Medlin v. United States, et al, No. 2:2015cv00078 - Document 37 (S.D. Ga. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER granting the United States' 36 Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff's case is DIMISSED. The Clerk is DIRECTED the enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal. Signed by Chief Judge Lisa G. Wood on 11/29/2016. (ca)
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Medlin v. United States, et al Doc. 37 t^t ?i9nttelii States! IBtsitriet Court (or tl^e ^ontliem I9t0trtct o( 4^eorgta Pruitotaitcit l9ti)toton ALBERT V. MEDLIN, Plaintiff, No. 2:15-CV-78 V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant. ORDER Before the Court is Motion dkt. to no. Dismiss for 36. The Defendant United Lack Motion of Subject will be States of America's Matter GRANTED Jurisdiction, for the reasons herein. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Medlin Is Disciplined By His Supervisors Plaintiff instructor in Enforcement FLETC is an Albert the V. Medlin worked Firearms Division Training Center C'FLETC"). agency within as the of United a senior the Dkt. State firearms Federal No. 1-1 Law SI 2. Department of Homeland Security and ^'is actually a town unto itself with its own zip code . . . known as Glynco, GA." GA, Fed. Law Enforcement Id.; About Glynco, Training Ctrs., D72A ev. 8/82) Dockets.Justia.com https://www.fletc.gov/about-glynco-ga (accessed Nov. 11, 2016). The original defendant in this case, Medlin's branch chief. Dkt. No. 1-1 5 4. Walter Burns, was Burns recommended Medlin's termination from federal employment on June 6, 2014. Id. S[ 7. falsely He did so because Medlin allegedly let his wife indicate authority take the two animals of Id. at employee. Id. Burns' and someone law-enforcement property for the benefit of Medlin's grandchildren. be of had private Burns deemed this to off them else's 17. to that conduct Medlin's unbecoming division a federal chief, Scott Donovan (whom Medlin sued in a parallel proceeding ultimately consolidated with this one. No. 2:15-CV-123 (S.D. Ga.)), agreed and terminated Medlin from federal employment on August 29, 2014. SI 8. FLETC canceled Burns' decision on February 26, 2015. recommendation Id. SISI 12-13. and Donovan's Medlin claims that it did so because they were based on false allegations. Id. SISI 14-15. On March 25, 2015, Burns proposed suspending Medlin for fourteen days without pay. Id. SI 17. Donovan suspended Medlin without pay for eighteen days on April 17, 2015. 18. on Id. SI FLETC modified this suspension to fourteen calendar days April 27, 2015, ^^because it unlawfully exceeded the disciplinary penalty proposed by Burns' Suspension Proposal." Id. SISI 19-20. Medlin Sues His Supervisors and the United States Is Substituted Medlin sued Burns for libel, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and statutory violations relating to the disciplinary recommendations on May 27, 2015. id. The case Dkt. No. 1. was The removed to this Court on See generally June 26, 2015. United States moved to substitute itself for Burns on June 26, 2015. Dkt. No. 4. While the parties were briefing that motion, the United States moved to dismiss the case for want of subject matter jurisdiction. that all decision. of Dkt. No. 10. his claims Dkt. No. 23. Medlin responded by acknowledging hinged on the Court's substitution He asked the Court to deny the motion as premature, given the ongoing substitution dispute. Id. at 4. waived He then sovereign conceded immunity that as ^'the to United libel States claims, has and not that, if [substitution] is granted, he cannot pursue his libel claim." Id. He likewise granted that in the event of substitution, ^'his emotional distress claim [would] also [be] barred" under binding Eleventh Circuit precedent. Id. at 4-5 (arguing ''that the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation . . . is plainly wrong" so as preserve the issue for appellate review"). he withdrew his statutory violation claim. Finally, Id. at 6-7. Medlin's parallel case against Donovan, No. 2:15-CV-123 {S.D. Ga.), 2016. was consolidated with this one on February 19, Following a hearing on the substitution and dismissal motions, dkt. no. 29, the Court granted substitution on March 31, 2016. Dkt. No. 35. It denied the motion to dismiss with permission to refile in light of substitution. Id. at 13. The United States refiled its motion to dismiss the next day. Dkt. No. 36. To date, Medlin has not responded. LEGAL STANDARD The court's plaintiff subject bears matter the burden jurisdiction. of establishing Ishler v. the Internal Revenue, 237 F. App'x 394, 395 (11th Cir. 2007). DISCUSSION The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Medlin's claims for distress. libel The and United intentional States is infliction immune from unequivocally waives its sovereign immunity. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33 of suit emotional unless it United States v. (1992). As Medlin concedes, the United States retains its sovereign immunity as to ^MaJny claim arising out of . . . libel." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h); Dkt. No. 23 at 4; see also Pl.'s Resp. United States' Mot. Dismiss, Dkt. No. 9 at 3, Medlin v. Donovan, No. 2:15-CV- 123 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2015) (^'Donovan Resp,") - The Court thus lacks jurisdiction over Medlin's libel claims. Medlin emotional also concedes distress claim that his intentional regarding Burns is infliction barred Eleventh Circuit's read of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). by of the Dkt. No. 23 at 4-5; Metz v. United States, 788 F.2d 1528, 1535 & n.9 (11th Cir. 1986) (barring intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because it was based on alleged libel); Dkt. No. 1-1 SI5 42-47 (basing claim on alleged libel). The Court lacks jurisdiction over this claim. Medlin does not surrender his intentional emotional distress claim regarding Donovan. 3-4. it infliction of Donovan Resp. at He alleges that his claim is not based on libel because ^'is knowing not and dependent on deliberate falsity," decision to but rather, find him ''Donovan's guilty of uncharged conduct, because Donovan could find no evidence to support the charged misconduct." Id. at 3. This mischaracterizes Medlin's complaint: Donovan intentionally making the knowingly false factual findings of misconduct contained in his Removal Decision was extreme and outrageous conduct because [] Donovan terminated Medlin's employment for conduct of which knew Medlin was not guilty; . . . . he Donovan intentionally making the false factual findings of misconduct contained in his Suspension Decision was extreme and outrageous conduct because [] Donovan punished Medlin for conduct of which he knew Medlin was not guilty; . . . . Donovan's knowingly false factual findings of misconduct contained in his Removal Decision and his Suspension Decision intentionally caused Medlin to experience severe mental suffering, wounded feelings, humiliation, embarrassment and fear. Medlin's experiencing severe mental suffering, wounded feelings, humiliation, embarrassment and fear was the natural result of Donovan's Removal and Suspension Decisions intentionally containing factual findings of misconduct which both Donovan and Medlin knew to be untrue, and which jeopardized Medlin's employment. Despite FLETC modifying his unlawful penalty, Donovan did not change the knowingly false factual findings contained in his Suspension Decision, thereby intentionally continuing Medlin's severe mental suffering, wounded feelings, humiliation, embarrassment and fear. Compl., Dkt. No. 1-1 SISI 51-55, Medlin v. Donovan, No. 2:15-CV- 123 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 27, 2015); see also id. fSI 49-50, 72-75, 77-80. The complaint only alleges additional wrongdoing {usually, right alongside falsity) to argue that Donovan acted outside the scope of his employment—a threshold consideration relating to intentional Id. 15 sovereign infliction 63-64 misconduct, immunity of (alleging made that emotional that knowingly not distress Donovan false is part claim ^'considered findings of of the itself. uncharged misconduct on both charged and uncharged misconduct, and considered a prior offense"), 66 consider (same; Medlin's also alleging reply), 68 that Donovan (alleging that failed to Donovan "considered aggravating factors that he knew to be false and knowingly refused to give any weight to mitigating factors."), 71 {alleging that Donovan failed to consider evidence). alleged falsity libelous alleged of Donovan's character—is the statements—that meat of Medlin's wrongdoing is a light garnish. claim. is, The their claim. Other Metz thus bars the 788 F.2d at 1535 & n.9. Even if establish it did intentional not, Medlin infliction would of be left emotional trying distress to based on Donovan's considering improper factors and failing to fully review evidence. Such a claim would be dismissed sua sponte for failure to state Corp., 953 F.2d a claim. 1275, 1276 (affirming dismissal 'Mischarge for an improper kind of conduct egregious for See Beck (11th failure Cir. to reason on v. 1992) state does which a Interstate a not claim Brands (per curiam) claim because constitute of the intentional infliction of emotional distress can be based."). The Court lacks jurisdiction over Medlin's claims. The present motion must be granted. CONCLUSION For Dismiss, the dkt. DISMISSED. MOOT. reasons no. above, 36, is the United GRANTED. States' Plaintiffs' Motion to case is All pending motions in this case are DISMISSED AS The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal. 7 so ORDERED, this 29th day of November, 2016. LISA GODBEY WOOD, CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN 3 72A ev. 8/82) DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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