Brown v. Georgia Department of Human Services Division of Family and Children Services et al, No. 2:2014cv00018 - Document 61 (S.D. Ga. 2016)

Court Description: ORDER granting 43 Motion for Summary Judgment. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter the appropriate judgment. Signed by Chief Judge Lisa G. Wood on 11/8/2016. (csr)

Download PDF

Brown v. Georgia Department of Human Services Division of Family and Children Services et al Ifn Doc. 61 ?linttelii States; Bisitrtct Court for tl^e ^outfiem l^iotrict of C»eorsta ilimnolDtck IBtbtOion LISA BROWN, Plaintiff, CV 214-18 V. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES DIVISION OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN SERVICES and LISA C. LARISCY, individually and in her official capacity. Defendants. ORDER Plaintiff Lisa Brown brings Department of Human Services Children Services "'Defendants") . Defendants Plaintiff, retaliated discrimination, U.S.C. ("'DECS") suit {''GDHS") and Lisa an against C. against for Georgia Division of Family and Lariscy African-American, her the (collectively, alleges complaining of that racial in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 § 2000e et♦ seq., the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. demoting her; unlawfully: (1) terminating her ("Compl."). Plaintiff contends that Defendants terminated her employment. (2) transferring § 1984, by See generally her; Dkt. and No. (3) 1 A0 72A (Rev. 8/82) Dockets.Justia.com employment after she filed a formal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (^^EEOC") Defendants Summary charge. responded Judgment (Dkt. No. by filing 43), the instant arguing that: cannot prove a prima facie case of retaliation; (1) (2) Motion for Plaintiff Plaintiff's claims regarding her alleged demotion and reassignment are timebarred; and (3) Lariscy is entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity and, thus, is not liable to Plaintiff in her individual capacity. generally Dkt. No. Plaintiff opposes these contentions. See 54. The parties fully briefed the Motion, dkt. nos. 43, 54, 57, and it is now ripe for review. The Motion is GRANTED for the reasons set forth below. FACTUAL BACKGROUND^ History of the Parties and Structure of GDHS ^ Plaintiff's March 2009 demotion and October 1, 2009 reassignment claims are time-barred. The 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims fall under Section 1981's four-year statute of limitations. Dkt. No. 54-1 at 55. As to the Title VII claims, a charge of discrimination must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days "after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see also Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 2001) ("For a charge to be timely in a nondeferral state such as Georgia, it must be filed within 180 days of the last discriminatory act."). Assuming that Plaintiff's April 5, 2010 Intake Questionnaire qualifies as a charge, any action occurring prior to October 7, 2009, is time-barred. See EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (applying statute of limitations because "[t]he alleged acts at issue . . . were discrete, one-time employment events that should have put the claimants on notice that a cause of action had accrued."); Beavers v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 975 F.2d 792, 796 (11th Cir. 1992) ("[A]negations that the discriminatory act continues to adversely affect the employee or that the employer presently refuses to rectify its past violation will not satisfy the [statute of limitations]." (quoting Gonzalez v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 610 F.2d 241, 249 (5th Cir. 1980))). Summary judgment reassignment claims. is thus GRANTED as to Plaintiff's demotion and In June 2007, Children Services the Liberty County Department of Family and (''LCDFCS") Dkt. No. 43-7, 50:15-19. employee the leave, internal behalf of [and] hired Plaintiff as office manager. Plaintiff was responsible for handling ordering and control [Richard] distributing plan, [] attending Chamberlin, completing adpours."^ [] Id. supplies, outside ^^updating meetings on paying the office expenses, at 59:18-25. Plaintiff also reported computer issues to the IT specialist and supervised two receptionists (whom Plaintiff deemed the only front-desk staff), id. at 58:21-59:6, 60:13-61:1; include collecting mail. In November 2007, her responsibilities did not Id. at 60:22. Richard Chamberlin, a Caucasian, became Plaintiff's supervisor when he was promoted to LCDFCS director. Dkt. No. 43-15, 12:13-24. He, in turn, reported to the regional Human Resources Director^—at the time, LeRoy Felder, an AfricanAmerican. 2, 2009, Id. Dkt. 4. 43-12, Lisa Lariscy, dkt. at Nos. no. 43-12, 29:20-21. a Caucasian, 26:17-25, Her 43-15, 51:17-53:16; 43-4, replaced Felder in April becoming peinnanent supervising director became Dennis Burns, July 2009. 34:3-11; regional human an African-American, that fall. resources beginning in Dkt. No. 43-23, 15:22-16:9. ^ Adpours are "documentation of invoices." Id. ^ Responsible for "hiring and firing; compensation; consulting with County Directors and other managers about general personnel matters; responding to EEOC / GCEO [Georgia Commission on Equal Opportunity] charges; internal grievances; and external complaints from vendors or clients." Dkt. No. 43-4 1 3. Plaintiff's Performance in Liberty County Around September 10, 2008, Plaintiff received a Performance Management Evaluation reviewed by Felder. it, (^^PME"), completed by Dkt. No. 43-9 at 22-24. Chamberlin and Plaintiff signed but took issue with its criticisms of her performance.'^ Shortly thereafter. Chamberlin's use Plaintiff of Performance Survey. Plaintiff Felder, never and Chamberlin. a complained supplemental, Dkt. No. 43-7, complained Felder Dkt. No. 43-8, Felder about unapproved Administrative 168:7-169:11, 177:21-178:11. about discussed to racial discrimination Plaintiff's 167:13-171:20, concerns to with 177:11-178:11. Leadership Changes at LCDFCS In January 2009, Mclntosh County retire. Dkt. Felder learned that the Director of the Department No. 43-4 of Children 10-14. Services Felder asked planned Chamberlin to to serve as interim director there while remaining LCDFCS director. Id. H 14. Multi-county directors, who enjoyed pay supplements, were common, given financial constraints. Chamberlin accepted on February 5. Id. HH 13, 17. Id. 21, 23. He successfully requested Janice Collier's promotion to Plaintiff s direct supervisor, effective March 1. Dkt. Nos. 43-15, 60:5- 61:18; 49-17 H 4. ^ Plaintiff "Met Expectations" regarding her work responsibilities. Id. at 24. However, as to "Statewide Responsibilities," she received a negative rating on teamwork and satisfactory ratings with regards to customer service, organizational commitment, and performance management. Id. at 22-23. Plaintiff' S' Complain-bs Adams' F i r s t Comment Plaintiff alleges that in early February 2009, Delores Bell Adams, a co-worker who neither supervised her work nor reviewed her performance, her a "redbone^ claims that, and that ''as get dkt. ass she no. went to and work 114:4-17, Id. heifer. colleagues [, ] along 43-7, at derogatorily called 108:16-109:6. Chamberlain, who allegedly [Plaintiff and Adams] the need[ed] to try Chamberlin denies that Plaintiff ever reported Adams' comment or On February 27, Plaintiff No. Id. her 113:13-17. Dkt. out." told at other racial discrimination. matter Plaintiff 43-15, signed a 45:5-46:7. copy of her Interim Progress Review, completed by Chamberlin and reviewed by Felder. Dkt. Nos. 43-9, pp. 25-26; 43-5, 109:7-113:5.® The Second Adams Incident Shortly Adams' 24. thereafter, on March 13, Plaintiff office to deliver some documents. Adams Dkt. in a 43-7, into 116:20- "picked the papers up and slung them back towards [Plaintiff,] stating 'I am sick of this shit' up No. walked charging motion." Id. at . . . and . 117:3-118:4. . . got Plaintiff ^ "Redbone" is a term used within the African-American community to describe African-Americans with light skin. See, e.g., JeffriAnne Wilder, Color Stories: Black Women and Colorism in the 21st Century 69 (2015) , available at goo.gl/tsbI6X. ® Plaintiff ^'Met Expectations" in all categories, but Chamberlin explained that she needed to iir^rove by "work [ing] collaboratively with colleagues and staff to provide program support throughout the office" and "[w]ork[ing] expediently to resolve and complete assignments." Id. emailed Chamberlin to complain, and when she did not hear back, emailed him again on March 17. On discuss March the insulted, or uttered Id. was Chamberlin, incident. Plaintiff. she 20, Id. at 118:21-120:9. at Id. a at and Plaintiff 121:12-14. racially 165:1. satisfied, Adams, Adams derogatory Chamberlin asked and Plaintiff met never again comment Plaintiff responded to. whether negatively, explaining that she wanted to relay her concerns to Felder. at to Id. 121:15-125:8. Plaintiff emailed Felder, Chamberlin'5 193:4. leadership requesting a style. Id. at meeting to discuss 151:21-153:10, 192:22- She did not explicitly set forth any racial concerns, because she wanted to discuss such ^^sensitive" issues in person. Dkt. Nos. 43-7, at 153:7-14; 49-17 H 23. Felder, met with Plaintiff on April 9. 43-7, 160:17-22; 43-12, Lariscy, who replaced Dkt. Nos. 43-6 at 29-33; 26:18-29:25. Plaintiff's Complaints to OHBMD On June 22, Plaintiff filed a complaint with Isabel Blanco, DFCS Deputy complaints, retaliation, Director, that as a she was subjected to harassment, and 176:20-177:25. discrimination. ^^state explaining agency a hostile The Id. staff work environment. complaint at did 177:18-20. would provide not result her unfair treatment, Dkt. No. mention Plaintiff an of honest, 43-7, racial assumed that legitimate investigation into her complaints and that her supervisors would truthfully inforin any investigator of her complaints of Adams' racially derogatory comments." Burns' 31-i32. Investigation In August 2009, retaliation claim and Dkt. No. 49-17 Lariscy's abilities. Burns decided to investigate Plaintiff's (based on removal of her supervisory duties) concerns regarding Chamberlin's Dkt. Nos. 43-10 at 22; 43-23, 32:4-11. leadership Burns denies receiving a race-discrimination allegation from Plaintiff. Nos. 43-23, 42:21-45:2, 106:22-107:5. her federal because assessment" level," complaint." he to his expressed "avert specifically, 66:11, the because wanting complaint it was to complete going a the "Title VII August 19 Investiga-tion report. Burns criticized both Two major themes were revealed during this process: A) Leadership deficiencies with accountability, performance conflict management; B) interpersonal behaviors. • a to management and Plaintiff: • 105:16, Dkt. No. 43-17 at 11-12. The Results of Burns' In 59:20-61:20, Plaintiff avers that Burns knew of this angle to complaint ''thorough 54:22-55:18, Dkt. [Plaintiff] has not been management and Inappropriate harassed nor retaliated against for reporting issues to upper management by [Collier] or [Chamberlin]. However, the administrative upper realignment of her position was inappropriately by [Chamber1in]. • There are performance staff issues and managed to However, [Plaintiff] performance [Plaintiff's] relationships members. not with \mtil management with these appropriately handled issues nor the other were communicated end cycle. of the [Plaintiff] did not have the opportunity to address and correct performance deficiencies nor was she given specifics. • There are significant issues with County Director, [Chamberlin's] style of leadership as evidence by his handling of incidents with the following staff: [Plaintiff], Patricia Stevens, and Matilda Adams. Chamberlin has not exercised parity with treatment of employees, doesn't confront issues head-on and has not fostered a high performing environment. Dkt. No. 43-16 a t 75-76. Burns recommended a personnel shakeup: • the "Regional Director should consider transitioning [Chamberlin] to the Mclntosh County in an effort to focus and further develop him. The dysfunction at Liberty County is so strong that he would need to start fresh. continuation We of would a not recommend multi-county status the for [Chamberlin] • Paula Mungen should be promoted, because she was "overwhelmingly [] perceived as a knowledgeable and fair leader and it's my recommendation leadership that role at she assume Liberty a County greater (i.e. Acting County Director)." • Plaintiff should work "under Mungen. [Chamberlin] trusts Collier explicitly and may ignore concerns from [Plaintiff] because A0 72A (Rev. 8/82) she is perceived as being difficult to work with." Id. Burns noted that the relationship between Collier and [Plaintiff] was ^'damaged, unhealthy and has adverse consequences for the remainder of the staff. It is my feeling that this relationship cannot be repaired." Id. LCDFCS changed significantly, with Chamberlin demoted, dkt. no. 43-12, director. 51:13-18, Id. 61:8-62:13, 92:3-6, and Mungen becoming a t 92:23-93:3. Impact of the Report on Plaintiff Soon after Burns's report, LCDCFS noted concerns with P l a i n t i f f ' s work: • Inability to recognize that your point is one of many, and there maybe of [sic] points of views that should be reviewed for use when making decisions. • Poor follow-up and response to various projects. • Perception of being difficult and unpredictable. Dkt. No. 43-10 at 32., LCDCFS set forth expectations Plaintiff's continued employment: • Have positive engagement in person with a fellow member, in meetings and discussions or when you need to be critical of what is being said, do so in a constructive, yet pleasant way. • When receiving a new project or task, you will ensure that you have all pertinent pieces of information by asking for for clarification by if you establishing Additionally, do a when not understand and project timeline. responding to update requests, you will provide a detailed summairy of exactly where you are with the project, thus nothing successful milestones and barriers to completion. You will refrain from comments like, "I have until Friday to complete." You will also transition from telling your supervisor you' re going to be away from the office for 20 minutes to requesting to be away from office for 20 minutes as an example. • Maintain a courteous, positive, professional demeanor employees and the public. • Maintain a with courteous, professional demeanor and clients, positive, in the and presence of clients, the general public, and employees. Additionally, you can be more inviting by working with your door open (unless you're in a meeting or working on a time-sensitive project). • Refrain from emotional outbursts in the workplace. • Do not circumvent your supervisory chain by involving team members and other Liberty County staff with workplace concerns. Plain-biff's Reassignmen-b Upon Glynn Holmes, Chamberlin's Counties an were demotion, combined DFCS offices in Mclntosh under leadership Dkt. African-American. the no. 43-12, of and Semona 150:10-115:15. Holmes took charge of the Glynn office in early summer 2009, and of Mclntosh in September. 15:21-16:19. A0 72A (Rev. 8/82) Dkt. Nos. She reported to Lariscy. 10 43-8, 218:1-219:23; Dkt. No. 43-25, 43-25, 23:8. Mclntosh did not position was vacant. and Holmes 141:12. have an office manager and Id. at 11:3-25; 43-12, 153:4-25. noted each office's Lariscy alleges needs. that there administrative support positions. Dkt. was No. a 43-12, hiring Glynn's Lariscy 135:22- freeze for Id. Lariscy reassigned Plaintiff to Mclntosh with the approval of Burns and DFCS's Debra Keys. 43-25, had 11:3-24. some Holmes that she be effective October 1, She also 132:5-133:22; Plaintiff, [Holmes would] leadership Lariscy told work well with style and Dkt. No. 43-25, 38:3-14. reassigned Policy #106.'' with that [Holmes's] On September 28, would problems [thought] with personality." 43-12, Although Lariscy allegedly intimated that she experienced [Plaintiff] Dkt. Nos. 2009, Lariscy infonned Plaintiff that she as the County office manager, pursuant to GDHS Human Resource/Personnel Dkt. Nos. 43-8, informed Mclntosh Plaintiff 215:1-5; 43-10, p. 33 that Plaintiff would (Ex. 15). work under Holmes's supervision and that her reassignment occurred because Mclntosh County needed an office manager. Id.^ ' ^*Based on the needs of the Department, management has the authority to assign, take from, add to, . . . or otherwise change the duties and responsibilities of employees, and to direct and control their work. The assignment of duties and responsibilities may be temporary or permanent . Employees may be assigned from one duty station to another as a transfer, promotion, demotion, or relocation of function." . . result of Dkt. No. 43-10 at 39. ® The memorandum Lariscy gave Plaintiff states: "Managers and employees have a shared responsibility to ensure that the mission of the Department is accomplished. In order to accomplish this responsibility, managers have the 11 The next day, Plaintiff sent an email to Holmes, introducing herself and noting that she needed to use a day for annual leave. Dkt. No. 43-10 at 34. Plaintiff alleges that she was unaware that she would also work in the Glynn County office, eighteen miles October 4. Holmes («PMF") further away, until she Dkt. No. 49-17 HH 38, 39.^ discussed and Plaintiff's duties, coordinating which employee leave. with Holmes on That day. Plaintiff and Performance included met Management maintaining Dkt. No. Evaluation supplies 43-8, and 220:24-25. Plaintiff understood that she ^'^would be in Mclntosh three days a week, and [Holmes] Id. at were 220:24-221:4. from 8:00 desk[,] left it at to [her] discretion as to what days." Plaintiff 5:00" and that acknowledged she that her ^'would also man the and take mail to and from the post office [,] ^'hours front as well as meet with outside vendors in reference to our emergency plan and banking and inventory." When Plaintiff dkt. nos. 43-7, Id. at 221:4-8. started, she 20:22-21:3; 43-25, supervised volunteer workers, 24:7-25, but alleges that she did not supervise front-desk staff until February 1, 2010. No. 49-17 H 43. supervisory duties. Holmes, Her PMF had a ''not Dkt. No. 43-9 at 34. applicable" at for However, according to Plaintiff had duties that "weren't necessarily specified authority to reassess and/or re-locate employees at any time." 10 mark Dkt. Dkt. No. 43- 33. ® Multi-county employees were assigned to a purposes. Dkt. No. 43-21, 34:18-23. 12 specific coimty for accoiinting or clearly outlined," supervising front-desk applications and distributed assisted by the 21:17-24:25, dkt. no. staff. 51:4-16, Said fonns entire office. 28:5-23, 43-25, staffers to clients, Dkt. including No. received and they were 43-25, 15:21-16:19, 51:4-15. January 2010 Issues In January 2010, following evaluation for Glynn County, a front-desk work Regional Manager Jacqueline Bryant devised an office restructuring plan. 159:17. negative Dkt. No. 43-12, 156:14- On January 22, Plaintiff attended a meeting with Bryant and Economic Support Supervisor Lisa Bessett to discuss changes to her duties, Glynn County effective February 1, front desk/registration 2010: staff; (1) (2) supervise the work Monday, Wednesday, and Friday in Glynn County, and Tuesday and Thursday in Mclntosh County; (3) take outgoing mail to the post office on her scheduled days in Glynn. County; and (4) desk duties. Bessett Dkt. No. offered 43-8, to be perform some front- 229:17-231:11; 43-10 at 42. available sent to registration training, for help. Plaintiff was Bryant arranged for the Chatham County Office Manager to ""shadow" Plaintiff, and Bryant arranged for Liberty County staff to assist Plaintiff with registrations. Dkt. No. 43-8, 229:17-231:11; 43-10 at 42. 13 Bryant wrote a memorandum Bessett sent an email expectations. confirming the to Plaintiff and her staff changes, about and the new Dkt. Nos. 43-8, 229:17-231:11; 43-10 at 42. Lariscy believed that Plaintiff's prior experience supervising front-desk staff in Liberty County qualified her to supervise. Dkt. No. 43-12, 160:9-15. Bryant allegedly delegated a partial front-desk supervisory role to Plaintiff. Dkt. No. 43-12, 159:8-11. Plaintiff maintains that she began to supervise all of the front-desk staff. Dkt. Nos. 43-8, 20, She further claims that 231:17-12; 43-10 at 42 she was ill-prepared, receptionists. In 19). given that she had only ever supervised Dkt. Nos. 49-17 H 40; 43-7, 60:24-61:7.^° mid-January 38:19-41:22. (Ex. 2010, Holmes resigned. Dkt. 43-10 Plaintiff that ^^it H 74. for 43-25, at [was] 41; 43-25, Dkt. Nos. 61:17-63-24. not an official copy." 43-8, Holmes Dkt. No. told 49-17 Lariscy reviewed the evaluation and returned it to Holmes corrections, Lariscy No. She had given Plaintiff an unofficial performance review indicating that she ^^Met Expectations." 227:4-228:16; 221:15- but allegedly Gomillion, Holmes sent the made none. incomplete Dkt. No. 43-20 evaluation to at 38. Petula an interim Liberty County director who did not know Plaintiff, for a ^^re-do." Dkt. No. 4 9-18 HH 3, 5, 8. Plaintiff further alleges that "[t]hese responsibilities were not substituted for my prior responsibilities; rather, they were loaded on top of what I already was doing." Dkt. No. 49-17 ^ 40. 14 Effective became February director interim 1, 2010, for Beth Mclntosh and thus Plaintiff's immediate supervisor. 232:25, 245:4-10; 43-12, Griffis, a Glynn Dkt. counties, Nos. 154:22-155:12; 43-18, Caucasian, 43-8, and 231:17- 13:5-25. Plaintiff's Requests for a Salary Supplement and Rental Car Back when Mclntosh, Plaintiff Holmes first suggested began that she working request in a Glynn multi-county salary supplement; Lariscy denied Plaintiff's request. 49-17 H 49. According to both Griff is and Dkt. No. and Beverly Boone, a regional human resource manager, a supplement was only approved when an employee's duties significantly surpassed her day-to-day responsibilities and job description. 19, 133:9-136:23; 43-21, 11:4-12, 115:16-118:18.^^ DFCS did not from to their homes their offices, cars had to deduct personal miles. Dkt. Nos. 43- 46:5-58:7, reimburse and 81:12-87:12, employees those normal who for travel used rental Dkt. No. 43-21, 36:24-45:17. Lariscy allegedly told Holmes that if a salary supplement were approved for PlaintijEf, it would need to be approved for every multi-county employee, which would be unfeasible. No. 43-25, everyone 26:2-21.^^ that worked Dkt. Holmes explained that while ''pretty much for Glynn County was available Boone stated that the only employees who automatically received supplement were multi-county directors. Dkt. No. 43-21, 50:8-51:21. for the An employee would submit a supplement request to a supervisor; it would then progress up the chain to OHRMD. Dkt. No. 43-21, 58:2-59:3. The claim could be stopped at any point and approval depended on "the specifics of the actual circumstances." Dkt. No. 43-21, 57:7-12. 15 Mclntosh," none of these received a supplement. Id. Plaintiff responds that not eveiy employee who worked for Glynn was also available to work for Mclntosh. On March 19, 2010, Dkt. No. 49-17 H 48. Plaintiff spoke to Griffis requesting both a salary supplement and a rental car. 43-8, 242:6-247:23; 43-10 Griffis had approved manager. Dkt. No. Plaintiff that she used a personal vehicle, office runs. a at 44. rental Plaintiff car 49-17 HH 51-52. even for Dkt. Nos. heard that social-service a had about case Griffis allegedly informed rental car to preserve miles on her offering Plaintiff its use for post Id. t 51. On March 29, Plaintiff asked Griffis if she had spoken with Lariscy. Dkt. No. 43-10 at 44. Griff is replied that she could not request the supplement because of staffing realities: Many workers are working both Glynn and Mclntosh at this point as we have combined the counties. Staff are being compensated for the travel expenses between their home county and the other. Your PMF that you sighed reflect that you are assigned as office manager for both counties and this arrangement was reached before my assignment in Glynn/Mclntosh. Dkt. Nos. 43-8, According supplement 242:6-244:13; to because office manager. Boone, her 43-10 at 46. Plaintiff duties was did not Dkt. No. 43-21, go not eligible beyond those 81:16-87:10, 115:20-117:2. 16 for a of an Plaintiff does not know why her request for a was denied. Dkt. Nos. 43-8, 242:6-244:21. for travel between her home office, rental car She was reimbursed Mclntosh County, and Glynn County; trips to the post office to get DFCS mail; and travel to training. Dkt. No. 43-8, 236:4-237:23, 244:4-20, 248:2-249:17. Plaintiff alleges that after her requests were denied, displayed 247:8; strange attitude towards [her] Id. Griffis at 245:4- 43-10 at 64. Griffis' Problems with Plaintiff When Griffis began, she perception of Plaintiff as a was allegedly unaware challenging employee, of the given that Lariscy described Plaintiff as an experienced office manager. Dkt. No. 43-18, 33:20-34:22. Griffis was also unaware of any complaints of race discrimination by Plaintiff. 132:7. Griffis assumed that Plaintiff duties, but she soon noticed problems. Griffis Office of claims that Plaintiff Family Independence ("OFI") front-desk (2) timely submit a deficiency in handle failed to: (1) (4) register applications because she id. at 44:23-45:6; 43- processing OFI (3) applications, id. at help other employees, because she stayed in her office with her door closed, 45:11-15; job plan of action addressing a 60:20-61:25; 43-20 at 33; 43-10 at 52; 43-18, her Id. at 56:12, 61:3-69:3. delegated that responsibility to others, 10 at 54-57; could Id. at 127:13- dkt. no. tell Griffis which office she was going to. 17 instead of seeking her input, 15; 43-10 at 54-57; distribute mail 138:4-25; 43-10 (6) at at 42:14-43:1; 43-8, 272:10- retrieve mail on one occasion and to correctly, 43-20; 41:19-24; (5) id. dkt. nos. 43-18, accurately complete 54-57; (7) remain 41:10-12, time for 52:3-25, sheets, the id. duration at of a special training, dkt. nos. 43-18, 41:25-42:12, 53:21-55:12; 4310 at 54-57; and 19, (8) appropriately use her leave, dkt. nos. 43- 92:5-97:15; 43-10 at 54-63. Griffis also maintains being out on Mondays, that Plaintiff had a history of requested sick leave at the last minute after being told that she could not take annual leave unless her work was completed, and scheduled a doctor's conflict with an Emergency Preparedness Meeting. 20, appointment Dkt. Nos. in 43- 150:8-153:17; 43-10 at 54-63. Griffis tried to rectify these problems, dkt. no. 43-18, 61:13-14, but claims that Plaintiff was hostile and unreceptive. Id. at 61:13-21. Plaintiff complaints. responds See Dkt. Nos. 49-22, 14:4-17, action ''plan," 17:15-20. not that her 49-23, She learning "inadequate" until later. immediate staff 31:21-34:9; 49-25, says that that Dkt. No. she Griff is had 54:5-57:16; sent a detailed considered 49-17 KH 63-64. no it Plaintiff also noted that any deficiencies in front-desk supervision could 18 not be attributed to her because she did not have a supervisory role until February 1, 2010. front-desk Id. H 63. She believed from her prior work with Holmes and from her memorandum light of Griffis' that she office should needs. displeasure. independently Dkt. Plaintiff without first informing her. Plaintiff only assistant was ill, No. of H 65, complaints 31:21-34:9; 49-25, Plaintiff training for to claims her, use 42. left the schedule in Following office again one mail complaint, when her and she maintains that a co-worker Id. f 66. She never received from employees. Id. H 67; 49-23, 54:5-57:16; 49-22, 14:4-17, 17:15-20. that as Dkt. No. 49-17 H 68. minutes at 43-10 never interfered with her mail duties. any timesheet her Dkt. No. 49-17 HH 57, 71. heard id. set the the Griffis did training not arrange in question was special regional. She acknowledges that she left for fifteen restroom, but says she returned remainder and explained her absence to the speaker. for the Id. She says that she used leave because she was experiencing ^'temporary but serious health issues." Plaintiff ensure that alleges someone planning meeting. that from Griffis the Id. H 70. 19 Id. H 69. merely asked Plaintiff office attend the to emergency GriffIs Complains about Plaintiff Griffis notified Lariscy that she. was having problems with Plaintiff's performance and Lariscy directed her to voice her concerns with the Office of Human Resource Management Division C'DHRMD"). Dkt. No. 43-18, 49:21-50:14, 67:21, Accordingly, on April 1, 2010, Griffis emailed Burns. 43-20 at 35-36. number of the 71:3-9. Dkt. No. Burns explained that Plaintiff had exhibited a issues Liberty County, Griffis complained of while and that Lariscy had met with her. working Id. at Burns noted that since Plaintiff's problems were repetitive, she would receive a written reprimand. On April 9, 2010, supervisory duties Plaintiff. Dkt. Plaintiff had Besset took over Plaintiff's front-desk and assumed Nos. yet disciplinary action, Id. 43-8, to supervisory 282:13-283:17; receive dkt. a no. any role 43-20 written 37-40. corrective 49-17 ^ 72; moreover, received any report for the year 2010. at over or she never Id. In an email exchange beginning on April 12 and ending on April 13, Griffis memorandum. requested Dkt. that sent Nos. Griffis Burns 43-20 send supporting at 37-40; Plaintiff's documentation 43-10 at interim 54-57. review. and a Burns Id. Griffis alleges that she could only find an unexecuted draft and that Holmes review. Dkt. could Nos. not remember 43-18, if 48:19-51:20; 20 she completed 43-19, Plaintiff s 84:21-85:12; 43-20 at 37; 43-8, 287:4-288:15. Lariscy told Griffis that she sent the review back to Holmes for corrections, complete them before her resignation. but Holmes failed to Dkt. No. 43-20 at 38. Griffis reported the lack of a finalized interim review, and Burns responded on April 13 at 3:09 p.m., with instructions: Please complete the review from the time that she transferred to Glynn up until the present. You can use some of the qualitative/quantitative information that you agree with from [Holmes] during her oversight period; and then add your input with special attention to the performance deficiencies that you have noticed and have documentation to support. Please have Jackie Bryant, and whomever else in a supervisory capacity provide you with information as well - if they have observed performance. You'll need to have an inclusive well-rounded approach when providing feedback to this employee. Please confirm that she received expectations upon arrival to Glynn. This MRF will document all of that you presented to me in a the issues previous e- mail. Dkt. No. 43-20 at 37. Griffis drafted an interim review on April 14. 44. at 41- It gave Plaintiff low ratings and noted the issues of which Griffis complained. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Griffis did not use any positive information from Holmes' 19, Id. 85:21. without the Griffis claims that aid Lariscy or of 21 she review. drafted Burns, dkt. the no. Dkt. No. 43- report alone, 43-18, 50:24- 51:20, but Griffis Plaintiff show argues otherwise, that emails no. 49-10 dkt. stated that she did not receive a until after she was fired, between at Lariscy 2-15. copy of the and Plaintiff interim report and that it was unofficial because it was never signed or executed. Dkt. No. 43-8, 285:17-288:15. Internal Complaint On April 5, Plaintiff used sick leave for a medical appointment; she also visited the EEOC to file a complaint. at 258:5-20. an EEOC Plaintiff did not tell anyone that she completed Intake emailed Blanco, Questionnaire. Id. Plaintiff aware of her 13, Plaintiff Walker and Assistant Id. at 278:20-280:20; Dkt. No. Plaintiff did not send a copy of that email to Griff is. Burns, or Lariscy, 129:9-130:15; April notifying them that she had filed an EEOC retaliation complaint. 43-20 at 45-46. On copying Commissioner B.J. Commissioner Mark Washington, aware of it. Id. and they allege that they were never Id.; Dkt. Nos. 43-12, 74:4-20, contends EEOC 43-23, 105:20; 43-19, 121:17-122:5, 113:6-18. that Lariscy, complaint because: Burns (1) and Griffis Plaintiff were emailed Blanco at 4:23 p.m. on April 13 and at 4:35 p.m., the email was forwarded to Rosa Waymon 64; her, (2) {Burns' supervisor) , dkt. no. 43-10 at Burns then sent an email to Griffis asking to speak to dkt. no. 43-24 at 30; 16 that she ^Vanted (3) [documents] Plaintiff told Griffis on April to submit to the EEOC," dkt. 22 no. 43-8, a 294:5-295:14; and report from an (4) Griffis emailed Lariscy that day of employee that Plaintiff information to prove" discrimination. ^^was gathering Dkt. No. 43-11 at 22. The Enterprise Incident On April Rent-A-Car 12 or April 14, Plaintiff (a DECS contractor) , contacted Enterprise stating that she was an office manager and wanted receipts for Griffis, Chamberlin, and another supervisor, Laurie Morton. at 71; 43-21, sole 36:15-24. purpose of Dkt. Nos. 43-8, 292:5-293:24; 43-10 Plaintiff says that she did so ^^for the getting documentation discrimination/retaliation charge." Dkt. to No. support 49-17 H 81. April 15, Griffis emailed Burns about the incident: I just received a telephone call from the manager of the Kingsland Georgia Enterprise Vehicle Rental Chain. that she felt She called to t e l l me uncomfortable about a DECS employee calling her repeatedly for the past two days insistent on getting copies of mine and Laurie She advised me herself as Morton's that car rental this [Plaintiff], person Office agreements. identified manager of DECS and represented to her that she needed these copies to process [sic]. The manager stated times that but she called [Plaintiff] during presented very busy like this was something she had to have at the moment. She requested agreements be sent to two different EAX numbers which the manager thought was strange. [Plaintiff] has nothing whatsoever to do with this process, especially since mine and Ms. Morton's positions are Camden County. These calls were obviously a misrepresentation of DECS business. Besset A0 72A (Rev. 8/82) this Also, I have afternoon 23 that heard from [Plaintiff] Lisa had [her] On [Chamberlin's] rental agreements faxed to her at the Mclntosh office. Dkt. No. 43-11 a t 22. The next day. Plaintiff requested Family Medical Leave Act (^'FMLA") leave, effective from April 19 to May 5. On April 16, about the Id. at 2-3. Burns directed Griffis to contact Plaintiff Enteirprise statement from her, incident because in addition to a at Enterprise who contacted her. he needed a signed statement from the person Id. at 22. Burns requested that Griff is fax him copies of the documents Enterprise sent to Plaintiff, along with Griffis' interim review of Plaintiff. Griffis replied later that day, explaining that she Id. called Plaintiff at home and Plaintiff admitted to calling Enterprise to obtain rental car agreements. Id.; .Dkt. No. Griffis informed told Burns that Plaintiff her 49-17 H 82. that she was gathering evidence of discrimination, allegedly threatening that was the least of Griffis' out what she meant. Dkt. problems and that Griffis would find No. 43-24 a t 35. 13 In the same email, Griffis explained her privacy concerns: I am not worried about " [Plaintiff's] cause. I have done nothing wrong and stand behind my work and work action. What I am worried about is her gathering my personal information for a vendor by misrepresenting herself using her job title to get it. This is very upsetting to me. I obviously do not trust her with my personal information. I feel this is a breach of confidentiality and fraudulent. I feel this should be dealt swiftly with some action taken and not left on hold iintil she returns to work. Id. at 22 24 Thanks. Plaintiff claims that she told Griffis and Morton that she was taking the documents to the EEOC, dkt. no. 49-17 f 83, and that she only gave investigator and, 295:10. her information later, from her attorney. them Dkt. to No. the 43-8, EEOC 294:13- Plaintiff said that she apologized to Morton and told that she would shred any document with confidential information because she was not trying to commit identity theft. Id. at 297:1-301:5. Defendants never requested or obtained a signed statement from Plaintiff. Griffis claims that this the camel's back." termination. Dkt. at According to Lariscy, her behavior employee." " Boone ^'was Dkt. No. 49-17 i| 82. incident was No. 43-18, 48:6-52:2, the 62:9-12. 66:3-17; '^straw that broke She 43-19, recommended 80:2-81:19. she wanted to terminate Plaintiff because significantly egregious conduct by a state Dkt. No. 43-13, 208:20-24." stated that Plaintiff s phone call to Enterprise violated Standards of Conduct and Ethics, which Plaintiff signed. Dkt. Nos. 119:12-125:25; 43-10 at 8-21; 43-9 at 6-9. The policy states: All employees of the [GDHS] are expected to maintain and exercise at all times the highest moral and ethical standards in carrying out their responsibilities and functions. Employees must conduct themselves in a manner that prevents all forms of impropriety, placement of self-interest above public threats, interest, partiality, prejudice, favoritism and undue influence. Employees must be alert in conducting business with employees and non-employees to avoid even the appearance of misconduct, personal or financial gain or conflict of interest. While performing departmental duties, employees are reqpaired to comply with . Services, Rules of policies. . . the the the Code of Ethics for Governor's Executive Order State Personnel Board and 25 Govemment . . . and Department GDHS 43-21, Lariscy and Griffis agreed that the basis for termination was the report of Plaintiff s Plaintiff's misrepresentation to Enterprise that she needed the records for payment when she had no job-related reason to obtain them. 118:10; 43-18, On April termination. could not Griffis 62:9-12, advise to 68:10-25; 43-19, Lariscy Dkt. No. claims events" 16, that Burns, 43-11 at 22." without the she sent id. ; dkt. contends that no. dkt. nos. 43-18, 43-10 to recommend documentation. and at a 71, Griffis and ^'statement but need the records to process payment. Plaintiff Lariscy had 43-19, 43-21, in 80:12-81:19, fact and she did not claim to Dkt. No. 49-17 H 84. Dkt. Nos. 43-21, 119:10-131:24; 43-11 at 8-21 (parentheticals Boone testified that when an infraction is particularly egregious, No. of long before the Enterprise 65:13-66:17; Dkt. Id. Dkt. No. 50-2 K 169. that during her phone call to Enterprise, dismissal could be warranted. 114:11- Burns responded that he documents recommended her termination in March, incident, Burns requested the 43-12, 102:12-108:9. emailed alleges that they were not produced. Plaintiff Dkt. Nos. She omitted). immediate 130:21-131:24. "Not only do I see [Plaintiff's] work performance as a significant issue, but I am very concerned about the threat that [Plaintiff] made to [Griffis] this a.m. and see this situation only escalating if [Plaintiff] is allowed to return. In my opinion, [Plaintiff] has created a hostile working environment by threatening [Griffis]. To my knowledge, [Griffis] has done nothing wrong and has actually been the first County Director to deal appropriately with [Brown] in trying to hold her accountable. Based on what [Griffis] has stated to me the information that Enterprise faxed to [Plaintiff] has [Griffis'] personal information such as social security number on it. I know that we have to be fair with all staff but at this point, [Griffis] needs to be supported by the Division as well and by allowing [Brown] to return to work I do not believe this shows our support for a solidly performing employee who is managing three counties. Georgia is an at will employer and as such I think when we have these types of situations we need to balance out all employees' interests and rights. Please let me know OHRMD's thoughts on t h i s matter." Id. 26 avers that the document she received did not contain Griffis' social security number, credit card number, or driver's license number. Dkt. No. Plaintiff 43-11 a t 22. acknowledged that her employment was ^^at will" and that she could be ^^separated at any time without notice or statement of reasons." Dkt. Nos. 43-7, 54:15-55:17; 43-9 at 7. Request for Donated Leave Plaintiff argues that she was denied the opportunity to apply for donated leave. Dkt. No. 43-8, 303:4-6. Plaintiff testified that she requested a donated leave form from Telisha Mack, but the paperwork was never sent to her. 306:14. Mack, Id. at 302:18- a Financial Operations Generalist for Region XII Accounting, forwarded Plaintiff's leave request to Burns, asking how to respond. Dkt. No. 43-11 at 33. DHS Donated Leave Policy provides and use leave donations, without pay annual, personal, time." for Dkt. Nos. 80 43-8, that in order to solicit an employee must be on approved leave consecutive sick, Burns responded that and hours and have forfeited leave and exhausted all compensatory 302:18-306:14; 43-11 at 33. Boone says that donated-leave forms were easily accessible online. Dkt. No. Plaintiff admitted time of her request. 43-21, to 98:13-20. knowing that Dkt. No. 43-8, 27 Defendants she was contend ineligible 303:4-304:8. at that the Plain-tiff's Termlna-tion On May 4, 2010, Lariscy told Griff is that both she and OHRMD had approved Plaintiff's termination. 48. Lariscy did so on April 16. Dkt. No. 43-20 at Dkt. No. 43-11 at 22. Burns allegedly informed her that she could not terminate Plaintiff until Plaintiff returned from her FMLA leave, the wrong impression. Dkt. Nos. 43-19, 112:20-113:11, 118:9-12; Dkt. No. 43-23, 118:8-119:10. Lariscy nor temination. terminated Waymon, 118:4-9, Griffis Id. for fear of giving Burns also testified that neither pressured at Plaintiff him to 120:22-121:1, in with Dkt. No. Griffis. 43-12, Griffis called Plaintiff notify Plaintiff that she was being terminated. 113:3-114:19; same date, 308:17; Lariscy Burns, 88:9-89:23, 208:3-210:18. Directed by Burns, 19, Plaintiff s 127:20-128:1. collaboration and Gary Nagel at OHRMD. approve OHRMD 43-11 at 43-8, 307:11-308:17. Via a terminated Plaintiff. 34. Burns letter and Griffis signed it. drafted Dkt. Dkt. Nos. 5 to 43- letter with the No. 43-8, Plaintiff's Dkt. No. 43-19, Lariscy retired on July 1. on May 307:11- termination 109:14-110:6. Dkt. No. 43-6 H 3. EEOC Charges On July 14, 2010, Plaintiff filed a charge with the Georgia Commission on Equal Opportunity (^'GCEO") , terminated discrimination on the basis of race 28 alleging that she was and retaliation. Dkt. No. 43-11 notice. Id. charge at 37-45. On August 4, 2010 GDHS received That notification stated that GCEO dismissed the and relinquished investigation. Id. jurisdiction to the EEOC for On November 1, 2010 Plaintiff received an EEOC Notice of Right to Sue. Id. LEGAL STANDARD Summary judgment is required where ^^the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as movant is entitled to Civ. P. 56 (a). outcome of the Grp. V. is 658 Liberty if it "might governing law." F.3d fact and the a matter of law." ''material" suit under the (quoting Anderson v. (1986)). judgment as A fact FindWhat. com, to any material 1282, Lobby, 1307 Inc., Fed. affect FindWhat (11th 477 the Inv^r Cir. U.S. R. 2011) 242, 248 A dispute is "genuine" if the "evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. In making this determination, the court is to view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw Johnson 501, 507 all v. reasonable Booker (11th Cir. T. inferences Washington in Broad. that Serv., party's Inc., favor. 234 F.3d 2000) . The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. V. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 29 Celotex Corp. The movant must show the court that there is an nonmoving party's case. If the moving absence of evidence to support the Id. at 325. party discharges this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to go beyond the pleadings and present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of fact does exist. Anderson, 477 U.S. this burden in two ways: at 257. First, The nonmovant may satisfy the nonmovant ''may show that the record in fact contains supporting evidence, withstand ignored' a directed verdict by the moving party, motion, which was sufficient to 'overlooked who has thus failed to meet the initial burden of showing an absence of evidence." V. City of Atlanta, Celotex, the 477 U.S. nonmovant 2 F.3d 1112, 1116 at "may 332 (Brennan, come sufficient to withstand a or (11th Cir. 1993) J., forward Fitzpatrick dissenting)). with additional (quoting Second, evidence directed verdict motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary deficiency." Id. at 1117. DISCUSSION Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated after she complained about racial discrimination by denying her a subsidy after transferring her job duties to a different office, causing her to drive 114 miles roundtrip; drafting a false performance review; denying her sick-leave requests; assigning her excessive work for which she had no training; 30 terminating her employment while she was on approved FMLA leave; and terminating her after she filed an EEOC Complaint. I. Plaintiff Fails to See generally Compl. Set Forth a Prima Facie Case of Retaliation Plaintiff 2000e-3 (a) (1) asserts a retaliation {''Title VII") Section 1981 "have the and 42 U.S.C. same Standard v. (11th Cir. 1998). under § 1981. requirements same analytical framework." 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 claim 42 U.S.C. § Title VII and of proof and use the A.B.E.L. Servs./ Therefore, Inc., the Court will "explicitly address the Title VII claim with the understanding that the analysis applies to the § 1981 claim as well." Given this that case is Plaintiff governed relies by the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, on circumstantial burden-shifting 411 U.S. 792 Id. evidence, framework (1973). of Brown v. Ala. Dep^t of Transp., 597 F.3d 1160, 1181 (11th Cir. 2010). "Title employer case." Cir. (b) a for protects that employees participation Donne lion v. 1986). prove VII To (a) Freuhauf establish she in engaged a against an Corp., retaliation employment 794 retaliation F.2d by an discrimination 598, claim. 600 Plaintiff (11th must in statutorily protected activity, she suffered a materially adverse action, and (c) there was casual relation between the protected activity and the adverse action. Butler v. Ala. Dep^t of Transp., 31 536 F.3d 1209, 1212-13 {11th Cir. 2008) F.3d 1261, 1277 (quoting Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co. , 513 (11th Cir. 2008)). After the plaintiff establishes employer may present a legitimate, a prima facie case, the non-retaliatory reason for \ the action. 1266 Pennington v. (11th Cir. F.3d 1457, 1460 2001) City of Huntsville, (citing Olmstead v. 261 F.3d 1262, Taco Bell Corp., 141 (11th Cir. 1998)). If i t does so, then ^'[t]he ultimate burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the reason provided by the employer is a pretext for remains on the plaintiff." A. retaliatory conduct Id. Plaintiff Engaged in Statutorily Protected Activity There are activities. two categories of statutorily protected The Participation Clause protects individuals who have filed EEOC charges. Sys. prohibited, Servs. , Inc. , 42 U.S.C. 221 F.3d 1171, § 2000e-3 (1) ; EEOC v. Total 1174 (11th Cir. 2000). The Opposition Clause protects activity prior to that point, such as filing an supervisor. internal complaint 42 U.S.C. Dep^t of Law Enf^t, plaintiff engaging in a least, comm\micate to the employer, ' informally § 2000e-3(a); Terrace, 267 F.3d 1197, 1201 Fla. or complaining Pipkins v. (11th Cir. 2001) 868 F.2d 397, 400 that (citing Rollins v. (11th Cir. 1989)). discrimination A ^'^at the very is and cannot rely on the employer to 32 a City of Temple protected activity must, her belief to occurring ^infer that discrimination Fla., Inc., has occurred.'" 321 F. App'x 847, Demers 852 v. Adams (11th Cir. 2009) Homes of Nw. (quoting Wedd V. R&B Holding Co., 992 F. Supp. 1382, 1390 (S.D. Fla. 1998)). Plaintiff argues that she engaged in Participation Clause activity when she Questionnaire. agrees. (11th Cf. Cir. visited Dkt. Nos. EEOC and 49-13 at 2-4; Wilkerson v. 2001) the completed 54 at 9-10. Grinnell Corp., (holding that Intake an Intake The Court 270 F.3d 1314, Questionnaire 1321 can be formal EEOC charge for purposes of statute of limitations). a The Participation Clause ^^protects proceedings and activities which occur in conjunction with or after the filing of a formal charge with the EEOC." also Silver v. Total Sys. KCA, Inc., Servs., 586 Inc., F.2d 221 F.3d at 1174; 138, 141 (9th Cir. see 1978) (explaining that '""participation in the machinery set up by Title VII to enforce its provisions" is protected) . an employee Inc. , 221 to F.3d "instigate at 1174 n.2; (protecting "participat[ing] or] proceedings." m see also It is enough for Total 42 Sys. U.S.C.A. Servs., § 2000e-3 any manner in an investigation[ proceeding"). Plaintiff selected "Box 2," which states, "I want to file a charge of discrimination, and I authorize the EEOC to look into the discrimination I described above." Dkt. No. 49-13 at This brought her within the Participation Clause's ambit. Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. , 33 149 F.3d 253, 259 4. See (4th Cir. to 1998) {^'Participatory activities are vigorously protected ensure employees' continuing enforcement process."); 4:05-2086, 2008 WL access Richardson v. 906559, at to the EEOC Horry Cty.^ *10 (D.S.C. and the A. No. Civ. Mar. 31, 2008) (explaining that filing an Intake Questionnaire is protected); cf. Kaplan v. City of Arlington, Tex. 2002) can constitute 184 F. Supp. 2d 553, 564 (observing that filing a Plaintiff s protected prima facie state intake questionnaire behavior). case (N.D. is The first satisfied prong of to the as Participation Clause. It is not satisfied as to the Opposition Clause. argues that Defendants retaliated against her by demoting her and reassigning her to a different county. 14. Plaintiff Dkt. No. 54 at 10- The Opposition Clause makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee "because practice made VI], or because an unlawful employment [s]he has made a charge, [s]he has opposed any practice [Subchapter testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, hearing under [Subchapter VI]." by proceeding, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Plaintiff argues that she complained both of her co-worker's hostile, humiliating racial slur directed squarely at her and about the failure of her supervisor and then her supervisor's supervisor to do anything about it. And in late March when her supervisory responsibilities were removed without explanation less than two 34 or months from the date of her complaint, [Plaintiff] additionally complained about retaliation she perceived in response to her complaint of the co-worker's racial slur. Dkt. No. 54 at 11. The actions cited by Plaintiff are time-barred. at 2 n.l. The Court will not equitably toll the See supra statute of limitations on the ground that Plaintiff relied on Defendants' internal investigation. Defendants ''lulled complaints were reliance See Dkt. No. 54 at 22 (complaining that [Plaintiff] into believing properly addressed"). Defendants' on being internal investigation that her Plaintiff's plainly shows that "Defendants made no misrepresentations that hindered [her] from her." learning [their Intown Howard v. of Suites 739168, at *2 alleged] Mgmt., discrimination Inc., No. against l:04-CV-759, 2006 WL (N.D. Ga. Mar. 17, 2006). Plaintiff could attempt to save her Opposition Clause claim by leaning on other supposed wrongdoing, her request for a memorandum, the subsidy, denial of such as the denial of the drafting of a her sick leave false perfonnance request, or assignment of excessive work for which she had no training. generally Compl. faith, unlawful reasonable But she needs to show "that belief employment that the practices." Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956, 35 employer Little 960 v. [s]he had a was engaged United the See good in Techs., (11th Cir. 1997). She cannot do so. the event that Her complaint of racial discrimination- allegedly triggered retaliation—occurred approximately one year before any of those events.^® is devoid actions of evidence were due discrimination, her that to Plaintiff her previous motivated by racial complaints to believed management. The record that Defendants' complaint animus, Thus, of or the racial results of Plaintiff could not reasonably believe that she was still suffering from opposing an unlawful practice a year before the incidents in question. Higdon v. (observing, Jackson, 393 in finding a infer retaliation: F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th Cir. See 2004) three-month delay to be too great to ^^If there is a sxibstantial delay between the protected expression and the adverse action in the absence of other evidence tending retaliation fails as a to show causation, the complaint of matter of law."). Plaintiff may not agree with the decisions Defendants made, but the Court's ^^sole concern is whether unlawful discriminatory animus motivates a challenged Fleming Supermarkets Cir. 1999) . Plaintiff's It of did Fla., not. allegations. employment Inc., There 196 is Accordingly, decision." F.3d 1354, no 1361 evidence summary Damon v. (11th supporting judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's Opposition Clause claim. " Plaintiff immediately complained about Adams' insult and the subsequent March incident to management and continued to complain when she felt that her concerns were not adequately addressed. 36 B. Plaintiff Suffered a Materially Adverse Employment Action action is materially adverse if it ^might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.'" F.3d 1249, Fe Ry. 1259 Co. v. Chapter 7 Tr. (11th Cir. White, 2012) 548 U.S. employment was terminated. C. But-for claims. the activity," of Tex. is 53, 68 required (2006)). decision-maker Vignoli v. the other adverse (11th evidence substantial Ctr. had in Plaintiff's Causal v. Title Link between VII Nassar, at *7 action, (S.D. retaliation 133 S. Ct. 2517, protected 2007) tending to between the Fla. the Inc., Oct. protected No. 7, activity 12-24508- 2014) and Cooper Lighting, (noting show the complaint "[M]ere temporal proximity, of (citing and show "close temporal proximity Thomas v. Cir. delay knowledge Clifton Apartments, statutorily employment action." 1364 & Santa A plaintiff must both "'provide sufficient evidence 393 F.3d at 1220), between 1361, (citing Burlington N. 683 This prong is established. Sw. Med. 2014 WL 6850775, Higdon, Inc. , Protected Act and Her Teinnination causation Univ. 2533 (20i3) . CIV, Gate Gourmet, Intervening Misconduct Broke the Plaintiff s that v. that protected fails as Inc., "in causation, the if a 37 adverse 506 F.3d absence there expression matter without more, must be Id. the is and of of a the law"). "very close.'" Defendants Plaintiff were sent Washington, aware an of email Plaintiff's to GDHS and Walker on April 13, protected Commissioners 2010, Blanco, in which she stated that she had ^^filed a complaint with the EEOC." at 46. activity. Dkt. No. 43-20 This, even by itself, was sufficient to make a decision- maker ^'aware" of Plaintiff's protected activity. Even were it not. Defendants expect the Court to believe that since Plaintiff did not send the email to Burns, or Griff is, at 19. they were unaware of her complaint. Based on the evidence presented, a could find this argument to be implausible. Appalachian Corp., court may 494 F. Supp. 330, disregard believed."). Blanco, Lariscy, Blanco Walker, and Griffis. 45-46. evidence Dkt. forwarded 333 that Plaintiff's less Burns emailed Griffis, than an hour later. juror (^'The too incredible to supervise 278:20-280:20; email to direct supervisor, twelve minutes after receipt. at 64. 43-1 See Hales v. First {N.D. Ala. 1980) is 43-8, Dkt. No. reasonable and Washington Nos. Lariscy, be Burns, 43-20 at Waymon, Burns' Dkt. No. 43-10 requesting her telephone number, Dkt. No. 43-24 at 30. Plaintiff expressly told Griffis on April 16 that she ^^wanted [documents] to submit to the EEOC." emailed Lariscy that Dkt. No. another 43-8, 294:5-295:14. employee had Griffis reported that Plaintiff was gathering information to prove that she was being discriminated against. Dkt. No. 43-11 at 22. 38 At a minimum, Burns and Griff is were aware of Plaintiff s complaint. Plaintiff Plaintiffs also satisfies part filing protected act. thereafter. of her EEOC of the Intake causation analysis. Questionnaire was a Plaintiff notified GDHS Commissioners shortly That she was terminated only a few weeks later establishes prima facie causation.^' But the causation analysis does not end with timelines. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs contact with Enterprise broke the causation circuit. Plaintiff obtained Dkt. No. information 43-1 at 20. to which The Court agre.es. she was not using her status as a government office manager. entitled This was an adequate basis for her termination, and without evidence showing it to have been mere pretext, judgment for Defendants. No. CV 412-120, (granting reason motivate Merely a an reasonable quarreling suffice. Plaintiff Court with was cannot reason demoted infer in at *3 ^'[0]nce employment employer, the Furthermore, discriminatory The judgment: adverse authorizes granting summary See Hills v. Savannah River Util. Co., 2014 WL 4267486, summary for it for an employer action the that employee wisdom an (S.D. Ga. Aug. of termination, March 2009 and causation from these termination. 39 proffers might a otherwise must rebut it. does not legitimate, even transferred time 2014) reason that employer's 27, if on periods non- based October to the on 1, May a 2009. 2010 mistaken but liability." reasonable (internal belief, citation will omitted)); Coll. Sys. of Ga., No. CV 412-075, Ga. Dec. 2014) 11, 2013), (granting adopted, summary not subject Saripalli it v. Tech. 2014 WL 6504771, at *3 2014 WL 808005 judgment: (S.D. Ga. to (S.D. Feb. 28, 'MA]n employer's good faith, but incorrect, belief that an employee violated a work rule can constitute nondiscriminatory a reason for that employee's termination[.]" (citation and parenthetical omitted)). The Enterprise incident also purges any inference that the jury would draw misconduct from _the ^^break[s] the timeline. causal Intervening link between conduct and the adverse employment action." Express, No. 10-15633, (per curiam) 2011 WL 4600721, (unpublished opinion) judgment); see also Kiel v. 1131, (8th Cir. 1136 1999) the protected Henderson v. at *4 (11th Cir. (affirming grant of Select Artificials, (en banc) employee Inc., FedEx 2011) summary 169 F.3d (affirming grant of summary judgment and explaining that plaintiff's intervening misconduct '^eroded any causal connection that was suggested by the temporal proximity Schoebel 27AEP, of v. 2015 his Am. WL protected Integrity Ins. 4231670, at conduct Co. *3 of and his Fla., (M.D. Fla. termination"); No. 8:14-CV-426-T- July 10, 2015) (granting summary judgment in part). Plaintiff attempts to resurrect her claim by arguing that Griffis and Lariscy actually decided to terminate her in March. 40 Dkt. Nos. 43-18, But there can 65:13-66:17; be no 43-19, inference statutorily protected act. See, 80:12-81:19; of e.g. 54 retaliation at without Butler v. Ala. Transp., 536 F.3d 1209, 1212-13 (11th Cir. 2008). 18-21. Dept. a of Plaintiff did not come under the protection of the Participation Clause until April 5, when she filed her EEOC Intake Questionnaire. Besides, allegation, whereas See Shuler v. 544 (11th Cir. and Plaintiff's Bd. theory Defendants' of Trs. 2012) is is backed by Of Univ. of Ala., (per curiam) self-serving, allegations supported only record evidence. 480 F. App'x 540, (unpublished opinion) are inadequate plaintiff's burden on summary judgment."). by to (''Bare carry the Between April 5 and April 12 or 14, Lariscy, Griffis, and Burns discussed Plaintiff. Their emails reflect frustration, termination. 71:3-9; See, e.g., 43-20 at 35-36. Dkt. but do not explicitly discuss Nos. 43-18, 49:21-50:14, Lariscy did not recommend termination until April 16—after Plaintiff contacted Enterprise. 43-11 at wants the Court to the infer that the April of which Defendants learned on April 13, cause of her May 4 termination. is Dkt. No. 22. Plaintiff charge, 67:21, plainly evidenced Plaintiff's mere conjecture. survive summary judgment. 5 EEOC was the real But her contact with Enterprise reason, whereas retaliation is Such conjecture is not enough to See Schoebel, 41 2015 WL 4231670, at *3 {explaining that [w] here . an inference of fact, i.e. . . circumstantial evidence supports causation, but direct evidence proves the contrary, the inference has been shown to be unreasonable"). In light of Plaintiff's act of intervening misconduct, she has failed to prove causation, and thus her prima facie case for retaliation fails and the McDonnell Douglas inquiry ends. Summary judgment is GRANTED. II. Claims against Lariscy Are Barred by Qualified Immunity Lariscy is protected by qualified immunity. offers ^^complete protection their individual capacities for government if their conduct This defense officials Moes sued in not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" F.3d 1340, 457 U.S. 1346 800, (11th Cir. 818 2002) Vinyard v. Wilson, (quoting Harlow v. 311 Fitzgerald, (1982)). A public official must prove that she was acting within the scope of her discretionary authority at the time of the alleged wrongful acts. 2012). Terrell v. Smith, 668 F.3d 1244, 1250 (11th Cir. Lariscy did so. She was human resources director and Plaintiff complains of human resources decisions. The burden shifts immunity does not apply. assesses whether: that the (1) defendants to Plaintiff Vinyard, to show that 311 F.3d at 1346. the plaintiff alleged facts violated a 42 constitutional qualified The Court to establish right; and (2) that right was clearly established. U.S. 223, 232 (2009) . A Pearson v. constitutional Callahan, right is 555 clearly established if ''a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." U.S. 635, 640 Creighton, 483 (1987). Plaintiff argues rights. Anderson v. that Lariscy violated her constitutional See generally Compl. Lariscy was clearly involved in making decisions regarding Plaintiff's employment. But she did not violate Plaintiff's clearly established rights: Lariscy denied Plaintiff pay supplements and a rental car, but there is no evidence that she did so from racial animus. Lariscy Lariscy participated recommended difficulties working in Plaintiff's Plaintiff—who reassignment. had had But significant in Liberty County—for the Mclntosh Coiinty vacancy, describing her as an experienced office manager. No. 43-18, 33:20-34:22. When Lariscy transferred Plaintiff to work with Holmes, Lariscy believed that Holmes' would jibe well with Plaintiff. reasonable Plaintiff's juror would conclude complaints transferring her to match—not Lariscy that Dkt. Dkt. No. 43-25, 38:3-14. workplace a difficulties supervisor who was retaliated against a 43 See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 by better Plaintiff complaining to upper-level management. " Courts can address either prong first. Any that Lariscy tried to resolve and work under leadership style for Even toward progressive the end, discipline 39:17-40:13. Lariscy and help counseled Griffis Plaintiff. is No. apply 43-18, It was only after Plaintiff contacted Enterprise that Lariscy decided to terminate her. There Dkt. to no evidence that. Dkt. Plaintiff's discrimination against Adams, No. 43-11 at 22. complaints of racial and her challenge to Chamberlin's handling thereof—which occurred fifteen months earlier—motivated Lariscy's decision. Lariscy is thus entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. CONCLUSION For the reasons herein. Judgment is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Defendants' Dkt. No. reassignment 43. and demotion Motion for Summary Given the untimeliness of claims, summary judgment as to them is appropriate. Plaintiff failed to prove a prima facie because case of retaliation her misconduct—contacting Enterprise under false pretenses and abusing her piiblic position in doing filing so—broke of her the EEOC inferred charge and causal her connection between the termination. Qualified immunity protects Lariscy in her individual capacity. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED j udgment. 44 to enter the appropriate so ORDERED, this 8th day of November, 2016. LISA GODBEY WOOD, CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA A0 72A (Rev. 8/82) 45

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.