Kicklighter v. McIntosh County Board of Commissioners et al, No. 2:2014cv00088 - Document 36 (S.D. Ga. 2016)

Court Description: ORDER granting in part and denying in part 19 Motion for Summary Judgment. Therefore, Defendant McIntosh County Board of Commissioners and Defendant Goodrich in her individual capacity, are DISMISSED from this case. Defendant Goodrich in her official capacity shall proceed to trial. Signed by Judge J. Randal Hall on 2/19/16. (cmr)

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Kicklighter v. McIntosh County Board of Commissioners et al Doc. 36 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA BRUNSWICK DIVISION DAWN M. KICKLIGHTER, * * Plaintiff, * v. * CV 214-088 * MCINTOSH COUNTY BOARD OF * COMMISSIONERS * and SAUNDRA "BOOTIE" GOODRICH, in her * individual and official * capacities as Clerk of Court for Mcintosh County, * * * Defendants. * ORDER Presently before summary judgment (Doc. the Court 19) . is Defendants' For the reasons below, motion for Defendants' motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. I. BACKGROUND The present dispute arises out of Plaintiff's employment as a deputy serves as clerk the for Defendant Mcintosh Mcintosh County Clerk of Clerk of Juvenile Court. clerk in 2004, County Saundra Clerk State Court, (Compl., "Bootie" of Goodrich, Superior Court, who the and the Mcintosh County Doc. 1.) Plaintiff was promoted to Hired as a deputy chief deputy clerk in 2005 and served in that capacity until being terminated in March 2014. (Id.) Following her termination, Plaintiff filed this suit alleging several counts of wrongdoing by Goodrich, in her Dockets.Justia.com individual and official Board of Commissioners Plaintiff right her alleges of marriage alleges that compensation to Defendants by Robert ("FLSA") . Defendants failed of right to Mcintosh (Id.) First her Fair Labor that she County First, Amendment because Second, provide the (Id.) employment and sleep apnea, of Plaintiff with overtime Standards suffers Act from Plaintiff alleges that terminated her on the basis of a perceived or actual disability in violation of ("ADA"). to submitting asthma, her Kicklighter. violation Third, hypothyroidism, the violated her terminating Defendants in and ("Mcintosh County Board") . that association capacities, Fourth, the Americans with Disabilities Act Plaintiff alleges that Defendants leave under the Family Medical Leave Act denied her ("FMLA") and terminated her for attempting to take such leave. After discovery concluded, motion for summary judgment Griffith v. Wainwright, curiam), the (Doc. 19), 772 F.2d 822, judgment other materials 20). rules, the 24), Plaintiff 825 in opposition, Subsequently, right and the the instant in compliance with (11th Cir. Defendants filed a filed notice to file 1985) (per affidavits of a (Doc. 21), Plaintiff filed a sur-reply second intent or consequences of default Plaintiff filed a response Defendants filed a reply (Doc. 23), (Doc. and, filed the Clerk provided Plaintiff with notice of the motion, summary (Doc. Defendants to reply file a (Doc. 25), and second sur-reply (Doc. 26) before later withdrawing it (Doc. 28) . Consequently, this motion is ripe for the Court's consideration. II. Defendants' motion DISCUSSION for summary judgment will be granted only if *there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Civ. P. could 56(a). In this affect the substantive law. 248 (1986) . Court outcome Anderson v. view the non-moving party, Corp. , 475 U.S. Real of facts the are suit in Prop. , Liberty Lobby, in Matsushita 574, [its] 941 facts 587 1428, light Elec. (1986), favor," F.2d the "material" under of most Indus. the Inc., In evaluating the contentions must inferences context, Fed. R. Co. if they governing 477 U.S. 242, the parties, the favorable the v. to Zenith Radio and must draw "all justifiable United 1437 States Four Cir. (11th v. Parcels 1991) (en of banc) (internal punctuation and citations omitted). Initially, the moving party bears the burden and must show the Court, by reference to materials on file, motion. How to Celotex carry this proof at trial. 1115 Corp. (11th Cir. v. Catrett, burden depends Fitzpatrick v. 1993). 477 on U.S. who the basis for the 317, bears 323 the City of Atlanta, When the non-movant has (1986). burden of 2 F.3d 1112, the burden of proof at trial, the movant may carry the initial burden in one of by two ways — negating an essential element of the non- movant's case or by showing that there is no evidence to prove a 3 fact necessary to Clark, Inc., Adickes v. 477 U.S. met its 929 F.2d 604, S.H. Kress 317). opposition, the non-movant's & case. 606-08 Co., 398 See Clark v. (11th Cir. U.S. 144 1991) (1970) Coats & (explaining and Celotex, Before evaluating the non-movant's response in the Court must first consider whether the movant has initial burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (11th Cir. the (per curiam). cannot v. meet City of Columbus, 120 F.3d 248, 254 A mere conclusory statement that the burden at trial is insufficient. 929 F.2d at 608. If — that 1997) non-movant Clark, the Jones and only if — non-movant there is may proof at avoid indeed summary judgment." trial, the movant a Id. summary material carries its judgment issue of by initial burden, *demonstrat[ing] fact that precludes When the non-movant bears the burden of the non-movant must tailor its response to method by which the movant carried its initial burden. If the the movant presents evidence affirmatively negating a material fact, the non-movant withstand fact a "must directed respond verdict sought to be negated." the movant shows non-movant must with motion evidence at trial Fitzpatrick, show that the on the 2 F.3d at an absence of evidence on a either sufficient record material 1116. material contains to fact, If the evidence that was *overlooked or ignored" by the movant or "come forward with additional evidence sufficient 4 to withstand a directed verdict motion deficiency." at trial Id. at based 1117. burden by relying on the on the The non-movant pleadings or 1032, 1033-34 (11th Cir. evidentiary cannot carry its by repeating conclusory allegations contained in the complaint. F.2d alleged See Morris v. Ross, 1981). Instead, the 663 non-movant must respond with affidavits or as otherwise provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. A. Plaintiff First Amendment Right to Association contends that Defendants of her marriage to Robert Kicklighter. result, Plaintiff, pursuant to 42 terminated (Compl., U.S.C. § contend that summary judgment Doc. 1983, her First Amendment rights have been violated. Defendants her is because 1.) As a asserts that In their motion, proper as to all Defendants. 1. In Defendant Goodrich in Her Official Capacity defense Eleventh of Amendment Defendant Goodrich Amendment to Judicial of any suit against one of claim, immunity in the United power extend to this her Defendants bars the official States 1983 claim capacity. The equity, shall not be commenced, the United States by Citizens suits that against Eleventh that "the construed to or prosecuted of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." amend. XI. argue Constitution provides the United States in law or § first U.S. Const. *Although by its terms the Amendment applies only to against a State by citizens 5 of another State, our cases have extended the Amendment's applicability to suits by citizens against their own States." Garrett, to 531 U.S. agents and 356, Bd. 363 of Trs. (2001). instrumentalities of the Univ. of Ala, v. Such immunity also extends that act as xxarm[s] of the State" and "applies even when a state is not named as a party of record, if for all practical purposes the action is against the state." Manders cert, denied, v. Lee, 540 U.S. 338 1107 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003), (2004). In determining whether an official is acting as an "arm of the State," "(1) how control Further, Court law State derives judgments State' state the entity the whether defines maintains its against will funds; the a weigh the and was the (4) what entity; who acting is the responsible for F.3d an at "'arm 1309. of the function in engaged when taking the actions Id. of where 338 as factors: degree (3) the particular which liability is asserted to arise." to this § 1983 claim, Manders (2) Manders, must be assessed in light of which the defendant was four entity; over entity." defendant the at 13 08. out of Thus, as the Court must determine whether Defendant Goodrich was acting as an "arm of the State" when she terminated Plaintiff's employment. In doing so, the Court will be guided by the Eleventh Circuit's recent opinion in Pellitteri v. Prine, 776 F.3d 777 (11th Cir. 2015). a. How State Law Defines the Entity The Court will begin its Manders analysis by examining how Georgia law defines clerks of court. Constitution, Ga. Const, labels a clerk of superior court is a art. IX, sheriffs Pellitteri Sheriff deputies. an labeling, of Manders, 338 to of Id. Yet, defines State" 776 on the when F.3d at relying F.3d which sheriff's at 783. the Constitution the court Lowndes hiring the in County and firing In reaching that Georgia court office in Constitution's See id. Georgia. Id. the examined 1319). Second, Georgia the independence Georgia. the law Georgia the court examined the "'essential governmental each specific In of the officers. Georgia "county officer." the court in Pellitteri made three inquiries. nature'" the that "arm First, Third, Similarly, county instead at 780. offices 1. See Pellitteri, conclusion, extent § as found as According to the Georgia Constitution from the counties examined whether function at the issue was court provides that they the sheriffs' serve. Id. authority sheriff's derived (quoting for from the State of Id. Pellitteri, the court noted that the essential governmental nature of each sheriff's office is to "(1) 'enforce the law and preserve the peace on behalf of the sovereign State' and (2) xto perform specific statutory duties, by State, in corrections.'" Id. the law enforcement, (quoting Manders, in 338 directly assigned state F.3d courts, at and 1319). in As Plaintiff indicates, not the have sheriff, or same sheriffs and clerks essential governmental "receiving role. Instead, documents, filing, a receiving (PL's Sur-Reply, the court's chief sheriff but Pellitteri of the executing Quoting those the Pellitteri and nature. clerk being present in court." power superior a clerk does not have a law enforcement, correctional duties of rather duties. Eleventh concern See is was for Circuit's and and the 776 counties from cannot, the and State, do not, are sheriff any was at 780. Manders, the "'derive their controlled by delegate Yet, particular F.3d in court concluded that Georgia sheriffs and duties fines, at 4.) the decision a for not Pellitteri, Unlike peacekeeping, 24, whom do responsible fees Doc. court law the State, enforcement power or duties to sheriffs.'" Id. With respect to clerks of superior court, their power and duties from the State, they also derive for Georgia law does not provide any county with the ability to delegate duties clerk of superior court. O.C.G.A. §§ 15-6-50, See Ga. Const, art. 15-6-61. to the IX, § 1, g[ Ill(a); Though the Mcintosh County Clerk of Superior Court is also the county's state and juvenile court clerk, this delegation. county's arrangement is not the result of a county Georgia Code § 15-6-51 provides the authority for a clerk of superior court to clerk, and Georgia Code § 15-11-54(a) become its state court provides for the clerk of superior court's handling of §§ 15-6-51, juvenile court matters. O.C.G.A. 15-11-54(a). While it is evident that superior court clerks derive their power and duties superior from court Pellitteri, example, exercising clerks, are the the State, like independent Georgia control it the of the or not be the construed county to extend they For counties from Const, thereof, clerks art. IX, counties [a]ction the salaries in serve. affecting See Ga. that referenced prohibits to evident or of § 2 "shall affecting any the personnel except the personnel subject to the jurisdiction of the governing Constitution establish clerks. as legislative power granted to elective county office, thereof, counties otherwise superior court or their personnel. (stating that just sheriffs Constitution over is authority"). specifies and control See Ga. that the Const, Additionally, only powers art. IX, the and § 1, state duties l III. the Georgia legislature of can superior court Therefore, given the Georgia Supreme Court's explanation "that sheriffs cannot be considered county employees because they are subject only to the state legislature," it follows that superior court clerks cannot be county employees for F.3d at 780 (citing Bd. 260 Ga. 482 482, the same reason. See Pellitteri, of Comm'rs of Randolph Cnty. 776 v. Wilson, (1990)) . The final inquiry with respect to this first Manders factor is whether superior court clerks derive their authority for the 9 functions at issue from the State or their individual counties. Regarding Plaintiff's § 1983 claim, the function of hiring and firing deputy clerks In Georgia, is at issue. superior court clerks derive the authority for such a function from the State. O.C.G.A. § 15-6-59(b) provides that "[t]he clerks of superior courts shall have the power to appoint a deputy or deputies." For these reasons, the first Manders factor - how state law defines the entity - weighs in favor of immunity. b. Degree of Control the State Maintains over the Entity The second Manders factor for the Court to consider degree of control the State maintains over the entity. its decision "sheriffs when are they App'x 575, court in Georgia firing largely personnel 578 (11th Cir. that such Pellitteri, exercises of deputy a 2012). a 776 deal sheriffs, regulates the Specifically, the hiring from the However, at of and in was 781. [of 477 Pellitteri, incorrect over that Georgia] Prine, First, control second, v. the Prior to had held State Keene statement F.3d great Pellitteri, Eleventh Circuit decisions." their power for the State. In the independent make stated reasons. Pellitteri, is for the F. the two State of the hiring and the sheriffs several ways exercise Id. court and noted firing of deputy the State sheriffs. Id. the court highlighted certain statutory provisions that require peace officers to be of a minimum age and to have certain intellectual, moral, and 10 physical capabilities. Id. The court also noted that Georgia has created a special council to address officer misconduct while also providing the governor with broad investigatory and suspension powers to discipline sheriffs if they abuse their appointment or removal powers. With respect to the hiring and firing of deputies, Id. Georgia does not regulate superior court clerks as significantly as they do sheriffs. perquisites committee No for to statute deputy details clerks, discipline nor deputy the physical does and mental statute create Yet, clerks. any a Georgia law does require deputy clerks to take the same oath that superior court clerks take, the same O.C.G.A. and it also provides that deputy clerks shall have powers and § 15-6-59. duties as superior Additionally, court under O.C.G.A. clerks. See § 15-6-82, the Governor has broad powers to investigate and discipline superior court clerks if O.C.G.A. they abuse their appointment or removal powers. § 15-6-82. Given the relative absence of state regulation over the personnel decisions of superior court clerks, one could conclude that against the However, rely degree control the Pellitteri on the consideration. the Pellitteri whom of [do] presence See court of factor indicated that regulation Pellitteri, 776 court identified the sheriffs exercise weighs F.3d 11 at the should not most 781-82. "xkey question'" [their] Manders, 338 F.3d at 1319 n.35). as courts immunity. power[?]'" salient Instead, as Id. "x[F]or (quoting Once applying that question to the facts of this case, it is clear that superior court clerks exercise and their Georgia. in firing powers for the State Superior court clerks select deputy clerks their Const, hiring duties, art. which IX, § 776 F.3d at 782. 1, 5 they derive 111(a); Accordingly, from O.C.G.A. the § to assist State. 15-6-60; of See Ga. Pellitteri, the second Manders factor weighs in favor of immunity. c. The third government held Where the Entity Derives Its Funds Manders entity's that this funds. factor *[c]ounty is Sheriff's Office, factor clearly involves In Keene, weighed the immunity source including for personnel 447 F. App'x at 579. Conversely, source of the the Eleventh Circuit had against principal the of because funding for expenditures." in Pellitteri, the the Keene, the court held that this factor weighed in favor of Eleventh Amendment immunity for two reasons. Pellitteri, 77 6 F.3d at 782. First, the State "mandates that counties set a budget for the sheriff's office," and second, counties those funds." equipment State for how necessary for clerk's salaries. See mandates the counties must superior court clerks' the funding Specifically, dictate the sheriff spends Id. Similarly, substantial xx cannot offices that of counties superior *supply all fixtures, the proper offices, and O.C.G.A. 12 §§ court clerks. supplies, functioning" counties must 15-6-87, provide 15-6-88. and of their pay their Yet, as with sheriffs, counties cannot superior court clerks. control See Ga. Const, the actions art. IX, of § 2, their 5 1(c). Thus, the third Manders factor weighs in favor of immunity. d. Liability for and Payment of Adverse Judgments Finally, judgments the Court must against the consider entity." "who Manders, is responsible 338 F.3d at for 1309. Should Plaintiff obtain an adverse judgment against the clerk of superior court, the judgment would presumably be paid out of the clerk's budget, not directly out of county. See sheriff in id. his at official sheriff's budget, Therefore, 1327 the budget of (holding that capacity a would the State or judgment against paid of be out a the which is comprised of state and county funds). as noted by both parties, this factor weighs against immunity. Having individually evaluated and collectively balanced the four Manders Goodrich, in factors, her official immunity with respect However, Plaintiff's barred as official Eleventh capacity this to Court concludes & Mental enjoys Eleventh Plaintiff's § 1983 claim for damages. claim for reinstatement Amendment defendants immunity from Retardation, 1995) (quoting Lassiter v. Ala. (11th Cir. Defendant capacity, 1993)); see also 49 actions F.3d is xxxdoes 1490, A & T Univ., similarly not insulate prospective State Dep't Mental 1503 (11th Cir. 3 F.3d 1482, 1485 Collier v. Clayton Cnty. 13 Amendment not seeking injunctive relief.'" Cross v. State of Ala., Health that Serv. Bd., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1364 (N.D. Ga. 2002)(holding that Eleventh Amendment immunity reinstatement). does not preclude Nevertheless, this a plaintiff's claim must claim still for survive summary judgment to move forward. To "must successfully show that prove she her retaliation engaged Plaintiff constitutionally in claim, protected activity and that the protected conduct played a 'substantial or motivating role' Walden v. 1289 1293, Ctrs. alleged adverse 2012)(quoting Akins (11th Cir. both showings, the employment for Disease Control & Prevention, (11th Cir. 1303 in 2005)). Defendant Yet, v. Fulton even if action." 669 F.3d 1277, Cnty., 420 Plaintiff Goodrich can still F.3d can make avoid liability if she can prove that she "would have taken the same action absent the protected conduct." Id. In evaluating this claim, the Court will view the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, as described below. During Plaintiff 2009, and while her Robert Kicklighter, Unsolicited Goodrich because to his putting and Robert wife was employed Mcintosh began dating. to Plaintiff as County a deputy Sheriff's (Kicklighter Dep. the couple's that Kicklighter was and these husband, prior informed she she to "mentally unstable" children. (Id. at comments aside, (Id. Kicklighter in December 2009. 14 55-56, 66) . Deputy at 54-55.) marriage, "needed clerk, Defendant be careful" and abusive Nevertheless, Plaintiff married Robert at 55.) However, in the days and years that followed, Defendant Goodrich continued make such negative comments about Plaintiff's husband. to In fact, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Goodrich's negative comments and general dislike Plaintiff's for her co-workers felt as she did. Plaintiff asked (Id. also husband at 57, became Plaintiff why Plaintiff disapproving time off comments to care Additionally, and for Goodrich that Defendant Goodrich expressed that Defendant become her angry indirect ways. Goodrich about stepchildren. (Id. 62-65.) (Id. Plaintiff points Defendant at taking tell her to get off the phone when her husband would call. 2014, that Plaintiff make would Finally, contends would For Goodrich at 72.) Plaintiff that 65.) contends claims evident Defendant her dislike for Robert Kicklighter in other, example, so to the events of March 6-7, as evidence that Defendant Goodrich terminated her because of her marriage. On the entered the petition. did afternoon Mcintosh know Goodrich came Thereafter, by her her Plaintiff Robert exchanged of left the Clerk's husband's desk to 2014, Robert office to whereabouts obtain watched a Defendant but two. without 6, Kicklighter file Unaware of his intentions, Kicklighter, between Kicklighter March County (Id. at 74-78.) not sobbing of she (Id. any 15 case apparent not 76-78.) divorce Plaintiff Defendant number. Goodrich did at until a return hear any When incident, (Id.) to a words Robert Defendant Goodrich presented Plaintiff with the petition and stated only that her husband was upset and emotional. The next day, find Defendant were not hear Plaintiff arrived at work to nephew, Mcintosh in the office. their discussing Defendant 2 014, Goodrich's Deputy Ty Poppell, could March 7, her Goodrich's (Id. conversation, husband. Plaintiff earlier While received Deputy a text Goodrich had clerk's determine if angry" message statement left, was from police on March Deputy Poppell still her (Id. in clocked at mother. (Id. the room, file her that she on without asking 87.) if Plaintiff Defendant visit to Consequently, the after Plaintiff approached Defendant Goodrich to contends that (Id. Defendant "I had to You don't understand." out two belief office, regarding his to head at 85-86.) Defendant to the Goodrich (Id. at 85.) room to telephone Goodrich "grabb[ed] (Id.) At at" very He Hearing this, before Plaintiff 16 "got assisted a customer, file Plaintiff left To this I had to do. However, "didn't understand." and physically unwell, at 80-81.) do what Plaintiff simply returned to her desk, then this the county attorney Ad the husband report 6. and stated further: creamed me. believed based that While she [Robert Kicklighter] she had filed a report. Plaintiff 80-81.) Sheriff's at 81-83.) Poppell filed a office inquiry, (Id. at County Plaintiff Poppell and she "could do things to [her] knowledge." (Id. at 78.) and her could reach her and this point, told crying the office after clearly expressing to Defendant Goodrich that she was not in a position to continue talking. Conversely, (Id.) according to Defendant Goodrich, Plaintiff was much more animated on the morning of March 7 than she contends. Among was other things, Defendant Goodrich noted that "[Plaintiff] in a rage and she was hollering and screaming and moving." (Goodrich Dep. that day, at 46.) following Plaintiff's departure on Defendant Goodrich mailed her a (1) Plaintiff (2) after provide Thus, was that an letter, being placed on paid leave period, Plaintiff explanation for her was to March for return 7th stating that one week and to work behavior and or face termination.1 (Kicklighter Dep., Ex. 2.) Like Defendant dated March 7, Goodrich, 2014. Plaintiff (Kicklighter Dep., Defendant Goodrich, Plaintiff to air the many grievances (Id.) Among Plaintiff's those listed was Defendant Goodrich had filed a her husband's behavior Accompanying this Goodrich not had mentioned penned Ex. 1.) served letter Addressed to as a medium contention "false police report" office Plaintiff anything a for she had against her boss. Plaintiff's in the clerk's assertion, made by her husband. letter also to on March stated her that about that regarding 6. (Id.) Defendant any threats (Id.) 1 Defendant Goodrich mailed this letter on March 7, 2014; however, Plaintiff did not receive it until, at the earliest, March 17, 2014. (Kicklighter Dep., Ex. 2.) At the time, Defendant Goodrich was separated from her husband and was having her mail forwarded to her mother's home. (Id. at 117-18.) 17 Ultimately, County Human 20, 2014, Plaintiff received Resource Administrator indicating that her (Kicklighter Dep. at 110.) returned text to work message doctor's to her 2014 that she (Goodrich Dep., that this Goodrich terminated 1.) on terminated. Plaintiff had not notes and informing at her While least of one recent the notice did Defendant Goodrich stated Discharge" Plaintiff Mcintosh dated March had been 113-14.) termination, Information Ex. doctor's at from Sherry Collins employment sent (Id. reason for notice Prior to March 20, Defendant "Employer - had appointments. not provide a in but a "due to dated March 17, insubordination." Defendant Goodrich went on to specify insubordination resulted from Plaintiff going "into a rage of anger" after learning that Defendant Goodrich "had filed a police report on [Robert Kicklighter]." Based adverse on these employment facts, action" Plaintiff when position as chief deputy clerk.2 1558, 1563 action refusals (11th Cir. "includes to not hire, (Id.) she refusals was suffered terminated from "an her See McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1994)(stating only clearly that discharges, to adverse but promote, also and employment demotions, reprimands"). 2 Plaintiff also alleges that she suffered an additional adverse employment action. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that she did not receive a payraise at some time between 2009 and 2014 when other deputy clerks did. (Kicklighter Dep. at 73.) However, Plaintiff does not have personal knowledge regarding when such raises were awarded or how much of a raise was given. (Id.) Plaintiff is only aware of such raises because she heard "the other deputy clerks making comments to each other." (Id.) In the absence of additional evidence, the Court will not consider this allegation. See Evers v. General Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1985) (* [C] onclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative value."). 18 Additionally, at that constitutionally (MT]he right time, protected Plaintiff activity to be married . . was of . is a engaged in See marriage. Plaintiff's marriage factor" in her termination, To satisfy Plaintiff her must have was a id. freedom of association right entitled to special constitutional protection."). whether the "substantial or As for motivating this answer is less clear. burden with presented respect to sufficient this element, evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that her marriage was a substantial or motivating terminate her. F.3d 1234, burden, 1243 has Defendant (11th Cir. points to (1) in Defendant support makes two arguments. of of summary Fort decision the numerous filed to meet ways marriage against judgment, to Lauderdale, In an attempt toward her Goodrich First, Goodrich's City 2003). expressed animus report Meanwhile, in See McCormick v. Plaintiff Goodrich police factor 333 this Defendant and (2) the her husband. Defendant Goodrich Defendant Goodrich argues that the motivating factors in her termination decision were Plaintiff's insubordinate work. behavior Second, on March Defendant 7 and her Goodrich failure argues marriage in December 2009 and Plaintiff's 2 014 are two jury could events conclude "so temporally that remote that that the marriage was at 18.) 19 return to Plaintiff's termination in March motivating factor in the employment decision." 19-1, to a no reasonable substantial or (Defs'. Br., Doc. Despite Defendant Goodrich's argument, because was still married at the time of her termination, gap existed between the two events. facts in March the 6-7, 2014 Defendant - it - are marriage would was the irrelevant certainly marriage fact for a jury, juncture, genuine was seem dispute apparently has as to for factor in Defendant Goodrich's her the likely is can still however, Defendant prevail Goodrich objectively legal basis Goodrich must show that (11th Cir. objective reason not did - but rather, to what time issue of enough raise evidence marriage was to a a motivating termination decision. on summary must "would Seminole Cnty. 1985) (xx [T]he an a At this provide renew more have taken is not Defendant To than termination. the do [the plaintiff] the - it an Defendant same action 755 F.2d 1492, whether so, just 669 F.3d at 1289; School Dist., issue fact, judgment. absent the protected conduct." See Walden, also Holley v. Defendant law for the Court. for Plaintiff's she that Goodrich. her marriage at this by idea that Even with this genuine dispute of material Goodrich filed Defendant ending, presented whether to the events of report dispel less not a question of Plaintiff police to Goodrich would terminate Plaintiff when Plaintiff, the enough no temporal In fact, when viewing the favorable to particularly Goodrich Plaintiff's While light most Plaintiff see 1505 Board had apparently in fact motivated the Board."). Since this inquiry involves an examination of a government official's 20 intentions, some courts have summarily held that this issue "is a factual dispute inappropriate that (M.D. Ala. In this be resolved for resolution on summary Lewis v. Eufaula Cnty. 06 must at trial judgment." Bd. of Educ, 922 F. Supp. and See, is e.g., 2d 1291, 1305- 2012). case, Defendant Goodrich Goodrich contends that provided differing Within her briefs, reasons for Plaintiff's dismissal. Defendant Plaintiff was has dismissed because Plaintiff "left her job and then refused to return for nearly two weeks." (Defs'. Br., Doc. 19-1, at 19.) Supporting this contention, the record indisputably indicates that (1) Defendant Goodrich sent a letter to Plaintiff that within a week's within that Conversely, Defendant of the March informing her time and time frame. in her Goodrich 2014. Plaintiff stated that and insubordination claim, 92.) Therefore, termination dispute - anger" Ex. Plaintiff has, 114 on Ex. she 1.) 2.) Discharge," Plaintiff because exhibited on As to this as previously highlighted, (Kicklighter Dep. at 85, 91- Court - the underlying cannot say as facts a of matter Defendant Goodrich would have terminated Plaintiff of her marriage. & when considering Defendant Goodrich's differing rationale this of Dep., presented testimony in opposition. at terminated "rage (Goodrich Dep. Information she return to work failed to return to work (Kicklighter "Employer "insubordination" 7, (2) she must which of are law in that irrespective See Stewart v. Baldwin Cnty. Bd. of Educ, 908 21 F.2d 1499, fact 1506-07 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that a question of existed when evidence indicated that employee's Daphne, termination 79 F.3d were 1079, in the dispute); 1084-85 (11th facts Fikes Cir. given for v. City 1996)(noting of the significance of an employer's differing termination rationale). Consequently, Defendant Plaintiff's § 1983 claim for reinstatement against Goodrich, in her official capacity, survives summary judgment. 2. Defendant Goodrich in Her Individual Capacity Defendant that qualified Plaintiff's qualified was § Goodrich, her individual immunity protects 1983 immunity, acting in within claim. the the her from However, public scope h[er] any xx[i]n official of capacity, liability order must 1188, omitted) . shifts first to 1194 If (11th the official the plaintiff. determine - Cir. Id. At evaluating the this such point, facts receive in [s]he authority Ferraro, quotations showing, under that discretionary 2002)(internal can make to prove when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred." Lee v. F.3d contends the 284 marks burden the Court must the light most favorable to the plaintiff - whether the facts indicate that the official's conduct violated a constitutional right. Id. Then, xxxin light of the specific context of the case,'" the Court must evaluate *'whether the (quoting Saucier v. Katz, right was clearly established.'" 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2002)). 22 Id. In this case, it is undisputed that Defendant Goodrich was acting within the scope of her discretionary authority when she terminated Plaintiff's employment. See O.C.G.A. § 15-6-59(b) ("The clerks of superior courts shall have the power to appoint a deputy or section, a deputies."). genuine constitutional Court must issue violation now Further, of noted material that decide as fact Plaintiff whether in the exists alleges. Defendant previous as to Thus, Goodrich the this violated clearly established law. *xWhere the facts assumed for summary judgment purposes in a case involving qualified immunity show mixed motives (lawful and unlawful motivations) and pre-existing law does not dictate that case the favor, merits the the defendant is of Dalton, v. of Ga., Holston, official 94 has indisputably entitled to 219 F.3d 1280, F.3d xv lawful 1528, and establishes must 1295 1535 (11th Cir. Here, it at least in part, is Cir. that Plaintiff's Stanley v. 1996)). objectively (2) in City 2000) (quoting Foy motivations" exist for the defendant's conduct and motivated, decided immunity.'" (11th unlawful (1) be if A public the record valid reasons that the defendant was by such lawful considerations. undisputed that Defendant Goodrich, Id. in terminating Plaintiff, was motivated at least in part by Plaintiff's failure to to return work as required by Defendant In reaching this conclusion, two facts. First, Goodrich's letter. the Court relies significantly upon Plaintiff was 23 not terminated until after Defendant Goodrich's to return to (Kicklighter letter was work within at sent and after Plaintiff 110-15 Dep. the & designated Ex. failed frame. Second, 2.) time though Plaintiff's termination came while she was married, it came more than five years after the marriage was solemnized. (Kicklighter Dep. at 55.) Having least found in part, must now Plaintiff's by termination objectively valid determine whether a to be motivated, considerations, reasonable superior at this Court court clerk would have known that firing Plaintiff for both her marriage and her failure to return constitutional rights. is the Court aware of that Defendant these to Here, work violated Plaintiff's Plaintiff has not pointed to - nor - any cases that have clearly established Goodrich circumstances. could As a not have result, the acted lawfully Court cannot under find violation of clearly established law, and Defendant Goodrich, her individual capacity, is entitled to qualified a in immunity on Plaintiff's § 1983 claim. 3. Defendant Mcintosh County Board of Commissioners Plaintiff Board is actions. also liable However, contends for that Defendant Defendant Goodrich's a county is liable under Mcintosh County unconstitutional § 1983 only when a county policy causes a constitutional violation and the county has control over the policy. 335 F.3d 1326, 1329, 1331 See Grech v. (11th Cir. 24 2003). Clayton Cnty., In this Ga., case, as previously indicated, Defendant Goodrich Mcintosh County had no hired and fired. Thus, control over who Defendant Mcintosh County Board cannot be liable under Plaintiff's § 1983 claim. B. Plaintiff Fair Labor Standards Act next alleges that Defendants are liable to her under the FLSA for uncompensated hours of overtime. 1. As Defendant Goodrich in Her Official Capacity she Eleventh in the Goodrich, Defendant did in Amendment damages. In the Plaintiff's by barred finding, the However, this Plaintiff's bars capacity, Plaintiff's above, § this 1983 claims, contends FLSA Court that claim determined for that claim for damages against Defendant Goodrich Eleventh Amendment Goodrich Amendment immunity. contends against contention is analysis depends, of official paragraphs Defendant Eleventh her immunity § 1983 was context all that she of is of true. this protected Plaintiff's not necessarily at least in part, Because by claims. The Manders on the specific function at issue. For Plaintiff's § 1983 claim, the function at issue was the hiring and firing of employees. Here, the compensation of Despite being distinguishable, these functions Manders 771 have inquiry. F.3d 748, employees. 757 been treated See Walker v. (11th Cir. as the function at issue is one purposes Jefferson Cnty. 2014) (noting 25 for that of Bd. of the issues the Educ, of employee hiring, function of Goodrich, assignment, and compensation *employee-related decisions"). in her official capacity, is fall under Therefore, the Defendant also protected against Plaintiff's FLSA claim for damages. Besides damages, Plaintiff also asks the Court to require xxDefendant [to] immediately cease its practice of failing to pay its employees minimum wage in violation of the FLSA." for (Compl., Doc. injunctive relief 1.) under Yet, the requirements "the right to bring an action the Fair Labor Standards Act exclusively with the United States Secretary of Labor." v. Florida, Plaintiff's Goodrich, 132 F.3d FLSA 677, claim 678 for of (11th Cir. injunctive 1998). relief As Powell a against rests result, Defendant in her official capacity, must fail. 2. Defendant Goodrich in Her Individual Capacity Plaintiff specifically contends that Defendant Goodrich, her individual Plaintiff's 207 capacity, "employer" (providing that faces at all no FLSA relevant employer for more than forty hours employee receives overtime [her] claim must fail because v. Carver, 169 F.3d 683, because See 29 employ was U.S.C. § her in a workweek unless that Here, XNa public official xemployer' 686 (11th however, sued in under the FLSA." Cir. Welch v. Laney, 57 F.3d 1004, 1011 (11th Cir. 1995)). 26 any she of compensation). individual capacity is not an Was cura times. shall employees Plaintiff's liability in 1999) (citing 3. Defendant Mcintosh County Board of Commissioners Plaintiff further contends that Defendant Mcintosh Board is While liable Mcintosh funding she for the overtime County may provide needs to pay her payments Defendant employees, County Board is not Plaintiff's employer. IX, § 2, J to "affect[] or the Goodrich with Defendant See Ga. seeks. the Mcintosh Const, art. I (c) (1) (stating that counties do not have the power any elective personnel jurisdiction Bartow Plaintiff County thereof, of the Cnty., county office, Ga., except county 860 the Supp. salaries personnel governing F. the subject authority); 1526, thereof, to Taylor 1536 (N.D. the v. Ga. 1994) (XNDeputy clerks of superior court are not county employees, but the employees Walton, 202 of S.E.2d the clerk of 405, 409 (Ga. superior court."); 1973)(stating Warren v. that *deputy sheriffs are personnel of the sheriff," not personnel subject to jurisdiction of the county). Therefore, Plaintiff's FLSA claim against Defendant Mcintosh County Board cannot continue. C. Plaintiff Americans with Disabilities Act next alleges that Defendants are liable for terminating her on the basis of a disability in violation of the ADA. 1. In in her Defendant Goodrich in Her Official Capacity defense official of Plaintiff's capacity, ADA claims, contends 27 that Defendant Goodrich, Eleventh Amendment immunity protects her from liability. As the alleged wrongful conduct stems from Plaintiff's termination, is the hiring and firing of employees. the conduct at issue Because this Court has already determined that clerks of superior court are *arm[s] of the State" for purposes of this function, in her official capacity, Defendant Goodrich, cannot be liable for damages under this claim. In also addition seeks injunctive request that a to relief. first, complained of damages, a violated Doc. state and 1.) however, officials in and rights Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1337 (11th Cir. of former stating procedures as secured the Eleventh Amendment federal court retrospective or compensatory relief." Summit Med. v. the judgment practices, Yet, forms Addressing Plaintiff's 1.) Plaintiff multiple declaratory policies, (Compl., against Doc. seeks acts, herein for judgment (Compl., Plaintiff under the ADAAA." suits claim declaratory xx Defendants' "bars her 1999). seeking Assocs., P.C. Accordingly, because the declaratory judgment that Plaintiff seeks would only address the legality of the prior actions of a state official, this form of relief is unavailable. As requests for Plaintiff's that the Court enjoins "Defendants, and all of any claims its (1) for injunctive relief, issue a permanent chief, agents, Plaintiff injunction employees, that attorneys, those acting in concert with them from engaging in employment practice or policy which 28 discriminates against the Plaintiff exercise of and their participation former *[i]t others in rights this position. is well similarly under settled the ADA, (2) reinstate the permanent Regarding that a 'plaintiff his own legal rights and interests, or because and lawsuit" (Id.) situated because of of her the their to her injunction, generally must assert and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.'" AT&T Mobility, L.L.C. v. Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, 494 1356, 1361-62 F.3d extent Plaintiff "others that 963 F. Furthermore, herself has 2d no harming Cir. 2007). permanent this 1267, injunction claim 1284 standing a immediate - [she] - as threat Regents of Univ. alleges, Cir. Plaintiff the of Jones v. 2013) (holding Defendants similar from fashion). opposed of and ultimately proves, to future a merely injury.'" 1994)). must note In that preparing xxx[p]ast to Bd. to such or of (11th Cir. 30 F.3d 1332, make exposure 1284 v. to a real conjectural Wooden Sys. of Ga. , 247 F.3d 1262, 2001) (quoting Church v. City of Huntsville, (11th to behalf See Ala. enjoin in on fails. (N.D. to nonparties Therefore, Plaintiff has standing for injunctive relief as xxxonly if hypothetical a situated," Supp. Plaintiff prospectively and seeks similarly Buckner, (11th Inc., a illegal 1337 showing, conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief ... if unaccompanied by present adverse effects.'" Wooden, 29 any continuing, 247 F.3d at 1284 (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496 (1974)). has alleged prior ADA-based allegations injuries, While Plaintiff she has not made any or presented evidence indicating that she threat of future injury. Consequently, faces a Plaintiff's claim for a permanent injunction cannot continue. Conversely, Plaintiff's claim for reinstatement is properly alleged and is not subject to Eleventh Amendment immunity. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (g) (xx [T]he See court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice and appropriate, order which reinstatement."); 1322, 1338 may Cir. affirmative include, Farley v. (11th proper remedy such but 1999)(stating not insulate prospective in her not Ins. that for ADA discrimination as (11th Cir. is Nationwide Mut. means of making a plaintiff whole"); 1503 action as may limited Co., 197 is xxthe most see also Cross, 49 capacity defendants injunctive relief"). official capacity, cannot from However, be F.3d actions Defendant liable under is a likely F.3d at 1995) (stating that the Eleventh Amendment official to, reinstatement it be xxxdoes seeking Goodrich, the ADA, for she is not an ADA xxemployer" - xxa person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each preceding of 20 calendar or more year." calendar 42 U.S.C. weeks § in the current 12111(5) (A). or While Defendant Mcintosh County Board may have had more than fifteen employees for each working day, 30 Defendant Goodrich never had more than eight (Kicklighter full-time Dep. at employees 20-25.) and two summer Accordingly, interns. Plaintiff's ADA claim for reinstatement must fail. 2. In Defendant Goodrich in Her Individual Capacity her individual capacity, Defendant Goodrich that she is not liable under Plaintiff's ADA claims. to the Eleventh Circuit, contends According xxindividual defendants are not amenable to private suit for violating the anti-discrimination provision of Subchapter I of the ADA." Albra v. 830 (11th Cir. 2007) . Advan, Consequently, Inc., Defendant 490 F.3d 826, Goodrich cannot be liable in her individual capacity for Plaintiff's ADA claims, which are all brought under Subchapter I. 3. Defendant Mcintosh County Board of Commissioners Defendant Mcintosh County Board asserts that it can have no ADA liability Mcintosh to County, Plaintiff was because Plaintiff's Defendant Goodrich, not Although the employer. Eleventh Circuit has not ruled specifically on this issue, the Northern District of Georgia has stated that xx[d]eputy clerks of superior court the clerk of are not superior county employees, court." Taylor, but 860 the F. employees Supp. at of 153 6. Given this decision and our earlier xxarm of the State" analysis, this Court Goodrich, Plaintiff's agrees not ADA that Defendant claim Plaintiff's Mcintosh against employer County Defendant cannot continue. 31 was Defendant Board. Therefore, Mcintosh County Board D. Finally, Family Medical Leave Act Plaintiff asserts a FMLA claim against Defendants alleging that they denied her FMLA rights and terminated her for attempting to exercise those rights. 1. Defendant Goodrich in Her Official Capacity Defendant Goodrich, she is immune Eleventh from in her official capacity, Plaintiff's Amendment. As a FMLA general immunity protects state officials in the FMLA context, claims by matter, contends that virtue Eleventh from claims for v. Ct. Suits of App. for of damages Md., under 132 S. certain Ct. has only provided the self-care provisions.3 1334, family-care barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Plaintiff 1327, Id. evidence damages, but, to suits See Coleman 1338 (2012). provisions are not However, to the Amendment such immunity is only definite as filed pursuant to the FMLA's self-care provisions. of support in this case, violations of Therefore, Defendant Goodrich will be protected by the Eleventh Amendment so long as she was acting as an "arm of the State" for the functions at issue. Regarding Plaintiff's Defendant Goodrich is FMLA claim of wrongful immune, for the Court has termination, already found that superior court clerks are xxarm[s] of the State" when hiring and firing employees. Similarly, regarding Plaintiff's claim 3 In support of her contention that Defendant Goodrich violated the familycare provisions, Plaintiff points to the fact that Defendant Goodrich once questioned her ability to use "sick time" to care for her ill stepchildren. (Kicklighter Dep. at 63.) However, because Plaintiff was attempting to use sick time and not FMLA leave, this evidence is insufficient to prove an FMLA claim. 32 that Defendant Goodrich denied her request for FMLA-qualifying leave, superior court clerks are also immune. such a request or demand for leave, making employee-related decisions. with respect are also claims Plaintiff's "arm[s] for capacity, As to of damages the against superior court In that FLSA claim, State." As When entertaining a Defendant clerks capacity, superior result, as noted court clerks Plaintiff's Goodrich, are in her FMLA official cannot continue as a matter of law. for Plaintiff's FMLA claim for reinstatement, Defendant Goodrich contends FMLA liability cannot attach for two separate reasons. First, Defendant Goodrich did employees to be an FMLA "employer," and, not second, is an With respect to Defendant Goodrich is incorrect, official capacity as a superior court clerk, FMLA employer. 50 "'public as agenc[ies]', FLSA]." See 29 U.S.C. or more employees, defined § 2611(4). in include private they also section Thus, for in her Defendant Goodrich Although FMLA employers sector employers with enough Plaintiff was a member of Defendant Goodrich's personal staff. the first argument, have 203(x) include of [the because a public agency includes "the government of a State or a political subdivision thereof" as well as "any agency of ... a State [] or a political subdivision of a State," Plaintiff was employed by an FMLA employer. See 825.108(d)("All public 29 U.S.C. agencies § 203 (x) ; 29 C.F.R. are covered by the regardless of the number of employees."). 33 § FMLA Despite these provisions, Defendant Goodrich's argument was not totally misplaced. Under the FMLA, "[e]mployees of public agencies must requirements eligibility, meet all of the requirement that the employer . . the worksite or within 75 miles." if the public within 75 agency miles, does its Court Georgia, of must (2) . employ 50 employees at 29 C.F.R. have employees protections of the FMLA. this not including fifty are not § 825.108. or more Hence, employees entitled to the Though seemingly an easy application, first determine Mcintosh County, or whether (3) (1) the State of the Mcintosh County Clerk Superior Court was the public agency for which Plaintiff was employed. According to 29 C.F.R. § 825.108, whether two or more agencies actually constitute the same public agency "can only be determined on a determination, that two for Governments." not "[o]ne agencies separately case-by-case 29 necessarily factor are basis." that separate statistical C.F.R. § would is 825.108. dispositive. in example, a they are treated Census this when this conclusion the Nonetheless, For making support whether purposes In it of factor is was faced with the question of whether a local housing authority and the State of District Carmouche Louisiana of v. were Louisiana did Marksvilie 3049408, at *2-3 (W.D. separate not public even Hous. consider Auth., La. June 17, 34 agencies, No. census the Western data. 12-3023, 2013 See WL 2013); see also Rollins v. Wilson Cnty. Gov't, 154 F.3d 626, 629 (6th Cir. 1998) ("A court should decide the status of the governmental state law Instead, if the state law Carmouche definitively court looked entities based on resolves to the Louisiana issue."). law and held that the government entities were separate because the housing authority was responsible for its debts, could own property, and may sue and be sued directly. Carmouche, 2013 WL 3049408, at Census of *3. Within the Governments, judges, one Georgia section of the 2012 there is no mention of clerks of court, or any other judicial organizations. could, Mcintosh based County on 29 Clerk independent public C.F.R. of § 825.108, Superior Court However, it agency. state court In light of conclude is not this, that the an imprudent would be itself for this Court to do so without first examining Georgia law. Under Georgia which Plaintiff is ("Deputy clerks of the employees Coweta Cnty., of law, Mcintosh employed. is See Taylor, not 860 the F. agency Supp. at clerk of 530 S.E.2d 718, superior 719 court."); (Ga. 2000)("Griffies, but v. as clerk is an elected constitutional officer and is Moreover, of determination, Court's 1536 Griffies not an employee of the county commission."). the for superior court are not county employees, the of superior court, County earlier seems inconsistent for court could be public "arm one of to agencies the State" conclude separate 35 that clerks from the of in view it superior State. Yet, because of the accompanying four factors, that the Mcintosh County Clerk of separate agency. clerks' 6-88. court First, the Superior Court is with See, supplies See O.C.G.A. and equipment § 15-6-87. it O.C.G.A. §§ 15- to function clerks of superior See Taylor, 860 F. Supp. at (example of superior court clerk being sued); S.E.2d at 718 Griffies, (example of superior court clerk suing). superior court and fired as the needs Third, court can sue and be sued directly. 153 6 e.g., for the State does not provide the clerks of superior the properly. in fact a State is not responsible day-to-day financing needs. Second, Georgia law indicates clerks have discretion over who deputies, when deputies will deputies should be trained. See O.C.G.A. 53 0 Fourth, should be hired be promoted, and how § 15-6-59. As for the final stage in the "eligible employee" analysis, the Court must determine whether the public agency "employ[s] employees at 825.108. Given never the employed interns, worksite or Plaintiff's more than within 75 testimony eight miles." that deputy 29 C.F.R. Defendant clerks and 50 § Goodrich two summer the Mcintosh Clerk of Superior Court does not meet this requirement. a result, Plaintiff is not an "eligible employee" under the FMLA, and her FMLA (Kicklighter claims cannot Dep. proceed. at 20-25.) Though this inconsistent with the purpose of the FMLA, stated that that "[t]here Congress is intended nothing illogical to restrict 36 FMLA As outcome may seem the Sixth Circuit has in concluding benefits to . . . public employees who work for public employers with a not-insubstantial workforce." Tilley v. Kalamazoo Cnty. 311 (6th Cir. 2. Defendant Goodrich in Her Individual Capacity the FMLA claims, individual capacity, Consistent with Defendant Goodrich, this xemployer' As a result, in her contends that she is not an FMLA employer. contention, the xxa public official sued in his is not an 777 F.3d 303, 2015). In defense of that Rd. Comm'n, Eleventh Circuit has held or her individual capacity under the FMLA." Was cura, 169 F.3d at 687. Plaintiff's FMLA claims against Defendant Goodrich, in her individual capacity, must fail. 3. Defendant Mcintosh County Board of Commissioners Finally, cannot be employer. § 1983, not Defendant liable As FLSA, Ga. employees, Thus, already the xx employer." County FMLA concluded and ADA claims, Plaintiff's (N.D. under Mcintosh as with Board it contends is that it not respect Plaintiff's to Plaintiff's Defendant Mcintosh County Board is See Taylor, 860 F. Supp. at 153 6 1994) (xxDeputy clerks of superior court are not county but the employees of the clerk of superior court."). this claim cannot survive Defendants' motion. 37 Ill, For the reasons IN PART Defendants' her claims, against only Defendant proceed to trial. above, CONCLUSION the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES motion for summary judgment Plaintiff's Goodrich, Thus, § 1983 in her claim (Doc. for official 19) . reinstatement capacity, shall the Clerk is directed to ENTER JUDGMENT in favor of Defendant Goodrich, in her individual capacity, in County The favor Clerk of is Defendant further in her individual Of Mcintosh directed capacity, Board to TERMINATE of and Commissioners. Defendant Goodrich, and Defendant Mcintosh County Board of Commissioners as parties. ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, February, Georgia, this //^ day of 2016. HONOWKBLE J. UNITEp/STATES DISTRICT JUDGE JTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 38

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