiction. F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001) ("We reiterate that the burden of proving jurisdiction lies with the defendant.") removing Defendants' Notice of Removal asserts that both federal question and diversity jurisdiction jurisdiction exists over federal While exist. Plaintiff's Section 1983 question claims for deliberate indifference to serious medical need, it is not clear that 28 U.S.C. § 1332's $ 75,000 amount in controversy threshold is met for Williams diversity provides jurisdiction guidance for over his district state law claims. in courts such circumstances. \\ When damages, the complaint removal from does state not claim court is a proper specific amount of if it is facially apparent from the complaint that the amount in controversy exceeds ft Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319. the jurisdictional requirement. Complaint here does not state a particular damages figure. it simply alleges (in damages are measured jury. // \\ terms familiar to Georgia The Instead lawyers) that by the enlightened conscience of an impartial (See, e.g., Compl. f 126.) 2 This Court has jurisdiction in this This paragraph states. matter on the basis of federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ (sic) 1331 and § 1441(b) and on the basis of diversity // jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 6 If the jurisdictional amount is not facially apparent from the complaint - as here the court looks to the notice of removal. Defendants' Notice of Removal See Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319. contains only a conclusory statement that diversity jurisdiction exists. (See Notice of Removal SI 3.) Although the jurisdictional n it is nonetheless conceivable amount is not \\ facially apparent, that Plaintiff's claims could amount to more or less than $ 75,000. Therefore, the Parties are invited to submit additional judgment-type threshold. evidence rr regarding the amount in summary- controversy Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319; see also Dixon v. Whatley Oil & Auto Parts Co., 2018 WL 4275924, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 7, 2018); Pitts V. Ram Partners, 2018 WL 5786219, at *8 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 5, 2018) . Lack of service also implicates jurisdiction over the various Doe Defendants. The Complaint asserts negligence claims against the Doe Defendants. (See Compl. 51-71.) Apparently, some of the Doe Defendants were identified during discovery, but Plaintiff did not attempt to develop his responded to the pending motions.^ claims against them until he Plaintiff has not served these would-be defendants, and the time to do so has passed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (m) (providing 90-day deadline to serve a defendant 3 The Complaint does not describe the Doe Defendants in any identifiable way; it only states their alleged negligence in the broadest of terms. (See Compl. M 51-70.) 7 Neither has Plaintiff amended his absent showing of good cause) . \\ Complaint to name the Doe Defendants. Once a plaintiff has had an opportunity to ascertain the true name of a John Doe defendant, the plaintiff must amend the complaint to name the defendant and effect service of process. // Slaughter v. City of Unadilla, 2008 WL 345794, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 2008) (dismissing claims against unserved Doe defendants at summary judgment stage) (citing James V. Mazda Motor Corp. , 222 F.3d 1323, 1324 n.6 (11th Cir. 2000)) . Because the . . . Doe defendants have never been properly named and there has been no service of process, the Court currently has no jurisdiction over them. Because the claims against prejudice. Ga. 2002) statute all Doe u Id. of limitations Defendants has they run are on Plaintiff's dismissed with See Seegars v. Adcox, 258 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1377 (S.D. (dismissing claims against Doe defendants following failure to serve process within Rule 4's deadline) ; O.C.G.A. § 93-33 (providing two-year limitations period for filing of personal injury actions). Apart from dealing with the Doe Defendants on procedural grounds, ruling is deferred on Plaintiff's state law claims. III. LEGAL STANDARD Summary judgment is dispute as to appropriate any material fact when and the \\ there is movant is no genuine entitled to fr judgment as a matter of law. fact is one that could Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) . A "material // \\ affect the outcome of the suit under the n governing [substantive] law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), while a dispute is genuine \\ if the nonmoving party has produced evidence such that a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict in its favor. Assocs., Inc., 276 F.3d ff Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001). Any inferences drawn from the facts must be in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio w Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986), and the Court is to reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the resolve all non-movant. H United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (citation, internal quotation marks. and internal punctuation omitted). evidence or determine credibility. The Court may not weigh the Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The moving party has the initial burden of showing the Court the basis for its motion by reference to materials in the record. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant may carry its initial burden in different ways depending on who bears the burden of proof at trial. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993) . When the movant bears the burden at trial, it must make an affirmative showing of an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. must then respond with See id. The nonmovant evidence sufficient to call into question 9 the inference created by the movant's evidence on the particular material fact // to avoid summary judgment. Id. at 1116. When the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial the movant has two options as to how it can carry its initial burden. Id. at 1115-16. The movant may demonstrate an absence of evidence to support the nonmovant's case, or provide affirmative evidence demonstrating the nonmovant's inability to prove its case at trial. Id. by The nonmovant must then respond according to the manner used the movant. sufficient to The nonmovant withstand a must directed provided affirmative evidence. Id. respond verdict f! evidence with when the movant When the movant demonstrates an absence of evidence, the nonmovant may either identify evidence in the record sufficient to withstand a directed verdict, or the nonmovant may come forward with additional evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict. IV. Id. at 1116-17. DISCUSSION OF FEDERAL CLAIMS As an initial note, none of Plaintiff's responses address the immunity arguments in the Moving Defendants' motions.'* the responses focus on identified Doe Defendants. the alleged actions of Instead, numerous now- District courts in the Eleventh Circuit ^ Plaintiff's responses do discuss immunities with respect to some of the now-identified Doe Defendants, but not the Counties or Sheriffs. 10 have found that when a non-movant fails to address a claim at summary judgment but responds to other arguments, the non-movant abandons the claims. See Johns v. CSX Transp., Inc., 210 F. Supp. 3d 1357, 1373 (M.D. Ga. 2016) (collecting cases). Therefore, where the Moving Defendants have carried their initial summary judgment burden and Plaintiff did not respond to their arguments, summary judgment will be granted. A. Section 1983 Claims against the Counties and Sheriffs in Their Official Capacities I. Sheriffs in Their Official Capacities Sheriffs McLemore, Steverson, and Sheffield (the "Sheriff Defendants") assert Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity against Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims Eleventh capacities. against government Manders v. Lee, Amendment officials 338 against them F.3d sovereign acting 1304, 1308 as in immunity arms (11th their of Cir. official bars the 2003) suit State. rr (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal, v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429-30 (1997)). The Eleventh whether an Circuit entity or has set official out is four an factors \\ arm of for the determining State n carrying out a particular function: (1) how state law defines the entity; (2) what degree of control the State maintains over the entity; (3) where the entity derives its funds; and (4) who is responsible for judgments against the entity. 11 when Id. at 1309. sheriff's Georgia district courts^ applying these factors to a provision of medical care to inmates have come to differing conclusions, but recent cases find sovereign immunity for this function. The Middle District of Georgia has had frequent occasion to address the issue. In Youngs v. Johnson, 2008 WL 4816731 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 30, 2008), the court found that the first three Manders factors weighed in medical care to favor inmates of as treating a county a sheriff's function, factor implicating both the state and county. provision with the of fourth See id. at *7-8 . It then concluded that the sheriff was not entitled to sovereign immunity on the plaintiff's sheriff summary judgment. Section 1983 See id. at *8. claim and denied the This was a standard conclusion before Lake v. Skelton (Lake I), 840 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2017), reh'g denied 871 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc). See, e.g., Lewis v. Whisenant, 2016 WL 4223721 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 09, 2016) (denying sovereign immunity to Georgia sheriff for claim arising from provision of medical care); Dukes v. Georgia, 428 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (same). The Middle District returned to the question following the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Lake I, which held that a Georgia ^ "The issue of whether an entity is an 'arm of the State' for Eleventh Amendment purposes is ultimately a question of federal law. But the federal question can be answered only after considering provisions of state law." Manders, 338 F.3d at 1308. 12 sheriff providing food to inmates acts as an arm of the state and enjoys sovereign immunity for that function. at 1340-44. See Lake I, 840 F.3d In Palmer v. Correct Care Sols., LLC, 291 F. Supp. 3d 1357 (M.D. Ga. 2017), the Middle District explained that although the Eleventh Circuit panel in Lake I addressed only the provision of food, the rationale for its holding would apply equally to the provision of medical care. See Palmer, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 1362 ("The panel's holding and rationale suggest that it would reach the same conclusion regarding a county sheriff's medical care . . . to county jail detainees."). provision of Palmer supported that interpretation with Judge Martin's dissent from the en banc decision not to rehear Lake I, in which she stated that under Lake I, no person in a county jail will be able to sue his jailer (in the jailer's official capacity) for damages in federal court, even where the jailer violated the law by depriving the inmate of . . See id. (quoting Lake v. Skelton (Lake II), 871 . medical care. F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2017) (Martin, J., dissenting)) . A more recent Middle District decision elaborates on how Lake I's reasoning leads to sovereign immunity for sheriff's providing medical care. 1159 (M.D. Eleventh See Brooks v. Wilkinson Cnty., 393 F. Supp. 3d 1147, Ga. 2019) . Circuit] As for the rejected Youngs's Georgia delegate their duties county sheriff. under first Manders position factor. that [the counties in [O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2] to the Instead, the Brooks court explained, any duty a 13 county sheriff has under [O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2] is directly imposed by the State. n Brooks continues: Id. The [Eleventh Circuit] then turned its attention to the second Manders factor and concluded that state law vests control over the provision of food in the State rather than the county. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on the fact that a State statute guaranteed inmates certain minimum standards of access to food while detained. Georgia has similar statutes guaranteeing inmates in jails minimum access to medical care. The final departure from the Youngs decision relates to the third Manders factor. While the Youngs court focused on whether the State or county funded the function at issue (the provision of medical care) , the Lake Court focused on which entity funded the sheriff's office generally. Because the State is responsible for funding the sheriff's office, the Lake Court concluded that this factor weighed in favor of finding that the sheriff was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. (citations omitted). Returning to Palmer, the court conducted a renewed analysis of the four Manders factors in light of Lake I, but also found it \\ likely sufficient of medical care rr to rely on the proposition that the provision and food to Eleventh Amendment purposes. This Court finds Palmer Thnendment and inmates are indistinguishable for Palmer, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 1362. without input from Plaintiff on the matter Brooks sovereign persuasive. immunity in their Protected official by Eleventh capacities as providers of medical care to inmates, the Sheriff Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. 14 2. Counties Counties are not liable under Section 1983 via respondeat superior for deprivations of constitutional rights their employees commit. See Seeqars, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 1377 (citing Monell v. Instead, a plaintiff Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). must show that his or her rights were violated as official government policy, the actions of an a result of official \\ an fairly deemed to represent government policy, or a custom or practice so pervasive and well-settled it assumes the force of law. // Id. (quoting Denno v. Sch. Bd. of Volusia Cnty., 218 F.3d 1267, 1276 (11th Cir. 2000), cert, denied, 531 U.S. 958 (2000)) ; see also Camp V. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1350 (M.D. [t]he Eleventh Circuit has articulated three Ala. 2009) (stating. H ways a plaintiff can meet his or her burden under Monell and listing the same three methods). With respect to Telfair and Dodge Counties, Plaintiff has not identified any policy, custom, or under Monell. Riddle's practice to carry his burden The only practice Plaintiff mentions is Sergeant practice of providing copies of inmate medical documentation to her superior for any inmate she transported to a medical facility. 12. ) Even settled it (See Doc. No. 74, at 11; Doc. No. 75, at 11- assuming that practice assume[d] force the 15 of was \\ so law[,] n pervasive Plaintiff and well- does not attempt to show how the practice caused a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff does identify an official policy of Ben Hill County, namely, the policy prohibiting inmates in obvious need of medical Plaintiff argues that attention from being booked into the jail. he was booked into the Ben Hill County Jail in violation of that He argues policy because he was unable to walk and incontinent. the booking treatment. but the then led to his languishment in the jail without However, it was not the policy that caused his injury. violation of it.® Plaintiff would have to establish a practice or custom of violating the booking policy in order to survive summary judgment. He has not done so. and even if the violation County of the Ben Hill Jail booking Plaintiff of his Eighth Amendment rights. \\ \ policy deprived [p]roof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose ft liability' against a municipality. Craig v. Floyd Cnty., 64 3 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting City of Qkla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985)) . In summary, the policy Plaintiff identifies did not cause his injury, and he has failed to establish that the actual cause of his injury was an official policy, practice, or custom. Therefore, summary judgment is ® After all, the purpose of the booking policy is to ensure inmates receive medical treatment. 16 appropriate against Plaintiff on his Section 1983 claims against the County Defendants. B. Section 1983 Claims against the Sheriffs in Their Individual Capacities’^ Plaintiff's Defendants in claims under Section 1983 their individual capacities against are the Sheriff on alleged based constitutional violations caused by a deliberate indifference to serious medical need. w [GJovernment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional known."8 of which a reasonable person would Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). shield is Katz rights known as required Previously, qualified immunity. district courts to first determine have This Saucier v. whether a plaintiff has made out a violation of a constitutional right, and second, if so, decide whether the right was See Pearson Saucier v. v. Callahan, Katz, 533 555 U.S. U.S. 194 223, (2001)). \\ clearly established. 232 (2009) Now, n (discussing Pearson permits Plaintiff does not phrase his individual capacity claims in terms of supervisory liability, so it is not discussed. 8 Each Count of the Complaint asserting a Section 1983 claim contains an allegation that the respective Sheriff was acting within the scope of his discretionary functions. (See Complaint gil 81, 88, 95. ) 17 district courts to consider the qualified immunity prongs in the order of their choosing. See id. at 236. The Court will nonetheless begin with the question of whether Plaintiff has made out a violation of a constitutional right. In the context of a deliberate indifference to serious medical need violation, not received adequate "9 Eighth Thnendment. \\ every claim by a prisoner that he has not medical treatment states a violation of the Estelle V. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976) . The Eleventh Circuit has set out three necessary components to a such a claim. 2010). See Youmans v. Gagnon, 626 F.3d 557, 563 (11th Cir. They are: (1) a serious medical need; (2) the defendant['s] deliberate indifference to that need; and (3) causation between that indifference and the plaintiff's injury. Id. (quotation omitted) (alteration in original). The second component is split into another three factors: (1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than [gross] negligence. Id. at 564 (quotation omitted) (alteration in original). 3 "The Fourteenth Amendment governs claims of medical indifference to the needs of pretrial detainees while the Eighth Amendment applies to claims of convicted prisoners." Youmans, 626 F.3d at 563 n.6. However, the same standard is applied in either case, and the Eleventh Circuit "consider[s] as precedents cases decided under either amendment." Id. 18 There is no evidence that any of the Sheriffs had subjective knowledge of Sheffield was supervision a risk unaware while of serious of at the harm to Sheriff Plaintiff. the reason for Plaintiff's Dodge County Jail, and Telfair medical County officials never communicated with Sheffield regarding Plaintiff's medical needs. (See Sheffield Dep., Doc. No. 66-5, at 14-16; Moon Dep. at 99; Riddle Dep., Doc. No. 66-7, at 89.) Sheriff McLemore likewise lacked subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm to Plaintiff; McLemore did not even know Plaintiff was in the Ben Hill County Jail until he saw Plaintiff just before Plaintiff was transported to Grady Memorial Hospital. Sheriff Steverson's only interaction Plaintiff with medical care. Plaintiff was while was receiving (See McRae Dep. at 30.) Additionally, regardless of Plaintiff's failure to respond to the qualified immunity arguments, the Court can discern no evidence on the record that the Sheriff Defendants disregarded any risk of serious harm or acted with more than gross negligence. The record reflects that Plaintiff received medical care numerous times in the custody of each Sheriff. Defendants' favor is Thus, summary judgment in the Sheriff appropriate on Plaintiff's claims against them in their individual capacities. 19 Section 1983 V. CONCLUSION Upon the foregoing, the summary judgment motions (doc. nos. 53, 66, 68) are GRANTED IN PART. Specifically, the Clerk is DIRECTED to ENTER JUDGMENT on all of Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. Plaintiff’s claims DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. against the Doe Defendants are The Parties are invited to submit summary-judgment-type evidence regarding the amount in controversy threshold within twenty-one (21) days of this Order. Ruling is DEFERRED on Plaintiff’s state law claims against named Defendants. ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this 18th day of September, 2020. ____________________________ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 20
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