Talcott Resolution Life and Annuity Insurance Company v. Phoenix Printing Group, Inc. et al, No. 1:2020cv00074 - Document 50 (S.D. Ga. 2020)
Court Description: ORDER denying without prejudice 17 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 25 Motion to Allow Certain Depositions. Signed by Chief Judge J. Randal Hall on 11/10/2020. (thb)
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Talcott Resolution Life and Annuity Insurance Company v. Phoenix Printing Group, Inc. et al Doc. 50 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA AUGUSTA DIVISION * * * * * * TALCOTT RESOLUTION LIFE AND ANNUITY INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, V. k CV 120-074 k PHOENIX PRINTING GROUP, INC.; EMILY BOYLES HADDEN, Individually and as Natural Guardian of C.R.H. , a minor; and BRENT ANDREW HADDEN, k * k k k Defendants. k k k ORDER Presently Inc.'s Group, (Doc. 17) motion 25) . the ("Phoenix Court is Printing") Defendant motion allow depositions prior to Phoenix Printing's motion for Phoenix Printing summary judgment ("Emily B. Hadden") for and Defendant Emily Boyles Hadden's to Defendant before the Court's summary ruling judgment on (Doc. For the following reasons. Defendant Emily B. Hadden's motion is GRANTED, and Defendant Phoenix Printing's motion is DENIED. I. BACKGROUND Talcott plaintiff Resolution in this Life action, and Annuity brought this claims over a death benefit payment. Insurance suit to Company, the resolve multiple Plaintiff alleges Defendant Dockets.Justia.com Phoenix Printing applied coverage on the life (Compl., Doc. 1, at 2.) as of the owner for Joseph L. Hadden On or term life \\ (the insurance Deceased"). around May 25, 2010, Plaintiff "Policy") to Defendant Phoenix Printing as the owner and sole beneficiary. On issued June Ten 27, Year 2013, Term by \\ Policy beneficiary settlement option form Phoenix Printing, No. and ft LT4910506 (the designation form and designated signed by the Deceased, as secretary of Jeffrey Hadden, as president of Phoenix Printing, Defendant Phoenix Printing was designated 66.67% primary beneficiary and Defendant Emily B. Hadden, the ex-wife of the Deceased, was designated 33.33% primary beneficiary of the Policy. (Id. at 3. ) form ff On October 21, 2016, by "change of beneficiary request signed by Jeffrey L. Hadden, Defendant Phoenix Printing was (Id. ) again named 100% primary beneficiary of the Policy. On February 4, 2020, after the death of Joseph L. Hadden, the Policy proceeds in the amount of $3,000,000 became payable, An amount of $2,000,000 of the Policy proceeds was not contested, and Plaintiff Phoenix paid that Printing on portion March of 26, the death 2020.^ benefit Both to Defendant Defendant Phoenix Printing and Defendant Emily B. Hadden, on behalf of the Deceased's surviving children. made a claim to the remaining $1,000,000. Defendant Emily B. Hadden claims the remaining proceeds based on 1 Although Plaintiff alleges $2,000,000 was not contested at the time it paid that portion of the death benefit. Defendant Emily B. Hadden now claims, without citing specific legal authority, the $2,000,000 should be paid into the Court's registry and any costs and expenses incurred by Plaintiff and the Deceased's (See Doc. 36, at 22.) children as a result of this matter be paid from it. 2 w a Mediation Agreement in connection with the Final Judgment Decree of Divorce // Total between herself and the Deceased. (Id. ) Defendant Phoenix Printing asserts the remaining proceeds are not payable to Defendant Emily B. Hadden because the Deceased is not the owner of the Policy, so the terms of any divorce settlement do not bind them. asserts the (Id. at Policy is a benefit of the company. 4.) W Defendant key man // Phoenix Printing also policy that it owns for the (Id. ) Defendants Brent Andrew Hadden and Emily B. Hadden filed their answer on June 29, 2020. (Doc. 9.) On July 13, 2020, Defendant Phoenix Printing filed both its answer and a motion for summary (Doc. 14, 17.) j udgment. Subsequently, Defendant Emily B. Hadden filed the present motion requesting the Court to allow depositions prior to its ruling on summary judgment. Defendant Phoenix Printing's motion for Currently, discovery is stayed until the resolution of the present motions. II. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT w Summary judgment is appropriate only if dispute as to any material fact judgment as a matter of law. w material ff if they could // and the there is no genuine movant is entitled Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). to Facts are \\ affect the outcome of the suit under the ff governing [substantive] law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), and a dispute is genuine \\ if the non[-]moving party has produced evidence such that a reasonable factfinder could 3 verdict in its favor. ff return a Assocs., Inc., 276 F.3d Waddell v. Valley Forge 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. Dental The Court 2001). must view factual disputes in the light most favorable to the non¬ moving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., \\ 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986), and must in [the non-moving party's] favor. of Real Prop., 941 F.2d 1428, H 1437 (citation, internal omitted). The Court should not credibility. draw all justifiable inferences quotation United States v. Four Parcels (11th marks, and Cir. 1991) internal weigh the evidence (en banc) punctuation or determine Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The moving party has the initial burden of showing the Court, by reference to materials in the record, the basis for the motion. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Because the standard for summary judgment mirrors that of a directed verdict. the initial burden of proof required by either who carries the burden of proof at trial. party depends on Id. at 322-23. When the movant does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it may carry the initial burden in one of two ways element of the non-movant's case or by negating an essential by showing that there is no evidence to prove a fact necessary to the non-movant's case. See Clark V. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 606-08 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. 317). by merely declaring burden at trial. The movant cannot satisfy its initial burden that the non-moving Id. at 608. 4 party cannot meet its If — and only if — the movant carries its initial burden, the non-movant must demonstrate that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes summary judgment. n When the Id. non¬ movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the non-movant must tailor its response to the method by which the movant carries its initial burden. affirmatively For example. negating a if the material movant fact, the presents evidence non-movant \\ must respond with evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial on the material fact sought to be negated. n Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 1993) . On the other hand. if the movant shows an absence of evidence on a material fact, the non-movant must either show that the record contains evidence that was \\ overlooked or ignored" by the movant or "come forward with additional evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary deficiency. burden by f/ Id. at 1116-17. relying on the The pleadings non-movant cannot carry its or allegations contained in the complaint. F.2d 1032, 1033-34 (11th Cir. 1981). by repeating conclusory See Morris v. Ross, 663 Rather, the non-movant must respond with affidavits or as otherwise provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. In this action, the Clerk of Court provided all parties notice of the motion for summary judgment. the right to file affidavits or other materials in opposition. and the consequences of default. 5 (Doc. 18.) For that reason, the notice requirements of Griffith V. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 822, 825 (11th Cir. 1985) , are satisfied. III. STANDARD FOR RULE 56(d) MOTION The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit the filing of a motion for summary judgment at any time after the filing of the complaint. Procedure Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b). 56(d)2 \\ allows a However, Federal Rule of Civil district court to deny a summary judgment motion when a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to ff justify its opposition. Garner v. City of Ozark, 587 F. App'x A 515, 518 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). motion under this Rule \\ must be supported by an affidavit which sets forth with particularity the facts the moving party expects to discover and how those facts would create a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. n Id. (citing Herbert Int'l, Inc. V. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1280 (11th Cir. 1998)). The rely on vague assertions that moving party must do more than additional discovery will produce needed, but unspecified facts, ' rather the party must specifically demonstrate how delaying a ruling on the motion will enable it to rebut the movant's showing n that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Williams-Evans Rule 56(f) was renumbered to 56(d), without any 2 Effective December 1, 2010 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, Advisory Committee substantial changes to the Rule. notes to the 2010 amendments, Any case law herein referring to Rule 56(f) has been altered to 56(d). 6 V. Advance Auto Parts, CV 118-148, 2019 WL 2426443, at *2 (S.D. Ga. June 7, 2019) (citing Reflectone, Inc, v. Farrand Optical Co., 862 F.2d 841, 843-44 (11th Cir. 1989)). \\ Whether to grant or deny a [Rule 56(d)] motion for discovery requires the court to balance the movant's demonstrated need for discovery against opposing party. \\ provided a burden such discovery will place on the ft marks omitted). has held: the Garner, 587 F. App'x at 518 (internal quotation With that burden in mind. the Eleventh Circuit [sjummary judgment is premature reasonable opportunity essential to his opposition. ft to when a party is not discover information Smith V. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 713 F.3d 1059, 1064 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 n.5); see also WSB-TV v. Lee, 842 F.2d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir. 1988) (finding the \\ common denominator jurisprudence on summary judgment is ff of the Supreme Court's that [it] may only be decided upon an adequate record"). IV. DISCUSSION Defendant Phoenix Printing filed its motion for summary judgment approximately six weeks prior to the parties' Rule 26(f) conference. In response. Defendant Emily B. Hadden filed her Rule 56(d) motion requesting depositions to explore and develop issues pertinent to her case. Hadden, at a minimum, The Court finds that Defendant Emily B. has shown 7 she has not been provided a reasonable opportunity to discover information essential to her claim. Specifically, the Court finds Defendant Emily B. Hadden has W put forth enough explanation to satisfy the liberal"^ standard of Rule 56(d) with regards to the following individuals: 1. Jeffrey Hadden, the president of Phoenix Printing, whom she seeks to depose to explore the terms of the buy-sell agreement between the Deceased and Phoenix Printing (Doc. 25-1, ^ 1); 2. Keith Beckworth, the Prudential Insurance Company agent. whom she seeks to depose to investigate his communications with employees of Phoenix Printing regarding her removal as a beneficiary to the Policy (Id., SI 2); 3. Harvey Cook, the Deceased's prior attorney and the Chief Financial Officer of Phoenix Printing, whom she seeks to depose to determine certain facts surrounding the Policy and the Deceased's payouts (Doc. 49, SI 18); and 4. Robert Lyn Allgood, the attorney who mediated Defendant Emily B. Hadden and the Deceased's divorce settlement, whom she seeks to depose to resolve disputes surrounding the terms of their settlement agreement (Doc. 25-1, SI 4). The law in this circuit is clear: the party opposing a motion for summary judgment should be permitted an adequate opportunity 3 The Eleventh Circuit "long ago recognized that 'Rule 56[(d)] is infused with " Estate of Todashev by Shibley v. United States, 815 a spirit of liberality.' F. App'x 446, 453 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Wallace v. Brownell Pontiac-GMC, 703 F.2d 525, 527 (11th Cir. 1983)). to complete discovery prior to consideration of the motion. n V. City of Columbus, Ga., 120 F.3d 248, 253 (llth Cir. 1997). is especially true when w 815 F. App'x This the key evidence lies in the control of the [party moving for summary judgment]. Shibley, Jones at 453 (quoting ff Estate of Todashev by McCray v. Md. Dep't of Transp., 741 F.3d 480, 484 (4th Cir. 2014)); see also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) ("Mutual relevant facts gathered by both knowledge of all the parties is essential to proper litigation.") Moreover, this is not a situation where a party has lacked diligence or failed to utilize available discovery mechanisms. See Estate of Todashev by Shibly, 815 F. App'x at 454 ( The most common situation in which [Rule 56(d)] will not be applied to aid a nondiligent party arises when the nonmovant has complied with [Rule 56(d)] but has failed to make use of the various discovery mechanisms that are at his disposal or seeks a continuance of the motion for Springs, that 626 purpose. F.2d r tf 1317, (quoting 1322 (5th Walters Cir. v. City 1980)); of Ocean Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 932 (llth Cir. 1989) (affirming denial of motion to stay consideration of summary judgment pending further discovery where the movant \\ had ample time and opportunity for discovery. yet failed to diligently pursue his options"). Defendant Emily B. Hadden has had no opportunity to Here, conduct discovery because discovery was stayed pending the Court's ruling on the present motion. (Doc. 47.) 9 Defendant pursue Emily B. discovery, and Hadden has shown Defendant at least Phoenix some Printing need has to not Thus, in articulated any burden sufficient to outweigh this need. an abundance of caution, the Court is inclined to permit Defendant Therefore, the Court Emily B. Hadden to proceed with discovery. finds Defendant Phoenix Printing's motion for summary judgment to be premature. Defendant The Phoenix Court expresses Printing's no motion opinion for on summary the merits judgment, of and thus, has no objection to it being re-filed at any time prior to the deadline set in the forthcoming Scheduling Order. (See Sept. 2, 2020 Order, Doc. 47.) V. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above. Defendant Emily B. Hadden's Rule 56(d) motion (Doc. 25) is GRANTED and Defendant Phoenix Printing's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 17) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this ay of November, 2020. J. RAWesT HALL, CHIEF JUDGE UNITED ^ATES DISTRICT COURT SOimtEra DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 10
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