Jordan v. City of Darien et al, No. 2:2015cv00049 - Document 131 (S.D. Ga. 2016)

Court Description: ORDER granting Defendants' 73 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 74 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 75 Motion for Summary Judgment; and denying Plaintiff's 77 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter the appropriate judgment and to close this case. Signed by Chief Judge Lisa G. Wood on 11/18/2016. (csr)

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Jordan v. City of Darien et al Doc. 131 Ktt t{ie ^Kntteb States! Btsitrict Conrt for t|ie ^otttfiem Biotrict of (Georgia iHirttttOfotck IBibtOton DWIGHT E. JORDAN, Plaintiff, CV V. 215-49 CITY OF DARIEN, BONITA CALDWELL, CHIEF DONNIE HOWARD, OFFICERS ROUNDTREE, DAVIS, and BROWN, Defendants. ORDER Pending before the Court are multiple motions filed by all parties. First, (''Chief Howard"), is Defendants Police Officers Davis', Defendant (Dkt. No. Officer 74). Roundtree's Third, is Jordan's Summary Judgment No. (Dkt. 77) . motions was held before this (Dkt. No. Motion for Defendant ("Caldwell") Motion for Summary Judgment is Plaintiff Dwight E. Donnie Howard's Officer Brown's and the City of Darien's Motion for Summary Judgment is Chief 73). Second, Summary Judgment Bonita (Dkt. No. Caldwell's 75) . Fourth, ("Plaintiff") Motion for Partial Oral argument regarding these Court on September 19, 2016. The motions have been fully briefed and are ripe for decision. For D72A ev. 8/82) Dockets.Justia.com the reasons stated below, 74, 75) are GRANTED, the Defendants' and Plaintiff's Motions Motion (Dkt. (Dkt. Nos. No. 77) 73, is DENIED. FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. The Board Meeting On April 18, 2013, the Mclntosh County Board of Education (the "Board") met in Darien, Georgia. and Caldwell were both members of Dkt. 77 pp. 2. the Board. Plaintiff Id. pp. 2-3. Plaintiff served as the Board's only African-American member and had been on the Board for fifteen years. 15:12. 12. Caldwell was the Board's During the meeting, Dkt. chairwoman. 77-3 at 13:25- Dkt. 74-5 at 3:9- tensions began to mount as Plaintiff vigorously discussed an issue regarding school uniforms in the district. Dkt. No. 77-14 at 1:40:00. When a matter was brought up that Plaintiff believed he had already addressed. said "I could have sworn I ingles? Ooooh ok." said that, yo hablo usted espanol or at began to de-escalate. Plaintiff 1:40:13. When the confrontation Plaintiff said "Ok, meanwhile back at the ranch," to which Caldwell replied "with the horses." 14 at 1:40:50. all around." interjected, Id. at Id. at 1:40:50. encouraging Plaintiff 1:40:57. meeting?! Plaintiff responded, Plaintiff then Why don't you check at 77- "with the manure too, A fellow Board it's member to "stick" to Board issues. yelled, [Caldwell]! "Let's Check stick to the [Caldwell]!" Id. at 1:41:05. professionalism, board, then to which Plaintiff finger and saying, the Caldwell you on 77-14 the both other "in accused Plaintiff to the Caldwell accusations that and of she for the purpose of being a t 1:41:10. two threatened M. 1:41:30. at conspiring was a Board statement immediately followed Caldwell state." 1:41:45-1:42:30. Plaintiff's responded by pointing his board A shouting match between the which Plaintiff's ^^You've been unprofessional since you came on came vindictive!" questioned "criminal" members against meeting was called into recess. and began Caldwell, "turn" each Plaintiff against to then him and yelled "corrupt." to at leave until Id. at 1:42:00. during finally the At this point. Board members were in the hallways of the building. Plaintiff passed by Caldwell and exclaimed, "You can call the Deals.^ can call anybody you want to call." No. 62 at 16:25-17:8. in You Dkt. No. 67at 57:1-12; Dkt. Plaintiff then exited to the parking lot. This, however, was not the end of the incident. B. The Police are Involved After the meeting. Board member Larry Day ("Day") called Chief Howard of the Darien Police Department to notify him that no police officers were present at the meeting that night. 65 at 17:10-25. Day states that his request was ^ Plaintiff was apparently referencing the Govenor of Georgia, and his family. Dkt. related to Nathan Deal, school security and Howard, in turn, called Officer Davis and told him to report to the Board. Dkt. 66 not at Plaintiff's 31:21-23. behavior. Chief Officer Davis was routinely present at Board meetings for security purposes and had known Plaintiff prior to the incident. Dkt. No. 47 pp. 10-12. Officer Brown overheard on his police radio that Officer Davis was going to the Board meeting and decided to join him. No. 61 Dkt. a t 12:17-22. Officer Davis was exited the building. already at the scene Dkt. No. 67 at 46:4-9. appears confrontation with to be Board When the police arrived. Plaintiff animated members. as Dkt. As he No. Davis reports. continued 65 at his 17:10-25. Plaintiff continued to behave as such. cursed during his confrontation with Officer Davis, who in turn told him to stop cursing. thereafter. Plaintiff A video recording of the activities shows Plaintiff's behavior. Plaintiff when at 63:8-22. Officer Brown arrived. Shortly at 60:12-61:21. Officer Davis told Plaintiff that he needed to leave the premises or he would be arrested. Plaintiff asked building to collect his belongings. if he at 0:30. to and the parking lot. the officers, officers' at actions 1:00-2:00. re-enter at 61:9-19. then re-entered the building. protest could argue the Plaintiff Plaintiff continued with them in the Plaintiff briefly approached continuing to protest their actions. at 3:30. Plaintiff then left. His departure, however, did not conclude the matter. C. The Investigation After was tasked by Chief Howard with investigating Plaintiff's conduct. Dkt. No. the 74-15 relation at to incident occurred. 79:25-80:21. Plaintiff, Officer Roundtree Officer nor to the Roundtree incident. has Dkt. no prior No. 128. Officer Roundtree conducted multiple inteirviews as part of his month long investigation. Caldwell on April 30. First, Officer Roundtree interviewed Dkt. No. 19 Ex. WWW-1 at 0:25. Caldwell conveyed the events that took place at the Board meeting and indicated Plaintiff was screaming and cursing that night. at 10:00-11:15. Caldwell stated that Plaintiff was Id. "very, very out of control" and had multiple altercations with Officer Davis prior to being asked to leave. stated that following Plaintiff was her around Id. at 11:15-13:00. shouting at her, in a physically attack her. way that at 32:00-44. she insulting her, feared a different level." Id. specifically made her afraid, her and followed her. at Day stated that would 33:00-8. stating "this When asked what Caldwell said Plaintiff yelled at a t 36:00-37:00. Officer Roundtree next interviewed Day on May 2. 74-6. he and Caldwell dispelled the idea that this was normal behavior for Plaintiff, was Caldwell he had little relationship Dkt. to No. either Caldwell or Plaintiff. at 4:17-19. Day stated that Plaintiff was cursing loudly outside of the building and had a confrontation with Officer Davis. interviewed Boone Board member indicated that Holly On May 3, Boone Plaintiff was (^'Boone") • yelling outside and she could hear him yell, Officer Roundtree while Dkt. 74-16. police were ^""You act like you've never cursed before and you probably curse all the time," at someone outside. at 23:1-25. Boone indicated Plaintiff was yelling while police were outside. at 23:16-25. Officer Roundtree also reviewed an incident report compiled by Officer Davis and Officer Brown. 25;85:1-9. Officer Davis Dkt. indicated that No. upon 70 at his 84:14- arrival. Plaintiff was yelling to one of the female Board members, say anything I goddamn want." Id. at 75:1-11. can The report states that when Officer Davis asked Plaintiff to not use that language. Plaintiff yelled again, want any goddamn time I can say any goddamn thing I want." Another officer on the scene reported that when Officer Davis told Plaintiff he should not curse in public. Plaintiff replied, ''I don't you can't Roundtree whether do a goddamn concluded Plaintiff anyone on the scene. that was thing." the Id. record yelling at at was a [sic] a goddamn and 66:1-4. ^'debatable" close Dkt. No. 70 at 372:1-22. Officer as to proximity to D. Officer Roundtree Concludes the Investigation On May sufficient 22, Officer probable cause Roundtree to arrest determined Plaintiff conduct and disrupting a lawful meeting.^ 24. Officer Roundtree presented a there for was disorderly Dkt. No. 70 at 154:10- Mclntosh County Magistrate Judge, Jean Bolin, with his findings via warrant affidavit and a phone conversation. Roundtree's Dkt. warrant No. application Bolin conduct and submitted day. to found the Dkt. the Mclntosh 155:1-25. that No. cause Officer Plaintiff 74-18. probable sufficient approved at concluded committed disorderly conduct. Judge 70 arrest had Magistrate of disorderly warrant. Plaintiff County Detention Center He was subsequently released. Ultimately, later that the disorderly conduct charge was dismissed and Plaintiff brought this action. LEGAL STANDARD Summary judgment is required where ^^the movant shows that there is movant Civ. no genuine dispute is entitled to P. 56(a). outcome of the Grp. V. (quoting (1986) ) . Anderson A v. dispute is under FindWhat. com, to any material judgment as A fact suit as 658 matter of law." ^^material" the if governing F.3d Liberty over a 1282, Lobby, such a fact it law." 1307 Inc., fact ^^might is and the Fed. affect the FindWhat Inv' r (11th 477 Cir. U.S. '^genuine" 2011) 242, 248 if the ^ The disrupting a public meeting charge was later rescinded and is not at issue in this case. R. ^'evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." the court is favorable to to inferences view the in all of nonmoving that Washington Broad. Id. the evidence party party's Serv., In making this determination, and favor. Inc., 234 in the draw all Johnson F.3d light reasonable v. 501, 507 most Booker (11th T. Cir. 2000). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating fact. the Celotex Corp. absence v. satisfy this burden, of Catrett, a genuine 477 U.S. issue 317, 323 of material (1986). To the movant must show the court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Id. at 325. If burden shifts the moving party discharges this burden, the to the nonmovant to go beyond the pleadings and present affirmative evidence to fact does exist. Anderson, show that a 477 U.S. satisfy this burden in two ways: at 257. First, genuine issue of The nonmovant may the nonmovant ^^may show that the record in fact contains supporting evidence, sufficient to withstand a ignored' directed verdict motion, to meet the initial burden of showing an absence of evidence." Fitzpatrick City of Atlanta, Celotex, the 477 U.S. nonmovant who has thus ^overlooked or failed v. by the moving party, which was 2 F.3d 1112, at ^^may 332 come 1116 (Brennan, forward (11th Cir. J. , 1993) dissenting)). with additional (quoting Second, evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary deficiency." nonmovant instead attempts to nothing more ^'than a repetition of his conclusional allegations, summary Morris v. Ross, [is] this Where the burden with judgment for the defendants carry Id. at 1117. not only proper but required." 663 F.2d 1032, 1033-34 (11th Cir. 1981). DISCUSSION I. P l a i n t i f f ' s Section 1983 Claims Must Fail Plaintiff alleges that Defendants committed numerous violations of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and 42 U.S.C. Section 1985.^ See generally Dkt. No. 41. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges violations of his constitutional rights against Officer Davis, Officer Brown, capacities. and Id. Officer at Howard and Caldwell KH Roundtree 4-6. in Further, their individual Plaintiff sues Chief in both their individual and their official capacities on similar grounds, as well as the City of Darien. at nil 7-8, 76. Officer Brown, Howard have Officer Davis, asserted qualified Officer Roundtree, and Chief immunity. qualified ^'That immunity protects government actors is the usual rule; only in exceptional cases will government actors have no shield against claims made against them in their individual capacities." ^ Plaintiff s claim under the Open Meetings Act was dismissed at Oral Argument on September 19, 2016. Plaintiff provided no argument which would satisfy a claim under t h a t s t a t u t e . Dkt. No. 128. Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Univ., (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc) Bd. of Trs./ 28 F.3d 1146, 1149 (citations and emphasis omitted). To determine if qualified immunity applies, the Court considers (1) whether the plaintiff officers violated a alleged facts constitutional right; right was clearly established. 223, 232 (2009) . qualified to The immunity the and Pearson v. Eleventh in establish Circuit disorderly (2) that whether that Callahan, has the 555 U.S. determined conduct that context is determined by whether ^^arguable" probable cause existed for the arrest. Cir. Redd v. City of Enterprise, 1998); Fish v. Brown, 140 F.3d 1378, 2016 WL 5746264, No. 1383 (11th 15-12348, at *9 (11th Cir. Oct. 3, 2016). Plaintiff alleges violations of both his Fourth and First Amendment arrest. rights stemming from his allegedly unconstitutional An arrest without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment Ortega and v. Further, provides Christian, an arrest the 85 in basis F.3d for 1521, retaliation for a 1525 Section 1983 claim. (11th Cir. 1996). exercising one's First Amendment rights may provide a basis for a Section 1983 claim. See Redd, The 140 F.3d at 1383. existence bar to both claims. 1383. Further, of probable Ortega, cause, however, is an absolute 85 F.3d at 1525; Redd, 140 F.3d at Plaintiff's claims under Section 1985 must also be dismissed if no denial of his constitutional rights occurred. 10 gee 42 U.S.C. officers had § 1985. arguable Therefore, probable the cause issue to of whether arrest Plaintiff the is dispositive of this matter. A. Plaintiff's Claims Against Brovm and Davis Must Fail Plaintiff alleges Section 1983 claims against Officer Davis and Officer Brown. was seized when Dkt. No. 4-5. Officer Brown leave the Board meeting. of 1 and leave under threat of physically restrained, entering belongings question the Board before before arrest. 102-1 p. that Davis forced 12. to Video footage Plaintiff However, him was forced Plaintiff was to never was never physically prevented from re- meeting, leaving. the Officer Dkt. No. the alleged seizure reflects Plaintiff argues that he Court, and was Dkt. allowed No. then, 67 is at to gather 63:8-22. whether the his The officers violated a clearly established right when they ordered Plaintiff to leave the Board meeting. A seizure does not occur when a believe he is free to leave the area. F. App'x. 873, (11th Cir. 2016). attempted to 878 obtain multiple occasions. quickly began. Id. public records at 875. reasonable plaintiff would 0'Boyle v. In O' Boyle, from the M. 638 the plaintiff town hall on A confrontation with police The plaintiff was ^'grabbed," ''shoved," and told that he would be arrested if he did not the building. Thrasher, immediately leave The Eleventh Circuit held that this did not 11 amount to a seizure because the plaintiff should have known at a l l times that he was free to leave. Plaintiff Tisdale v. relies heavily Id. on a sister Gravitt to establish that a court's 1385-86, however, the 1396-97 plaintiff (N.D. Ga. in Tisdale 2014). was 51 F. Supp. Unlike in 0'Boyle, not free to leave instead was ^^escorted" by police to the back of the room. at 1396-97. Specifically, a existed regarding whether a free to ^'terminate the in seizure occurs whenever a citizen is forced to leave an area by the police. 3d 1378, ruling genuine issue of and Id. material fact reasonable person would have felt encounter" with police. Here, nothing in the record suggests Plaintiff was not free to leave the area. To the contrary, he was not permitted to stay. physical force was used in his removal, No and Plaintiff was free to re-enter the Board meeting to obtain his belongings. Regardless, establish that immunity. clear they were the that Brown Officers Officer to be Davis Brown Plaintiff need only entitled to qualified 767 F.3d 1063, 1068 it is Plaintiff s seizing and law is unclear West v. Davis, Specifically, so Officer (llth Cir. 2014). burden to show that the law is and Davis and violating rights when they forced him to leave. had Id. ^'fair his notice" that constitutional A review of the relevant case law in this jurisdiction provides no such notice. See O'Boyle, 638 F. App'x. at 878. 12 Thus, Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims fail against Officer Brown and Officer Davis because they did not violate any clearly established right. 555 U.S. at Pearson, 232. B. Plaintiff's Section 1983 Claims Against Officer Roundtree Chief Howard and the City of Darien Must Fail Plaintiff Officer also alleges Roundtree. It is a Section undisputed arrested Plaintiff on May 22, 2013. 1983 that action Officer Dkt. 74-18. against Roundtree Therefore, the Court considers whether Officer Roundtree had arguable probable cause to arrest determines Plaintiff arguable probable ''reasonable officer [] in the the same knowledge as that probable cause Cir. omitted). 1990) disorderly cause The considering [Officer Roundtree] to Von Stein v. (internal Notably, by conduct. Court whether a same circumstances and possessing existed disorderly conduct. {11th for arrest" for Brescher, quotation "[t]his could have believed 904 marks standard the crime F.2d 572, and recognizes of 579 citations that law enforcement officers may make reasonable but mistaken judgments regarding probable cause but does not shield officers who unreasonably conclude that probable cause exists." Skop v. of Atlanta, 485 F. 3d 1130, 1137 City (11th Cir. 2007) . Determining qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action is a far lower criminal case. standard than For instance, that of in Redd v. 13 determining guilt in City of Enterprise, a the plaintiffs brought a claim under Section 1983 for violations of both their 1383. First While court and the declined Fourth Amendment Eleventh to Circuit determine court looked whether guilty of disorderly conduct. rights. to or not conduct arrest to law, the were Instead, cause the existed Id. the Court must look to Georgia law on disorderly determine Plaintiff. if arguable Under Georgia probable law a cause person offense of disorderly conduct by acting 1) existed commits or abusive words, to the without provocation using to another in such a person's presence 3) opprobrious which by their very utterance tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace 16-11-39(a){3}. at Plaintiffs considered only whether arguable probable Therefore, F.3d Alabama See id. at 1382. for plaintiffs' arrest for disorderly conduct. 2) 140 (^^fighting words"). O.C.G.A. § An overview of the relevant case law indicates that fighting words are a combination of 1) cursing, 2) yelling, 3) threatening behavior, and 4) conduct in front of multiple people. Simply finding police of insulting arguable officer wrote a police probable the officer cause. Cir. 2013). to write the In plaintiff's failing to use a seatbelt properly. is insufficient Merenda daughter v. a for a Tabor, a ticket 506 F. App'x 862, 864 for (11th The plaintiff attempted to persuade the officer not ticket, but the officer did so anyway. 14 The plaintiff said ^^this ''you're a f to plaintiff king sucks," and as he walked away, a "come hole." here" and forcibly arrested him. plaintiff's conduct probable cause. The when he muttered, officer refused asked the the officer The Eleventh Circuit found that the was insufficient behavior for arguable Id. Disorderly conduct is typically public conduct that ^raises hostility in S.E.2d 250 the (Ga. minds of Ct. App. at bar patrons. others. 1998), In Tucker v. State, the defendant repeatedly cursed When asked to calm down, the defendant said that he could say whatever the "f_k" he wanted to say. 251. The Court found that defendant's conduct was provoke violence, bystander, before and indeed did arrived. Therefore, guilty of disorderly conduct. 603 defendant's "f provoke Id. at sufficient to violence in one who was going to "slap the taste out of his mouth" officers State, 504 S.E.2d 666, insults at 254; 668 toward defendant (Ga. his Ct. was found see also McCarty v. App. girlfriend 2004) that {holding she was a king whore" and "b_ch" at convenience store sufficient for disorderly conduct conviction). The whether stresses Plaintiff conduct. acted Court Instead, reasonably that actually the in it does committed Court not the determines determining 15 that endeavor offense if of Officer Plaintiff to decide disorderly Roundtree may have committed the offense. 5746264, at *9. Redd, Indeed, 140 F.3d at '^arguable 1383; probable Fish, cause 2016 WL does not require an arresting officer to prove every element of a crime or to obtain a negate confession before making an arrest, the concept of probable cause and transform arresting officers into prosecutors." 1302 which would (11th Cir. notes 245 F.3d 1299, 2001). The Scarbrough v. Myles, Court that Officer Roundtree conducted long investigation prior to Plaintiff's arrest. obtained authorization Judge Jean Bolin.'^ multiple from a neutral Dkt. No. 74-18. witness interviews, factors indicate to the Court Furthermore, he Officer Roundtree conducted reviewed law. incident high reports, consulted Judge Bolin, See generally Dkt. a month and detached magistrate. consulted officers who were at the scene, and reviewed relevant case a level of 70. These diligence by Officer Roundtree in determining arguable probable cause. More from importantly, his investigation existed. The record provided with accounts the evidence Officer Roundtree indicates that arguable reflects that Officer from multiple was yelling for an extended period. 32:00-44; Dkt. No. 74-6 at 4:1-125; witnesses Dkt. Dkt. No. 74-16 obtained probable Roundtree cause was that Plaintiff 19 Ex. WWW-1 at at 23:1-5; Dkt. ^ Plaintiff has repeatedly reminded the Court that seeking a magistrate judge's approval alone is insufficient to establish probaible cause. Dkt. No. 130-1 p. 1. Indeed, the Court does not "end the inquiry" on that basis alone. Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 16 1239 (2012). No. 70 at 75:1-11 Further, he was provided with multiple witness accounts claiming that Plaintiff was repeatedly cursing. No. 19 Ex. WWW-1 at 32:00-44; Dkt. No. 16 at 23:1-5; witnesses stated whatever I it." 6 at Dkt. No. that 70 he at 74-6 at 4:1-125; Dkt. 75:1-11. said some Specifically, variation goddamn want to say whenever I Dkt. No. 70 at 75:1-11; Dkt. Dkt. of ''I 74- these can say goddamn want to say 74-16 at 23:1-5; Dkt. No. 74- 4:1-125. In addition, multiple witnesses reported that Plaintiff was threatening. Caldwell said that she feared that Plaintiff would become violent, she had an intense confrontation in the hallway with him and, during the meeting. Plaintiff had directed hateful comments No. toward her. Dkt. 67 at 57:1-12; Dkt. No. Officer Davis both Davis'] No. face," 74-9 which at 19 Ex. WWW-1 62 at 16:25-17:8. indicated Officer Davis noted that Dkt. No. that 23:3-4. Davis When to ^^be Officer 32:00-44; Dkt. Officer Brown and Plaintiff Plaintiff ^^g[ot] caused at was threatening. right up in prepared Brown to arrived [Officer fight." on the scene, he believed that there was about to be a fight based upon P l a i n t i f f ' s conduct. Dkt. No. 74-14 a t 15:2-16:20. Georgia law reflects that yelling, accusations at individuals, people are all factors whether arguable cursing loudly, yelling and doing so in front of groups of taken into consideration in determining probable cause 17 of disorderly conduct exists. See Tucker, Therefore, one 504 S.E.2d at 253-54; McCarty, 603 S.E.2d at 667-68. the totality of Plaintiff's conduct, individual act, indicates existed for his arrest. the proposition that Dkt. No. 77 pp. 17-20. that rather than any arguable probable cause Plaintiff cites Merenda in support of arguable probable cause does not exist. However, Merenda is distinguishable from this case for multiple reasons. In Merenda, curse words were muttered so softly that no one but the police officer could hear them. 506 F. App'x at 864. Here, multiple persons heard Plaintiff yell curse words in public, similar to the situations in Tucker and McCarty. 504 S.E.2d at 253-54; 603 S.E.2d at 667- 68. Plaintiff vigorously denies that he yelled and large portions of the testimony of multiple witnesses. 102-3 pp. 12-15. Plaintiff cannot, however, survive disputes Dkt. No. summary- judgment simply by giving his own subjective appraisals of his behavior otherwise. (11th Cir. in contradiction See Cordoba v. 2015). qualified immunity, GRANTED. to the Dillard's, Therefore, overwhelming Inc., evidence 419 F.3d 1169, Officer Roundtree is 1181 entitled to and his Motion for Summary Judgment will be Furthermore, this grant of summary judgment extends to all claims against Chief Howard and the City of Darien as well. 18 II. Plain'tiff's Section 1985 Claims Fail Plaintiff's to ''1). state a the Section claim under defendants 1985 claims must Section 1985, reached also fail. Plaintiff an understanding In order must or show that agreement that they would deny the plaintiff one of his constitutional rights, and his (2) the conspiracy resulted in an actual denial of one of constitutional rights." Weiland Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1327 added) omitted). (citation circumstantial evidence and Defendants' Grider v. the Houser, 754 City of Auburn, Beach 2015) Plaintiff existence of participation in the United States v. Palm (11th Cir. Certainly, to prove v. Cty. (emphasis may rely an agreement alleged conspiracy. F.3d 1335, 618 F.3d 1240, 1349 1260 on (11th Cir. See 2014); (11th Cir. 2010) (^'Factual proof of the existence of a § 1983 conspiracy may be based on circumstantial evidence."). Here, involved Plaintiff relies on the fact that many of the people in incident, this case know each other, communicated after the and some parties allegedly have some personal vendetta against him. Dkt. amounts to ^^unsupported speculation" Plaintiff cannot Cordoba, 419 establish a 102-1 survive F.3d at conspiracy pp. 19-25. summary 1181. This regarding a and summary best basis. Plaintiff judgment GRANTED in regard to Plaintiff's Section 1985 claims. 19 at conspiracy and judgment on this Therefore, occurred evidence See cannot will be CONCLUSION For the reasons Summary Judgment set forth (Dkt. Nos. 73, above. 74, Defendants' 75) are GRANTED. Plaintiff's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment DENIED. Motions for As such. (Dkt. No. 77) is The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter the appropriate judgment and to close this case. SO ORDERED, this 18th day of November, LISA GODBEY WOOD, 2016. CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 20

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