Whitaker v. The Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia et al, No. 1:2018cv00141 - Document 42 (S.D. Ga. 2020)
Court Description: ORDER granting 30 Motion to Dismiss; granting 38 Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff's federal claims are dismissed. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims, and those claims are dismissed without prejudice. This case stands closed. Signed by Chief Judge J. Randal Hall on 8/24/2020. (pts)
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Whitaker v. The Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia et al Doc. 42 FILED i! C IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA f COURT “iUGliS 1A 01V. ni^Tp ’^??fi!JG24 PH 2=42 AUGUSTA DIVISION CLERKl3g^ SO.Dl^r'QE DEMARCUS WHITAKER, * Plaintiff, * V. CV 118-141 * THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE * UNIVERSITY SYSTEM OF GEORGIA, * et al., •k k * Defendants. ORDER Before the Court In its September the dismiss, Robert 30, 38.) 2019 Order denying the original motion to 27, Court Boehmer, (Docs. are two motions to dismiss. dismissed and James three defendants — Brooks Rush — and allowed Keel, DeMarcus Plaintiff Whitaker ("Plaintiff") an opportunity to file an amended complaint (Sept. not amounting to a shotgun pleading. 24, at 2, Defendants") . 25, at defendants On 1. ) Compl., October Mot. Dismiss, Angelica Doc. 25, ("Original Defendants") states Defendants and Sprouse (Compare counsel to 2019 Order, Doc. In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff named two new 4-5. ) defendants — Clay Doc. 27, 1, 2019, at 1, the filed a 30, motion ("New with Am. Compl., remaining original filed a motion to dismiss that should apply to New Defendants. Doc. Hardison at 1 n.l. ) to dismiss \\ (Original Defs.' On November 12, 2019, New adopti[ing] the arguments Dockets.Justia.com already made on behalf of the [Original] Defendants new arguments. (New n and raising Defs. ' Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. 38; Br. Supp. New Defs. ' Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. 38-1, at 1.) both motions to dismiss in conjunction. The Court evaluates For the following reasons. both motions to dismiss (Docs. 30, 38) are GRANTED. I. BACKGROUND^ In 2016, Plaintiff attended Augusta University ("AU") , a unit of the Board of Regents (Am. Compl., ("BOR"). of the University System of Georgia 65, 66); see Ga. Const, art. VIII, § 4, SI 1(b); O.C.G.A. § 20-3-1; McCafferty v. Med. Coll, of Ga., 287 S.E.2d 171, 173-74 (Ga. 1982), overruled on other grounds by Self V During the Fall . City of Atlanta, 377 S.E.2d 674 (Ga. 1989). 2016 semester. Plaintiff and Jane Roe^ were students partners in a biology class taught by Defendant Wear. and (Am. Compl., In September, Ms. Roe reported to Defendant Wear that SI 76. ) Plaintiff consent. ft had sexually (Id. SI 87 . ) harassed and touched her without her Defendant Wear sent the report of Ms. Roe's allegation to AU's Title IX coordinator. Defendant Reed. w SI 90.) lab On October 13, 2016, AU issued a no contact // Roe and Plaintiff via their student email accounts. (Id. order to Ms. (Id. SIS! 92, 1 Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is ninety-nine pages with almost 200 paragraphs n comprising the "factual allegations common to all claims. M 75-266.) {Am. Compl., at 21, In drafting this section, the Court parses only essential details relevant to addressing the federal claims. 2 Jane Roe is not a defendant. 2 94 . ) Ms. Roe and Plaintiff continued to work together lab as partners until October 25, 2016, when Plaintiff became aware of the \\ no contact "3 // order and demanded him in violation of the w their lab no contact rr be order three times — on October 25, 2016; November 8, 2016; and November 15, 2016. 108, groups Plaintiff alleges Ms. Roe spoke to (Id. gni 94, 96. ) changed. that (Id. OT 105, On the same day as the November 8, 2016 violation. 114.) Plaintiff reported it to Defendants Reed and Thurman, the Assistant Dean of Student Life and Enrollment and an investigator of Ms. (Id. at 1, giSI 2, 5, 113. ) Roe's sexual harassment claim. the Fall 2016 semester. Plaintiff "drop[ped] class and fail[ed] stress. // (Id. Many Reed, of were 1 During out of his Biology his Macroeconomics class due to the unnecessary 267. ) the including Defendants, involved in processing complaint of sexual harassment. and Defendants Thurman Ms. investigating (See, e.g. , and Roe's 121, 125-130, 186. ) Plaintiff believed Defendants Thurman and Reed were biased in their investigation and, on January 12, 2017, challenge against both individuals. Director of coordinator Human of East Resources Georgia and State Plaintiff brought a bias Defendant (Id. ) Career Services College,'^ Woods, and conducted the Title the IX bias 3 Plaintiff did not see the email but became aware of the allegation on October (Am. Compl. 1 94. ) 25, 2016, when he met with Defendant Reed. (Am. Compl. , 3 66. ) ^ Like AU, East Georgia State College is a unit of the BOR. 3 investigation and returned a finding of no bias. ff (Id. at 1, SI5 23, 25, 186, 189. ) On May 8, 2017, a hearing was held concerning Ms. Roe's claim that Plaintiff sexually harassed her. (See id. SI 88.) Plaintiff takes issue Defendants' conduct 'Not at the with hearing. Responsible' for \\ some [t]he sexual of the hearing and Although Ms. Roe's panel found [Plaintiff] harassment. // (Id. SI 215; see id. SISI 88-89, 91, 202-214.) AU did not begin to investigate Plaintiff's report against \\ Ms. Roe for violating the no contact rr order until after resolved Ms. Roe's sexual harassment claim against Plaintiff. it (Id. At that point, Ms. Roe had graduated and AU declined to SI 229. ) fully investigate the matter, (Id. SI 237. ) Plaintiff challenges this reasoning arguing that AU's Student Misconduct policy extends to conduct awarded. ff that is N\ A not discovered until after w f/ allegations retaliation. action. Plaintiff degree is (Id. SI 238. ) Plaintiff states he and his wife divorced this a and he ceased (Id. SI 51.) attending seven University due to On August 31, 2018, Plaintiff brought (See generally Compl.) raises the due to the false federal claims seven state law claims (Counts 8-34). 4 In his Amended Complaint, (Counts 1-7) and twenty- For the foregoing reasons. the Court dismisses Plaintiff's federal claims^ and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. II. Under must LEGAL STANDARD Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint \\ contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief \\ fair notice // ir so that the defendant has Bell of both the claim and the supporting grounds. Atl. Corp. V. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). If Although "detailed factual allegations w are not required, Rule 8 demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed- me accusation. // Ashcroft V. Iqbal, (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) Furthermore, a plaintiff's pleading obligation "requires more than labels and conclusions. and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. ff Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. \\ To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted a complaint as true,® t n 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. \\ 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). to Iqbal, A claim has 5 Plaintiff originally brought a Title VI claim but asserts no such count in his amended complaint. (Compare Compl., 21 269-270 with Am. Compl.) ® The court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences the plaintiff. n therefrom in the light most favorable to Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. \\ 2006) (citation omitted). Conclusory allegations, however, are not entitled to an assumption of truth — legal conclusions must be supported by factual allegations. n Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709-10 (11th Cir. 2010). 5 facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. // Id. the that The court may not reasonably infer the defendant is liable when the well\\ pleaded facts misconduct. n fail to show more than the mere possibility of Id. at 679; see Butler v. Sheriff of Palm Beach Cty., 685 F.3d 1261, 1265 (11th Cir. 2012) ("[FJactual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.") III. DISCUSSION'^ The Court has original jurisdiction over the federal claims in this 28 case. U.S.C. § 1331. As such, the Court begins by addressing the federal claims. A. Count I: Title IX Sex Discrimination Plaintiff alleges that Defendants BOR, Reed, Thurman, Wear, Woods, Sprouse,5 and Hardison^° are under discrimination the liable under Title IX for sex following theories: selective enforcement, deliberate indifference, and erroneous outcome. (Am. ' Although the Amended Complaint maintains many traits of a shotgun pleading, the Court addresses the motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint as best it can. ® The Court uses the spelling of Defendant Wear's name within the caption of (Am. Compl. , at 1; see also Def. Wear's Executed Waiver the Amended Complaint. of Service, Doc. 12. ) ^ Defendant Sprouse is the Interim Vice President for Audit, Compliance, Ethics and Risk Management and the Chief Audit Officer. (Am. Compl. , at 1. ) Defendant Hardison is the Enterprise Privacy Manager and Compliance Analyst. (Am. Compl. , at 1. ) 6 \\ Title IX states: Compl., gi 269. ) No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program // assistance[] . . or activity 20 U.S.C. receiving § 1681 (a). Federal financial Plaintiff's claim under each theory fails as a matter of law. Although neither the Supreme Court nor the Eleventh Circuit have adopted the selective enforcement test for university disciplinary proceedings, see Doe v. Valencia Coll., 903 F.3d 1220, 1236, 1236 n.l3 (11th Cir. 2018), the Court finds that, assuming its adoption, it would fail as \\ selective enforcement claim. a matter Plaintiff of law. must allege To state a sufficient facts to permit the plausible inference that a 'similarly-situated member of the opposite sex was treated more favorably than the t // plaintiff due to his or her gender. Doe V. Rollins Coll., 352 F. Supp. 3d 1205, 1211 (M.D. Fla. 2019) (quoting Doe v. Cummins, 662 F. App'x 437, 452 (6th Cir. 2016); Mallory v. Ohio Univ., 76 F. App'x 634, 641 (6th Cir. 2003)) . Plaintiff brings his selective enforcement claim on his complaint that Jane Roe's violation of the no-contact order was not fully investigated in contrast to Jane Roe's sexual harassment complaint. For the reasons discussed in Section III(E), infra, Plaintiff fails to show how his offered comparator, Ms. Roe, was similarly situated in this situation and how any differential treatment was based on Plaintiff's sex. 7 A deliberate indifference claim under Title IX requires the \\ plaintiff to show the Title IX funding recipient was indifferent to sexual harassment, of which [it] deliberately had actual knowledge, that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school. 526 Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 629, 650 (1999) . ff U.S. The Court swiftly dismisses this claim because Plaintiff does not claim he was the victim of sexual harassment. Lastly, claim under the erroneous outcome theory. erroneous 1236, Title the Court quickly deals with Plaintiff's Even if we assume the outcome test applies, see Valencia Coll., n wrongly found to have committed an offense. 903 F.3d innocent the test requires Plaintiff to show he was Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 715 (2d-Cir. 1994). IX Yusuf V. at and Vassar Plaintiff, however, was exonerated; thus, not found to have committed an offense. B. Count II: Retaliation Under Title IX Courts analyze retaliation claims under Title IX the same as those 788 under F. Title VII. Kocsis V. Fla. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., App'x 680, 686, 686 n.4 (11th Cir. 2019). As such, student makes a retaliation claim under Title IX by showing W a (1) that []he engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) that []he suffered an adverse action; and (3) that there is some causal rr relationship between the two events. Id. at 686 (citation W omitted). An individual engages in protected expression when []he opposes practices made unlawful by the relevant statute (the opposition "11 clause). . Id. (citing Clover v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1999)). The only reported instances identifies in support of this claim 12 of Plaintiff opposition that (1) he reported to are Defendant Woods that he believed he was being investigated unfairly in response to Ms. Roe's sexual harassment claim, and (2) he told Mr. Rush he believed his counterclaim was being treated differently than Ms. Roe's. (7\m. Compl., ^ 271.) Plaintiff states the alleged adverse to of \\ action Defendant rationale. Woods If his first returned (Id.) a claim finding discrimination of no bias that without a The alleged adverse action to his second claim n \\ of discrimination was was Mr. Rush telling him to sue (Id.) us. Plaintiff offers no allegation that he conveyed his belief that his sex generated unfair treatment. Nevertheless, neither allegedly adverse action establishes a prima facie case of sex discrimination. or harm // to The adverse action element requires the be would . . . 'dissuade[] materially a adverse. reasonable meaning individual from injury that it making or 11 Protected conduct can also include "participat[ing] in any manner in an investigation under the relevant statute (the participation clause)." Kocsis, 788 F. App'x at 686. Plaintiff declines to allege his participation in a Title IX investigation was the cause of any alleged discrimination; thus, there is no basis for employing the participation clause. [R]efusing to get a medical statement" and raising a counterclaim against Ms. Roe are not actions opposing discrimination. (Am. Compl., 3 271.) 12 9 r n Kocsis, 788 F. App'x at supporting a charge of discrimination. 686 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)); see also Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 974 (11th Cir. 2008). The causation element requires showing the university decision makers knew about his protected conduct and that conduct was not wholly unrelated to the adverse action. Bowers v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 509 F. App'x 906, 911 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Shannon v. BellSouth Telecomms. , Inc., 292 F.3d 712, 716 (11th Cir. 2002)). Defendant Woods finding Plaintiff's investigators were not biased is not materially adverse nor was it caused by Plaintiff's First, speech. after investigating Ms. Roe's claim Plaintiff, Plaintiff was ultimately found innocent. against Second, the investigation and alleged bias began prior to any alleged protected speech by Plaintiff; thus, precluding any Plaintiff's speech caused investigation bias. F. Supp. 3d of S. Fla. Bd. of Trs., conclusion that Cf. Garrett v. Univ. , 2020 WL 1433059, at *14-15 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 24, 2020) (discussing how the initiation of an investigation in retaliation for opposition could potentially constitute a materially adverse action). Likewise, Plaintiff's investigated properly counterclaim prior to was Plaintiff's allegedly not being alleged protected speech; thus, could not have been caused by Plaintiff's speech. Being told to N\ n sue us is also not a sufficient harm or injury to 10 Plaintiff as required by the statute. Stores, Inc., No. 3412170, at *8 (S.D. retaliation adverse claim, investigate her 18-81588-CIV-ROSENBERG/REINHART, 2019 WL in Title VII Fla. May 31, 2019) (finding. the employment Cf. Carey v. O'Reilly Auto. plaintiff-employee action when complaint of the adequately employer's sexual harassment showed an to failure lead to the piaintiff-employees' discharge). As stated in Defendants' motion, being // charge of sexual harassment Roe brought that sexual Supp. Original Defs. ' Mot. to No Defendant brought the false charge Dismiss, Doc. 30-1, at 10.) of charged with a false is materially harmful, however, Ms. (Br. charge. \\ Plaintiff's claim of retaliation fails as harassment. a matter of law. C. Counts III and IV: Section 1985 Conspiracy Against Rights and Failure to Prevent Conspiracy Plaintiff Defendants BOR, a raises Reed, 42 U.S.C. Woods Thurman, § 1985 and claim Sprouse asserting conspired to interfere with his civil rights (Count III) and a 42 U.S.C. § 1986 claim that conspiracy Defendants (Count IV). BOR and (Am. Sprouse Compl., failed to 272-73.) potentially applicable subsection of Section 1985 is prevent The a only subsection (3), which provides a claim for conspiring to deprive a person of \\ rights or privileges. Section 1985(3) requires: (1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly. 11 any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right // or privilege of a citizen of the United States. Denney v. City of Albany, 247 F.3d 1172, 1190 (11th Cir. 2001). \\ First, a corporation's employees, acting as agents of the corporation, are deemed incapable of conspiring among themselves // or with the corporation, v. Alachua Cty. Comm'n, 200 Dickerson \\ F.3d 761, 767 (11th Cir. 2000), because the organization and its // employees are treated as a single legal actor. Pep't of Agric., 754 Nassar v. F. App'x 903, 907 (11th Cir. 2018). doctrine applies to governmental entities. Fla. This Dickerson, 200 F.3d at 767 (citing Chambliss v. Foote, 562 F.2d 1015 (5th Cir. 1977)). As such. Defendant BOR and its employees cannot conspire as a matter of law. Second, for reasons contained within this Order, Plaintiff's other civil rights claims fail on the merits. has not been \\ deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, fails. Denney, Plaintiff['s] conspiracy As such. Plaintiff n and Plaintiff's conspiracy claim necessarily 247 F.3d substantive claim fails as at claims 1190 ("Having fail well . . on /r the see concluded merits, also that their Twomey v. Tuscaloosa Cty, No. 7: 18-cv-01653-TMP, 2019 WL 2325945, at *5 (N.D. 12 Ala. May 31, 2019) ("To plead a conspiracy under Section 1985 brought pursuant to Section 1983[,] a plaintiff must show that the defendants denied him a constitutional right and that the // defendants agreed to deny the plaintiff's rights. ). For fails. the foregoing reasons. Plaintiff's conspiracy claim Consequently, Plaintiff's failure to prevent a conspiracy claim must also fail. D. Count V: Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Violation Plaintiff also brings procedural and substantive due process claims. (Am. Compl., SI 27 4.) 1. Procedural Due Process Procedural due process is a guarantee whereby the state may not deprive a person of life, liberty, providing appropriate procedural safeguards. 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). or property without Daniels v. Williams, Plaintiff's procedural due process claim fails on its face because Plaintiff was not deprived of any life. liberty, or property interest. harassment, provided Plaintiff's a complaint Plaintiff was accused of sexual hearing. and liberally. exonerated. any claimed // harm — "apart from some more tangible interests Construing reputation is not a protected liberty interest within the meaning of the due process clause. ff Smith ex rel. Smith v. Siegelman, 322 F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)); see also Cotton v. Jackson, 216 F.3d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 2000) 13 ("We have said although that damage to reputation, standing alone, does not provide a basis for an action under . . . [Section] 1983 — when reputational damage is sustained in connection with a termination of employment. it may give rise to a procedural due process claim for deprivation of liberty which is actionable under [Sjection 1983.") Additionally, process claim Plaintiff that he was cannot sustain deprived of his a procedural life, due or liberty, property interest when the school refused to charge and discipline Plaintiff Jane Roe for violating the no-contact order. shown, and the Court is unable to see, how Plaintiff has not has a cognizable liberty interest in another student being disciplined. 2. Substantive Due Process \\ To establish a substantive due process claim. must show that Locka, 261 Amendment's F.3d \\ of a federal right by a he . . . 'was deprived person acting under color of state law. Due 1295, 1303 Process (11th Clause a plaintiff r ft Cir. Griffin v. City of Qpa2001). protects those The Fourteenth rights that are 'fundamental,' that is, rights that are 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Cir. 1994) r It (quoting McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1556 (11th Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)) . Plaintiff does not specify the fundamental right Defendants violated. Because Plaintiff later 14 voluntarily dropped out of school, the Court generously construes his claim as being that his right to continued enrollment at a public university was infringed. W As a matter of law, however, this claim fails because students at a public university do not have a fundamental right to continued enrollment. others, /r Valencia Coll., 903 F.3d at 1235-36 (citing, among Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. district court's decision that the 202, 221 (affirming (1982)) plaintiff failed to state a substantive due process claim by arguing his right to continued W enrollment was violated when the school acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner during his disciplinary proceedings"). E. Count VI : Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause Violation Plaintiff claims Defendant BOR discriminated against him based on his sex in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection § 1; 42 (Am. Compl., SI 275); U.S. Const, amend. XIV, Clause. U.S.C. Plaintiff's § 1983. argument is that he did not Equal receive the Protection same treatment as n Roe in the charge of sexual harassment against him. SI 275. ) \\ [T]he Equal Protection Clause Clause (Am. Compl., requires n Jane government entities to treat similarly situated people alike. Campbell v. Rainbow City, 434 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2006). A violation of the Equal Protection Clause is not just that defendants treated a plaintiff differently than other persons; it requires that the differential treatment \\ was motivated 15 by an intent to discriminate. // Elston V. Talladega Cty. Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1406 (11th Cir. 1993); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987). For a plaintiff to show intentional discrimination, courts employ the same legal analysis used in Title VII disparate treatment claims. Lewis V. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213, 1220 n.5 (11th Cir. 2019). Under Title VII's framework, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by, in part, showing how similarly-situated students rr outside the protected class [were treated] more favorably. V. Chattahoochee Tech. Coll., No. 1:05-CV-1454-JOF, Brown 2006 WL 2583688, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 5, 2006); see also Santos v. Hutto, No. 2:09-CV-135-TMH [WO], 2009 WL 1405518, *1 (M.D. Ala. May 19, 2000) (citing Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944, 947 (11th Cir. 2001)) (stating that to make out an equal protection clause claim a plaintiff must, at the very least, allege that he is similarly situated with other persons who were treated differently and that the reason for constitutionally recently the protected clarified N\ comparators to be differential the treatment interest"). The similarly-situated was based Eleventh standard on a Circuit requires n similarly situated in all material respects. Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1218. Leniently construing Plaintiff's Complaint, the Court finds Plaintiff references three occasions of discrimination: (1) When the individuals investigating Ms. Roe's sexual harassment claim 16 (2) When his bias claim was, as seemed to favor Ms. Roe over him; alleged, not properly investigated; (3) When his complaint that For Jane Roe violated the no-contact order was not investigated. each however, Ms. situation. Plaintiff, and Plaintiff Roe is not similarly situated to fails to allege the differential treatment was based on Plaintiff's sex. For differential treatment during the investigation of the sexual harassment claim. Plaintiff fails to show Plaintiff and Ms. To state the obvious, Jane Roe was Roe were similarly situated. The facts that "Jane the accuser and Plaintiff was the accused. Roe was allowed to make false statements during the hearing \\ Defendant Thurman and Reed ff hearing favoring Jane Roe gave false statements // during and the (Am. Compl., f 275), fail to support an Equal Protection Clause claim because there is no evidence of different treatment of similarly situated individuals. Regarding other Plaintiff's individual who bias brought claim. a bias Plaintiff claim. points Thus, to no Plaintiff altogether fails to name a comparator here, and the Court has no evidence by which to find Plaintiff was discriminated against throughout the course of the investigation of his bias complaint. Lastly, Plaintiff seems to argue he was discriminated against when his complaint that received insufficient Jane Roe violated investigation complaint of sexual harassment. the compared no-contact order to Jane Roe's Plaintiff, again, however, fails 17 to show Jane Roe was situated comparator \\ similarly situated misconduct) as A him. similarly will have engaged in the same basic conduct II (or to the 918 Lewis, plaintiff. F.3d Plaintiff First, the complaints themselves differed. at 1227. offers no legal support for finding students who file any type of complaint are automatically similarly Original Defs.' Mot. to Jane Roe decline had to already pursue situated. Dismiss, graduated, the (See PI.'s Resp. Doc. 37, at 7, 17.13) which lead Even complaint. the if Opp'n Second, university that to reasoning potentially misaligns with Augusta University's policy, it shows that the parties were not similarly situated. Ultimately, if Ms. Roe can be considered a comparator here. Plaintiff fails to allege the differential treatment was on account of his sex. Conclusory assertions concerning bias and discriminatory intent are insufficient to establish gender bias at the pleading stage. . . . Rather, plaintiffs must allege facts that support a plausible inference of bias and causation — for instance "statements by members of the disciplinary tribunal, university officials, or statements patterns of by pertinent decision-making // that also tend to show the influence of gender. Rollins Coll., 352 F. Supp. 3d at 1209 (quoting Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715) (footnote omitted) (finding the plaintiff met his burden to plead sex bias by pointing to, among accusations that the university other things, additional investigator was The Court cites to the PDF page numbers as supplied by CM/ECF. 18 biased). Plaintiff points to no alleged facts that tend to show Plaintiff's sex motivated any defendants' action. As such, Plaintiff's Equal Protection Clause claim fails as a matter of law. F. Count VII: Section 1983 Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause Violation Plaintiff raises a Fifth Amendment claim because \\ Defendant Reed stated that not responding to the investigation report against him meant that she would go by whatever was written against him within it. ft \\ person . . . shall witness The Fifth Amendment states, (Am. Compl., f 276.) against be compelled himself. ft in U.S. any Const, criminal amend. proceedings were initiated against Plaintiff. no right against self-incrimination. case V. No to be No a criminal Thus, Plaintiff had See Baxter v. Palmigiano, \\ 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976) (stating that the Fifth Amendment does not preclude [an adverse] inference where the privilege is claimed by a party to a [cjivil cause"). G. State Law Claims In addition to the federal claims. Plaintiff asserts numerous state law claims. With no surviving federal claims, the current action's posture implicates 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if . . . the district court has dismissed all // claims over which it has original jurisdiction. \\ Id. § 1367 (b) (3) . [I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated 19 before trial, the balance of factors to be [supplemental] doctrine j urisdiction under the considered judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity — will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction Carnegie-Mellon For that over Univ. reason, remaining Cohill, v. the the Eleventh 484 U.S. Circuit state-law 343, 350 claims. n.7 encourage[s] n (1988). district courts to dismiss any remaining state claims when, as here, the n federal claims have been dismissed prior to Raney trial. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1089 (11th Cir. 2004). the foregoing, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims. v. Based on supplemental Accordingly, the state law claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the motions to dismiss (Docs. 38) are GRANTED. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's federal claims are DISMISSED. jurisdiction over 30, his The Court declines to exercise supplemental state law claims. and those claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 4L ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, ^4'day of August, 2020. / I J. RANDAL HALL, C EF JUDGE UNITED/STATES DISTRICT COURT .--..SOUTHERN 20 DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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