Kicklighter v. McIntosh County Board of Commissioners et al, No. 2:2014cv00088 - Document 51 (S.D. Ga. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER denying as moot 38 Motion for Reconsideration; granting 38 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 41 Motion for Reconsideration; and terminating 50 Motion for Leave of Absence. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the Defendant and close this case. Signed by Judge J. Randal Hall on 6/6/16. (cmr)
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Kicklighter v. McIntosh County Board of Commissioners et al Doc. 51 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA BRUNSWICK DIVISION DAWN M. KICKLIGHTER, * Plaintiff, * * v. * CV 214-088 * SAUNDRA "BOOTIE" GOODRICH, * in her official capacity as * Clerk of Court * for Mcintosh County, * Defendant. ORDER Presently before reconsideration judgment (Doc. (Doc. (Doc. 38) . 38), the 41), Court motion for and Defendant's motion for reconsideration For the reasons below, judgment, Plaintiff's Defendant's second motion for summary motion for reconsideration, summary is and the Court DENIES Plaintiff's GRANTS Defendant's second motion for DENIES AS MOOT Defendant's motion for reconsideration. I. On February 19, 2016, BACKGROUND the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant's motion for summary judgment. a result, only reinstatement Plaintiff's against 42 Defendant U.S.C. Goodrich, § 1983 in capacity as Clerk of Court for Mcintosh County, remains. However, (Doc. 36.) claim her As for official Georgia, now since February 19, Defendant has informed the Dockets.Justia.com Court that County. (Doc. is (Doc. caution, the she no 38-1.) Defendant Court's 38.) longer Clerk Consequently, filed summary the both judgment In response, a of out motion order Plaintiff Court of a an abundance of of motion filed a brief as well as her own motion for reconsideration. Regarding Defendant's motions, the Mcintosh reconsideration for and for to in opposition (Doc. Court, dismiss. 41.) in its order dated April 14, 2 016, first relayed that evidence of Defendant's retirement "newly Defendant 47.) was to prevail See Fed. 481, 483 not R. Defendant's motion and P. 60; 2007). to Rease v. Next, dismiss AT&T Corp., seemed appropriate, a motion pursuant 12(b)(6) along with evidence of Defendant's see Fed. Defendant's R. summary judgment submit additional (Doc. 47.) all of the Civ. motion not allow to P. to Federal 12(d). dismiss (Doc. 239 F. App'x the Court indicated that while consider 47 j would on her motion for reconsideration. Civ. (11th Cir. discovered" Rule Hence, into of it could not Civil Procedure retirement. the Court the instant and provided both parties (Doc. converted motion for the opportunity to evidence and briefing on the issues at hand. Now, as the window for submissions has since closed, above-referenced motions are ripe for the Court's consideration. 1 The Clerk, in accordance with Griffith v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 822, 825 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam), provided Plaintiff with notice of the motion, the summary judgment rules, the right to file affidavits or other materials in opposition, and the consequences of default. (Doc. 48.) II, PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONISDERATION With her motion for reconsideration, requests that the Amendment Court immunity on reverse the its grounds 1304, (2004). 1308 (11th Cir. issued No. 2003), unemployment A15A1991 Plaintiff, County Ct. of App. Mar. Although the Court denied, 540 Lee, U.S. 2016). by xxnot[ing] was v. entity Eleventh . . . realizes Governor's (11th Cir. Council 1984) . judgment order, to immunity," appellate decision that on As According Indian Plaintiff's that it "state cites. Affairs, the Eleventh Circuit, the advantage gleans noted within within a state's body of law. analyzes to that the Mcintosh employer" Plaintiff's employer, take Plaintiff state law defines an entity, court 1107 is an 44.) designed Amendment 338 Butler, law provides assistance in ascertaining whether the state intended to an county submitted the Kicklighter 23, dispelled the notion that Defendant, (Doc. a See Manders v. See Commissioners "arm of the State." Eleventh recent decision in her suit for state- the Court of Appeals, Board is Plaintiff has compensation. (Ga. of Defendant cert, In support of her request, Georgia Court of Appeals' finding that official and not an "arm of the State." F.3d Plaintiff specifically very See Inc., the of the little create state's from the Tuveson v. Fla. 734 Court's F.2d first 730, 732 summary in determining exactly how does not simply look at the labels (Doc. 36.) **essential 3 Instead, the circuit governmental nature'" of the entity, the extent independence to from the which counties state that law it provides serves, the entity and whether the entity derived its authority for the function at issue from the state. 2015) See Pellitteri v. (quoting Manders, such an analysis, Prine, 338 776 F.3d at F.3d 777, 1319). 780 (11th Therefore, the Kicklighter decision is of Cir. without minimal value here. Without any other evidence or argument would warrant DENIES her relief motion from for the Court's from Plaintiff that prior reconsideration. order, See Fed. the R. Court Civ. P. 60(b). HI, DEFENDANTS SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Defendant's second motion for summary judgment will be granted only if "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. contends P. that 56(a). As because she longer a proper should be remedy dismissed. O.C.G.A. has for her motion, retired, § § this Defendant reinstatement such that Plaintiff's In maintaining cites first to O.C.G.A. Under the basis remaining argument, is no claim Defendant 15-6-59. 15-6-59(b), *[t]he clerks of superior court shall have the power to appoint a deputy or deputies," and the MpJowers and duties of deputy clerks shall be the same as those of the clerks, so long as their principals continue in and not office deputy clerks' reelection of 860 F. longer." (emphasis added). employment is "dependant Put [sic] the clerk of court." Taylor v. Supp. 1526, 10-5-59(b)). 1536 (N.D. Accordingly, Ga. 1994) upon another way, a upon the will and Bartow Cnty., Ga., (interpreting O.C.G.A. Defendant's retirement, § her successor had the right to remove all of the incumbent deputies and appoint her Defendant's seemingly, own. Thus, successor be to is 1343 interfering with (11th Cir. empowered to the Court . . . [the clerk] which a order it would, that Harkins, by statute, business to discretion See Underwood v. all were Plaintiff, hiring 2012) ("'When, conduct authorized to conduct this reinstate clerk possesses and covets. 1335, if the 698 F.3d deputy clerk the clerk is must be able to select a deputy in whom he has total trust and confidence and from whom he can expect, without question, undivided loyalty'" (quoting Stegmaier v. Trammell, 597 F.2d 1027, 1040 (5th Cir. 1979)). For further support, Defendant directs the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Lucas v. O'Laughlin, (11th Cir. 1987) . County, Florida, sheriff seeking, However, as the In filed Lucas, a inter § a to the 831 F.3d 232 deputy 1983 alia, Court sheriff in suit against the county's Id. at reinstatement. lawsuit was pending, St. Johns 233. the defendant-sheriff was replaced, and the district court was faced with the question of whether reinstatement was still available. reinstatement would be improper, 5 In concluding that the district court stated that while "[a] prevailing reinstatement," to allow for citation agreed, plaintiff the citing remedy. the Id. Later, the person on following whom the he same entitled quotation appeal, the rationale: on the already to "unusual" marks Eleventh "[S]hould the court, day had (internal on be reinstated by the order of him ordinarily the circumstances of the case were too omitted). terminate is and Circuit [the deputy] the new sheriff could ground appointed that in he [the preferred deputy's] place." Id. Like the deputy sheriff in Lucas, Plaintiff seeks to be reinstated to her former position so that she may work under an elected official who has taken office during the pendency of her suit. Yet, Defendant's assuming successor, that like "could terminate [Plaintiff] [the preferred successor] appointed in 59(b). [Plaintiff's] Therefore, unless the the Court ordered sheriff's reinstatement, successor in Lucas, on the same day on the ground that the person place." See Plaintiff whom [s]he had id. ; O.C.G.A. can persuade already § 15-6- the Court otherwise, it appears that Defendant's retirement will prohibit Plaintiff from obtaining reinstatement. In opposition to Defendant's motion, Plaintiff argues that her claim should proceed to a jury trial for three reasons: (1) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25 allows her claim to continue; (2) two of the above-referenced cases - Taylor and Lucas - are distinguishable; and (3) even if reinstatement is unavailable, 6 she is entitled to proceed with a claim for front pay and back pay. (Doc. 41.) A. Pursuant public Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25 to Rule officer resigns, who 25(d), is a Ma]n action does party in an not official abate when a capacity dies, or otherwise ceases to hold office while the action is pending." Instead, xx[t]he officer's successor is substituted as a party." Id. Thus, automatically Defendant's successor is now the party against whom Plaintiff asserts her remaining claim.2 However, Court's as a procedural determination as rule, to Rule whether 25 has no impact reinstatement is on a the viable remedy. B. Next, Distinguishing Cases while Plaintiff is correct that Taylor and Lucas are distinguishable, the insignificant. distinctions that she draws With respect to the Taylor decision, are this Court relies only on the Northern District of Georgia's interpretation of O.C.G.A. arguments § 15-6-59(b), suggesting otherwise incorrect. not attack factual 2 the that As standard similarities and Plaintiff the not interpretation for the Lucas applied between has that nor case asserted was opinion, flawed any or Plaintiff does does she question and the one at the hand. "An order of substitution is not required, but may be entered at any time if a party desires or the court thinks fit." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25 advisory committee's note to 1961 amendment; accord Polk v. Nugent, 797 n.l (11th Cir. 2014). 7 554 F. App'x 795, Consequently, the Court finds no reason why the principles from Taylor and Lucas should not be followed. C. As for stated summary in Front Pay and Back Pay the Court's judgment, Plaintiff's Eleventh claims injunctive Inc. Rehabilitative Amendment officials or not federal declaratory 225 relief, but first immunity except See of F.3d generally court Defendant's Amendment 3 6.) State Servs., does in (Doc. v. on Defendant, against relief. Facilities, order Fla. Fla. 1220 prohibit p[T]he suits relief such as restitution or damages. Rehab. & Eleventh against seeking of for Health seeking only prospective bars of of suits all those Ass'n Dep't 1208, bars motion state injunctive retrospective ... If the prospective relief sought is measured in terms of a monetary loss resulting from a past equivalent breach of money citation omitted)). - that she is reinstatement of a legal damages." duty, (internal For that reason, (2) a claim for is the functional quotation marks and Plaintiff's final argument entitled to proceed on or it either (1) a claim for front pay and back pay - is also unpersuasive.3 3 Additionally, Plaintiff would not be entitled to a trial by jury even if her claim for reinstatement survived summary judgment. See Sullivan v. Sen. Bd. of Pinellas Cnty., 773 F.2d 1182, 1187 (11th Cir. 1985) (indicating that a claim for reinstatement is *equitable and therefore not the proper subject of a jury trial"). 8 In sum, having found each of Plaintiff's three arguments to be unavailing, holding in the Court, Lucas, consistent with the Eleventh Circuit's GRANTS Defendant's second motion for summary judgment. IV, Because judgment, DEFENDANTS it the has MOTION granted Court FOR her now DENIES RECONSIDERATION second AS MOOT motion for Defendant's summary motion for reconsideration. V. For the reasons above, for reconsideration (Doc. for summary judgment motion for directs the to the Court DENIES 41), (Doc. reconsideration Clerk CONCLUSION ENTER GRANTS 38), (Doc. 38). TERMINATE all motions and deadlines, June, Defendant's and DENIES AS JUDGMENT ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Plaintiff's motion in second motion MOOT Defendant's Accordingly, favor of the Court Defendant, to and to CLOSE this case. Georgia, this (p^ day of 2016. HONORABLE J. RANDAL HALL UNITED/STATES DISTRICT JUDGE -^SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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