Maryland Casualty Company et al v. Dublin Eye Associates, P.C. et al, No. 3:2015cv00081 - Document 66 (S.D. Ga. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER denying 55 Motion for Reconsideration re 50 Order on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Lisa G. Wood on 6/30/2017. (ca)
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Maryland Casualty Company et al v. Dublin Eye Associates, P.C. et al Doc. 66 In t|ie ?Htttteb States! BiKtrtct Court for ^ontfiem 29tOtrtct of C^eorgta Jinbltn IBtlitOtott MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY and FOREMOST SIGNATURE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiffs, CV 315-81 V. DUBLIN EYE ASSOCIATES, P.C.; DR. ROGER D. SMITH; and DR. JAMES Y. JONES; Defendants. ORDER Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs' Maryland Casualty Company (^^MCC") and Foremost (^'Foremost") (collectively Reconsideration (Dkt. Signature Insurance '"Plaintiffs") No. 55). For the Company's Motion for reasons stated below. Plaintiffs' motion is DENIED. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Many of the facts of this case are not in dispute. On April 13, 2011, Defendant Jones and two other parties filed an Employee against Life") Retirement Income Massachusetts in the U.S. Security Mutual District Life Act ("ERISA") Insurance Court for the Company Eastern lawsuit ("Mass. District of A0 72A (Rev. 8/82) Dockets.Justia.com Kentucky. {Dkt. No. 1 H 13). That court ultimately granted summary judgment in Mass. Life's favor on July 12, 2013. Dublin Eye Assocs., P.C. v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 957 F. Supp. 2d 843 (E.D. Ky. 2013). On August 12, 2013, Mass. Life filed a claim for attorney's fees pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). On March 24, 2014, the motion was granted. P.C. V. 1217664 Mass. (E.D. plaintiffs in $1,191,799.99. Mut. Ky. the Life Mar. Ins. 24, Co., No. 2014). underlying 5:ll-cv-128, Defendant lawsuit Dkt. No. 1 t 22. Dublin Eye Assocs., were and ordered 2014 WL his co- to pay On May 4, 2015, Plaintiffs were notified of the judgment and the award of attorney's fees. At the time, MCC insured Defendant with the following policy ('^Policy"): We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of ^'personal and advertising injury" to which this insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any ^^suit" seeking those damages. However, we will have no duty to defend the insured against any ^'suit" seeking damages for ^^personal and advertising injury" to which this insurance does not apply. We may, at our discretion, investigate any offense and settle any claim or '^suit" that may result. (Dkt. No. 1 SI 28). Further, the Policy covered injury" arising out of ''malicious a ^^personal and advertising prosecution" (as well as a number of other offenses not at issue in this case). LEGAL STANDABD A party may seek to alter or amend a judgment in a civil case within 28 days after the entry of the judgment. Civ. P. 59(e). should be Reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy which used sparingly. Bostic v. Astrue, No. l:12-CV-082, 2012 WL 3113942, at *1 (S.D. Ga. July 31, 2012). motion may not arguments or prior to granting be used to re-litigate entry Rule of 59(e) judgment, motion are manifest errors of law or fact." 1343 (11th old A Rule 59(e) matters, raise present new evidence that could have been the a Fed. R. Cir. 2007) as ^'the only raised grounds newly-discovered new for evidence or Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, (internal quotations omitted). ''"Rule 59(e) is not a vehicle for rehashing arguments already rejected by the court or for refuting the court's prior decision." Bostic, 2012 WL 3113942, at *1 (quoting Wendy's Int'l v. Nu-Cape Const., Inc., 169 F.R.D. 680, 686 (M.D. Ga. 1996)). DISCUSSION Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate newly discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact that would justify reconsideration. considered and Plaintiffs raise new restyle arguments before dismissal of their claims. that arguments previously could been have made Neither form of argument is appropriate on a motion to alter, amend, or vacate. Id. at *1. Primarily, Plaintiffs point to arguments that were already considered on their motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs assume the Court misunderstood or ignored. not so. which This is Plaintiffs assert that the Court did not address their primary argument-that the elements of a motion for attorney's fees under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) need to be comparable to an action for malicious prosecution under Kentucky law in order for Defendant to survive summary judgment. The Court only considers underlying case could prosecution under Kentucky similar, as Plaintiff have Dkt. No. 55-1. whether also law—not suggests. the facts sustained whether See Atl. the Mut. a from the malicious two laws Ins. Co. are v. Atlanta Datacom, Inc., 139 F.3d 1344, 1345-46 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). The holding in Atlanta Datacom undercuts Plaintiffs' 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) arguments and therefore the Court did not choose to analyze the cross-motions for summary judgment through Plaintiffs' incorrect framework. Plaintiffs assert that the Court misinterpreted the fourth element of malicious prosecution under Martin v. 0'Daniel, 507 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2016). This element requires that the malicious prosecution proceeding must be terminated in favor of the person against whom it was brought. Plaintiffs attempt to clarify their previous argument in that they assert that an action must have terminated in Mass. Life's 4 favor before they could conceivably have a right to sue for malicious prosecution. No. 55-1. However, underlying lawsuit. this is exactly what occurred Dkt. in the Mass. Life was granted summary judgment and then filed for attorney's fees. It is difficult to conceive how a grant of summary judgment is not a "termination" in favor of Mass. Life. Plaintiffs also re-argue that even if this was a "termination," it was not on the "merits," because the case was dismissed on statute of limitations grounds. Plaintiffs rely heavily on Alcorn v. Gordon, which holds that a grant of summary judgment on the basis of the statute of limitations is not a "success on the merits" for malicious prosecution purposes. S.W.2d 809, reiterates 811 that (Ky. the Ct. App. underlying 1988). order First, at issue the here 762 Court plainly discussed the merits, under a heading aptly titled "Success On the Merits." Dublin Eye Assocs., 2014 WL 1217664, at *3-4. Court would be was a resolution The hard-pressed to deny that the underlying order on the merits when the judge who issued the decision clearly intended and labeled it to be just that. Regardless, the Court applied the revised elements set forth by Kentucky's highest court in Martin, not those set out by its intermediate court in Alcorn. These revised elements simply require that the "proceeding be terminated in favor of the accused," not that this termination be on the merits. Martin, 507 S.W.Sd at 11. In fact, the Martin decision seems to reject the notion that a decision needs to be ^'on the merits." For example, the Court specifically stated that the old elements^ as applied by Alcorn Finally, were in ^'need of revision." Plaintiffs argue that the Court found a fact question regarding malice. Plaintiffs argue that the issue of at 8. inappropriately Dkt. No. 55-1 p. 17. whether the action in the underlying lawsuit constitutes malicious prosecution is an issue of contract construction and therefore must Court. However, Instead, the contract issue is construction whether is be decided not the Defendant's by the issue actions here. in the underlying lawsuit support the elements of malicious prosecution or not. Under Kentucky law, malice is typically decided by the fact-finder Plaintiffs be. at also trial. Martin, misunderstand 2016 what the WL 5244518, fact-finder's at role *3. would The Court does not, as Plaintiffs suggest, task the fact- finder ruling. with interpreting the Eastern Instead, the fact-finder Defendant's conduct and decide District will whether of Kentucky's apply Kentucky law Defendant acted ^ The parties argue over whether or not Alcorn has been overruled. to with While Martin makes no mention of Alcorn, it expressly abrogates Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Ky. 1981), which is the basis of Alcorn^ s analysis. Alcorn also relies heavily on a comment to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 653. The Kentucky Supreme Court appears to have considered this section in a fair amount of detail in Martin, yet made no mention of this comment, nor the "on the merits" requirement. Martin, 507 S.W.Sd at 11. As such, while the Court cannot say whether or not Martin decision certainly shakes Alcorn^ s foundation. overrules Alcorn, the Martin malice or not. See id. As such. Plaintiffs' arguments on this motion for reconsideration fail, and the motion will be denied. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above. Plaintiffs' Maryland Casualty Company and Foremost Signature Insurance Company's Partial Motion for Reconsideration (Dkt. No. 55) is DENIED. SO ORDERED, this 30th day of June, 2017. HON. LISA GODBEY WOOD, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA A0 72A (Rev. 8/82)
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